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Abstract 
This research explored why certain stigmatized and marginalized groups such as the 
Gypsies are dehumanized by being considered less than human. Twelve studies 
conducted in Britain and Romania (six in each country) explored what might 
predispose an ethnic minority to being dehumanized, and what functions 
dehumanization might serve in the context of inter-ethnic relations. Firstly, focus 
groups interviews probed how the human-animal binary as well as anthropocentrism 
can inform theories of dehumanization. It indicated that rational autonomy 
differentiates humans from animals, while sentience makes them similar, and that the 
motives underlying the ideology of speciesism may underpin dehumanization, too. 
Secondly, questionnaire surveys measured on a 7-point scale the human typicality of 
twelve emotions and twenty traits that were used in the operationalization of 
dehumanization in the present research. Some emotions and traits were rated as more 
typically human than others, and their human typicality ratings were not significantly 
correlated to their animal typicality ratings, suggesting that what is typically human is 
not necessarily un-typically animal. Thus, dehumanization was measured through the 
lesser association of typically human attributes with the out-group than with the in-
group. Three vignette experiments employing artificial out-groups revealed that while 
the target out-groups were overall dehumanized, the out-groups culturally different 
from the in-group, as well as the poor ones, were more dehumanized than the 
culturally similar out-groups and the rich ones, respectively. Concerning real groups, 
a pilot study indicated that the Gypsies and the Germans were perceived as 
threatening and non-threatening and as low-status and high-status groups, 
respectively. A questionnaire survey and a vignette experiment revealed that the 
Gypsies were dehumanized, but that the Germans were not, in both countries. Overall, 
the results indicate that dehumanization is not an automatic in-group bias, and that it 
may be shaped by ideologies that place poor low-status and marginalized people at the 
boundaries of the category . human' . 
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Overview 
Chapter 1: Overview 
"Fighting Japs is not like fighting normal human beings .... We are not dealing 
with humans as we know them. We are dealing with something primitive. Our 
troops have the right view of the Japs. They regard them as vermin." 
-Sir Thomas A. Blarney, World War II commander of the Allied land 
forces in New Guinea, New York Times, January 9, 1943 
1 
Overview 
Contents of Chapter 1 
1.1 Aims of the present research ............................................................................... 3 
1.2 Theoretical background and methodological considerations .............................. 3 
1.3 Overview of the present research ........................................................................ 6 
2 
Overview 
1.1 Aims of the present research 
Some groups of people can be perceived in certain circumstances as being 
unlike most humans. Their humanness can be denied in a variety of ways: they may 
be viewed as deviants from the human norm, or may be portrayed as primitive and 
therefore as uncivilized and anti-social. Alternatively, they may be associated with 
animal-like attributes, in particular with animals that conjure images of dirt and 
induce feelings of fear, disgust, and contempt. Such denial of humanness to certain 
groups or individuals is an expression of extreme prejudice, which has been termed 
dehumanization. The present research is concerned with the antecedents, moderators, 
and functions of dehumanization in inter-group relations in the context of culturally 
diverse societies. The questions addressed here are whether only certain groups are 
dehumanized, whether dehumanization is an expression of in-group favouritism, and 
whether dehumanization is driven by motivations related to in-group identification, 
social dominance orientation, or endorsement of multicultural ideology. The present 
research was conducted in Romania and Britain, taking into account the perceived 
relative status of the in-group, and the influence of relative economic development, 
immigration history, and multicultural ideology on dehumanization. Last but not least, 
the present research is also concerned with how dehumanization may be best 
operationalized, and examines why the human-animal paradigm has been implicitly 
adopted in research on dehumanization. 
1.2 Theoretical background and methodological considerations 
There are two main theoretical perspectives within which most of the existing 
work on dehumanization has been conducted, namely the theories of 
infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) (e.g. Leyens, Paladino, 
Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000) and 
ontologization (dehumanization through traits) (e.g. Perez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001). 
The infrahumanization researchers focus on the in-group and postulate that people 
have an intrinsic motivation to reserve the human essence to their in-group, and to 
deny it to out-groups. .They. view infrahumanization as a 'lesser form of 
dehumanization' which is contingent on in-group favouritism. By contrast, In 
ontologization research the focus is on the out-group and on the conditions that 
predispose ethnic minorities to being dehumanized and socially excluded by the 
ethnic majority. Ontologization researchers have suggested that when a group is 
3 
Overview 
perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the in-group, it is attributed 
a different, and less-than-human essence, that explains its failure to be 'converted'. 
These theories of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and 
ontologization (dehumanization through traits), with their different interpretations and 
operationalizations of dehumanization, will be at the core of the present research. 
The present research was also informed by the conceptualization of 
dehumanization as pseudospeciation (Erikson, 1970; 1985), i.e. as a form of self-
idealization at the group level which creates "a false sense of unique identity in 
groups and ignores the genetic integrity of the human species" (Erikson, 1985: 213). 
This conceptualization of dehumanization shows that infrahumanization and 
pseudospeciation are very similar insofar as they locate the cause of dehumanization 
in the individuals' motivation to view their in-group as more human than other 
groups. At the same time, the present research drew on the conceptualization of 
dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice (Tajfel, 1981), taking into account 
potential ideological factors and legitimizing myths that justify the inhumane 
treatment of out-groups. In this sense, dehumanization is a form of moral 
disengagement (Bandura, 1975; 1996; 1999), of moral exclusion (Staub, 1989; 
Opotow, 1990), and of delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990). The conceptualization 
of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice that serves to delegitimize and 
exclude certain groups shares many assumptions with the thesis of ontologization, to 
the extent that the dehumanization is not a form of in-group bias, but rather serves 
specific functions in specific contexts. 
The present research was also concerned with the ways in which 
dehumanization can be operationalized and measured in empirical (but not 
exclusively quantitative) research. The choice of operationalization depends largely 
on how 'humanness' and 'de-humanization' are conceptualized. As the quote cited at 
the beginning of the chapter illustrated, one can dehumanize by considering the target 
deviant from the human norm, by viewing it as primitive, by associating it with 
animal-like attributes, or even by using all of the above strategies simultaneously. The 
multiplicity of dehumanizing strategies suggests that one can invoke various 
dimensions of humanness which can be denied in the target of dehumanization. 
Consequently, there does not exist a single, unique way to operationalize 
4 
Overview 
dehumanization, as diverse aspects of humanness can be used as criteria, and as 
various opposites of 'human' such as humans vs. animals, or humans vs. machines 
can be employed. 
However, most of the researchers on dehumanization, and in particular those 
working on infrahumanization and ontologization, have implicitly relied on the 
human-animal binary to operationalize dehumanization. In this sense, the in-group is 
expected to be associated with human-like attributes, while the dehumanized out-
group is expected to be ascribed more animal-like than human-like attributes, and less 
human-like attributes than the in-group. Thus, one measures dehumanizatin through 
the differential attribution of humanness to in-group and out-group, the in-group often 
acting as a control or reference group. Furthermore, it is not enough to operationalize 
dehumanization in terms of humans vs. animals, one also needs to specify which 
dimensions of the human-animal binary are to be used. In this sense, the 
infrahumanization researchers have employed the distinction between primary and 
secondary emotions, where primary emotions are assumed to be common to animals 
and humans, e.g. fear, while secondary emotions are presumed to be uniquely human, 
e.g. nostalgia. Given that the in-group is associated with secondary emotions to a 
greater measure than the out-group, one can conclude that the out-group is 
infrahumanized (dehumanized). Rather similarly, the researchers working on 
ontologization have adopted the human-animal binary and have operationalized 
dehumanization in terms of human-like attributes, e.g. creative, and animal-like 
attributes, e.g. dirty. By being associated more with animal-like than human-like 
characteristics, the out-group is dehumanized. 
Most research on dehumanization has adopted quantitative approaches, in 
particular the research on infrahumanization, which has often employed implicit 
measures such as IA T (e.g. Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), with qualitative 
approaches being rarely used (but see Tileaga, 2005; 2006). Researchers' choice of 
methodology in the field of dehumanization seems to have been largely informed by 
the particular epistemological positions they embrace, but also by their specific 
conceptualizations of dehumanization and their research hypotheses. For example, the 
conceptualization of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) as an in-
group bias that occurs implicitly and automatically has lead to the use of IA T methods 
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(e.g. Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, Gaunt, & Demoulin, 
2002; Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007). By contrast, the focus on the 
legitimizations for the moral exclusion of dehumanized groups such as the Gypsy 
minority has lead to discourse analytic approaches (Tileaga, 2005; 2006). 
In the present research the human-animal binary was adopted as the basis for 
dehumanization, and the operationalization by means of emotions and traits, in line 
with previous research. However, it departed from a strict categorical 
operationalization such as animal vs. human traits, and employed instead a continuous 
measure of how typically human the target emotions and traits were. Thus, in the 
present research dehumanization was measured through the differential attribution of 
human typicality to in-group and out-group. The present research was not driven by 
adherence to anyone specific epistemology: both qualitative and quantitative studies 
were used to inform the process of dehumanization. However, most of the present 
research consisted of experiments which were designed to test specific hypotheses 
concerning the antecedents, mediators, and correlates of dehumanization. In total, six 
focus group interviews, six surveys and eight experiments were conducted in Britain 
and Romania. Their results will be summarized in the section below. 
1.3 Overview of the present research 
Chapter 2 
This chapter offers an extensive review of current theories of dehumanization as well 
as a summary of current research on dehumanization in inter-group relations. In 
Chapter 2 I first argue that while the humans vs. animals may be an adequate basis for 
theorizing and operationalizing dehumanization, the current researchers on 
dehumanization have somehow overlooked the ideological influences of 
anthropocentrism on the construction of animals as inferior to humans, as well as the 
potential parallels than can be drawn between speciesism (anthropocentrism) and 
dehumanization. Secondly, I review and critically assess and compare the most 
prominent research paradigms on dehumanization, infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through 
traits). Thirdly, I formulate the research hypotheses of the present research and 
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explain how conducting this research cross-culturally in Romania and Britain can 
inform the process of dehumanization. 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter I examine in greater detail why the current research on dehumanization 
has implicitly adopted the human-animal binary in the operationalization of 
dehumanization, and why animals are often taken for granted as the opposite of 
humans. While other researchers have examined whether animals can be viewed as an 
out-group (PIous, 2003), I do the reverse by exploring whether animals and their 
relationship with humans may serve as a model for the dehumanization of human 
groups. In this chapter I report and analyse six focus group interviews conducted in 
Britain and Romania (three in each country) which were centred on issues pertaining 
to human and animal life, e.g. abortion, animal experimentation, fox hunting. 
Exploring these ethical issues cross-culturally enabled me to take into account the 
influence of postmaterialist values (e.g. Inglehart, 1997) on animals' entitlement to 
rights. Bases on the findings of these studies, I suggest that the drawing of the 
boundary between in-group and dehumanized out-group may vary in line with 
particular ideologies or interests that need to be justified. I also suggest that one can 
extrapolate from speciesism and find motives of exploitation in dehumanization. 
Finally, given that the most excluded animals were the vermin, it may be that 
dehumanization may be a reaction to perceived threat from the out-group. 
Chapter 4 
Based on the existing research on dehumanization, twelve emotions and twenty traits 
were selected to be used as measures of dehumanization in the present research. In 
Chapter 4 I report on four questionnaires surveys (two in each country) in which I 
compared different methods of operationalizing the humanness and animal-ness of the 
target emotions and traits. The first study indicated that the traits and emotions were 
not perceived as either exclusively typical of human or of animals, respectively, but as 
varying in their degree of human typicality. In the second study, I adopted a between-
participants design, and each emotion and trait was measured on a 7-point scale of 
human typicality or animal typicality, respectively. The results indicated that some 
emotions and some traits were more typically human than others, and the human 
typicality ratings were not significantly correlated with the animal typicality ratings. 
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This suggests that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal, in 
line with previous research (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). Only the 
human typicality ratings of the emotions and traits were used in the subsequent 
studies, with dehumanization being measured through the lesser attribution of human 
typicality to the out-group than to the in-group. 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter I report the first series of vignette experiments which explored whether 
cultural differences between the in-group and ethnic minorities as well as the 
minorities poor socio-economic status might predispose them to being dehumanized. I 
also explored the role of perceived threat, be it symbolic or material, in 
dehumanization. In the experiments, artificial ethnic groups were described as either 
culturally similar or as culturally different from the in-group, and as either rich or 
poor. The results indicated that while all the artificial target groups were dehumanized 
(through traits), the poor targets were more dehumanized than the rich ones, in both 
countries. The culturally different targets were more dehumanized (through traits) 
than the culturally similar ones only in Romania, and their dehumanization was 
mediated by the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group. 
Overall, perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization; instead the dehumanization 
of the poor targets mediated the perceived material threat against them, in Britain. The 
symbolic threat scales did not achieve adequate internal reliability in either country. 
The findings suggest that the poor groups and the culturally different ones may be 
more readily seen as deviant from the human norm, and they raise issues regarding 
the measurement of perceived threat. 
Chapter 6 
In this chapter I report on a second series of vignette experiments that aimed to 
replicate and elucidate the findings from the first experiment. A scale of perceived 
cultural differences and a more 'threatening' scale of perceived symbolic threat were 
introduced. The artificial groups and the vignettes describing them remained the 
same, except that the targets' economic status was expressed by means of their 
average income, which was described as either above or below the national average. 
Similarly to the previous experiment, the culturally different groups were more 
dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar ones, in both countries, and 
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the poor targets were more dehumanized (through traits) than the rich ones, but only 
in Britain. Regarding infrahumanization, i.e. the attribution of typically human 
emotions, in Romania only the poor out-groups were infrahumanized, whereas in 
Britain only the culturally different out-groups were infrahumanized. Perceived 
cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the infrahumanization 
of culturally different groups in Britain, and the dehumanization (through traits) of 
culturally different groups in Romania. These findings bring support to suggestions 
that perceived differences at the level of values and beliefs might lead to the 
dehumanization of out-groups (e.g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Neither perceived 
material nor symbolic threat were found to playa part in dehumanization, although in 
Britain the poor groups and the culturally different groups invoked more material 
threat than the other groups, while in Romania endorsement of multicultural ideology 
was the only predictor of both perceived material and symbolic threat. Overall, the 
results suggest that dehumanization is not necessarily a reaction to perceived threat, 
but rather a response to the cultural and economic status of the out-groups, which may 
be interpreted as a rationalization of their economic and cultural status. The findings 
also raise the issue as to whether perceived threat should be best measured as 
combined scale of both material and symbolic items. 
Chapter 7 
Given that in the previous two experiments the two measures of perceived threat, 
material and symbolic, respectively, failed to have an impact on dehumanization, it 
was decided to combine the two types of threats into a single measure. At the same 
time, given that in some cases dehumanization predicted perceived threat, it was 
hypothesised that in the case of real groups perceived threat may in fact be a 
justification for dehumanization rather than an antecedent of it. Therefore I decided to 
contrast the dehumanization of artificial and real groups in order to examine how the 
relationship between perceived threat and dehumanization may differ in the different 
inter-group contexts. Firstly I conducted a preliminary within-participants study in 
each country using twenty-one ethnic minorities and immigrant groups as targets, 
aiming to find the groups that invoked the most and the least threat, respectively, with 
two items assessing material and symbolic threat, respectively. The Gypsies were 
found to be the group posing most symbolic and material threat in each country. The 
Germans were found to be the group invoking the least threat in Romania, while in 
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Britain the Chinese invoked the least material, and the Australians, the least symbolic 
threat. For the sake of comparability, the Germans were chosen as non-threatening 
target group in both countries, and the Gypsies, as the threatening one. The artificial 
groups were described as in the previous experiment. However, given the very high 
correlations between the perceived material and symbolic threat items from the pilot 
study, and the need for equivalent artificial groups, it was decided to describe the 
artificial targets as both rich and culturally similar to the in-group, and as both poor 
and culturally different, respectively. The participants were assigned either to the real 
or artificial group condition, and had either a 'threatening' (culturally different and 
poor) or 'non-threatening' (culturally similar and rich) target out-group. The results 
indicated that in both countries the artificial groups were dehumanized (through 
traits), the threatening ones more than the non-threatening ones, and that only the 
Gypsies were dehumanized, the Germans being attributed equal human typicality as 
the in-group. As for perceived threat, the factor loadings failed to distinguish between 
material and symbolic threat. Perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization, but 
neither did dehumanization mediate perceived threat. Instead, blatant prejudice 
mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania. Overall, the results indicate 
that there are differences between artificial and real groups, as all artificial groups 
were dehumanized but only the Gypsies were. And they also suggest that 
dehumanization does not function as a form of in-group favouritism in the case of real 
groups, and that it may be contingent upon the perceived status of the out-group. 
Chapter 8 
In the final series of experiments I explored whether the perceived power status of the 
out-group and its perceived legitimacy can playa part in its dehumanization. The 
Gypsies and the Germans were retained as target groups, and I devised a vignette that 
assessed the relative power status and legitimacy of each group. Perceived threat from 
the out-group was also retained as a variable because it was expected to influence 
perceptions of legitimacy, and thus the process of dehumanization. But unlike the 
previous three experiments where threat was at the material and symbolic levels, in 
this experiment threat was conceived as threat to the in-group's social identity under 
the form of political pressure on the in-group. The vignette informed the participants 
that a recent EU report had highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) children 
in schools. In the 'Germans' condition, the participants were told that the German 
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Parliament had used the report to persuade the European Commission to propose a 
new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU. Their motive was 
to 'promote the German model of multiculturalism'. In the 'Gypsies' condition, the 
vignette informed the participants that the European Roma Rights Office had used the 
report to propose the same directive. In the threatening condition, this directive was 
supposed to entail spending public money and have some negative consequences, e.g. 
reducing school places available to non-Roma children, whereas the non-threatening 
condition, the participants were informed that if adopted, the directive would not be 
binding, but rather optional, and that it would be unlikely to have negative 
consequences. The results indicated that only the Gypsies were dehumanized (both 
through emotions and traits) in each country. Both the Gypsies and the Germans were 
perceived as less legitimate in the threatening condition. Furthermore, the Gypsies 
were perceived as a lower-status group than the in-group, and lower in status than the 
Germans, in both countries. But while Romanian participants rated the Germans as 
higher in status than the Romanians, the British participants rated the Germans as 
lower in status than their in-group. Given that the British participants did not 
dehumanize the Germans even though they perceived them as lower in status than 
themselves suggests that dehumanization is not a form of in-group favouritism, and 
that the relatively lower-status of the out-group is not always a precondition for 
dehumanization. Overall, the results indicate that a relatively high status protects 
group from being dehumanized, and that dehumanization occurs only in the case of 
certain groups. 
Chapter 9 
In the final chapter I highlight the key findings of the present research and link them 
to the existing research on dehumanization. I argue that humans' relationship with 
animals and the ideology of speciesism can offer a blueprint for the dehumanization 
of human groups. But at the same time I suggest that dehumanization does not need to 
be based on the human-animal binary, but can be operationalized in terms of what is 
typically human or how typically human certain target attributes are. Moreover, I 
argue that traits may offer a better operationalization of dehumanization than 
emotions given the higher consistency in the results using the traits measure. I suggest 
that cultural differences between in-group and out-group, poverty, and perceived 
relative group status can act as antecedents of dehumanization. Nevertheless, given 
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that the artificial target groups were overall dehumanized, I suggest that the 
dehumanization of artificial groups may be based on judgements of human typicality 
and deviation from the norm, where the in-group is taken as the prototype, whereas 
the dehumanization of real groups may draw on other factors such as relative group 
status. I conclude that dehumanization may be an instance of out-group derogation but 
not necessarily one of in-group favouritism, and that studying it cross-culturally can 
reveal its relationship to the in-group's status and to specific power relations. 
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2.1 Introduction to dehumanization 
In 2003, a Hungarian judge decided that two Gypsy men wrongly accused of 
murder should receive less compensation than they had demanded in their wrongful-
arrest suit. The judge argued that the two Gypsy men had "more primitive 
personalities than the average, therefore, the psychological damage they suffered was 
not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested" (Transitions On 
Line, 18-24 November, 2003). Cases like this illustrate dehumanization, the process 
whereby out-group members who suffer discrimination are associated with more 
animal-like attributes, or are perceived as being less than human. The present research 
is concerned with the cognitive underpinnings and the ideological functions of 
dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations. 
Recent research on prejudice and on inter-group relations has shown that 
prejudice against out-groups can be not only evaluative, but also semantic-
anthropological. While evaluative prejudice uses a negative - positive dimension to 
discriminate against out-groups, semantic-anthropologic prejudice employs an 
animal-human continuum to discriminate between in-group and out-group, and 
between different out-groups. This semantic-anthropological prejudice, termed 
dehumanization, associates certain groups, be they ethnic out-groups or other 
stigmatized groups, more with animal-like than with human-like attributes, and deems 
them as less than human. At the same time, this type of prejudice associates the in-
group with more human-like than animal-like attributes, and with more human-like 
attributes than the out-group. Dehumanization is assumed to playa role in inter-group 
relations because it implies considerations of inferiority of hence of status, and 
because it is assumed to underlie process of de legitimization and social exclusion. 
This chapter will review theories of dehumanization, will examine the dimensions 
upon which dehumanization hinges, and will discuss the potential functions of 
dehumanization as well as whether dehumanization is different from other forms of 
prejudice. Finally, this chapter will examine why dehumanization is important to the 
study of inter-group relations, and will explain how the present research will 
contribute to the existing body of research on dehumanization. 
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2.2 Defining dehumanization 
Defining dehumanization is complicated by the existence of different research 
paradigms which have theorized and operationalized dehumanization in rather 
different ways. Moreover, the dehumanization paradigm is complicated by the lack of 
a clear definition of 'humanness', which is what is denied to others when they are 
dehumanized (Haslam, 2006). Largely, dehumanization is a form of prejudice 
involving the denial of human essence to out-group members, or the attribution of a 
less-than-human essence to them (e.g. Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, 
Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000). Dehumanizing others, either at the 
individual or the group level, means viewing them as less than human and perceiving 
them as more similar to animals (or machines) than to humans. Dehumanization is 
assumed to go beyond the negative dimension of prejudice, as out-group members can 
be dehumanized in terms of positive animal attributes (Chulvi & Perez, 2003; Perez, 
Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002), or in terms of highly efficient robots. For example, 
artists are associated more with animals than automata, whereas business people are 
associated more with automata than animals (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). 
Defining dehumanization is also complicated by the fact that it constitutes not 
only a psychological phenomenon, but also a social practice (Tileaga, 2007). Groups 
such as the Gypsies and the poor are dehumanized, but they are also denied equal 
opportunities in health and education, and are marginalized by society, that is, by both 
ordinary people and by societal institutions (see Perez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001; Lott, 
2002). Thus, dehumanization is not a question of metaphor, nor should it be seen 
simply as a matter of social perception, but it should be seen as part and parcel of 
social practices that have negative consequences for the dehumanized groups. To 
dehumanize is not simply to associate out-group members with animal-like attributes, 
or to perceive them as being less than human, but to endorse beliefs or to engage in 
behaviours that maintain the social exclusion of these groups. Otherwise, simply 
perceiving others as being less than human may not be of consequence for inter-group 
relations. Arguably, it would be more accurate to envisage the perceptions of others as 
less than human as a consequence of the social practice of dehumanization rather as 
an antecedent of it. Therefore defining dehumanization should take into account the 
consequences of this phenomenon for inter-group relations, as well as ideologies that 
favour it. Having said this, it may not always be possible to examine dehumanization 
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by observing dehumanizing behaviour or social practices, as one can hold 
dehumanizing views about a particular group without necessarily engaging in 
dehumanizing behaviours towards that group. Equally, the association of out-groups 
with less-than-human attributes is not always tantamount to dehumanization, as for 
example the association of artists with animals (see Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). 
From a methodological perspective, in experimental settings dehumanization is 
inevitably reduced to being an association of less-than-human attributes with the 
targets in question, which arguably cannot take into account issues of ideology or of 
social practice. Nevertheless, it could be argued that studies of dehumanization should 
distinguish between dehumanization as an issue of perception, and dehumanization as 
an ideological representation (see Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Augoustinos & 
Walker, 1998; 1999). 
To illustrate dehumanization in more concrete terms, two research paradigms 
on dehumanization will be briefly mentioned here but we will return to them later (for 
a more detailed description, see section 2.5 of this chapter). One such paradigm, the 
inJrahumanization paradigm, defines infrahumanization as a "lesser form of 
dehumanization" and argues that all groups are bound to infrahumanize all out-groups 
because people have an inherent motivation to reserve the human essence to their own 
group (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & 
Gaunt, 2000; Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & 
Demoulin, 2001; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, Paladino, 
Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, & Vaes, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, 
& Giovanazzi, 2003). Infrahumanization has been operationalized in terms of the 
differential attribution of primary and secondary emotions to in-group and out-group, 
where primary emotions are common to animals and humans, e.g. fear, whereas 
secondary emotions are uniquely human, e.g. nostalgia (Leyens et aI., 2000, 2001, 
2003). It should be stressed here that this attribution of emotions to groups does not 
refer to the emotions that people feel towards those particular groups, but to the 
emotions people think those groups can experience or are more typical of those 
groups' feelings. While the primary emotions are attributed equally to in-group and 
out-group, the secondary (more human) emotions are attributed more to the in-group 
than to the out-groups, hence the infrahumanization of the out-groups. It is argued that 
infrahumanization shows that out-groups are perceived as being less human than the 
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in-group because they are perceived as lacking the ability to feel uniquely human 
emotions in the same measure as the in-group. Infrahumanization is assumed to be a 
general phenomenon, independent of the status of the in-group or of the out-group, 
because all human groups are assumed to be motivated to reserve the human essence 
to their in-group. 
The second main strand of research on dehumanization, the ontologization 
paradigm, has focused on the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority. The 
ontologization paradigm argues that the majority creates a different ontology for those 
social groups which have resisted cultural assimilation for centuries in order to 
explain their resistance. This approach has operationalized dehumanization in terms of 
the differential attribution of animal (or natural) and human (or cultural) attributes to 
the Gypsies, where animal attributes are common to animals and humans, e.g. dirty, 
whereas human attributes are uniquely human, e.g. creative, (Perez, Chulvi and 
Alonso, 2001; Perez, Moscovici and Chulvi, 2002; Chulvi and Perez, 2003). Research 
has shown that the Gypsies are attributed more animal than human attributes, but also 
less human attributes than the in-group (e.g. Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). 
Ontologization is not the same as infrahumanization, because it conceives of 
dehumanization as being a form of prejudice directed at specific groups for specific 
reasons. Perez et al argue that nature and culture act as principles for social 
classification, and that ontologization functions by excluding the ethnic minorities 
from the map of humanity. However, they argue that ontologization does not 
necessarily fall into negative discrimination, because out-groups can be dehumanized 
by being attributed a positive animal essence. 
Another formulation of dehumanization is pseudospeciation (Erikson, 1970; 
1985), which, as the name implies, is the false belief that the in-group is 
prototypically human, and that it is more human than other human groups. Erikson 
stressed the intentional falsity of pseudo speciation, which he defined as a "dominant 
psychosocial and potentially maladaptive process" which creates "a false sense of 
unique identity in groups and ignores the genetic integrity of the human species" 
(1985: 213). In Erikson's view, pseudospeciation "denotes that while man (sic) is one 
species, he appears and continues on the scene split up into groups (from tribes to 
nations, from castes to classes, form religions to ideologies, and professional 
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associations) which provide their members with a firm sense of unique and superior 
human identity - and some sense of immortality" (1985: 214). It is noteworthy here 
that not only ethnicity, but also class, religion, ideology, and even occupation may 
predispose an individual or a group to being dehumanized. Pseudo speciation can be 
reinforced under conditions of war or propaganda, and can make a "group's self-
idealization both more defensive and more exclusive" (Erikson, 1985: 214). 
Theoretically, pseudospeciation bears resemblance to infrahumanization 
because both assume dehumanization to rest on an exaggerated sense of humanity of 
the in-group. But both approaches are different from ontologization which assumes 
that dehumanization occurs in the case of specific out-groups, regardless of the in-
group's sense of its own humanity. Unfortunately, the concept of pseudospeciation 
was never fully developed, nor operationalized by Erikson, therefore the comparisons 
to infrahumanization and ontologization are inevitably speculative. Overall, these 
different formulations of dehumanization raise the question whether dehumanization 
is contingent upon an exacerbated sense of the in-group' s humanity (an 
overhumanization of the in-group as it were), or on particular features of the out-
group, such as their cultural or economic status, or even on an interaction between the 
two. This issue is important because the overhumanization of the in-group may not 
necessarily translate into the dehumanization of the out-group (although this has often 
been inferred in experimental settings, as in the infrahumanization paradigm). 
Overall, the infrahumanization and the ontologization paradigms have focused 
on the dehumanization of ethnic out-groups, but studies have shown that other low-
status or stigmatized groups can be infrahumanized: women (Viki & Abrams, 2003), 
lesbians and gay men (Brown & Hegarty, 2005), the mentally ill (O'Connell, 
unpublished manuscript), and the homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006), to name just a 
few. However, the focus of the present research is on the dehumanization of ethnic 
groups, and therefore those aspects of dehumanization which are relevant to inter-
group prejudice will be at the forefront of the present theoretical review. 
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2.3 Dehumanization and related concepts: depersonalization and deindividuation 
Dehumanization could be seen as somewhat similar to the processes of 
depersonalization and deindividuation. Just as animals or machines do not possess 
personhood or identity, it can be argued that individuals or out-group members who 
are dehumanized are also depersonalized and deindividuated. Dehumanization and 
depersonalization have been theorized as ends of a continuum (Tajfel, 1981) in the 
sense that depersonalization refers to the cognitive aspects of prejudice, whereas 
dehumanization consists of the emotional, motivational, ideological and behavioural 
elements of prejudice (see also Billig, 2002). It may well be that dehumanization 
involves an element of depersonalization, but depersonalization alone may not be a 
sufficient condition for dehumanization. Tajfel (1981) viewed the dehumanization of 
out-groups as "the next stage" after their depersonalization. Dehumanization is not 
mere categorization of out-groups into 'less-than-human', but involves ideological 
factors and legitimizing myths that justify the inhumane treatment of out-groups 
(Tajfel, 1981). Otherwise stated, "merely to be categorized as a member of an out-
group is not sufficient to be considered as being non-human, although, conversely, it 
can be said that an ideology of dehumanization must rest on the distinctions of social 
categorization" (Billig, 2002: 181). 
Dehumanization is a different phenomenon from the depersonalization process 
envisaged by self-categorization theory where the focus is on the self and on the loss 
of individual identity. According to SeT, people depersonalize themselves in the 
process of becoming group members (see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987). Here, depersonalization is seen as inevitable side-effect of group 
formation and not as a negative thing, and refers to a contextual change in the level of 
identity. Similarly, dehumanization is different from deindividuation which, like 
depersonalization, focuses on the self and refers to individuals behaving as group 
members rather than as individuals as in Zimbardo's famous prison experiment (see 
Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Deindividuation is a negative form of 
depersonalization, and is assumed to underlie antisocial collective behaviour such as 
violent crowd behaviour, hooliganism, or lynching mobs (see Diener. 1977; Postmes 
& Spears, 1998). Given that depersonalization and deindividuation focus on the self 
and refer to decreased self-awareness. it cannot be argued that dehumanization is the 
same phenomenon as the other two. Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage that 
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individuals who belong to dehumanized groups may also be depersonalized and 
deindividuated, and that groups which are dehumanized may also be perceived as 
entitative, i.e. perceived as a uniform entity rather than as a collection of individuals 
(see Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). 
2.4 Cognitive and ideological underpinnings of dehumanization 
What is the structure of dehumanizing beliefs? If dehumanizing others means 
denying them full human status, then we need to understand what humanness is and 
what substitutes it during dehumanization. Recent research has suggested that 
humanness can be conceptualized in terms of what makes humans unique and 
different from animals, i.e. uniquely human features, but also in terms of the features 
that are typical of humans and which may be shared with animals, i.e. human nature 
(Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). While the uniquely human features 
such as reason, language, morality, secondary emotions, rest on comparisons between 
humans and animals, the human nature component of humanness is not contingent 
upon comparisons to animals because both humans and animals display instinctive 
behaviours, primary emotions, and other features relating that make humans and 
animals living organisms. Instead, the human nature component is often contrasted 
with machines (Haslam, 2006). Human nature refers to what all humans have in 
common, "those permanent and universal capacities, desires and dispositions that all 
human beings share by virtue of belonging to a common species" (Parekh, 2000: 115). 
Human nature traits have been found to comprise cognitive flexibility, warmth, and 
emotions responsiveness, whereas uniquely human traits refer to self-control, 
morality, intelligence, openness, and sociality (Haslam et aI., 2005; Haslam, 2006). 
The human nature traits were found to be relatively emotional, desirable, prevalent, 
and universal, whereas the uniquely human traits were judged as relatively infrequent 
and culturally specific (Haslam et aI., 2005). The uniquely human characteristics may 
represent human essence in a sortal sense, grounded in dimensions such as religion, 
language, or culture, whereas the human nature traits may represent human essence in 
a natural kind sense, based on biological or natural dimensions. However, while 
Haslam et ai. argue that the uniquely human and the human nature dimensions are 
independent of each other, it could be argued that uniquely human features such as 
morality, sociability or culture may be viewed as part of human nature because no 
human individual or group exists without them. Admittedly, cultures are acquired, but 
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humans cannot exist outside culture or outside a human community, because they are 
"culturally embedded in the sense that they are born into, raised in and deeply shaped 
by their cultural communities", as Parekh points out (2000: 120). Therefore, it may be 
difficult to separate human nature from human uniqueness, especially as these aspects 
can be disputed in discourse where their construction may be contingent upon various 
rhetoric purposes. For example, in-group members may argue that having culture is in 
their group's nature, while at the same time arguing that the dehumanized out-group is 
inherently averse to culture. 
What constitutes human nature and human uniqueness, however subjectively 
constructed, can help understand the structure of dehumanizing beliefs. Haslam et al. 
(2005) have shown that only human nature traits are conceptualized in an essentialist 
manner, and have consequently argued that if dehumanization rests on the denial of 
human essence to the out-group, as envisaged by the infrahumanization paradigm, 
then dehumanization must take place at the level of human nature. And as human 
nature traits represent what is typically human, it could be argued that dehumanization 
consists of a denial of human typicality, although Haslam et al. (2005) concede that 
other forms of dehumanization involving human uniqueness can also occur (see 
Haslam, 2006). However, this makes it unclear whether dehumanization involves 
essentializing beliefs or not, an issue which remains unsolved to date in the 
dehumanization research. 
While the conceptualization of humanness seems to rely on human nature and 
human uniqueness, these two dimensions are in tum underlain by various binaries, 
such as human vs. animal, human vs. machine, human vs. less-than-human, culture 
vs. nature, civilization vs. savagery. For example, human uniqueness may be based on 
the human-animal dichotomy, while human nature may be based on the human-
machine contrast (Haslam, 2006), and even on the human-God comparison as in those 
instances where human weakness needs to be explained. These various binaries can 
underpin the process of dehumanization and have been employed to different degrees 
by researchers on dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). These structures are cognitive, for 
they provide the building blocks of the dehumanizing beliefs, but ideological at the 
same time, because their use can perform specific ideological functions in specific 
contexts and in relationship to specific groups. For example, equating an ethnic 
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minority group such as Australian Aborigines to primitive savages may serve to 
justify their social exclusion (Buchan & Heath, 2006), whereas comparing an out-
group to machines may serve to portray them as emotionally inert (Haslam, 2006). At 
the same time, the human vs. animal and the civilization vs. savagery binaries may be 
used in inter-ethnic group prejudice, but they may not be appropriate for the 
dehumanization of other stigmatized groups, such as the physically or mentally 
disabled, where the human-machine binaries may be more useful, or the 
dehumanization of sexual minorities where the human vs. less-than-human may be 
more adequate. 
Also, in inter-group relations, these different binaries can reflect the different 
status of out-groups: low-status groups may be dehumanized along the human-animal 
dimension (e.g. the Gypsies), whereas high-status groups may be dehumanized along 
the human-machine dimension (e.g. the Americans, which may be perceived as highly 
efficient but as lacking warmth). Arguably, there may be similarities between the use 
of these different binaries and Glick & Fiske's (1996; 2001) stereotype content model. 
According to this model, stereotypes about groups vary according to perceptions of 
competence and warmth in the out-groups, which lead to four different types of 
stereotypes: paternalistic, where the out-group is viewed as incompetent but warm; 
envious, where the out-groups is stereotyped as competent but cold; admirative, where 
the out-group is both competent and warm; and contemptuous, where the out-group is 
viewed as incompetent and cold. One could argue that the human-animal binary 
underlies paternalistic and contemptuous prejudice, whereas the human-machine 
dichotomy underlies envious prejudice. 
All the binaries mentioned above might relate to dehumanization to various 
extents, and given their different connotations they may perform different ideological 
functions and may be appropriate to different degrees to the study of inter-group 
prejudice. Therefore these binaries will be briefly examined here to understand how 
dehumanization may work and what functions it may fulfil in inter-group relations. 
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2.4.1 Culture vs. nature, and civilization vs. savagery 
Binaries such as culture vs. nature and civilization vs. savagery are very 
similar to each other and will be analyzed here together. They indicate that the 
dehumanized groups are perceived as savages lacking culture (or possessing a 
primitive culture) and as being closer to nature than to civilization. The ontologization 
paradigm, for example, is built on these binaries (although it also employs the human-
animal dichotomy). Largely, culture is "that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man (sic) as a member of society" (Tylor, 1958:1). Culture is also a set of 
"explicit and implicit patterns, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including the 
embodiment in artefacts" (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952: 181). Culture, in the sense of 
civilization, denotes human progress, "an achieved condition of refinement and order" 
(Williams, 1988: 58), "intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development" (Williams, 
1988: 90). Importantly, culture "begins at the point at which humans surpass whatever 
is simply given in their natural inheritance, and implies "the cultivation of the natural 
world" as well as "the ability of human beings to construct and to build, and the 
ability to use language" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999: 1 02, original emphasis). Nature, 
on the other hand, is "that which is opposed to, prior to, or simply outside human 
society and culture (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999: 256, original emphasis). It follows that 
if nature is outside society and culture, out-groups associated with nature may be 
perceived or may be ideologically constructed as outside society, hence their social 
exclusion. As Edgar & Sedgwick point out, "if nature is opposed to human society, 
then it can either be because nature is seen to be superior to society, or because it is 
inferior" (1999: 256). Arguably, the construction of the other as 'noble savages' or as 
'uncouth primitives' suggests dehumanization in both cases, but the former also 
involves a positive connotation, whereas the latter, a negative one. 
At another level, culture is "a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which 
a groups of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and 
collective lives" (Parekh, 2000: 143). Cultural values can playa role in inter-group 
prejudice (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993) and have been found to be at the core of 
perceived symbolic threat (e.g. Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000). The theory of belief congruence (Rokeach, 1960; 1968) can be 
23 
Chapter 2 Dehumanization: A theoretical overview 
relevant in this respect: one's culture provides a frame of reference, and any different 
culture from one's own may be judged, subjectively, according to its similarity and 
compatibility with one's native culture. Research has found that perceived 
dissimilarity between groups in terms of the hierarchy of basic values can lead to 
perceived inhumanity of the out-group (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In particular, 
perceived trait inhumanity and perceived value dissimilarity mediated the effect of 
perceived conflict on aggression. Thus, the cultural beliefs, values and norms of 
behaviour can be considered to reflect a group's humanity, and in this case 
dehumanization involves a negative evaluation of the out-group's cultural practices. 
How might the civilization vs. savagery binary underlie dehumanizing beliefs? 
Civilization has often been contrasted with savagery or barbarism (Williams, 1988), 
and it generally refers to social order, refinement, and knowledge. At the same time, 
the concept of primitive has been considered the polar opposite of a variety of 
concepts, including Western, civilized, advanced, prosperous, modern, and although 
its use has greatly changed in recent times, it nonetheless carries negative 
connotations (Berndt, 1968). Similarly, human has often been contrasted with savage 
or barbarian (see for example Jahoda, 1992; 1999; Montagu, 1968). Historically, the 
'domesticated man' ('l'homme domestique') and the 'wild man' ('l'homme sauvage') 
have been conceptualized as the ends of a continuum of humanness, where the 
domesticated man is assumed to possess intellectual, social, technical and scientific 
powers, whereas the wild man is presumed to lack science, religion, logic, is more 
inclined to mythical and magic thinking and to observing 'narrow-minded' social 
practices (Moscovici, 1979, my translation). The former incarnates the superior model 
of reason, culture and refinement, the 'civilized' man par excellence, while the latter 
is represented by the primitive, the peasant, the nomad, or the stranger. Moscovici 
(1979) argues that this continuum of humanness serves to define the relationships 
between human groups as it establishes and legitimizes a social hierarchy, and 
whichever group views itself as the epitome of humanness then feels compelled to 
'domesticate' the other groups. However, it is not clear whether such thinking is 
universal or idiosyncratic to Western cultures, although Moscovici (1979) suggests 
that it was linked to Western cultures' need to justify their exploitation of non-
Europeans (cf. Jahoda, 1992; 1999). 
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The contrast between civilization and savagery provides clues to the ancients 
roots of modem prejudices in Western cultures (Jahoda, 1999), and arguably has had 
repercussions in contemporary debates about multiculturalism and the assumed clash 
of cultures. A historical examination of the construction of what it means to be human 
shows that this has been used in the past as a tool to dominate and exploit the peoples 
living in the European colonies in the 17th , 18th, and 19th centuries. Therefore one 
could argue that humanness is not merely a point of philosophical debate, but also an 
issue relating to scientific and political practices, where the dehumanization of the 
'other' can serve power interests and legitimizing ideologies (Jahoda, 1992; 1999). 
The peoples the colonizers came into contact with, e.g. North American Indians, 
African tribes, Australian Aborigines, were perceived as savages due to their apparent 
lack of economic and scientific progress. It could be argued that these peoples were 
indeed less developed economically and scientifically than their European 
counterparts, but their lack of economic and scientific development could have been 
explained through other factors such as lack of domesticated animals and crops, 
environmental conditions, or climate (see Diamond, 1997). Or it could be argued that 
they were equally developed if 'development' includes models that sustain the 
ecosystem. At the same time, even when the newly-encountered peoples were 
economically and scientifically developed, e.g. the Maya, the Inca, this did not 
prevent the European occupiers from abusing and subjugating them, and from failing 
to recognize their contributions to science. One could perhaps argue that the 
dehumanization of the colonized 'other' stemmed from a fundamental attribution 
error (see Ross, 1977), whereby their less developed economies were explained in 
terms of a dispositional nature (i.e. a less-than-human essence) instead of situational 
factors. The indigenous populations were often viewed, or rather ideologically 
constructed, as being driven only by instinct, lacking rationality and the assumingly 
essential human and universal propensity for cultural progress. But the Enlightenment 
standards of economic development and scientific progress were often used as 
yardsticks of civilization and implicitly of humanness, and served to exclude from the 
realm of humanity those groups appearing to be lacking in them (Larrain, 1994). 
Historically, sciences such as anatomy or linguistics were pervaded by racist 
views such as poiygenism, the belief that white Europeans, the peoples of Africa and 
the peoples of Asia were different human species (lahoda, 1999), a belief which bears 
25 
Chapter 2 Dehumanization: A theoretical overview 
a family resemblance to pseudospeciation and ontologization. In line with the ethos of 
the time, the peoples of the colonized territories were viewed as simple-minded, 
stupid, weak, and brutal savages, and were assumed to lack internal autonomy, 
intelligence and adequate impulse control. These scientific doctrines about the 
presumed animality of the colonized "savages" seem to have acted as both 
rationalizations of these groups' status and as justifications for European colonialism: 
by denying their humanity, it became possible to justify and to legitimize their 
exploitation and slavery. For example, polygenism was used to justify slavery in 19th 
century USA (see Gould, 1981), which suggests that dehumanization is selectively 
invoked to justify existing social arrangements. Similarly, the colonialization of 
Australia was made possible through the portrayal of Aborigines as savages living in a 
pre-civilized state (Buchan & Heath, 2006). That the Aborigines were dehumanized is 
quite evident in the social policies directed at their forceful 'emancipation', such as 
the removal of Aboriginal children from their families in order for them to become 
'civilized' through White upbringing. Buchan & Heath argue that 'savagery' and 
'civilization' were discursive constructions that justified "the appropriation of 
Indigenous land through the non-recognition of Indigenous social forms, modes of 
governance and relationships to land" (2006: 6). 
While it may be possible to envisage how dehumanization might take place at 
the level of culture, dehumanization may not involve a total denial of culture in the 
'other', because all human groups have culture regardless of their economic 
development. If culture is used as a criterion for dehumanizing groups, it would be 
more appropriate to envisage dehumanization as a devaluation of the out-groups' 
culture, i.e. considering their culture 'primitive' or inferior, rather than as an all-or-
nothing phenomenon. It could be argued that to dehumanize out-groups on the basis 
of their culture may involve elements of cultural essentialism or determinism, in the 
sense that culture is naturalized and the out-group members are seen as inexorably 
constrained by their cultural heritance (see Parekh, 2000; Eagleton, 2000). Those 
immigrants, for example, who endorse different cultural practices from those of the 
host society can be seen as deviants and can be abnormalized by host society 
members (Verkuyten, 2001), their abnormalization stemming from the immigrants' 
presumed violation of what is culturally normal. Culture can be essentialized by both 
host society and minority group members (Verkuyten, 2003), albeit for different 
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political purposes, and this demonstrates that essentialization can take place at the 
level of "uniquely human" features, contrary to Haslam et aI. 's claims (2005) that 
essentialization takes place only at the level of "human nature" features. This 
discrimination on the basis of cultural norms ("culturalism", as Eagleton, 2000, might 
put it) makes dehumanization resemble the 'new racism' or the 'racism of difference' 
(see Barker, 1981; Taguieff, 1987; Hopkins et aI., 1997), and also the 'symbolic 
racism' (Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003), where the focus of prejudice shifts from 
race to culture. This is perhaps due to the contemporary norms of prejudice 
suppression (see Crandall, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). Thus, dehumanization at the level of culture may provide a new 
form for an old bigotry, and a more subtle one at the same time (see also Perez, 
Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001). 
2.4.2 Human vs. animal, and human vs. less-than-human 
The human-animal binary has figured in the construction of humanness and of 
dehumanizing beliefs (Haslam, 2006), and underlies the paradigms of 
infrahumanization and ontologization. In both paradigms, the operationalization of 
dehumanization, i.e. primary vs. secondary emotions, and animals vs. human 
attributes, respectively, has relied on the contrast between humans and animals. 
Animals are presumed to be unable to experience secondary emotions such as pride or 
nostalgia, and traits such as creative or competent cannot be applied to them. Humans 
resemble animals in terms of their 'nature', but differ from them in terms of their 
human uniqueness (Haslam et aI., 2005; Haslam, 2006). That is not to say that human 
nature and animal nature are the same, but that certain elements such as survival 
instinct, sleeping, eating, and reproduction are common to both, and distinguish both 
humans and animals from machines. 
But how exactly is the human-animal boundary drawn? And how can 
anthropomorphism as well as anthropocentrism be avoided in the attempts to define 
what animal nature is? Defining humanness in contrast to animality is not only a 
scientific but also an ideological exercise because "the relationship between humans 
and animals is not a given. There is no line on the map that allows us to define the 
boundary between Man and Beast. We have to draw that line oursel yes, according to 
our needs and perspectives" (Malik, 2000: 205). And although the drawing of this line 
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can be shaped by "our understanding about what it means to be human" (Malik, 2000: 
205), it can also be shaped by humans' needs for using animals for food, clothing, or 
scientific experimentation. 
One way to define what humans are in contrast to animals is to examine the 
rights they enjoy and the dimensions that underlie them. Human rights rest on 
cognitive and non-cognitive criteria: the cognitive criterion is rational autonomy, and 
the non-cognitive one, sentience (Regan, 1997). It can be noticed here that sentience 
is an element of human nature, while rational autonomy is a uniquely human feature. 
The rational autonomy criterion holds that humans are rational autonomous agents 
and therefore are entitled to rights. Indeed, the first article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that "all human beings ( ... ) are endowed with 
reason and conscience". But Regan (1997) remarks that rights are given to humans 
who are not rational autonomous agents, such as infants or the severely mentally 
disabled, while they are refused to certain animals such as primates who have more 
rational autonomy than some brain-damaged humans. Arguably, the criterion of 
rational autonomy is applied inconsistently to animals and humans. As Garner notes, 
"the attempt to distinguish between humans and animals on the grounds of mental 
capacity falls down when it is considered that some, so-called 'marginal', humans do 
not have the mental capacity, and therefore moral worth, of other 'normal' humans" 
(2003b: 238). It thus becomes clear that rational autonomy is not so much an objective 
as an ideological criterion for distinguishing between humans and animals, and that 
the line demarcating animals from humans is bound to be disputed. Since animals are 
assumed not to have rational autonomy, they are also considered not to be moral 
agents, and this provides another reason for denying them rights (see Cohen, 1997). 
The other, non-cognitive, criterion holds that humans are sentient beings, i.e. 
capable of feeling pain and pleasure, and that rights therefore should be granted to 
them in order to protect them from suffering. As the article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights stipulates, "no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". However, despite animals 
being sentient beings, too, humans' anthropocentric attitudes prevent animals from 
being granted such rights (Regan, 1997). To be sure, organizations such as the 
28 
Chapter 2 Dehumanization: A theoretical overview 
RSPCA or PET A I show that there are attempts to protect animals from pain and 
suffering, but one could argue that they are a drop in the ocean compared to the 
thousands of animals caged and killed by the food industry. Generally, more 
'humane' treatment of animals is reserved to pets, through what Billig (1985) might 
call particularization and categorization: pets are particularized animals, humanized 
by their owners, while the animals reared for food production are depersonalized, 
faceless exemplars of the larger category 'animals'. Pets and farm animals are 
arguably a good example of the 'waxing and waning' of speciesism, and they 
somewhat show that being an animal does not necessarily lead to dehumanization. 
Certain animals such as dogs and cats can be anthropomorphized and 'humanized', 
and it could be argued that dehumanization may be not so much an issue of real 
essence, as an issue of interests and needs. 
Animals are denied rights, and in consequence they are often excluded from 
the scope of justice (Opotow, 1993), and are less morally considerable than humans 
(Gamer, 2003a; 2003b). To understand animals' exclusion from the scope of justice, 
we need to examine humans' anthropocentric attitudes. These are pervaded by the 
ideology of speciesism (Ryder, 1971; Singer, 1990), which is a lived ideology in the 
sense that it permeates many aspects of human individual life and of social 
organization. Humans' attitudes to animals' capacities for rational autonomy and 
sentience are more often than not contradictory: depending on humans' interests and 
animals' utility to them, animals are either anthropomorphized, such as one's pets, or 
dehumanized, such as pests, their anthropomorphization sometimes depending on 
their utility to humans (Opotow, 1993). But just like humans, animals have interest to 
stay alive, enjoy freedom of movement, and be free from pain and exploitation. 
Drawing on Bentham's principle of moral equality, Singer (1990) argues that the 
equality of animal and human rights should not rest on equality of characteristics and 
abilities, but on "the moral principle of equal consideration of interests" (p. 237), for 
"if a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering 
into consideration" (p. 8). Singer argues that "the capacity for suffering and 
enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all" (1990: 7), and that it is 
iRSPCA stands for the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals (in UK), and PET A 
for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (in US). 
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speciesist to believe that human life is sacrosanct and that only humans are morally 
entitled to rights and protection from harm and suffering. 
As an ideology, speciesism contains elements such as "a well-systematised set 
of categories which provide a 'frame' for the belief, perception and conduct of a body 
of individuals" (Eagleton, 1991: 43). In this case, the body of individuals whose 
actions are so framed is 'humans' themselves. Speciesism is legitimized by a host of 
beliefs which come both from science and religion. In Christian thought, for example, 
humans are considered to be at the centre of God's creation and animals are viewed as 
being given to humans in order to serve their needs. In science, there is a certain 
'reverse anthropomorphism', in the sense that animals are experimented on in order to 
inform human physiology and behaviour (Rollin, 2000). However, while science 
extrapolates from animals to humans on the basis of their similarity, animals are not 
considered similar enough to humans to prevent experiments from taking place, 
although nowadays animal experimentation does take place within strict guidelines 
which limit the amount of pain and discomfort for experimental animals. 
Like other ideologies that justify hierarchy and exploitation, specleslsm IS 
accompanied by representations of what one might call false consciousness in 
animals, i.e. an internalization of their inferiority. Of course, it is very unlikely that 
animals can experience false consciousness, but, nevertheless, humans often portray 
them as enjoying their exploitation, and farm animals depicted in mass media or 
children's books as happily working for the benefit of humans are not difficult to 
locate (Singer, 1990). For example, food packaging such as the Laughing Cow can 
mask the exploitation and pain that comes with intensive animal farming in consumer 
societies. As PIous notes, "animals are often described as benefiting from being used, 
as being content with their lot, as being insensitive to pain, unintelligent, unaware, or 
wanting to be used" (2003: 510). Similarly, writers on National Hunt horse racing in 
the UK routinely balance coverage of equine fatalities in races with claims about 
steeplechasing being within thoroughbreds' nature and a source of satisfaction to them 
(see Montgomery, 2006). It could be argued that such representations of false 
consciousness in animals function as a form of system-justification (see Jost and 
Banaji, 1994) in the sense that they naturalize and legitimize humans' exploitation of 
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animals (see also Gamer, 2003), but they also ease humans' conscience and reduce 
cognitive dissonance (PIous, 2003). 
Animals and their relationship to humans can inform the dehumanization 
paradigm at two levels. The first one is operational and concerns the 
operationalization of dehumanization in psychological research, be it quantitative or 
qualitative, in the sense that the dimensions that underlie the differences and 
similarities between humans and animals such as rational autonomy, sentience, but 
also morality, cognition, sociality (see Haslam et aI., 2005) may also serve to define 
the boundaries between in-group and the dehumanized out-group. If either emotions 
or traits are used as target characteristics to describe the out-group, their choice or 
their connotations of humanness may be informed by the dimensions mentioned 
above (see also chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the operationalization of 
dehumanization in empirical research). At the same time, when conducting pilot 
studies on animal emotions or traits, one should be aware of how anthropomorphism 
might shape the drawing of the human-animal boundary and the attributions of animal 
cognition and sentience (see Eddy & Gallup, 1993). Given that anthropomorphism 
may underlie the ratings of human or animal typicality, pilot studies should consider 
the type of animals used as a target, and also whether 'animal nature' or 'human 
nature' may be measured through different and less direct means than traits and 
emotions. For example, similarities and differences between animals and humans may 
be constructed in terms of what animals are capable of doing, what rights they should 
enjoy and why, what position they should hold in society, etc. Alternatively, to avoid 
interference from anthropomorphism, pilot studies may want to explore human nature, 
or human typicality in a non-comparative sense, leaving aside the comparisons to 
animals. While there may not be a definite solution to the problem of 
anthropomorphism, in future studies researchers might want to use designs that can 
reduce its impact (an issue to which we will return in Chapter 4 on the 
operationalization of dehumanization in empirical research). At the same time, given 
the possible influence of postmaterialist values on attitudes towards animals, one 
might wish to explore dehumanization cross-culturally, or to examine how vegetarians 
and non-vegetarians within the same culture may construct the human-animal binary. 
31 
Chapter 2 Dehumanization: A theoretical overview 
Secondly, animals' relationship with humans can inform dehumanization at an 
ideological level, and here exploring the discrimination of animals can be useful , 
because "the very act of 'treating humans like animals' would lose its meaning if 
animals were treated well" (PIous, 2003: 510). As we have seen above, humans' 
relationship with animals has often been one of domination and exploitation, and of 
exclusion from the scope of justice. Speciesism demonstrates that there is prejudice 
against animals, although it has been disputed whether speciesism is equivalent to 
sexism or racism, the argument against being that "people are capable of suffering in 
many ways that animals are not" (PIous, 2003: 510). Nevertheless, one could argue 
that there are many 'psychologically meaningful' parallels between speciesism and 
the dehumanization of out-groups, such as "power, privilege, dominance, control, 
entitlement, and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance when committing harmful 
acts" (PIous, 2003: 510). Witness the use of African Americans and Gypsies as slaves, 
or the forceful removal of Australian Aborigine children from their parents in an 
attempt to 'civilize' them, the exhibition of 'exotic' people from Africa (e.g. the 
Hottentot Venus), or the scientific experimentation on prisoners in Nazi concentration 
camps. To be sure, these practices belong to the past, although there are contemporary 
forms of human slavery such as human trafficking and sex slavery, and it should not 
be surprising if the victims are dehumanized both by the perpetrators and by society at 
large. Both speciesism and dehumanization may serve system justification goals, 
because in both cases people are motivated to "balance their desire to be fair with 
their desire to maintain an inequitable status quo (regardless of whether the out-group 
is human or another species)" (PIous, 2003: 512). Justifications of the sometimes 
cruel use of animals can involve considerations of sentience, namely to "deny that 
animals feel pain in the same way that humans do" (PIous, 2003: 519), but also of 
rationality: "another common way people reduce conflict over their use of animals is 
to acknowledge that animals feel pain, but to deny that animals are intelligent or self-
aware" (PIous, 2003: 521). Thus, it could be argued that the dehumanization of out-
group members, too, may involve denials of sentience and of rationality, which we 
may find reflected in the secondary emotions, or in the cultural traits. Another 
ideological parallel between speciesism and dehumanization regards false 
consciousness: just as representations of false consciousness in animals reduce 
cognitive dissonance and bolster their exploitation, so the dehumanization of certain 
groups may be accompanied by representations of false consciousness in them. 
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Moreover, it may be possible that groups which have been historically dehumanized 
may experience false consciousness themselves, as it has been suggested with regard 
to the Gypsy minority (see Barany, 1998). Thus, studies of dehumanization may want 
to take into account the perspective of the dehumanized groups themselves, and 
explore whether dehumanization leads to false consciousness, in-group derogation 
and out-group favouritism. 
While animals are ideologically constructed as essentially inferior to humans 
and are used to "show people their origin, and therefore their pre-rational, pre-
management, pre-cultural essence" (Haraway, 1991 : 11), in many instances 
arguments of similarity between the two categories are brought up to explain or justify 
humans' behaviour, such as group aggression, competition, gender-based divisions of 
labour, or even genocide, often fulfilling system-justifying functions. Witness for 
example Darwin's misunderstood and misquoted notion of 'survival of the fittest' 
(which is, one might argue, a mainstay of capitalism!), or how 'natural selection' and 
other notions have been turned into 'social Darwinisms' in order to explain and justify 
social arrangements (see Hofstadter, 1955). As Haraway notes, "despite the claims of 
anthropology to be able to understand human beings solely with the concept of 
culture, and of sociology to need nothing but the idea of the human social group, 
animal societies have been extensively employed in rationalization and naturalization 
of the oppressive orders of domination in the human body politic" (1991: 11, 
emphasis added), for example in areas such as the patriarchal division of authority and 
human sexuality. Haraway further argues that "animal groups have been used in 
theories of the evolutionary origin of human beings, of 'mental illness', of the natural 
basis of cultural co-operation and competition, of language and other forms of 
communication, of technology, and especially of the origin and role of human forms 
of sex and the family" (1991: 12). Arguably, animal groups models have been used in 
those psychological theories of human aggression which conceive of out-group 
prejudice as stemming from humans' innate aggressive drive and propensity for in-
group bias, which Tajfel (1969; 1981) criticized as the 'blood-and-guts' models of 
prejudice (see Billig, 2002). Thus, rational autonomy, the crucial element of 
humanness, can sometimes be conveniently overlooked from explanations of human 
behaviours which need to be explained, justified or naturalized. However, this is not 
to say that the humans in question are dehumanized: instead, they are merely 
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portrayed as humans who follow whatever their 'human nature' dictates and are thus 
exonerated from guilt. Similarities to animals can be used to justify human 
consumption of meat, hunting or inter-group aggression. It could therefore be argued 
that constructions of similarities between humans and animals and attributions of 
animal nature do not always results in dehumanization, unless there is a specific, and 
one might add ideological, reason for doing so. For example, negative behaviour on 
the part of out-group members may be seen as a manifestation of their animal or less-
than-human essence, whereas the same negative behaviour on the part of in-group 
members may be explained as an inevitable manifestation of 'human nature'. Thus, it 
could be argued that constructions of 'human nature' may be context-dependent and 
may overlap with constructions of 'animal nature' only if there is a reason for doing 
so, and that these constructions can fulfil system legitimizing functions for both the 
out-group's and the in-group's behaviours or social statuses. 
Besides the human-animal binary, there is also the human vs. less-than-human 
dichotomy which shows that while out-group members are not viewed as savages, nor 
as animals, they are nevertheless viewed as not quite fully human. This binary has 
been at the core of the infrahumanization paradigm, which has argued that 
infrahumanization is a lesser form of dehumanization and does not involve the 
animalization of out-group members, only a denial of their humanity. Arguably, the 
human vs. less-than-human dichotomy rests on the conceptualization of humanness as 
having 'fuzzy' boundaries, and as representing what is typically human, as Haslam et 
al. (2005) proposed. But what is typically human is not necessarily conceptualized in 
a comparative sense to animals, although it may involve a comparison to machines, as 
Haslam (2006) later suggested. Thus, conceptualizing out-group members as being 
less-than-human may indicate conceptualizing them as less typically human, and these 
beliefs may be present in the dehumanization of sexual minorities, people with 
learning difficulties, the mentally ill, or the physically disabled. It could perhaps be 
argued that while the human vs. animal binary is rather categorical, the human vs. 
less-than-human binary is rather continuous and it therefore may be more subtle and 
more appropriate for the study of ethnic prejudice, given the current norms of 
prejudice suppression. The human vs. less-than-human binary might have advantages 
over the human-animal binary in the operationalization of dehumanization of ethnic 
out-groups, because one cannot deny that ethnic out-group members lack language or 
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rationality. Nonetheless, one could shape the human vs. less-than-human comparison 
along dimensions such as morality, sentience, or self-awareness, where the 
dehumanization of out-group members may involve beliefs about lack of morality or 
sociability. Another advantage of the human vs. less-than-human binary is that it is 
less likely to be influenced by anthropomorphism. 
2.4.3 Humans vs. machines 
While most research on dehumanization has used the human-animal paradigm 
as the basis of the conceptualization and operationalization of dehumanization, it is 
possible to envisage dehumanization in terms of the human-machine binary. This has 
been termed the mechanistic form of dehumanization, and is assumed to involve the 
denial of human nature features, which comprise sentience, cognitive flexibility, 
agency, and depth (Haslam, 2006). Through mechanistic dehumanization the out-
group members are associated with inertness, coldness, rigidity, passivity, and 
superficiality (Haslam, 2006). Research has shown that automata are associated more 
with uniquely human traits and with social categories such as businesspeople, whereas 
animals are associated more with human nature traits and with social categories such 
as artists (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). However, it could be argued that machines 
also lack uniquely human features such as morality and sociability, therefore 
dehumanizing beliefs in terms of machine-like attributes might rest on both human 
nature, and uniquely human dimensions. Within this binary, the opposite of humans 
can be computers, robots, cyborgs, androids, humanoids, etc., which can vary from 
one another to the extent that they are hybrids of machines and organisms, with some 
having higher cognitive capabilities than others. 
Is the human-machine binary as appropriate for the study of dehumanization 
as the human-animal one? The latter may seem more relevant to inter-group relations, 
because depicting the out-groups as animals or as brutal savages can play an 
ideological role in justifying their exploitation or discrimination (see lahoda, 1999; 
Buchan & Heath, 2006). Arguably, the human-machine boundary is not as dilemmatic 
as the human-animal one, because machines do not have interests to stay alive, to be 
free from pain, and to reproduce, therefore interfering with them or exploiting them 
does not pose the same moral dilemmas. Animals can be harmed by humans whereas 
machines cannot. therefore comparing out-groups to machines does not carry the 
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same moral or ideological implications as comparing them to animals. While social 
psychologists have noted that animals constitute an out-group for humans (see PIous. 
2003), it is not entirely clear whether machines are an out-group, too. 
Secondly, it could be argued that the human-machine binary may be restricted 
to those cultures or societies where machines endowed with artificial intelligence (e.g. 
computers, robots) are commonly used and where references to machines are a 
cultural practice. Given that dehumanization as a psychological and ideological 
phenomenon is not necessarily restricted to industrialized societies, one may find it 
difficult to explore mechanistic dehumanization in less technologically advanced. 
agrarian societies. Thirdly, the human-machine binary may miss out the alleged 
essence of dehumanized groups. As Haslam et al. (2005) have found, only human 
nature traits are essentialized, and human nature traits have not been found to be 
associated with machines (see Haslam, 2006; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Machines 
do not reproduce among themselves as animals and 'savages' do, nor do they transmit 
their 'primitive' cultural values to their children, therefore it may be difficult to 
envisage machines as having an essence in the same way that animals or 'primitive' 
groups may be assumed to have. Consequently, dehumanizing certain out-groups in 
terms of machine-like characteristics may not capture the assumed essentialization of 
the out-groups. 
Fourthly, dehumanization is not mere metaphor, but also social practice, as 
Tileaga (2007) points out, and it remains to be seen whether the mechanistic form of 
dehumanization underpins social exclusion to the same extent as the animalistic one. 
Businesspeople may be associated more with automata than with animals, as 
Loughnan & Haslam (2007) suggest, but it remains to be seen whether this 
association translates into dehumanization, prejudice and social exclusion. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that one can dehumanize without engaging in social 
exclusion, and that a mechanistic dehumanization may occur precisely in those 
situations where social exclusion is not at stake. For example, soldiers defending the 
country may be dehumanized in terms of 'killing machines' which follow orders and 
behave like automata, but their dehumanization may serve a palliative function (e.g. 
cognitive distancing from their deaths) rather than a social exclusionist one. By 
contrast, enemy soldiers can be seen both as killing machines and as barbarians or as 
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animals, which will justify their moral exclusion and killing, as this American 
commander from Second World War illustrates: "fighting Japs is not like fighting 
nonnal human beings ( ... ). We are dealing with something primitive. Our troops ( ... ) 
regard them as vennin" (Okamura, 2003). Thus, mechanistic and animalistic 
dehumanizations may be applied to different targets and may fulfil different functions, 
and future research may want to address this issue. 
Regarding the operationalization of dehumanization in tenns of the human-
machine paradigm, this may be slightly more difficult than operationalizing it in terms 
of the human-animal binary. As we have seen, within the human-animal binary, 
dehumanization has been operationalized by means of emotions or traits which can be 
rated in tenns of their animal and human typicality, or in terms of their animal or 
human uniqueness. This is possible because one can envisage animals experiencing 
emotions, be they only primary, or possessing certain traits, e.g. wild, affectionate. 
Computers, too, have been found to be anthropomorphised and to be attributed human 
personality traits such as friendly, intelligent, trustworthy, persuasive and competent 
(Nass & Moon, 2000). However, infrahumanization may not be possible if the human-
machine binary were to be used because machines cannot experience emotions. 
Secondly, as in the case of animals, where the type of animal, e.g. mammals vs. 
insects, might influence the ratings of human typicality or uniqueness of the target 
emotions or traits, the type of machine might influence what kind of emotions or traits 
people attribute to them. It has been found for example that the more a robot looks 
and behaves like a human, the more positively people respond to it. However, if the 
robots are very realistic and resemble humans very much, people start finding them 
repulsive. This has been tenned the "uncanny valley" hypothesis (Mori, 1970), and 
holds that if robots are mostly unlike humans, then people focus on their similarities 
to humans, whereas if they are too human-like, then people focus on their 
dissimilarities from humans. Thus, when operationalizing dehumanization in terms of 
the human-machine binary in empirical research, one might think about what should 
be the optimal level of the machine's similarity to humans in order to elicit the best 
response from the participants. Equally, one might use the appearance of robots as a 
moderating factor in the drawing of the human-machine boundary. 
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2.5 Current main research paradigms on dehumanization: infrahumanization 
and ontologization 
How might the various binaries reviewed above be applied to dehumanization 
in inter-group contexts? In recent years, two research paradigms, infrahumanization 
and ontologization, have focused on the process of dehumanization in inter-group 
relations. The infrahumanization paradigm has made use of the human vs. animal and 
the human vs. less-than-human binaries, whereas the ontologization paradigm has 
focused on the human vs. animal dichotomy. These paradigms will be examined in 
tum. 
2.5.1 The infrahumanization paradigm 
One research paradigm on dehumanization is infrahumanization, which has 
focused on the perceptions of human emotions in the in-group and out-groups 
(Ley ens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 
2000). Infrahumanization is argued to stem from an essentialistic view of social 
groups, and from in-group bias (Leyens et aI., 2000, 2003; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, 
Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004). The infrahumanization paradigm builds on studies of 
subjective essentialism and on the assumption that people tend to attribute various 
essences to social categories (see Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and argues that people 
have an intrinsic motivation to reserve the human essence to their in-group. While the 
infrahumanization paradigm does not make fully explicit what the 'human essence' is, 
it illustrates it through 'uniquely human' features such as intelligence, language, 
morality, and secondary emotions (i.e. emotions which can only be experienced by 
humans, such as nostalgia). Infrahumanization is assumed to be a 'lesser form of 
dehumanization', hence its name, and the infrahumanization paradigm argues that 
when out-group members are infrahumanized they are not necessarily associated with 
animal-like attributes, but are rather viewed as being 'less-than-human'. 
Infrahumanization, the phenomenon of attributing more humanity to the in-
group than to the out-group, has been operationalized in terms of the attribution of 
secondary emotions to in-group and out-group. The infrahumanization paradigm 
distinguishes between primary emotions which can be experienced by both animals 
and humans, such as/ear, disgust, surprise, anger, and secondary emotions which can 
be experienced only by humans, such as shame, pride, nostalgia, guilt. These 
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emotions do not represent the in-group members' emotional reaction to out-group 
members; instead, they represent the emotions that in-group members think the out-
group members can experience, or the emotions that are typical of the out-group 
members' feelings. In other words, are the out-group members able to feel uniquely 
human emotions such as admiration or regret? The same process applies to the 
emotions attributed to in-group members. The infrahumanization paradigm postulates 
that primary emotions should be equally attributed to the in-group and the out-group 
because both groups are assumed to experience them, as both animals and humans can 
experience them. However, secondary emotions should be attributed to a greater 
extent to the in-group than to the out-group, because they are more human than 
primary emotions, and because the in-group should reserve the 'human essence' to 
itself. This is where the infrahumanization phenomenon is supposed to occur: in the 
significantly greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-
group. Researchers further assume that by denying out-groups these essential human 
emotions, dehumanizing treatment is justified (Leyens, Desert, Croizet & Darcis, 
2002; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, Paladino, Rodriguez-Perez, 
Rodriguez-Torres & Vaes, 2003). 
While the infrahumanization paradigm acknowledges that secondary emotions 
are not necessarily the 'essence' of human essence, as it were, they have chosen to 
focus on them because other aspects of human essence have already been researched 
in inter-group relations. As they put it, "because there is ample research 
demonstrating that individuals discriminate on the basis of intelligence, language, and 
sociability, we concentrated our attention on the emotional side of the human essence" 
(Leyens et aI., 2000: 188). The infrahumanization paradigm offers a combination of 
two binaries in dehumanization: while infrahumanization phenomenon itself denotes a 
lesser humanity of the out-group members, the operationalization of the phenomenon 
has its roots in the human-animal binary. Given the emotional side of 
infrahumanization, although it does not relate to emotional reactions per se, one can 
argue that the operationalization of this phenomenon cannot involve the human-
machine binary because machines cannot experience emotions and cannot be used as 
a model for infrahumanization. 
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Most research on infrahumanization has found that out-groups are indeed 
attributed less secondary emotions than the in-group, in line with the theory. For 
example, Peninsular Spanish people and Canarians infrahumanized each other 
(Leyens et aI., 2001). However, in some cases infrahumanization does not occur, such 
as when the out-group is not relevant to the in-group (see Cortes, Demoulin, 
Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, & Leyens, 2005), thus suggesting that relevance 
of the out-group may be a mediating factor in infrahumanization. Status and conflict 
have been argued not to playa part in infrahumanization (Leyens et aI., 2002, 
Demoulin, Leyens, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, Paladino, & Fiske, 2005). 
However, some research suggests that status may be a mediating factor, because when 
in-group and out-group are of equal status (e.g. French and Germans) there is no 
differential attribution of secondary emotions, (Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, 
Castano, & Leyens, unpublished manuscript). When in-group and out-group are of 
equal status, research has noticed an over-attribution of primary emotions to the out-
group (Rohmann et aI., unpublished manuscript), although this is not an indicator of 
infrahumanization as infrahumanization can only be inferred through the greater 
attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. Other 
research has found that lower-status groups such as Romanians do not infrahumanize 
out-groups (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Conflict between in-group and out-group 
has been argued to be irrelevant for infrahumanization, because infrahumanization is 
assumed to be driven mainly by people's need to identify with their in-group, and this 
identification may involve a comparison with the out-group at the level of the human 
essence, which triggers the process of infrahumanization (Leyens et aI., 2001; 2003). 
At the theoretical level, there are certain points in the infrahumanization 
paradigm that deserve closer inspection. Firstly, the paradigm has argued that all 
groups, regardless of their status, are prone to infrahumanize all out-groups because of 
an inherent motivation to attribute the human essence exclusively to the in-group. 
Furthermore, the paradigm has postulated that infrahumanization is implicit and that it 
occurs 'subconsciously' (and research using the IAT method has supported this 
argument, e.g. Paladino et aI., 2002). It could be argued that this formulation of 
infrahumanization resembles a 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice, as Tajfel (1969; 
1981) might have put it, and just like any 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice it 
arguably runs the risk of overlooking the deliberate aspects of infrahumanization as 
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well as the ideological functions that it might perform in particular contexts (see 
Billig, 2002). By overlooking the 'waxing-and-waning' aspects of prejudice that 
Tajfel (1981) highlighted in his criticism of the instinctivist theories of prejudice, the 
infrahumanization paradigm may fail to explain why and when infrahumanization 
occurs. Although infrahumanization researchers have admitted that it is unlikely that 
all out-groups are infrahumanized (see Leyens et aI., 2003), they have failed to 
specify the exact conditions when infrahumanization does occur, its mediators and 
moderators. As it has been formulated, the infrahumanization paradigm tends to 
overlook the cognitive and deliberate aspects of infrahumanization, as well as social 
constructionist accounts of prejudice (see for example Billig, 1985; 1991; 2002; 
Hopkins et aI., 1997). The overlooking of the ideological and deliberate aspects of 
infrahumanization is arguably also evident in the language used to describe the 
infrahumanization phenomenon: participants 'perceive' the out-group as being less-
than-human, they 'associate' the out-group with less-than-human attributes, or they 
'attribute' a less-than-human essence to the out-group. As Tileaga (2007) has pointed 
out, dehumanization is also social practice, and it would be interesting to know how 
the perception of the out-group as being less-than-human might translate into 
discriminatory social practices against them. 
Secondly, the infrahumanization paradigm has postulated that 
infrahumanization is closely linked to in-group bias, and that infrahumanization 
"integrates both in-group favouritism and out-group derogation" (Leyens et aI., 2002: 
705). However, in-group favouritism is not always tantamount to out-group hate and 
it has been suggested that these two concepts should be treated as two separate 
phenomena (Brewer, 1999). As Allport noted, "hostility toward out-groups helps 
strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required ( ... ) What is alien is regarded 
as somehow inferior, less 'good', but there is not necessarily hostility against it" 
(1954: 42). Infrahumanization researchers agree that in-group favouritism is not the 
same as out-group derogation, and that infrahumanization is not synonymous with in-
group favouritism. They postulate that in-group favouritism should be expressed 
through a preference of positive emotions for the in-group, whereas infrahumanization 
should be expressed through the greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-
group (Demoulin et aI., 2004b). However, given that in some cases negative 
secondary emotions have been rated as more human than the positive secondary ones 
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(Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), the in-
group bias for secondary emotions may be sometimes obscured by their negative 
valence. On a related note, when examining in-group favouritism in inter-group 
prejudice, one should bear in mind the distinction between patriotism and nationalism 
(Billig, 1995), and examine if infrahumanization might be linked differently to the 
two phenomena. Secondly, if in-group favouritism is linked to infrahumanization , 
then one should examine (for example, through a qualitative approach) if the content 
of the in-group identity revolves around beliefs about the humanity of the in-group. 
For example, does the in-group construct its identity as being typically or uniquely 
human? Is the humanity of the in-group identity constructed in opposition to savagery, 
animality, or machinery? As Hopkins notes, "if we wish to understand the relationship 
between national identification and discriminatory action, we should investigate the 
construction, dissemination, and reception of different versions of the nation's 
boundaries, the concept of identity and the nation's relations with others" (2001: 185), 
and the same argument could be made about the relationship between the construction 
of in-group favouritism and infrahumanization. Thirdly, while maintaining that 
infrahumanization is linked to in-group bias, the infrahumanization paradigm holds 
that conflict is not necessary for infrahumanization to occur. However, research has 
shown that when inter-group relations are not based on conflict, in-group bias and 
out-group prejudice are independent of each other (see Brewer, 1999). It could thus be 
argued that if infrahumanization is indeed a form of out-group prejudice, it may not 
necessarily be related to in-group favouritism in the absence of conflict. At the same 
time one might postulate that in the presence of conflict, all groups engage in 
infrahumanization, whereas in the absence of conflict, only high-status groups may 
infrahunlanize. 
Thirdly, infrahumanization has been linked to in-group identification, and it 
has been postulated that "people infrahumanize as a function of their identification 
with their in-group and to the extent that they look for an essential difference between 
their in-group and the out-group" (Leyens et aI., 2003: 712), and that "people who do 
not identify with their group should not feel the need to perceive it as essentially 
superior" (Demoulin et aI., 2004b: 264). Some research has found that while 
identification with the in-group increased the attribution of secondary emotions to the 
in-group, it did not decrease the attribution of secondary emotions to the out-group 
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(Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Paladino et aI., 2002; 
Paladino et aI., 2004). Other studies using a continuous measure of humanity of the 
emotions and looking only at the attribution of emotions to out-groups found that 
"stronger identification [with the in-group] was associated with greater attribution of 
emotion" (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006: 814), but details are lacking on the kind of 
emotions. In the case of equal status groups such as the French and the Germans in-
group identification did not mediate or moderate infrahumanization, nor did 
identification at the common European level (Rohmann et aI., unpublished 
manuscript). Other research has found that conflict moderated the effect of in-group 
identification and hence of infrahumanization, as only high in-group identifiers 
infrahumanized the out-group in a context of conflicting national groups such as the 
British and the Germans (Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-
Torres, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003, unpublished manuscript). Thus, it could be argued 
that in-group identification per se does not translate into attributing fewer secondary 
emotions to the out-group, which suggests that infrahumanization may be, at least in 
some circumstances, an overhumanization or a hyper-humanization (Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006) of the in-group rather than a de-humanization of the out-group 
per se. These empirical findings do not support the claim that "infrahumanization of 
the out-group implies both in-group favouritism and out-group derogation" (Leyens et 
aI., 2003: 712, original emphasis). On a more technical note, it could be argued that a 
proper index of infrahumanization is needed, too, so that in-group identification 
should not be correlated separately with the secondary emotions ascribed to the in-
group and the out-group, respectively, but rather with a relative measure of the two 
(an issue to which we will return later in the next chapters, see Chapter 4 for 
example). 
Fourthly, the infrahumanization paradigm argues that infrahumanization is "a 
lesser form of dehumanization" (see Demoulin, et aI., 2004b). If so, then one might 
expect that infrahumanization should indicate lesser prejudice and have lesser 
consequences for inter-group relations than dehumanization proper, and indeed the 
paradigm has focused on 'everyday' forms of infrahumanization. However, despite 
their claims that infrahumanization is a lesser form of dehumanization, 
infrahumanization researchers have often highlighted the similarity between this 
phenomenon and extreme forms of prejudice such as delegitimization and moral 
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exclusion, and have argued that infrahumanization is similar to the other two except 
that it does not involve extreme behaviours (Leyens et aI., 2000; 2001; 2003). As they 
put it, "although infrahumanization theory clearly relates to the concepts of 
delegitimization and moral exclusion", it refers, in contrast, to "relatively normal 
inter-group situations" (Demoulin et aI., 2004b: 269). But it would appear rather 
incongruous that a lesser form of dehumanization should be nonetheless compared to 
forms of prejudice that refer to conflict and genocide. This formulation of 
infrahumanization as a lesser form of dehumanization is somewhat at odds with 
Tajfel's (1981) conceptualization of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice: 
therefore it may be difficult to imagine infrahumanization as 'a lesser form of an 
extreme form of prejudice', as it were. At the same time, if infrahumanization is a 
lesser form of dehumanization, then it is unclear what would be a full form of 
dehumanization, how this might be measured, and how it might compare to 
infrahumanization itself. Thirdly, if infrahumanization has its roots in in-group bias, 
then it is unclear how in-group favouritism might relate to delegitimization or moral 
exclusion given that in the absence of conflict and in 'normal' inter-group situations 
in-group favouritism does not lead to out-group derogation (see Brewer, 1999). It 
could thus be argued that the infrahumanization paradigm might have benefited from 
companng infrahumanization, as a lesser form of dehumanization, to 
depersonalization, in line with Tajfel' s suggestion that depersonalization is less 
extreme than dehumanization. 
Fifthly, the infrahumanization paradigm has stated that infrahumanization is 
based on an essentialization of the in-group in terms of humanness, and some research 
has found that "the best predictor of infrahumanization was the common variance of 
identification and essentialism" (Leyens et aI., 2002: 712). Research on the structure 
of essentialist beliefs about social categories has found that essentialist beliefs are 
underlain by dimensions representing natural kinds, i.e. social categories are 
understood as having a biological basis, and entitativity, i.e. social categories are 
believed to be homogenous (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). But it is not clear 
whether the essentialization of the in-group in terms of a human essence follows a 
'natural kinds' or an 'entitativity' pattern, and hence it is not clear to which of these 
two dimensions infrahumanization is linked. This may be important because, as 
Haslam et a1. suggest, "the finding that essentialism is not unitary suggests that 
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theorists must be careful not to obscure the distinction, or to mistake one dimension 
for the whole" (2000: 123). Moreover, a discourse analytic approach to the 
essentialization of the in-group (Verkuyten, 2003) has found that groups such as 
ethnic minorities essentialize themselves when it is in their interest to do so, e.g. for 
political and ethnic mobilization, but do not essentialize themselves when it is against 
their interests, e.g. when they want to be considered Dutch citizens and be given equal 
rights. Therefore infrahumanization research might want to explore infrahumanization 
in those instances when it is in the in-group's interests not to essentialize themselves, 
e.g. when rejecting the majority's claim that they are a uniform group. While the 
infrahumanization paradigm has focused on the essentialization of the in-group, it is 
not clear whether the out-group is also essentialized, albeit in terms of a lesser 
humanity. This is relevant because research on essentialism has found that essentialist 
beliefs about out-groups are not always linked to prejudice against them (Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). As Haslam et aI. suggest, "essentialism is not a unitary 
syndrome of social beliefs, and is not monolithically associated with devaluation and 
prejudice" (2000: 113). This raises the issue as to whether infrahumanization is 
always tantamount to out-group prejudice, and whether, if it is functionally equivalent 
to prejudice, it may nonetheless occur sometimes without being based on essentialist 
beliefs about the in-group or the out-group. 
At the methodological level, the infrahumanization paradigm provides a subtle 
and arguably robust measure of prejudice. The greater attribution of secondary 
emotions to the in-group than to the out-group is found consistently in the research on 
infrahumanization. However, if infrahumanization is a minor form of dehumanization, 
it could be argued that the secondary emotions may tap into a dimension of humanity, 
which may not be at the very core of dehumanization. This possibility is not fully 
explored in the infrahumanization paradigm. Equally, alternative interpretations for 
the secondary emotions effect are not fully sought, although some alternative 
interpretations such as familiarity have been discounted in experimental research 
(Cortes et aI., 2005). 
What might be the consequences or functions of infrahumanization? It has 
been postulated that infrahumanization "is a sign of distinctiveness between the in-
group and the out-groups" (Demoulin et aI., 2004b: 266), because infrahumanization 
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refers to the in-group' s human essence and essence are thought to explain differences 
between groups. Thus infrahumanization IS assumed to function as in-group 
favouritism (Demoulin et aI., 2004b), but in the light of the existing empirical 
research it may not necessarily function as out-group derogation. Infrahumanization 
has been found to function as a reduction of out-group empathy: research using a lost 
e-mail paradigm has found that the email expressing secondary emotions (e.g. 
indignation) elicited stronger intentions to help to sender and kinder responses than 
the email expressing primary emotions (e.g. anger) (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). 
This suggests that people may be more inclined to empathize and to behave 
altruistically when confronted with a more 'human' stranger. Similarly, in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, research has found that in-group victims of the hurricane were 
attributed more secondary emotions than out-group victims, and that the tendency to 
attribute secondary emotions to out-group victims was correlated with intentions to 
help them (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007). Other research has found that awareness 
of the in-group's mass killing of an out-group increased the infrahumanization of the 
out-group members, which suggests that infrahumanization may help to morally 
disengage from an oppressed out-group and to diminish the sense of collective guilt 
(Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Related research has found that homeless people, 
too, are infrahumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Overall, it could be argued that 
infrahumanization may lead to cognitive, moral and behavioural distancing from 
victims, be they victims of the in-group, of the social system, or of natural disasters, 
which raises the possibility that infrahumanization may sometimes be underlain by 
beliefs in a just world (see Lerner, 1977) and may fulfil system justifying functions 
(see lost & Banaji, 1994; Kay & lost, 2003). These potential functions have not been 
fully explored by the infrahumanization paradigm; instead, it has been argued that 
infrahumanization cannot function as system-justification because even low-status 
groups will attribute the human 'essence' to themselves even if they accept that they 
are not as intelligent or skilled as the higher-status groups (Demoulin et aI., 2004b). 
However, it could be argued that the infrahumanization paradigm has overlooked how 
false consciousness might influence the attribution of 'human essence' to the in-group 
by low-status groups. False consciousness is a main component of system-
justification, and has been elaborated on by system-justification theory (see lost & 
Banaji, 1994; lost, 1995). In inter-group relations, false consciousness refers to the 
low-status groups' (be they subordinate, dominated, or oppressed groups) 
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internalization, rationalization and acceptance of their low status. Infrahumanization is 
linked to in-group favouritism; by contrast, false consciousness is linked to in-group 
derogation (see lost, 1995). Therefore, those low-status groups who experience false 
consciousness should, in theory, not engage in in-group favouritism and hence should 
not infrahumanize. Thus, false consciousness may mediate the attribution of 'human 
essence' to the in-group, or, if it does not, it might interact with the relative status of 
the out-group, e.g. low-status groups may not infrahumanize higher-status groups, but 
only groups lower in status than themselves. Therefore infrahumanization researchers 
may consider exploring false consciousness in future research. 
2.5.2 The ontoiogization paradigm 
Unlike infrahumanization, where the focus is on the in-group and on its bias in 
attributing the human essence to itself, in the ontologization paradigm the focus is on 
the out-group and the conditions that lead to its dehumanization. And while 
infrahumanization is assumed to be universal and contingent upon in-group 
favouritism, ontologization is assumed to be specific to certain groups and not 
contingent to any variables related to the in-group. But similarly to infrahumanization, 
the ontologization paradigm has built a model of out-group dehumanization on the 
animal-human and the nature-culture binaries. Ontologization, as the name implies, 
consists in the creation or attribution of a different 'ontology' to the out-group. This is 
supposed to happen when the out-group is considered (or ideologically constructed) as 
having failed to integrate in society (Perez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001). Ontologization 
is defined as "an operation of classification whereby a minority is categorized not 
only as an out-group, but also as outside the social map of human identity" (Perez, 
Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002: 53, my translation). The theory of ontologization has 
drawn mostly on the discrimination against the Gypsy minority, and holds that social 
groups which fail to become culturally assimilated are presumed to have a different 
essence from that of the majority. This presupposed different essence serves to 
explain the minority group's resistance to the majority's assimilation efforts, and their 
inability to become civilized and fully human (Perez, Moscovici & Chulvi, 2002). The 
ontologization paradigm views ontologization the same as dehumanization, not as a 
lesser form of it, and sometimes uses the two terms interchangeably. 
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The ontologization paradigm has operationalized dehumanization in terms of 
natural or animal-like traits, e.g. intuitive, and cultural or human-like traits, e.g. 
creative. Similarly to the infrahumanization paradigm where a random set of primary 
and secondary emotions, varying from study to study, is used to differentiate between 
the in-group and the out-group, in ontologization the animal and human attributes are 
firstly generated by one group of participants as characterising animals more than 
humans, then a second group of participants identify which of these attributes describe 
the Gypsies (Perez et aI., 2001). But in the ontologization paradigm the differential 
attribution of traits has not been the only way to differentiate between the in-group 
and the Gypsies. In one study, participants first identified the "specifically human" 
characteristics that "make humans beings human beings" (without having to think 
about any target out-group), then they estimated how much the Gypsies differed from 
the non-Gypsies on the basis of the characteristics identified (Chulvi & Perez, 2003). 
The characteristics named by the participants were grouped into clusters, and it was 
found that Gypsies differed mostly from the majority in terms of sociability, morality 
(virtues), aggression, and learning (e.g. capacity to progress, education, ability to 
develop), but least in terms of immorality (vices), biology, rationality, and feelings 
(Chulvi & Perez, 2003). This method indicates that instead of using a strict dichotomy 
between human and animal traits (or emotions), it is possible to think about some 
specifically human dimensions or characteristics, on which the in-group and the out-
group can be compared. 
Chulvi & Perez (2003) conclude that the Gypsies are represented as a "closed 
group, isolated, without respect for the rules of social life, and averse to social 
influence", insensitive to the pressure of social norms (Chulvi & Perez, 2003: 8, my 
translation). Chulvi & Perez (2003) argue that representing the Gypsies as asocial is 
tantamount to situating them outside the human species, somewhere between the 
animal and the human realms, and that their perceived unsociability is due to their 
seeming "resistance to cultural conversion" (2003: 8). It could be argued that the 
dimensions of sociability, morality and learning represent 'uniquely human' features, 
as Haslam et ai. (2005) would classify them, while the dimension of aggression is 
rather a 'human nature' feature, which can be shared with animals. Thus, one might 
conclude that the ontologization of the Gypsies takes place at the level of the uniquely 
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human rather than human nature level, a fact also implied by the use of cultural vs. 
natural traits. 
The ontologization paradigm has drawn solely on the prejudice against the 
Gypsy minority. Correlational and experimental research has shown that non-Gypsy 
participants in European countries (Spain, Romania, Britain) attribute more animal 
than human traits to the Gypsies (Perez et aI., 2001), but also less human traits to the 
Gypsies than to the in-group (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Moreover, the Gypsies 
are attributed more stereotypical characteristics in the condition where participants are 
told that despite the use of historical strategies to integrate them, the Gypsies have 
failed to integrate (Perez et aI., 2001). While focusing on a single ethnic minority can 
provide consistency and a historic argument to the theory of ontologization, it could 
be argued that this may inadvertently narrow down the scope of ontologization. In 
consequence, it is not clear whether ontologization is an idiosyncratic attitude of the 
majority toward the Gypsies, perhaps based on social representations of Gypsy 
nomadism, or whether other poor or nomadic groups (e.g. the homeless, travellers), or 
other discriminated minorities (e.g. sexual, religious) may be targets of ontologization 
if they are perceived as being untypical humans or as 'socially deviant' individuals. 
Nevertheless, research has indicated that other groups are represented in positive 
animal terms similarly to the Gypsies, such as children, the elderly, but also 
cannibals, Pygmies, and savage tribes (Chulvi & Perez, 2003). The association of 
children or old people with positive animal characteristics suggests that their 
dehumanization may imply a denial of rational autonomy, while the association of 
savage tribes with these characteristics may indicate a denial of culture. But it could 
be argued that groups such as the cannibals do not exist in real life, and that they are 
rather a European ideological construction (or misrepresentation) of certain foreign 
groups. Since neither children nor the elderly, but neither cannibals nor Pygmies can 
be considered as having failed to be culturally assimilated or socially integrated, it 
could be argued that their association with positive animal traits does not amount to 
ontologization and social exclusion as in the case of the Gypsies, although 
dehumanizing beliefs may underlie prejudices such as ageism. U sing the 
ontologization paradigm, research has shown that other ethnic groups such as • Black 
Africans' are ontologized by Swiss participants, being attributed more 'natural' than 
'cultural' traits, all positive, while other groups such as 'Muslims' or 'East 
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Europeans' are not ontologized (Deschamps, Vala, Marinho, Lopes, & Cabecinhas, 
2005). At the same time, the Swiss attributed more cultural traits to themselves than to 
Muslims, East Europeans and Black Africans. However, Deschamps et al. (2005) are 
not clear about why Black Africans might be ontologized, and they do not elaborate 
on the inter-group relations between this group and the Swiss. 
At the same time, research has found that other groups are represented in 
animal but negative terms, such as racists, Nazis, skinheads, terrorists, delinquents 
(Chulvi & Perez, 2003). However, these groups are also represented in equal 
proportion by negative human terms, too, so it is rather unclear whether these groups 
are primarily represented as human or as animal. What is interesting, though, is that 
such groups may be considered as having failed to integrate socially and to adopt the 
correct norms of social behaviour, which makes their association with animal terms 
closer to the thesis of ontologization. This opens the possibility that the ontologization 
of the Gypsies, too, may be linked to their perceived delinquency, since Gypsies are 
generally viewed as criminals and thieves. For example, focus groups in a number of 
Central European countries have revealed that the Gypsies are associated with a 'lack 
of adaptability and flexibility in relation to the expectations and standards dominant 
culture', 'lack of work ethic', 'tendency towards criminality' and 'dishonesty and 
tendency to cheat' (Current Attitudes Towards the Roma in Central Europe, 2005). 
Therefore it could be argued that the ontologization of the Gypsies may be due to their 
perceived criminal behaviour, rather than to their failed cultural assimilation per se 
(although one could argue that delinquent behaviour bespeaks of a failure of social 
integration). However, one might argue that it is the ethnicity of the Gypsies that 
contributes to their ontologization, since delinquents in general are associated 
predominantly with negative attributes, be they animal or human (see Chulvi & Perez, 
2003). Therefore future studies might want to explore how delinquent behaviour 
might interact with ethnicity to produce ontologization. 
The dehumanization of the Gypsy minority has been observed in other studies 
which have used interviews with majority members (Romanians) and a discursive 
analytic approach (Tileaga, 2005; 2006). These studies show that the talk about the 
Gypsies is more extreme than typical anti-immigrant or anti-alien prejudice, and that 
Gypsies are represented as being "beyond the moral order, beyond nationhood, 
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difference and comparison" (Tileaga, 2005: 603). It could be argued that such 
discourse about the Gypsies indicates the moral exclusion (cf. Opotow, 1990) or the 
delegitimization (cf. Bar-Tal, 1990) of this particular ethnic minority. Similarly to the 
findings of Perez and colleagues, Tileaga's qualitative research shows that the 
Gypsies are perceived as being unable and also unwilling to integrate. The Romanian 
participants constructed the Gypsies as 'unadaptable': "they cannot integrate, they like 
the life they are living" (Tileaga, 2006: 27), and as 'uncivilized': the cause of their 
behaviour is "their lack of civilization ( ... ) they are a lot behind the Romanian 
population in terms of civilization, culture" (Tileaga, 2006: 28). The Gypsies are 
described by one Romanian participant as "less hardworking, they think less for the 
future ( ... ) there is no preoccupation for education and for their children" (Tileaga, 
2006: 28), while another expresses the view that "I don't see the Gypsies integrating 
themselves among us, they don't like the civilized style ( ... ) they don't want to go to 
school, they don't want at all to progress" (Tileaga, 2006: 34). Firstly, Tileaga's 
findings reinforce the thesis that the Gypsies are constructed as an asocial group 
unable to lead a civilized life, and they bring support to failed social integration as the 
explanation for their ontologization. Secondly, they suggest that the dehumanization 
of the Gypsies takes place at the level of 'uniquely human' attributes such as culture 
and civilization. Thirdly, these qualitative findings also indicate victim blaming 
among the majority members, and arguably fundamental attribution errors in their 
judgement of the Gypsies for their lack of integration. 
What is it about the Gypsy minority that has made them a target of 
dehumanization? While Perez and colleagues suggest that the Gypsies are 
dehumanized because they have failed to be 'culturally assimilated by the majority', it 
could be argued that ontologization is not necessarily a reaction following failed 
cultural assimilation, but rather a precursor to social exclusion and marginalization. At 
the same time, it should be noted here that the cultural assimilation envisaged by 
Perez et al. (2001; 2002) is not necessarily the same as that envisaged by theories of 
multiculturalism and acculturation (see for example Berry, 1999, 2001; Bourhis, 
Morse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997), although there may be similarities between the 
two. This is because the ontologization paradigm is not directly concerned with 
multiculturalism and acculturation strategies, and uses 'assimilation' and 'integration' 
rather interchangeably. What Perez and colleagues mean by 'cultural assimilation' is 
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more similar to the strategy of 'integration' in the acculturation literature, in the sense 
that the minority may keep its cultural identity, but it should accept and abide by the 
norms and values of the dominant majority culture. However, given the 
discriminatory policies against the Gypsies in various aspects of life such as health, 
education, housing, etc. one might argue that the majority's strategies are more 
indicative of exclusion and marginalization, rather than of forceful cultural 
assimilation (see Barany, 1994). At the same time, given the diverse sub-groupings of 
Gypsies along professional, linguistic, or sedentary lines, one cannot speak of 
integration or exclusion all across the board, as some Gypsies are economically but 
not culturally integrated, while others are marginalized from both points of view (see 
Barany, 1998). Equally, the representation of Gypsies as a nomadic group is a 
misconstruction, as most Gypsies in fact live in settled communities (see Keil, Fenn, 
& Andreescu, 1994). 
It would appear that the ontologization of the Gypsies rests on dehumanization 
at the level of culture in the sense of beliefs, values, norms and behaviours, where the 
Gypsies' different culture leads to a 'perceived lesser humanity' as Struch & Schwartz 
(1989) might put it. The idea of the Gypsies being dehumanized on the basis of their 
culture is also echoed by Keil, et al.: "to the extent to which a subordinate group's 
culture and social practices are seen as different in normatively critical ways from 
those of the dominant groups, the subordinate group will be taken to be less fully 
human than the dominant groups" (1994: 397). However, this naturally begs the 
question as to whether there are specific elements of the Gypsy culture that lends this 
group to being dehumanized, or whether all different minority groups are ontologized 
on the basis of their culture. While Perez et al. (2001) argue that the Gypsies are 
ontologized because of their resistance to forced cultural assimilation, it remains 
unclear whether other Spanish ethnic minorities are ontologized if they are perceived 
as 'non-assimilated'. Some data shows that not all minority groups are ontologized, 
even if the majority expresses negative prejudice against it, as in the case of the 
Hungarian minority in Romania who has retained its cultural specificity and enjoys 
many minority rights (Marcu, unpublished manuscript). But ethnic minorities or 
immigrants who are perceived as not abiding by the majority's cultural and social 
norms are 'abnormalized', that is, they are constructed as having a different mentality 
and engaging in deviant behaviour (Verkuyten, 2001). 
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While the research on the ontologization of the Gypsies has mainly focused on 
the cultural differences between the Gypsies and the majority, it has somewhat 
overlooked the low economic status of the Gypsies as a possible explanation for their 
ontologization, although one could perhaps argue that the economic status of an ethnic 
group may reflect its cultural values, such as work ethic, and also the degree of its 
social integration. The socio-economic status of a group is very important because it 
can predict the content of the stereotype that others will have about it (see Glick & 
Fiske, 2001). Specifically, it will predict whether that group is competent or not, 
which in turn will make the group be associated with traits denoting competence, e.g. 
intelligent, shrewd, logical, ambitious, or lack of it, e.g. incompetent, lazy, 
animalistic, stupid, unambitious (Glick & Fiske, 2001). As the latter traits suggest, it 
may well be that poor groups are viewed as less human than rich groups because their 
incompetence is taken to reflect their less-than-human nature. Concerning the 
Gypsies, these have been "on the economic margin of every society in which they 
live" (Keil et aI., 1994: 399), which also explains their lack of political mobilization. 
As to the functions that the ontologization the Gypsies may perform, at one 
level it arguably rationalizes their cultural preservation in the face of forced 
assimilation. But given the century-long discrimination of the Gypsies, it could be 
argued that ontologizing the Gypsies justifies their treatment and social exclusion (cf. 
system justification theory, Jost & Banaji, 1994), in a similar way to the 
dehumanization of animals. Similarly to speciesism, ontologization provides the 
majority members with an ideology that naturalizes the differences between in-group 
and out-group and justifies their social exclusion, exploitation, and inhumane 
treatment. The Gypsies were victims of ethnic cleansing alongside the Jews during the 
Second World War. In Romania, for example, an estimated 25,000 Gypsies were 
deported to the Trans-Dniester region in 1942, where half of them died (Achim & 
Iordachi, 2004). The groups of Gypsies targeted for deportation were Gypsies who 
had a nomadic lifestyle, those who had criminal records, and those who did not have 
stable jobs (Achim & Iordachi, 2004). While at the political level this can be 
explained through the existence of a fascist regime at the time, it is telling that the 
general population mounted relatively little and ineffectual opposition to the 
deportations. When majority members did try to protect the local Gypsies from being 
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deported, they did so mostly because they needed them for the traditional jobs that the 
Gypsies performed (Achim & Iordachi, 2004), which is arguably similar to the 
finding that people humanize animals depending on their utility to them (cf. Opotow, 
1993). 
That the dehumanization of the Gypsies may function as a justification of their 
fate is also suggested by the existence of false consciousness in this group. False 
consciousness refers to "the holding of false beliefs that are contrary to one's social 
interest and which thereby contribute to the disadvantaged position of the self or the 
group" (Jost, 1995: 397), and is manifest in a group's legitimization and acceptance of 
its low status. False consciousness in the Gypsy minority has been inferred from their 
lack of political mobilization, inability to speak Romany, or denial of their Gypsy 
ethnicity at times of population census. As a Gypsy political activist notes, "a 
significant number of Roma deny their roots in an attempt to escape the social stigma 
associated with Roma identity. [ ... J This is well-reflected in the discrepancies 
between the estimated number of Roma and the lower results of official censuses" 
(Nicolae, 2007). False consciousness in the Gypsies can arguably also be inferred 
from their out-group favouritism towards majority group members who normally 
discriminate against them. For example, while both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians 
in Romania mostly characterized the Gypsies as dirty, backward, disunited, thieves, 
and lazy, the Gypsies characterized the Romanians as honest, hard-working, 
intelligent, hospitable, kind-hearted, and the Hungarians as civilized, hostile, hard-
working, hospitable, and kind-hearted (Barometrul Relaliilor Etnice, 2001). In the 
same ethno-barometer, the Gypsy respondents chose Romanian as a better descriptor 
of their identity than Roma (Barometrul Relaliilor Etnice, 2001). False consciousness 
can also be inferred from the Gypsies' derogation of other Gypsies: for example, 
Gypsy musicians in Romania think of themselves as more civilized and cultured than 
other non-musician Gypsies from which they distance themselves (Beissinger, 2001). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that false consciousness in the Gypsies might account 
for the Gypsies' lack of political mobilization and collective action (Barany, 1998; 
Keil et aI., 1994), although their poor socio-economic status has also been considered 
as a contributing factor. A similar argument about poverty leading to false 
consciousness has been made about the poor, where false consciousness is expressed 
in the 'poor but honest', and classism, in the 'poor but happy' stereotypes (Kay & 
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Jost, 2003). As we have seen above, attributions of happiness and enjoyment of their 
fate are also made to farm animals (see Singer, 1990; PIous, 2003), and it may well be 
that the poor are dehumanized, beyond considerations of ethnicity. However, one 
could argue that the Gypsies' maintenance of their cultural heritage despite the 
majority's efforts of forceful assimilation (or marginalization, depending on how one 
might look at it) indicates that false consciousness does not exist in this group, at least 
not on a large scale. If the Gypsies really experienced false consciousness, then they 
would have been culturally assimilated by now. Nevertheless, it could also be argued 
that cultural maintenance is not necessarily a rational choice, but rather an acceptance 
of one's fate or a refuge in the face of wide exclusion. 
2.6 Comparing infrahumanization and ontologization 
What may be the similarities and differences between ontologization and 
infrahumanization? Firstly, despite their shared reliance on the human-animal binary, 
ontologization and infrahumanization theories differ in their key assumptions. While 
the infrahumanization theory rather resembles a 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice, 
where all out-group are supposed to be infrahumanized, the ontologization theory is 
more specific about the conditions leading to ontologization and argues that only 
certain groups are ontologized. Ontologization views dehumanization as the in-
group's reaction to the status, behaviour, or culture of the out-group, whereas 
infrahumanization views dehumanization as something inevitable and inherent in 
inter-group relations. The ontologization paradigm is also more explicit about the 
historical basis of ontologization, suggesting that over time evaluative prejudice 
becomes categorical, ideological prejudice, as in the case of the Gypsies (see 
,Moscovici & Perez, 1997). It could be argued that the ontologization theory is 
bottom-up approach to dehumanization, based on real instances of discrimination and 
social exclusion, whereas the theory of infrahumanization is rather a top-down 
approach to dehumanization that starts with a theory of an in-group bias in the 
attribution of the human essence. Given the grounding of ontologization in a real 
phenomenon of extreme prejudice and social exclusion, it may be argued that 
ontologization offers a more ecologically valid approach to dehumanization than 
infrahumanization. In this sense, ontologization is closer to the conceptualization of 
dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice as suggested by Tajfel (1981). 
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Secondly, infrahumanization is assumed to be a 'lesser form of 
dehumanization', whereas ontologization does not make explicit claims about the 
level of dehumanization it implies. But given the wide discrimination and 
marginalization of the Gypsies ontologization is tantamount to full dehumanization. 
Therefore, it may be assumed that the Gypsies are also infrahumanized, although not 
all infrahumanized groups may be ontologized. It could be argued that the difference 
between infrahumanization and ontologization is not only in the degree of 
dehumanization they imply, but also in the functions they perform: while 
infrahumanization is a form of in-group bias in inter-group relations, ontologization 
functions as an ideology that justifies why certain groups are discriminated, 
marginalized, and as we have seen in the case of the Gypsies, deported and 
exterminated. However, some recent research on infrahumanization (e.g. Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006) has suggested that infrahumanization, too, might support and 
legitimate the unfair treatment of out-groups. 
Thirdly, infrahumanization is measured through the attribution of more 
humanity to the in-group than to the out-group, whereas ontologization is inferred 
from the greater attribution of animality than humanity to the out-group. However, it 
could be suggested that ontologization, too, may be inferred from the greater 
attribution of humanity to the in-group than to the out-group. Studies on 
ontologization have found that apart from being attributed more animal than human 
traits, the ontologized groups (e.g. Gypsies, Black Africans) are also ascribed less 
human attributes than the in-group (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005; Deschamps et aI., 
2005). It could be argued that comparing the attribution of humanity and/or animality 
between in-group and out-group is a more useful way to measure dehumanization 
because the in-group can serve as a control. 
Fourthly, similarly to infrahumanization, the ontologization paradigm has 
envisaged dehumanization as a matter of 'essence' where different essences, with 
different degrees of humanity, are attributed to the in-group and out-group. But unlike 
infrahumanization, though, where the focus is on the unique attribution of the human 
essence to the in-group, ontologization focuses on the out-group (the Gypsies), and on 
what makes it distinct from the majority. The attribution of a different essence to the 
Gypsies aims to maximise the differences between them and the in-group (Perez et aI., 
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200 I). Thus, the ontologization of the out-group is not contingent on how human the 
in-group perceives itself to be, although an operationalization of ontologization does 
sometimes involve a comparison between the humanity attributed to the in-group and 
that attributed to the out-group (e.g. Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). But, similarly to 
the infrahumanization paradigm, ontologization does not distinguish between the 
natural kinds and the entitativity dimensions of essentialization (Haslam et aI., 2000), 
therefore it is not clear whether ontologization is linked to the perception (or rather 
ideological construction) of the Gypsies as a natural group, or as a homogeneous 
entity. 
Finally, are infrahumanization and ontologization describing the same process 
of dehumanization or different phenomena? Are infrahumanized groups also 
ontologized and vice versa? Some research suggests that infrahumanization and 
ontologization may be different from each other. For example, while both the British 
and the Romanians ontologized the Gypsies, only the British infrahumanized them 
(Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), suggesting that infrahumanization may be contingent 
on the status of the in-group. At the same time, these results suggest that groups which 
are ontologized may be also infrahumanized but only by certain groups. The present 
research aims to study both processes simultaneously to elucidate whether they 
perform different functions. 
2.7 The functions of dehumanization 
What functions might dehumanization fulfil? It could be argued that 
dehumanization is an extreme form of negative prejudice, and that groups which are 
dehumanized may also be delegitmized, morally excluded, and stigmatized. However, 
given the various binaries on which dehumanizing beliefs can rest, and the various 
groups to which dehumanizing beliefs can be applied, it could be argued that the 
functions of dehumanization may vary with respect to the binary used. Thus, the 
human-animal dichotomy may serve to legitimize the domination or moral exclusion 
of a particular group, whereas the human-machine binary may serve to express dislike 
against the group. At the same time, not all forms of dehumanization lead to 
discriminatory practices. For example, groups which are infrahumanized may not be 
delegitimized, because infrahumanization is 'a lesser form of dehumanization' 
(Leyens et aI., 2000, 2003; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens. ~004). 
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Similarly, dehumanizing beliefs about a particular group may not necessarily translate 
into prejudice or social exclusion because they may simply fulfil a palliative function 
(see Bernard, Ottenberg, & Redl, 1965). 
As mentioned before, dehumanization is not mere metaphor, nor just an issue 
of social perception, but also a social practice (Tileaga, 2007). Dehumanized groups 
such as the Gypsies and the poor are not only 'perceived' as being less than human, 
they are also denied equal opportunities and are marginalized by the social system 
(see Perez, et aI., 2001; Lott, 2002). lust like speciesism, dehumanization could be 
seen as an ideology that legitimizes social inequalities, and arguably has the ability of 
any ideology to "shape and distort the understanding of the world" (Edgar & 
Sedgwick, 1999), so that unequal power relations are not questioned nor challenged. 
Thus, similarly to speciesism, dehumanization can serve to justify the existing power 
balance between groups (see lost & Banaji, 1994; lost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Also 
similarly to speciesism, dehumanization can be seen as a form of de legitimization, 
whereby out-groups are categorised into extreme negative social categories and 
excluded them from the realm of acceptable norms and values (Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990). 
From this perspective, de legitimizing the out-group serves to legitimize its oppression 
and inhumane treatment. Equally, dehumanization can act as moral exclusion (Staub, 
1987) whereby individuals or groups are placed "outside the boundary in which moral 
values, rules and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded 
are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving" (Opotow, 1990: 1). 
Following this approach to dehumanization, it would appear that the dehumanization 
of the out-group takes place if certain structural relations exist between the in-group 
and the out-group, i.e. when the in-group dominates or exploits of the out-group. 
However, other approaches to dehumanization have found that the out-group can be 
dehumanized even in the absence of conflict or oppression by the in-group, which this 
opens the debate as to whether dehumanization is linked to certain social 
representations of the out-group, or to legitimizing ideologies. 
From a different, and one might argue somewhat dated, perspecti\'e, 
dehumanization can be seen as a "particular type of psychic defence mechanism" 
which consists in "a decrease in a person's sense of his own individuality and in his 
perception of the humanness of other people" (Bernard et aI., 1965: 64; see also 
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Leyens et aI., 2003, for an interpretation of infrahumanization as a 'defence 
mechanism'). As a defence mechanism, dehumanization can be self-directed, where 
individuals stop perceiving themselves as human beings, or object-directed, where 
out-group members are dehumanized (Bernard et aI., 1965). Through self-directed 
dehumanization individuals' sense of their own humanness is diminished, individuals 
are emptied of human emotions, and it could be argued that the self-directed 
dehumanization might be similar to the processes of depersonalization (as envisaged 
by the self-categorization theory, see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987) and of deindividuation, see Diener, 1977). Self-directed dehumanization helps 
insulate individuals from "painful, unacceptable, and unbearable feelings referable to 
their experiences, inclinations and behaviour" (Bernard et aI., 1965: 66), such feelings 
being "fear, inadequacy, compassion, revulsion, guilt and shame" (1965:69). It could 
be argued that the self-directed dehumanization may be at odds with the 
infrahumanization theory which holds that all individuals and groups are motivated to 
reserve the human essence to themselves, as it suggests that individuals may diminish 
their sense of humanness in certain circumstances. 
Bernard et ai. (1965) postulate that dehumanization can have 'adaptive' as 
well as 'maladaptive' functions. In its adaptive function, the dehumanization of others 
occurs during processes such as autopsies, burials, surgery, dealing with natural 
disasters, where dehumanization "divests the victims of their human identities so that 
feelings of pity, terror, or revulsion can be overcome" (Bernard et aI., 1965:67). Thus, 
dehumanization can be an everyday phenomenon which enables people to de-
empathise with others in those circumstances when they cannot help them, and in this 
sense dehumanization has a palliative function and bears resemblance to the system-
justification functions of stereotypes (see Jost & Banaji, 1994), or to beliefs in a just 
world (Lerner, 1977). However, when dehumanization leads to interethnic violence or 
to genocide, then dehumanization has a maladaptive function, and here "both 
superhuman and debased characteristics are ascribed simultaneously to certain groups 
in order to justify discrimination or aggression against them" (Bernard et al. 1965: 
66). The distinction between 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive' dehumanization is quite 
interesting because it highlights that dehumanization is not necessarily an altogether 
negative phenomenon, and it suggests that dehumanization may be more prevalent in 
everyday life than previously thought (in line with the infrahumanization theory). 
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Bernard et ai. 's (1965) suggestions about the 'maladaptive' functions of 
dehumanization bear resemblance to Bandura's (1999) view of dehumanization as a 
mechanism of moral disengagement (see also Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), where 
those who are dehumanized "are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, 
and concerns but as subhuman objects" (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 
1996: 366). Moral disengagement means suspending one's moral agency and the 
regulatory self-sanctions that normally control humane behaviour (Bandura, 1999). 
From this perspective, dehumanization seems to function as a justification of the 
behaviour of the individual, the group, or the system, because "people enlist moral 
justifications for punitive conduct directed toward individuals who have been 
deprived of humanness, but they disavow punitive actions and condemn them on 
moral grounds toward individuals depicted in humanized terms" (Bandura et aI., 
1996: 366). Moral disengagement also resembles the process of delegitimization (Bar-
Tal, 1989; 1990), to the extent that both use dehumanization as a moral justification 
for the social exclusion or the violence committed against individuals or groups. 
Although in Bandura's view moral disengagement through dehumanization is a 
negative phenomenon, one can envisage moral disengagement also having a palliative 
function, similar to the 'adaptive' function of dehumanization suggested by Bernard et 
ai. (1965). In this sense, dehumanizing and morally disengaging from others whose 
fate one cannot change, such as war victims, fighting soldiers, or the homeless, can 
reduce the feelings of guilt or of frustration at not being able to help. For example, 
while at one level dehumanizing and morally disengaging from the poor may be 
interpreted as beliefs in a just world or a desire to maintain the existing power 
relations, ordinary people may dehumanize and morally disengage from war victims 
such as those in Darfur or Iraq because they may perceive themselves as being unable 
to help them. 
A question that naturally arises and which has been tackled by research on 
dehumanization, such as the infrahumanization paradigm, is whether dehumanization 
is the same as prejudice, or whether it fulfils the same functions as prejudice. As 
regards its negative functions, dehumanization is arguably very similar to prejudice, it 
is in fact an extreme form of prejudice. However, it may differ from prejudice in its 
ability to produce moral distancing and to have palliative functions. For example, 
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ordinary people may dehumanize sex traffic victims or prostitutes not because they 
have an interest in oppressing them, but because it helps them morally disengage from 
an issue they cannot address themselves. Nonetheless, given the focus of the present 
research on inter-group relations, the palliative functions of dehumanization may not 
be relevant to the comparison with prejudice in this kind of context. 
At the same time, is the human-animal binary, for example, the same as the 
negative-positive dimension of prejudice? Both the infrahumanization and the 
ontologization paradigms have argued that one can dehumanize without recourse to 
negative prejudice, as out-group members can be ideologically constructed or socially 
represented in positive animal terms. The ontologization paradigm has shown that the 
Gypsies, as well as other social categories such as children, the elderly, the young, 
cannibals, indigenous people, Pygmies, and savage tribes, are represented in terms of 
what is 'positive animal', whereas groups such as racists, Nazis, skinheads, terrorists, 
delinquents, and criminals are represented by both 'negative human' and 'negative 
animal' categories (Chulvi & Perez, 2003). This shows that considerations of 
humanness or of animality are not dissociated from the positive-negative dimension of 
prejudice. The infrahumanization paradigm, too, has argued that infrahumanization 
goes beyond considerations of negative prejudice, as both negative and positive 
secondary (uniquely human) emotions are attributed to the in-group in a larger 
proportion than to the out-group. Thus, dehumanization appears to go beyond 
considerations of valence and relate more to considerations of 'essence'. Similarly to 
animals or to machines, out-group members may be perceived or may be ideologically 
constructed as possessing (or lacking) certain features which disqualify them from 
being considered fully human, and these features may be other positive or negative. 
For example, racism is a negative but nonetheless a uniquely human feature, whereas 
intelligence, although positive, can be used to describe humans, animals and 
machines. 
However, it could be argued that it may be impossible to separate completely 
the human vs. other (animallmachine/less-than-human) binaries from the negative-
positive valence of prejudice and discrimination. For example, while the 
infrahumanization paradigm has contended that infrahumanization is independent of 
the negative valence of prejudice, some pilot studies have found that negative 
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secondary emotions are rated as more human than positive secondary emotions (Vaes, 
Castelli, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), while other 
studies have found that positive secondary emotions are perceived as more uniquely 
human than negative secondary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). Thus, it is rather 
unclear how considerations of humanness may be independent of considerations of 
positive valence (for a more detailed discussion on this, see chapter 4). Secondly, 
there is a tendency to construct humanness in positive terms (Deconchy, 1998). For 
example, Chulvi & Perez (2003) found that humanness was represented mostly in 
positive dimensions such as sociability, rationality, morality, emotions, with only a 
few negative dimensions such as aggression and immorality. Thirdly, given the 
animals' inferior status, it is very likely that constructions of 'animal nature' may be 
less positive than those of 'human nature'. As we have seen, speciesism is negative 
prejudice against animals, and it could be argued that speciesist attitudes might 
influence the emotions and traits attributed to animals. Fourthly, it may be possible 
that the human vs. animal/machine/less-than-human dimensions may interact with the 
negative-positive dimension of prejudice. Thus, some groups which are considered 
inferior but which do not have a relationship of conflict with the in-group which are 
considered inferior and are in conflict with the in-group may be dehumanized in terms 
of positive animal attributes, while other groups may be dehumanized in terms of 
negative animal attributes, function of inter-group relations, history, conflict, etc. 
Conversely, not all groups which are the target of negative prejudice are also 
dehumanized. For example, Romanian majority members view the Hungarian 
minority in terms of negative human traits, whereas the Gypsy minority, in terms of 
negative animal attributes (Marcu, unpublished manuscript). It may well be that 
dehumanization and negative prejudice overlap in those instances where social 
exclusion and marginalization are at stake, as in the case of the poor or of specific 
ethnic minorities. However, in those cases where social exclusion or in-group bias are 
not at stake, dehumanizing beliefs may be positive, as in the case of the disabled or 
the elderly. To a certain extent, the intersection between dehumanization and negative 
valence may resemble the stereotype content model (see Glick & Fiske, 1996; 2001), 
in that positive dehumanized groups may be viewed as incompetent but warm 
(paternalistic prejudice), while negatively dehumanized groups, as incompetent and 
cold (contemptuous prejudice). Also similarly to the stereotype content model, the 
positive dehumanization of out-groups may constitute a form of subtle and ambivalent 
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prejudice, perhaps similar to aversive prejudice (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
Fifthly, it may well be that the in-group is represented in positive human terms, while 
the out-group is represented in animal terms, both positive and negative. For example, 
studies have found a positive and significant correlation between the positive 
evaluation of human characteristics and their attribution to the in-group, while such 
correlation for the out-group (the Gypsies) was non-significant (Chulvi & Perez, 
2003). Finally, it could also be suggested that the same dehumanized group may be 
sometimes represented in a positive light, and at other times in a negative light, 
function of the in-group's ad-hoc interests. To conclude, it may not always be possible 
to separate dehumanization completely from the negative side of prejudice, and it 
could be suggested that instead of demonstrating that dehumanization is independent 
from the negative pole of prejudice, it may be more fruitful to examine the conditions 
where dehumanization and negative prejudice interact and the consequences they 
produce. 
2.8 Objectives of the present research 
Before examining the ways in which the present research aims to contribute to 
the existing research on dehumanization, it is necessary to specify how 
dehumanization is conceptualized here, given its potentially different definitions, 
functions and interpretations. The present research envisages dehumanization as an 
extreme form of prejudice against out-groups, in line with the theorizing by Tajfel 
(1981) and Bernard et al. (1965), and in line with the theory of ontologization and 
with Tileaga's (2007) theorizing, the present research views dehumanization as a 
social practice of exclusion directed towards particular groups. The present research 
considers ontologization to be very close to the formulation of dehumanization as an 
extreme form of prejudice, but views infrahumanization as a lesser form of 
dehumanization, in line with its original formulation. However, while the present 
research considers dehumanization to be a phenomenon that goes beyond mere 
perception and categorization of out-groups as less-than-human and animal-like, it 
acknowledges that in experimental settings dehumanization is inevitably limited to 
perception and categorization (as experimental research sometimes is). The present 
research does not view the potential attribution of less humanity to the in-group than 
to the out-group as prejudice against the in-group, but instead would interpret this 
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phenomenon as a lack of in-group favouritism, and possibly as a form of false 
consciousness if other related variables support this interpretation. 
The focus of the present research is on the antecedents and consequences of 
dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations. As we have seen, there are currently two 
research paradigms on dehumanization, infrahumanization and ontologization, 
respectively, which have adopted the human-animal binary in their theorization and 
operationalization of dehumanization. But how does each paradigm contribute 
theoretically to the knowledge on dehumanization in inter-ethnic contexts? 
Infrahumanization is assumed to be a lesser form of dehumanization, and to be a 
universal phenomenon stemming from in-group bias. Given the main tenet of 
infrahumanization that all groups are motivated to reserve the human essence for their 
in-group, and therefore to infrahumanize all out-group, it could be argued that the one 
should look for moderators of this phenomenon, i.e. those variables which increase or 
decrease the infrahumanization effect. However, the other paradigm, ontologization, 
suggests that only those groups which are perceived (or are ideologically constructed) 
as not socially integrated or culturally assimilated are ontologized, therefore one 
should explore the mediators of this phenomenon, i.e. those variables which explain 
the ontologization effect (see Baron & Kenny, 1986, for a detailed discussion of 
mediation and moderation). Failure to socially integrate or to culturally assimilate on 
the part of an ethnic minority should not automatically lead to ontologization unless 
the majority perceives that failure as a threat, either at the material or at the symbolic 
level, therefore the present research proposes to focus on perceived threat as a 
mediating factor of ontologization and hence of dehumanization. At the same time, 
ontologization itself may be moderated, for example in the interaction between 
material and symbolic threats. Furthermore, the findings on ontologization, as well as 
the critique on infrahumanization, raise the question whether infrahumanization, too, 
may be mediated by perceived threat, as well as by other factors such as group status 
or in-group identification. Therefore the present research undertakes to examine more 
closely which of these variables may mediate and moderate infrahumanization and 
ontologization. Also, the present research aims to examine in more detail whether 
infrahumanization and ontologization indicate the same phenomenon of 
dehumanization or different processes. 
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More specifically, gIven the ontologization's focus on the out-group, the 
present research draws on the ontologization of the Gypsy minority and proposes to 
investigate perceived threat from the out-group as an antecedent of ontologization and 
hence of dehumanization. The focus on perceived material and symbolic threat 
derives from the Gypsy minority's poor economic status and cultural difference from 
the majority. Perceived symbolic threat, which is assumed to stem from perceived (or 
ideologically constructed) cultural differences between in-group and out-group, and 
perceived material threat, presumed to be triggered by the out-group's poor economic 
status, may be mediators of ontologization. The present research recognizes that there 
may be other aspects of the majority's relationship with the Gypsy minority, such as 
perceived criminal behaviour, nomadism, or lack of a nation-state, which can playa 
role in their dehumanization. However, the present research chooses not to focus on 
these dimensions because they are not very common in inter-ethnic group relations, 
while a group's cultural values or its socio-economic status often playa part. By 
focusing on the more usual aspects of inter-group relations, the present research aims 
to be able to predict when dehumanization occurs. Secondly, the present research 
aims to explore the consequences of dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations, in 
particular how dehumanization may be linked to the delegitimization, social exclusion 
and to preferences for exclusory acculturation strategies for ethnic minorities. Thirdly, 
given the infrahumanization's focus on the in-group, the present research proposes to 
examine how groups of different statuses may engage in infrahumanization, will 
investigate this phenomenon cross-culturally in Britain and Romania. 
Methodologically, each paradigm contributes to the study of dehumanization 
by operationalizing the human-animal binary, either in terms of primary and 
secondary emotions, as in infrahumanization, or in terms of human and animal 
characteristics, as in the ontologization paradigm. Both paradigms explore 
dehumanization quantitatively, mostly experimentally and correlationally, and both 
paradigms assume a clear-cut and non-dilemmatic boundary between the categories 
animal and human, which is reflected in their categorical distinction between primary 
and secondary emotions, and between animal and human attributes, respectively. 
However, neither paradigm delves deeply on how the human-animal binary might 
serve as a basis for dehumanization, as they overlook the ideological basis for the 
construction of animal inferiority. Similarly, neither paradigm explores the possibility 
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that the emotions and traits used in the operationalization of dehumanization may be 
conceptualized as belonging to a continuum of humanity rather than to mutually 
exclusive categories such as 'primary' and 'secondary'. As it was mentioned earlier in 
the chapter, humanity can be measured not only in terms of human uniqueness, but 
also in terms of human typicality. Therefore the present research undertakes to 
examine the possibility of operationalizing dehumanization continuously rather than 
strictly categorically, taking into account variability within the categories 'animal' and 
'human', and the possibility of measuring dehumanization in terms of human 
typicality rather than uniqueness. Furthermore, the present research sets out to explore 
in closer detail the human-animal boundary as a cognitive and ideological basis of 
dehumanization within the context of inter-ethnic group relations. 
The present research aims to explore dehumanization using both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. A qualitative approach can provide insights into the content 
of dehumanizing beliefs, as well as into the ideologies that support them, while a 
quantitative approach can enable the exploration of the mediators and moderators of 
dehumanization. Furthermore, the present research plans to employ an experimental 
approach in order to be able to determine these mediators and moderators, using both 
artificial and real groups. Using artificial groups can help pinpoint those elements 
about a group that can predispose it to dehumanization, such as perceived threat, 
which in the case of real groups risks to be an expression of prejudice rather than of 
threat per se. Using real groups, on the other hand, can show how the relationship 
between in-group and out-group in terms of status, for example, can shape 
dehumanization, and infrahumanization in particular. Also, the artificial and real 
groups may show a different overlapping between dehumanization and negative 
prejudice, as artificial groups may invoke less negativity than real ones. 
The present research proposes to study the dehumanization of ethnic 
minorities in Britain and Romania, thus building on previous work on the 
dehumanization of ethnic minorities in these two countries (Marcu, unpublished 
manuscript) and in particular on the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority (Marcu & 
Chryssochoou, 2005). The cross-cultural setting can also inform the drawing of the 
human-animal boundary both cognitively and ideologically. While every culture 
distinguishes between the natural and the cultural realms, it is possible that different 
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cultures may draw the line differently between the two realms, as anthropological 
studies suggest (see Vandenberghe, 2003). As Britain and Romania are different not 
only culturally, but also at the level of ideology and public discourse with regard to 
animal rights and human rights, it is conceivable that animal and human essences 
might be constructed differently in the two countries. In fact, studies based on World 
Values Surveys have suggested that Britain is a postmaterialist society, characterised 
by a secular-rational orientation toward authority and holding self-expression values, 
whereas Romania is a materialist society: although it has a secular-rational orientation 
toward authority, too, it holds survival rather than self-expression values due to its 
underdeveloped economy (see Inglehart & Baker, 2000). And as postmaterialist 
values have been linked to animal rights and tolerance of sexual, cultural, ethnical and 
religious minorities, it is expected that the differences between Britain and Romania at 
the level of postmaterialist values might be reflected in the way animal and human 
essences are socially constructed, but also in the interpretation of cultural differences 
and in the expression of prejudice in inter-group contexts. 
Differences in the levels of political liberalization and democratization 
between Britain and Romania are also likely to be reflected in the attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities and immigrants, as well as in each society'S expectations of 
acculturation on the part of these social groups. While Britain is a country with a 
long-established liberal democracy, Romania has been classified as a partial 
democracy after the fall of the Communist regime, and these differences in the level 
of democratization have consequences for the way 'nation' and national identity are 
constructed, and on the way ethnic minorities and new immigrants are expected to 
acculturate. 'Nation' has been conceptualized in two ways: as a citizenship relation 
where "the nation is the collective sovereign emanating from common political 
participation" and as an ethnic relation, where it rests on an implicit isomorphism 
between ethnicity and nationality (Verdery: 1996: 84). It has been suggested that 
while the 'citizenship' meaning of nation has its origins in liberal democracy, the 
'ethnic' meaning of nation is most common in Eastern Europe, and is usually 
associated with nationalism (Verdery, 1996). Therefore it is expected that differences 
in how nation and national identity are conceptualized in Britain and Romania might 
affect the attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. At the same time, the 
level of immigration in each country may influence the construction of national 
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identity and of otherness: Britain is a high-immigration country, used to the presence 
of ethnic minorities and to political discourse regarding immigrants' rights and place 
in British society, while Romania has experienced immigration only on a small scale 
and only after the collapse of Communism. In fact, Romania is a country from where 
people migrate, either as asylum seekers or as economic migrants, whereas Britain is a 
country from where people migrate (or rather 'relocate', according to the media) 
mostly as "sun-seekers". These different histories of immigration may have 
consequences for the levels of perceived threat from ethnic groups and immigrants in 
the two countries, and subsequently on their dehumanization. 
The economic situation of a country also plays a two-fold part: firstly, the 
availability of resources and the citizens' perceptions of their economic status 
influences their attitudes toward economic immigrants and asylum seekers. Resource 
stress or perceived scarcity of resources can influence people's attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). 
Therefore, one might expect that Romanians would have more negative attitudes 
toward immigrants than the British as Romania is poorer than Britain, and given that 
"negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration would be especially prevalent 
when the economic situation in a country is poor or declining" (Esses et aI., 2001: 
395). Secondly, a stable and prosperous economy can lead to existential security, 
which in tum leads to postmaterialist values: while Western countries, including 
Britain, have been gradually changing their focus from material well-being to quality 
of life and self-expression due to increased existential security (Inglehart, 1990), 
former Communist Eastern European countries such as Romania have had to face the 
anxiety of social changes brought about by the transition from a politically repressive 
regime and a centralised economy to a system of democracy and a market economy. 
Given their different levels of economic development, Romania and Britain 
also differ in their power status. Britain is an international power, able to influence 
politics worldwide, whereas Romania has a minor power status and has only recently 
joined the European Union2. If a group's sense or construction of its own humanness 
is related to perceptions of its power status, then we might expect dehumanization to 
2 The present research was conducted in its entirety before Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007. 
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take different shapes in the two countries. Although the infrahumanization paradigm 
has argued that infrahumanization is not contingent on the status of the in-group, most 
of the infrahumanization research has been carried out on relatively high-status groups 
such as the Belgians, the Spanish or the Italians, whose countries enjoy a relatively 
high status in Europe and worldwide, therefore we do not know for sure how lower-
status groups might attribute humanness to themselves. Secondly, research carried out 
in Britain and Romania has shown that, contrary to the British, the Romanians did not 
infrahumanize the out-groups (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), which suggests that 
low-status groups may not engage in infrahumanization perhaps because they may not 
be biased into attributing more humanness to their in-group. Therefore the present 
research aims to explore in more detail how the relative status of the in-group 
influences the dehumanization process. 
Last but not least, the cross-cultural setting may offer an insight into prejudice 
suppression. Nowadays people in Western societies are aware of politically correct 
norms (see Crandall, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003) and often look for subtle ways of expressing their prejudice. 
Therefore one might expect that British participants will suppress prejudice more than 
the Romanian participants, and this may be reflected in a higher incidence of 
ambiguous prejudice such as animal but positive emotions or traits being attributed to 
out-group members. In Romania, on the contrary, we can expect more of an overlap 
between dehumanization and the negative side of prejudice. 
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3.1 Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter 2 that the human-animal binary has been the mostly 
used one in the operationalization of dehumanization. Both infrahumanization and 
ontologization have modelled the dehumanization of out-group members on the human-
animal dichotomy. However, neither of these research paradigms has thoroughly 
reflected on how the human-animal boundary is drawn or why it might serve as such a 
robust resource for dehumanizing out-groups or for legitimizing their unfair treatment. 
Regardless of whether the distinction between humans and animals is understood as 
categorical or continuous, it is often implied to be both consensual and unaffected by 
ideological factors, such as speciesism. Equally, neither infrahumanization nor 
ontologization researchers have reflected on the ideological underpinnings of the human-
animal distinction, and how this might serve as a model for the process of 
dehumanization itself. In the present study I was concerned with the cognitive and 
ideological ways in which people construct the differences and similarities between 
humans and animals. I focused on how humans configure animal nature so that it comes 
to support justifications of discrimination against animals, and by extrapolation, against 
out-group members. 
3.2 Humans, animals, and speciesism 
As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, defining what human essence and animal 
essence are is not a pure scientific exercise, but rather one influenced by ideology. Given 
the humans' dependence on animals for food, clothing, cosmetics, renewable energy, and 
scientific experimentation, it is foreseeable that humans' construction of the human-
animal binary might be underlain by speciesist ideology. In this study I explored the 
human-animal boundary as an ideological construction that can be made up and contested 
in dialogue, and I examined how the motives underlying speciesism might be similar to 
those underpinning the dehumanization of humans. As PIous has remarked, "just as 
racism, sexism, and other prejudices share a similar mindset, many of the psychological 
factors that underlie speciesism serve to reinforce and promote prejudice against humans. 
These factors include power, privilege, dominance, control, entitlement, and the need to 
reduce cognitive dissonance when committing harmful acts" (2003: 510). 
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How might the construction of human-animal differences be understood as 
ideological work? As Gamer (2003) points out, ideological discourse is dominated by 
anthropocentrism that reflects humans' power and domination over animals. Philosophers 
such as Ryder (1971) and Singer (1990) call this anthropocentric ideology speciesism and 
describe it as a lived ideology, suggesting that it may contain contrary propositions (see 
Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988). Indeed, animals are 
sometimes anthropomorphised as being like humans and sometimes dehumanized as 
being unlike humans (see Opotow, 1993). Humans may dehumanize the animals they eat, 
while simultaneously anthropomorphizing their pets to shore up their interests in protein-
rich food and inter-species companionship respectively. Thus, it may well be that the 
ideology of speciesism contains contrary themes and ideological dilemmas, which raises 
the issue whether dehumanization, too, might contain them. 
While humans are generally credited with being rational and sentient beings, 
science has traditionally been sceptical about attributing mental states to animals (Rollin, 
2000). While both scientific and ordinary common sense have always denied mental life 
to animals so as to avoid potential moral implications, science has done so also because it 
believes itself to be objective and therefore entitled to transgress moral considerations. As 
Rollin put it, "science insulated itself from the moral implications of its own activity with 
animals not only by denial of animal mentation but by another mainstay of scientific 
ideology-the claim that science is value-free, and thus can make no moral claims and 
take no moral positions, since moral judgements, too, are unverifiable" (2000: 110). In 
Rollin's view, while science has been disdainful of anthropomorphic attributions to 
animals, it has itself been acting on some sort of reverse anthropomorphism by 
extrapolating from animals to humans in animal research serving to model human 
behaviour. For example, most research on human painkillers is conducted on animals, 
although animals themselves do not benefit from protection from pain. The fact that 
science has turned a blind eye to this obvious paradox can only be explained in terms of 
ideology. 
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3.3 Cultural and postmaterialist values 
Although most societies and most humans are speciesist, to a certain extent 
cultural values can shape the ways that animals are imagined to be. For example, cows 
are viewed as holy in Hindu culture but pigs are seen as unclean in Muslim and Jewish 
cultures. Some religions, such as Jainism and Buddhism, prescribe vegetarianism for all. 
However, in Christian and secular societies, vegetarianism represents a personal choice. 
Some societies have even tentatively extended the concept of 'rights' to animals, and in 
some Western countries people can be prosecuted for cruelty against animals. However, 
one might remark that abattoir workers or pest control agencies seem to be exempt from 
being charged with such cruelty offences. 
Growth in concern about animal rights has been understood as a particularity of 
'postmaterialist' capitalist societies (Franklin, Tranter & White, 2001). Inglehart (1977, 
1990, 1997; 2000) holds that value-orientations in advanced industrial societies change in 
response to increased existential security, i.e. freedom from worry about material 
survival, which allows individuals more time for spiritual fulfilment. As people become 
liberated from immediate material worries, they dedicate more time to thinking about 
social groups who had historically experienced discrimination (such as disabled people, 
women and ethnic minorities), environmental politics and animal welfare. While 
postmodernity and postmaterialism bring about existential security, they have also been 
credited with triggering ontological insecurity (Franklin, 1999), i.e. a sense of loss and 
anxiety brought about by the fragmented and ever-changing nature of social relations and 
means of production. In extending rights to animals, postmaterialist values seem to help 
in breaking the dichotomy of culture-nature and in achieving a hybridisation of the two in 
what Latour (1991) would call "a work of translation". From this perspective, humans 
and animals are not separate entities, but interrelated organic elements of an ecosystem. 
However, postmaterialist values and the increased knowledge about the humans' 
relatedness to other species do not always moderate speciesist attitudes. As Singer 
remarks, "the moral attitudes of the past are too deeply embedded in our thought and our 
practices to be upset by a mere change in our knowledge of ourselves and other animals" 
(1990: 212). 
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In Britain, a postmaterialist society in Inglehart's terms, the movement for animal 
rights started in 1824 when the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was 
founded, the first ever animal welfare society in any country. Interestingly, a founding 
member of the Society was William Wilberforce, who was also involved in the anti-
slavery movement, which suggests that people who are against animal cruelty may also 
be against racism and other related forms of human prejudice. In other countries, such as 
Romania, the animal rights movement has taken shape only very recently, in the 1990's. 
While vegetarianism is quite common in Britain and has a long history, in Romania the 
Romanian Vegetarian Society was founded only in 1991, and while in Britain 
vegetarianism is linked to animal issues, whereas in Romania it is linked more to health 
reasons. 
3.4 The present study 
As it was highlighted in chapter 2, the concept of 'rights' can help understand the 
drawing of the boundary between animals and humans. Humans enjoy rights on the basis 
of their rational autonomy and sentience, whereas animals do not enjoy rights even 
though they are sentient beings and even though some animals may have more rational 
autonomy than certain categories of human beings such as the severely mentally disabled 
or foetuses. To better understand variation in the construction of the human-animal 
boundary, the present study proceeded by prompting dilemmas about life-and-death 
issues involving humans and animals among focus group participants in Britain and 
Romania. As Billig et al. (1988) have suggested, contrary themes are necessarily invoked 
when people argue and discuss everyday issues. Issues regarding human life such as 
abortion and euthanasia are relevant here because they raise the following points: where 
does humanness begin? Does a foetus have human rights? Should a terminally ill, dying 
human be killed to avoid further suffering? When two conjoint twins have unequal 
chances of survival, should they be separated to save the life of one of them, or would 
this be tantamount to killing the weaker one? 
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The present study aimed to examine constructions of the animal-human boundary 
In two countries at very different points on the postmaterialist spectrum. Following 
Singer (1990), it was predicted that both materialist and post-materialist values would 
support speciesism but in different ways. Singer argues that humans' speciesism has 
long-standing roots in humans' attempts to justify their domination and exploitation of 
animals. Thus while speciesism is traditional and long-standing, it is also the height of 
modernity. As a result, both materialist and post-materialist societies may be able to 
claim that their cultures' speciesism is inevitable but for different reasons. One might 
argue that the dehumanization of animals serves both system-justifying and palliative 
functions. Indeed, not all humans are cruel and intent on causing harm to animals, but 
they may nonetheless dehumanize them to be to cope with the knowledge of their 
suffering. 
Informed by current issues within each country, six questions pertaining to animal 
and human life were drawn up for each country. The questions about human life were the 
same across the two national groups and pertained to euthanasia, abortion and the 
separation of conjoint twins with unequal chances of survival. A question about animal 
experimentation was used for both national groups. The Romanian sample answered two 
other questions about the euthanasia of stray dogs in Bucharest (the Romanian capital) 
and the reduction of unnecessary suffering during the killing of animals at abattoirs. The 
British participants answered two questions about fox hunting and the culling of 
uninfected animals during the foot-and-mouth epidemic in 2001 (see Appendix I a for the 
British interview schedule, and Appendix 1 b for the Romanian one). The questions about 
animals differed in the two countries in order to reflect the animal issues specific to each 
country. Thus, although the questions were not identical, they were functionally 
equivalent as it is often the case with cross-cultural research (see Lyons & Chryssochoou, 
2000). 
Dilemmatic issues were chosen as questions in order to engage participants into 
thinking about real life situations. As Billig et al. (1988) have pointed out, thinking and 
debating rest on contrary themes and on tensions between equally important issues. A 
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qualitative method was chosen because it has more ecological validity than laboratory-
conducted studies, and because it can show the active nature of thinking about moral 
dilemmas. Given the potentially ideological natures of beliefs about human and animal 
nature, focus group interviews are more able to capture the 'waxing and waning' and the 
categorization and particularization of speciesism than simple questionnaires. For 
example, instead of asking people to respond on a 1 to 7 Likert scale if they agree with 
animal experimentation, a qualitative approach can reveal whether people agree with this 
statement generally or only in certain circumstances, and whether they distinguish 
between different kinds of animals used for research. Unlike a quantitative approach, a 
qualitative, discursive approach has the ability to reveal the contrary themes surrounding 
speciesism, and to reveal instances when participants contradict themselves or among 
themselves. The qualitative approach was deemed suitable also given the possibility that 
human nature may be at times constructed as similar to and at other times as different 
from animal nature in order to justify various ideologies or ad-hoc purposes. 
It was predicted that 'animal nature' would be a dilemmatic construction in these 
focus groups because people usually use animal-derived produce for their daily lives, can 
experience sympathy and pity for animals' plight, and include some animals in their 
homes as pets. We expected that, given the wider spread of postmaterialist values in 
Britain than in Romania, British participants would be more likely to extend the scope of 




Twenty-one Romanians and twenty-one British people participated. The nineteen 
female and two male Romanian participants were students at a high-school in Bucharest 
(age range = 17 to 19 years, M = 17.80 years). The ten male and eleven female British 
participants were recruited via posters on a university campus (ages range = 18 to 42 
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years, M = 24.80 years). All British participants were of British nationality, while in term 
of ethnicity they were 17 English, 1 Black African, 1 Chinese, 1 Pakistani and 1 Indian. 
3.5.2 Procedure 
The Romanian participants were recruited at a high-school in Bucharest, and the 
British participants were recruited on a British university campus. The Romanian 
participants were approached through their teacher in class, and invited to participate in a 
focus group study about "animal rights and human rights". The British participants were 
recruited through a poster announcing that participants were required to take part in a 
debate on current issues, and were rewarded £ 1 0 each for taking part in the debate. Each 
focus group was composed of seven participants, and the discussions were moderated by 
the researcher. Participants were sat in a circle, and a tape recorder was placed in the 
middle. The interviewer read out each question and invited the students to comment and 
express their point of view, and then moderated the ensuing debate. The interviewer tried 
to challenge the participants on the opinions they expressed in order to point out any 
inconsistencies or paradoxes in their responses. The focus group interviews were 
conducted in Romanian and English, respectively. In Romania the focus group interviews 
lasted between 40 and 50 minutes, while in Britain, between 60 and 70 minutes. The 
participants were debriefed at the end of the each focus group discussion. 
3.5.3 Analytic strategy 
The Romanian focus group interviews were translated into English. The analysis 
was informed by thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998), where themes represent "specific 
patterns found in the data in which one is interested" (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 57). Within 
this analytic framework, themes can be based both on the manifest content of the data, 
which is directly observable, as well as on latent content, which is implicitly referred to 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & Yardley, 2004). At the manifest or semantic level, themes are 
based on explicit meanings, which the analyst usually takes at face value. However, at the 
latent level, the themes draw on wider influences such ideologies, culture, history, etc., 
which means that the interpretative work moves from description to theorization (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). The thematic analysis can be inductive, i.e. the themes are closely 
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linked to the data and do not fit into a pre-existing coding frame, or they can be 
theoretical, i.e. the themes are driven by existing theory and by the researcher's analytic 
interest (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Given the aim of thematic analysis to "describe how 
thematic contents are elaborated by groups of participants, and to identify meanings that 
are valid across many participants" (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 66), thematic analysis was 
considered particularly suitable for analysing the data obtained from the focus group 
interviews. 
As the research aimed to examine the meanings people attach to animal and 
human existence within different cultural and socio-economic contexts, there was a 
specific focus on the construction of the categories of 'humans' and 'animals' in talk. 
Given the focus of the analysis on the latent content of the data and on ideological 
constructions, the approach shared many assumptions with discourse analysis (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and Foucauldian 
discourse analysis (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). Similarly to 
discourse analysis, the present study assumed that ideologies such as speciesism would 
be enacted in discourse, and that the participants, as non-vegetarians, would have a stake 
in expressing their beliefs about animals. In line with discursive psychology, the present 
research considered that "psychological activities such as justification, rationalization, 
categorization, and attribution are understood as ways in which participants manage their 
interests" (Willig, 2001: 91). Given its considerations of postmaterialism, societal level of 
analysis, and its cross-cultural aspect, the present research also shared the assumptions of 
Foucauldian discourse analysis that culture provides individuals with certain ideologies 
and discursive resources, and that discourses play a part in the legitimization of power 
relations and social arrangements (see Willig, 2001). Thus, the present thematic analysis 
was conducted within a constructionist framework, with the focus not on motivation or 
individual psychologies, but rather on the "socio-cultural contexts and structural 
conditions that enable the individual accounts that are provided" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 
85). However, unlike discourse analysis, the present analysis did not focus on language 
per se, nor on its function as social action. Thus, the interpretation of the present data 
bears resemblance to 'thematic discourse analysis' and to 'thematic decomposition 
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analysis' (e.g. Stenner, 1993; Taylor & Ussher, 2001), in the sense that patterns in the 
data were identified as socially produced, but no 'pure' discursive analysis as such was 
conducted (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Each transcript was read carefully and patterns in the data were noted. Data was 
categorised into codes, which represented sequences of the data that appeared interesting 
to the analysis, and which referred to "the most basic segment, or element, of the raw 
data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon" 
(Boyatzis, 1998: 63). Related codes were spliced, and themes were formed. The analysis 
was not linear, but rather recursive (see Braun & Clarke, 2006), as it involved a constant 
moving back and forth between the data itself and the themes that were constructed. It 
should be pointed out here that the themes did not 'emerge', as it were, because they did 
not have a concrete existence in the data, but rather they were constructed during the 
interpretative work. The themes were mainly based on the latent content of the data, 
because the analysis went beyond the simple surface meaning of the data and tried to 
"identify the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations - and ideologies -
that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data" (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 84). The themes were theory-driven and they sought to reflect instances of 
speciesism and influences of postmaterialism. The themes found can be assumed to 
illustrate social representations (Joffe & Yardley, 2004), in our case, social and 
ideological representations of what constitutes humanness and animality. 
3.6 Results 
Overall, four mam themes were constructed from both the British and the 
Romanian data, some of them reflecting similarities, and others, differences, between the 
British and the Romanians. In the paragraphs that illustrate dialogues or debates between 
participants, different letters are used to distinguish participants' entries from one 
anothers'. However, there is no focus on individual points of view but rather on the 
dialogues themselves. 
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3.6.1 Rational Autonomy 
Humans' rational autonomy was often spontaneously invoked by participants 
attempting to demarcate animals from humans. Humans were explicitly described as 
those who "have reason, which distinguishes them from animals" (Romanian focus group 
[RFG] 1, 170) but categorical distinctions were readily challenged, in which the dilemma 
was often resolved by resorting to incontestable ideologies such as religious dogma: 
A: "Humans are thinking creatures." 
B: "How do you know animals are not?" 
A: "They communicate, too, but not like humans." 
C: "Humans are superior creatures as God put them at the centre of his creation, 
the centre of animals, of nature, everything." 
B: "But that doesn't mean that humans should take advantage ... " (RFG 3, 154-
163). 
As it can be noted, participant C intervened to resolve the apparent dilemma but religion 
did not act as incontrovertible because participant B contested it. In discourse analysis, 
this form of argument is referred to as a 'bottom-line argument', i.e., one that invokes 
something that often works as a 'fundamental' and that cannot be challenged or is 
difficult to challenge. 
Reason was also used to justify why animals were inferior, and why they were 
used in scientific experiments: 
A: "To me it seems correct to test on animals certain diseases that appear both in 
humans and in animals rather than to test them on humans. Because, ok, the 
mentality nowadays is that animals are considered inferior to humans, and then ... 
Interviewer: "Why do you think they are considered inferior? 
A: "Because they lack reason ... 
B: "And because we like it there to exist someone we can take advantage of ... 
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C: "First of all, the issue of reason ... the issues of philosophy say that humans are 
the ultimate goal, and therefore we humans can use any means to reach our ends ... 
(RFG 2, 201-212). 
As the excerpt above indicates, lack of reason is used to morally disengage from animals 
and to legitimize experimenting on them. The cynical remark of the participants' shows 
that the animals' presumed lack of reason is not so much a scientific exercise, but rather 
an ideological construction motivated by humans' needs of domination and power. It 
could therefore be argued that the dehumanization of groups, too, may occur because 'we 
like it there to exist someone we can take advantage of. The last participant's point about 
the 'issues of philosophy' and humans being the ultimate goal is another example of a 
bottom-line argument, where philosophy is invoked to closed down an argument likely to 
bring up uncomfortable truths about animal use. The exchange illustrated above shows 
how rational autonomy in animals can be denied when it is in the humans' interest to 
'reach their ends', and arguably shows how dehumanisation can function as 
delegitimization ( cf. Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990), and as system-justification (cf. Jost & Banaji, 
1994). 
Rational autonomy was used also to make distinctions among humans themselves, 
and those who lacked this capacity were sometimes explicitly constructed as lacking 
human essence: 
"When people get Alzheimer's, ( ... ) they are basically stripped of them being a 
human being" (British focus group [BFG] 1, 37-38). 
Thus, contrary to Regan (1997), these participants attended to variability in humans' 
rational autonomy and used it as a basis to selectively allocate humanity. This often 
justified the withholding of human rights, such as the right to life of disabled unborn 
children: 
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"You cannot know if that child will have a conscience or just be a vegetable" 
(RFG 3, 291-92). 
or disabled children who were already born: 
"There's no use in that [disabled] child being In a wheelchair, being on a 
respirator, ventilator" (BFG 2, 523-25). 
and the right of terminally ill patients to decide when to die: 
"The patient may be considered as not being in his full mental faculties (RFG 1, 
405). 
As this last excerpt shows, it was not the case that humans who lacked rational 
autonomy were constructed as unworthy of life but rather that they lacked the ability to 
make rational decisions about the beginning or continuation of their own lives. However, 
the withholding of rights to choose life or death presumes that the speakers themselves 
possess rational autonomy and so can adjudicate such matters for others and presumably 
themselves. Thus, rational autonomy provides a basis for both demarcating humans from 
animals and for demarcating humans who can and cannot speak for themselves on 
matters of life and death. 
However, awareness of humans' distinct rational autonomy could also be used to 
argue against cruel treatment of animals who do not have a voice: 
"I just think that animals don't have a choice. We choose whether they're gonna 
live or die, which is really bad" (BFG 3, 81-82). 
"But the pig is still a being, it's got life, and .. .! don't know, human rights are 
more important but only because humans have reason, which distinguishes them 
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from animals, but nevertheless, because of this, does it mean we shouldn't offer 
them any ... facilities, so to speak?" (RFG 1,169-72). 
As these quotations indicate, some participants implied that humans should be 
responsible towards animals precisely because they have more agency than them, and it 
could be argued that these participants expressed group-based guilt for humans' 
mistreatment of animals. Just as in research on inter-group relations (e.g. Iyer, Leach & 
Crosby, 2003), the Romanian participant in the extract above arguably experienced 
group-based guilt and the dilemma of privilege because she perceived her in-group, the 
humans, to be unfairly advantaged in comparison to animals by being naturally endowed 
with reason and autonomy. By wanting to 'offer facilities' to animals she means to 
extend rights to animals because it becomes apparent that lack of reason should not 
automatically deprive other creatures from protection against cruelty. 
Morality also seemed to be a criterion for similarities between animals and 
humans. Immoral humans were judged as less worthy than animals, as in this exchange 
between Romanian participants about the traditions of knifing pigs at Christmas: 
A: "Anyway, the animal, at least the domestic one, cannot be regarded like a 
human. The moment I buy it with money, it means it is my property. Even if it is 
a creature ... You pay for it, you have rights over it. 
B: "I remember from the 3rd grade, from the geography classes. They said clearly: 
domestic animals are our source of food. From the beginning, their role was 
decided. They are on earth to serve our needs, period. 
C: "Why do we make differences? Why not cats and dogs? Let's say they are 
inferior. It is a gradual inferiority. I can say that for cats I find more compassion 
than for humans, humans can let you down, whereas cats ... 
B: "In this case, you can grow attached even to pigs ... 
C: "Yes, we have this mentality that pigs are dirty, that pigs are pigs ... Rather, 
pigs are more humanlike than piglike. 
83 
Chapter 3 Human-animal boundaries 
D: "Tradition started from the humans' desire to show their superiority to 
animals ... (RFG 2, 166-183) 
There are a few issues at stake in the dialogue above. Firstly, we can see how 
animals are reified, and one might think of the same argument applying to human slaves: 
"even if it is a creature ... you pay for it, you have rights over it". The domestic animals 
seem to be more reified than other animals because of their position of subordination 
relative to humans, although one participant challenges this: "why not cats and dogs?". 
Secondly, it can be noted how the 'role' of domestic animals, 'decided from the 
beginning', acts as a rationalization and justification of their fate. The use of the passive 
voice, 'their role was decided', eliminates the naming of who might have taken this 
decision. Thirdly, the supposed gradual inferiority of animals might suggest that the 
dehumanization, too, might involve gradual differences between groups, similarly to the 
theorization of ontologization as a principle of social classification. 
Fourthly, humans can be 'piglike' because they 'can let you down', which suggest 
that immoral humans can be considered worse than animals. Humans' immoral ity 
appears to strip them off of their human status, and it could be argued that immoral 
behaviour can lead to dehumanization. This idea is also echoed by some British 
participants talking about animal experimentation: 
A: "I'm not entirely decided one way or the other either, but I would prefer to see 
convicted criminals having been tested on rather than animals. 
B: "I agree with you on that. 
A: "But then you get into the whole human rights. But, you know, humans just 
know they're supreme beings, so they think they've got the right to use whatever 
they want. 
Interviewer: What is it about convicted criminals that they should be tested on, 
rather than animals? 
A: Well, not just petty thieves, things like that, but if people are causing harm to 
other people and killing and raping and all that sort of stuff, then I don't think 
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they belong in civilized society so to speak, they're a danger to other people. Yet, 
because we've brought down the whole death penalty and stuff like that, we look 
after them, we put them in jail, we feed them and that, so, you know, I 
mean ... (BFG 3, 51-66). 
As it can be seen, people engage in criminal behaviour do not belong in "civilized 
society", although society does treat them in prison by feeding them and protecting their 
rights. It could be argued that dehumanization may be an emotional reaction to human 
immoral or criminal behaviour, but also a rationalization of their actions: if they were 
really human, they would not have engaged in crimes. Given the widespread stereotypes 
of the Gypsies as thieves and criminals (see chapter 2), it could be argued that their 
dehumanization, too, may hinge upon their social representations as immoral, and 
therefore as asocial beings (cf. Chulvi & Perez, 2003). Last but not least, in both the 
Romanian and the British discourses we find awareness of humans' sense of superiority 
and enjoyment in taking advantage of smaller forms of life. 
3.6.2 Sentience 
While rational autonomy made humans distinct from animals, sentience was often 
invoked as the basis of similarity between humans and animals. When asked whether 
they believed animals had feelings or emotions, these two Romanian participants 
responded: 
A: "Yes, they are instinctual but have feelings nonetheless. 
B: "At the end of the day, our feelings are instinctual, too. It's a feature that 
makes us resemble animals" (RFG 2, 246-48). 
It is interesting here how instinct was brought up as a common ground between animals 
and humans. However, in some research on dehumanization, instinct has been used as a 
demarcation line between in-group and out-group, where dehumanized out-groups were 
considered primitive or instinctual (see for example Jahoda, 1992; 1999). It would be 
interesting to see how instinct may be used at different times to construct the presupposed 
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'animal' essence of the out-group, and at other times to justify the 'natural' behaviour of 
the in-group, such in-group bias or group competition. 
Furthermore, when asked by the researcher whether they thought that "if animals 
were proven to have feelings, or emotions, similar to those of humans, this would make 
us change our attitude towards animals, to stop the experiments, the suffering, the 
killing", the participants responded: 
A: "Yes, if we knew this, maybe ... 
B: "We already know they have them. 
C: "Come on, now we can say that even plants have feelings! 
A: "How could a plant express its feelings?! 
B: "First of all we have to think of the soul, every soul no matter to whom it 
belonged and no matter how bad that human or animal were, has emotions and 
feelings and so forth." (RFG 2, 255-265). 
We can see in the excerpt above how some participants hesitate and deny that animals 
have feelings, whereas another admits that animals have sentience and that judgements of 
character, as it were, should not undermine considerations of sentience. It would be 
interesting to know whether attributions of sentience might go beyond negative prejudice. 
Might one imagine these Romanian participants saying "no matter how bad Gypsies / 
criminals / homeless people are, they have a soul, and emotions, and feelings, and so 
forth"? It is possible that the sentience of these social groups might be more contested 
than animal sentience, because humans are not 'innocent' beings, but rather rational ones 
capable of knowing good from bad. 
If the participants accepted that animals possessed sentience, they nonetheless 
considered animal sentience to be less than that of humans, and that this limited 
emotional range was used to justify their exploitation. It could be argued that in some 
instances dehumanization may involve considerations of degree rather than of kind, as it 
can be seen in the following exchange between British participants below: 
86 
Chapter 3 Human-animal boundaries 
A: "But don't you think that's pretty hypocritical because the animal's parents, 
for example, might get really sad when the baby animal dies. 
B: "Yeah, I think you've to look at it ... ifthey actually do or not, because animals 
don't have the same kind of. .. like, you know, frontal cortex, emotional 
attachment as humans do, like self-awareness issues, so they may feel the loss, I 
guess, but in a different way, but it becomes quite philosophical, doesn't it? Does 
the way that we have attachment with ourselves ... we put that above the way 
animals have attachments to each other, which we as humans tend to do." (BFG 1, 
46-54). 
The downgrading of animal sentience echoes PIous's remark that one way to dehumanize 
animals is to "deny that animals feel pain in the same way that humans do" (2003: 519). 
Equally, the second participant denied the possibility of self-awareness in animals, 
possibly in order to reduce their feelings of guilt over animal experimentation. As PIous 
noted, "another common way people reduce conflict over their use of animals is to 
acknowledge that animals feel pain, but to deny that animals are intelligent or self-aware" 
(2003: 521). It may not be surprising if the dehumanization of human groups draws on 
the same arguments about the out-groups' presumed higher resistance to pain and lack of 
self-awareness. As it was pointed out in chapter 2, the Hungarian judge who denied full 
compensation for two Gypsy men in the wrongful-arrest suit argued that the two men had 
"more primitive personalities than the average, therefore, the psychological damage they 
suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested". 
Therefore, one should take into account the possibility that dehumanization in its more 
subtle forms might involve considerations of 'lesser humanity' rather than total denial of 
humanity in the target of dehumanization. 
Sentience served as a rhetorical basis for treating animals with respect 10 
discussions about animal experimentation in Britain: 
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"You can take that to a more basic level, as well, and argue about the discomfort 
and pain the animal might feel by being tested on. That no living creature has the 
right to undergo that treatment" (BFG 1, 60-62). 
Thus, while the participants denied moral status and decision-making to animals 
and humans lacking in rational autonomy, they nonetheless agreed that animals had 
moral standing on the basis of sentience. However, sentience was not a 'bottom-line' 
argument against the exploitation of animals for human ends. The type of animal seemed 
to matter. Regarding animal experimentation for example, one participant justified it on 
the basis of her dislike of rats and one could argue that portraying animals as unpleasant 
acted as a form of moral disengagement: 
"It's on rats that they [experiment], and I agree, I really don't like rats" (RFG 1, 
244-245). 
Just as in-groups may be included in the scope of justice more that out-groups, 
intimate animals (i.e., pets) were protected more than animal strangers from animal 
cruelty (see Opotow, 1993), in what Billig (1985) might have called instances of 
particularization and of categorization: 
"There's no way you're gonna test on my dog 'cause to me there's that emotional 
attachment [ ... ] If I was emotionally attached to an animal I would be against 
[animal testing], but just thinking, oh, yeah, some monkey out there I don't know 
anything about, I would think that's ok" (BFG 1, 163-164, 177-179). 
"If that rabbit were mine and I had feelings for it and if I noticed that it had 
feel ings for me, too, I would never agree with these experiments on it. And why 
not. .. there are many people who have hamsters, mice, even bugs, there are many 
who have snakes and all manner of creatures ... " (RFG 2, 237-240). 
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Similarly, humans who were attributed a lack of humanizing rational autonomy were 
described as feeling primary emotions, e.g. happiness. However, this was a basis for 
positive descriptions of such persons and their interests: 
"This malformation [Down's syndrome] doesn't prevent those children from 
being happy. They may be even happier than us in their own world" (RFG 2,377-
378). 
This participant somehow echoes the stereotype of the poor as being 'poor but happy' 
(Kay & Jost, 2003). Although the participant as well as society at large may not have an 
interest in constructing the mentally disabled as 'disabled but happy', it could be argued 
that such complementary beliefs about the mentally disabled, as well as their 
dehumanization, might have a palliative function, as envisaged by Bernard et al. (1965). 
3.6.3 Speciesism 
In the focus group discussions, speCleSlsm was characterized by mutually 
supporting claims that humans were onto logically superior to animals and that humans' 
interests took precedence over animals' interests. These claims could even be invoked to 
describe animal exploitation as unavoidable or even noble in some cases, e.g. animal 
testing: 
"I think that you have to test on something. There are certain things that you 
cannot test on humans" (BFG 2,21-22). 
"I agree with these experiments because this way lives can be saved, humans are 
prevented from getting ill, there are certain noble causes, so to speak" (RFG 2, 
224-25). 
To support speciesist ideologies, participants cited the authority of religion, philosophy or 
tradition: 
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"The issues of philosophy say that humans are the ultimate goal, and therefore we 
humans can use any means to reach our ends" (RFG 2,211-12). 
"It does make sense to test things on animals before humans if you believe that a 
human life is worth more than an animal life, which 1 happen to" (BFG 2, 29-31). 
"Humans have always regarded animals as a means ... through which they can 
reach their goals. Humans have always been superior, animals have been given to 
them to help them" (RFG 2, 218-20). 
"Humans are superior creatures as God put them at the centre of his creation, the 
centre of animals, of nature, everything" (RFG 3,160-61). 
On the one hand, these citations of 'the issues of philosophy,' the intentions of a 
God and the superiority of human beings evidence the plethora of ideological 
justifications that humans can use to defend speciesism. On the other, the citations 
suggest the vulnerability of speciesism to attack in that they acknowledge their need for 
defence. Indeed, some participants contested the validity of speciesism quite explicitly in 
their talk: 
"I would prefer to see convicted criminals having been tested on rather than 
animals. But then you get into the whole human rights. But, you know, humans 
just know they're supreme beings, so they think they've got the right to use 
whatever they want" (BFG 3, 51-57). 
Speciesist talk is dilemmatic and here the participants expressed contradictions 
that make up common sense ideologies about human-animal similarity. Human rights 
appear at first incontrovertible and then as the consequence of human arrogance. Of 
course, two categories of 'human' are at play here; the 'human rights' which might save 
the prisoner from experimentation and the humans who 'know they're supreme beings' 
and who might adjudicate whether this prisoner or the prisoner's animal counterparts are 
90 
Chapter 3 Human-animal boundaries 
to be the subjects of experimentation. However, in spite of their evident difficulty. 
participants often constructed a possible rational answer to the dilemmas between 
fulfilling human interests and avoiding animal cruelty that could be reached by 'weighing 
up' the evidence on each side, as in the case of animal experiments, for example: 
A: "It has been shown in time that [animal experimentation] is a pretty efficient 
option, even if it would appear slightly cruel or brutal. But, in the end, if we were 
to think about animal suffering, this wouldn't be too correct and it's not 
I " norma ... 
B: "But what could we do? Experiment on plants? Ultimately it is the only 
solution." 
A: "The best guinea pig is the rat (sic), it breeds extremely quickly and can have 
many offspring." 
B: "Yes, but not only rats, there are many experiments carried out on monkeys, 
especially as regards the brain. I mean, because they are very similar to humans, 
and some [experiments] are very cruel." 
A: "Yes, but it is less costly to do it on rats than on monkeys ... " 
B: "Yes, but with rats you can't do experiments researching the human brain. Or 
something indeed vital for humans." 
C: "Rats bring disease and carry microbes and rabies, I mean, I agree they should 
be used for experiments, anyway, mother-nature is not affected by a tiny mouse." 
0: "I don't agree, because 1 don't think we have the right to decide whether that 
creature is important or not, if it deserves to live or to reproduce, we don't decide 
that". (RFG 1, 222-67). 
Here we see participants weighing up the material as well as the moral costs and 
benefits of animal testing and we find that one efficient strategy to justify the inevitable 
cruelty of animal testing is to portray animals as pests. Note the complexity of the 
argument and how certain lines of reasoning are introduced and then effectively resisted. 
There seems to be a form of utilitarianism underlying these exchanges, which appears to 
be a standard and accepted basis for weighing moral dilemmas. However, not all 
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participants endorsed the VIew that animals should be sacrificed for the benefit of 
humans. The same dilemma regarding animal experimentation was echoed by the British 
participants: 
"If we didn't use animals to test on, how would we find new cures for medicine 
and stuff? What is the other option? So there's a lot of benefits and there's a lot of 
disadvantages, but you've just got to weigh up the two. I think there's a lot of 
abuse and exploitation and stuff going on ... " (BFG 2, 55-58). 
But as can be seen in the following exchange, the participants perceived the dilemmas 
associated with speciesism and with humans' power over animals: 
A: "I agree [with animal experimentation], we are superior beings and we have to 
test medicine on somebody else to see if they are good. 
B: "And if aliens come and kidnap you and do experiments on you to test 
whatever they need in order to evolve, would that seem logical to you because 
they are superior? 
C: Do you want, as a human, if you believe in medicine, shouldn't you test them 
on yourself, as a human? 
D: "We've got a responsibility, we can't test on animals because it would 
mean .... Because it doesn't say anywhere that humans are superior and that they 
should use animals and test on them and evolve because of them ... Because those 
animals are creatures, too, and have the same right as us to populate the earth, 
right?" (RFG 3,110-23). 
Here the participants questioned the authority of species ism, with phrases such as 
"it doesn't say anywhere that humans should use animals", and "if aliens do experiments 
on you, would that seem logical?", showing the lack of any fundamental ideology to 
which humans can appeal to justify their speciesist beliefs and behaviour and thus 
highlighting the inherently dilemmatic nature of speciesism. At the same time, phrases 
such as "we've got a responsibility, we can't test on animals" could be interpreted as 
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expressions of group-based guilt, which arises when members of an advantaged group 
acknowledge their responsibility and mistreatment of a disadvantaged out-group (see 
Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 2002), especially when the in-group's advantage seems 
unfair and beyond the in-group's control. 
Constructing similarities and differences between humans and animals appears 
dilemmatic to the participants, as in this excerpt regarding animal experimentation: 
A: "This could be looked at from a different viewpoint: as you believe that 
animals are similar to humans, isn't it the same thing ... doesn't it have the same 
implications as the testing on humans? 
Interviewer: "Would you like to develop this idea? 
B: "If we considered that humans are similar to animals, then we wouldn't be 
allowed to do experiments on animals anymore, that would automatically become 
immoral. If we consider ourselves superior, and at a great distance even from the 
most evolved of them, then we could conduct experiments on animals, but these 
wouldn't be relevant anymore." (RFG 3, 172-182). 
As it can be seen, similarities between humans and animals are necessary if we need to 
extrapolate from animals to humans in medical research, but at the same time these 
similarities involve moral considerations for the animals' well-being and interests to be 
free from pain. The participants seem to be aware that humans' beliefs of superiority over 
animals may stem from scientific knowledge as well as from necessity, and that the focus 
may shift from differences to similarities between animals and humans according to 
context and humans' needs. 
Speciesism has been described as the putting of humans' interests before 
animals'. Yet, attaching a lower value to animals' interests does not imply that those 
interests have no value whatsoever. Even where the priority of humans' interest was most 
boldly asserted, awareness of animals' interests was evident in views that it is normative, 
rather than logical, to prioritize humans' interests: 
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"You first have to think about human not animal rights" (RFG 1,186-87). 
that an animal's death was a lesser wrong than a human's death: 
"There's one thing for a lab mouse to die, another, for a human to die" (RFG 
3,147). 
and in the recognition that animal research required justification: 
"I think if there is any possibility of medical gain, then I think animal testing is 
justified" (BFG 3, 41-42). 
Thus British participants acknowledged the horror of culling animals to prevent the 
spread of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001 even when they did not disagree with such 
culling: 
"Even though it was awful ... the way it was handled was wrong. I think it had to 
be done because it was better to save us and a lot of people" (BFG 2, 264-65). 
Finally, participants often tempered their utilitarianism by calling attention to examples 
of animal research that were not necessary for humans' welfare and which were 
unjustified. Here participants often drew a distinction between medical research and 
cosmetics research, with the former being justified in terms of necessity and worth: 
"To conciliate both animals and humans, it is necessary to do certain experiments 
but only if strictly necessary, not for luxury or other purposes" (RFG 1, 276-77). 
"I don't agree with cosmetics, that's more of a vanity thing, but if it's for 
medicine, it's for a worthy cause" (BFG 1, 8-10). 
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In some instances, participants were aware of humans' speciesist attitudes and of their 
unjust treatment of animals, as in the case of fox hunting: 
"We do uphold traditions, but you can't use that as a way to justify an outdated 
practice. And, also, they could do it without foxes, they could put something out 
there that runs about, like a little machine, runs about, they could go around and 
stop it, but they don't 'cause they like seeing, you know, the chase, this thing 
ripped apart, it's like a mad conquer over this thing, they shred and they go and 
drink afterwards". (BFG 1, 262-266). 
or in the case of horse racing, which was questioned by the British particiapnts: 
A: "I just think that if it's the fences that are causing the deaths, why have the 
fences? Why can't they let them just run the race? It's just this issue, is horse 
racing a good thing or not? I always just assumed that, yeah, it's a sport, it's fun, 
nobody gets harmed, and then I realised that the fences caused so much harm to 
horses. 
B: "I suppose that those people who watch it are only interested in who comes 
first, doesn't really matter how the horses run. 
A: "It just seems unnecessary to have that aspect of race. But then again it's the 
old bit, it's the Grand National, that's part of the make-up of the Grand National." 
(BFG 1, 296-305). 
The Romanian participants were aware of humans' speciesist attitudes and sometimes 
critical of the humans' exploitation of animals: 
A: "Humans are aware of their superiority and therefore torture all the other 
around them. 
B: ''Not only animals ... (RFG 2, 156-159). 
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As this exchange shows, not only animals but also humans such as ethnic minorities may 
be 'tortured' and dehumanized. 
3.6.4 Maintaining the status quo 
Thus far there have been certain similarities in the Romanian and British data. In 
this final section, we attend to the differences in the ways that the participants in each 
country appealed to their own country's particular economic situation to justify the 
exploitation of animals. The Romanian participants were aware of the link between 
material development and social values and tended to agree that animals were better 
treated in Western European countries. However, in their own country, improvements in 
human rights took precedence over improvements in animal rights: 
"I think that in the end somewhat the facilitation of human rights ultimately 
determines a better life for animals, too. But the causal chain, so to speak, starts 
with humans: if humans have more rights and manage their money better, then 
with time there will be solutions for animals, too" (RFG 1, 198-201). 
For the Romanians, improving animal rights at home were perceived as a means of 
improving an inter-group situation in that it increased the chances of European Union 
membership, as in the case of the culling of stray dogs: 
"In my opinion, they should put [dogs] in a dog shelter, it is true, many financial 
resources are needed for such a thing, but, for us to get into the European Union, I 
think this is the best measure, not killing them" (RFG 1, 25-27). 
"Because no Western country ... we have aspirations to enter the EU and we kill 
them with the stick and fire! In England, or Germany or France such problems are 
not solved like that." (RFG 1, 59-61). 
Against these modernizing Westernizing agendas, concepts like "tradition" and "national 
identity" were invoked to justify the status quo in Romania, including the killing of 
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animals. One participant focused on the Romanian tradition of knifing pigs before 
Christmas: 
"This is a matter of tradition as well, because in our country pigs have always 
been cut in the traditional way" (RFG 1, 153-54). 
Again, rational autonomy, in the form of decision making, was introduced to justify the 
maintenance of traditional forms of animal cruelty: 
"At the beginning all peoples had something animalic in them. The differences 
between humans and animals were quite small. In time, we become civilised, but, 
still, certain traditions should be kept. And if humans, be they Romanian, Swiss, 
Belgian, want the pig to be cut or injected, they should be able to decide this" 
(RFG 2, 138-142). 
There were echoes of Bhiku Parekh's insightful observation that "although we can draw 
up a list of universal moral values, not all societies have the required moral, cultural, 
economic and other resources to live up to their demands" (2000: 133). Caught between 
the dilemma of tradition and Westernization, some Romanian participants concluded that 
Romania would modernize, but slowly: 
"For the third millennium, it's clear that this is what should be happening in order 
for us to evolve. But, as regards their application, I don't think that this will be 
possible, in our country, for a long time" (RFG 1,207-10). 
Interestingly, civilization and human progress were constructed in terms of humans' 
attitudes towards animals, where cruel attitudes were viewed as indicators of a lower 
degree of civilization. This discussion was present in the Romanian participants' talk 
about the culling of stray dogs: 
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"I think that animals, especially dogs as we are talking about them, haven't 
become an important element in Romanian society as they are abroad. So far we 
have never thought that we need well-organised methods." (RFG 2, 84-86). 
and in the reduction of animal suffering at the abattoir: 
A: "I think it's a step forward, this law ... 
Interviewer: "A step forward, toward what? 
A: "Toward ... in a way, linked to humans' conscience, because if they don't think 
about doing good to these animals, about their rights, then why would they think 
about human rights?" (RFG 1, 174-180). 
"I think the decision was taken so that we don't come across as a barbaric people, 
I mean, it's a pretty cruel tradition." (RFG 2, 149-150). 
The Romanian participants seem to be aware of their in-group's lower-status relative to 
other European countries, and sensitive to discussions about animal rights that would 
show them as an 'uncivilized' people. Arguably, the Romanian participants may suspect 
that given their in-group's record on animal rights, they may be dehumanized by other 
European, 'civilized' countries. This construction of the in-group as being less civilized 
than others with better human and animal rights records opens the possibility for self-
dehumanization of the in-group in those particular circumstance where comparisons with 
higher-status groups may be at stake. 
The accounts of the difficulties of securing animal rights might lead one to 
suspect that British participants would endorse them more obviously than Romanians did. 
Phrases like organic, vegetarian and against animal testing were part of the British 
discourse but not the Romanian one. In the course of the focus groups, one British 
participant declared herself to be a vegetarian and others advocated cruelty-free 
cosmetics and organic products. Participants often voiced the opinion that such 
postmaterialist values ordinarily shaped consumer behaviour: 
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"There'll be a lot of people who are concerned about animals rights and don't 
want to use products tested on animals 'cause they don't feel 
personally .... whatever, they've decided they don't want to. So they look at the 
product and it says "against animal testing" or "this product is not tested" (BFG 3, 
140-43). 
In contrast to the Romanian participants, who saw ethical treatment of animals as 
evidence of modernization, the British understood such practices as a return to tradition: 
"If they went back to traditional, natural, even organic farming methods, you have 
to respect the land, they'd have the space to go around, they wouldn't need all 
these injections to prevent the illnesses" (BFG 1, 384-87). 
Ironically, the British invoked tradition not to justify the exploitation of animals, like the 
Romanians did, but to propose less cruel alternatives to farming. 
Not only modernity and tradition but also poverty and wealth were used in each 
country to justify the status quo. In Romania, the participants used existential insecurity 
to legitimise the exploitation of animals: 
"Shelters [for dogs] don't seem to me a good solution in our country because we 
are a poor country, we hardly feed ourselves, let alone dogs" (RFG 2, 40-41). 
"From my point of view, that decision [culling stray dogs] was wise, because we 
don't have resources for other options. Castration and shelters would have cost 
money. But as we don't have money for health, education, and for street children, 
to spend money on dogs would have been ridiculous" (RFG 2, 63-66). 
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"And nobody says that you should be purely brutal in the act of getting food, 
because ultimately that's what it is, but in our country there are more important 
problems that require greater attention than this" (RFG 1, 133-35). 
"I don't know if this [the euthanasia of dogs] is a very good measure, but I know 
for sure that it is in line with our resources" (RFG 2, 32-33). 
For the British participants, consumption appeared to be the unstoppable force that 
limited changes in animal welfare: 
"There is a greater demand for cheaper food and all the economy brands, and the 
effect it's had on farmers, quite badly, they kind of tried to take shortcuts, like 
when they feed the animals their own brains and stuff, which led to BSE" (BFG 1, 
377-80). 
"Do you think we're actually to blame as consumers, partially, for these epidemic 
patterns? We're constantly saying we want food cheaper and the people who are 
gonna make it cheaper are the farmers, and they're gonna cut comers and this is 
why 1 think things like these may be happening" (BFG 3, 320-23). 
This is not to say that the British participants endorsed consumption patterns that limited 
animals' welfare, only that they constructed them as barriers to changing the status quo: 
"The whole sort of foot and mouth incident and everything like that just 
highlights the complete lack of respect that business seems to have for nature 
nowadays. Everybody is taking the short-term viewpoint of business, it's just the 
viewpoint of you making your profits for the end of year results" (BFG 1, 391-
95). 
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3.7 Discussion 
What are these British and Romanian participants telling social psychologists 
about how we should configure the human-animal boundary in our theories of inter-group 
relations? First, they show the contested nature of both that boundary itself and its 
relationship to exploitation. Rational autonomy makes (most) humans unlike (most) 
animals but sentience makes us all appear to be much more alike and almost equal in the 
rights we should enjoy. In line with Billig et aI's perspective, these essential differences 
and similarities fall out from, and are not epistemologically prior to, ideological concerns. 
Second, as in other domains of liberal ideology, our participants were caught on the horns 
of a dilemma between believing in their own groups' superiority and more important 
interests, and in believing that cruelty against other living things was wrong. While 
theories of dehumanization tended to assume that animals provide a good blueprint for 
ill-treated out-groups because animals have fundamentally different natures from 
humans, these data show how humans' shared consensus about human-animal differences 
can lead them to infer that they should treat animals well. As one participant put it, 
"humans rights are more important ( ... ) because humans have reason, which 
distinguishes them from animals, but nevertheless does it mean we shouldn't offer them 
any ... facilities, so to speak?" (RFG 1, 169-171). 
It could be argued here that speciesism served to justify the system (cf. Jost & 
Banaji, 1994) because it provided the participants with an ideology that could rationalize 
the existing power relations between humans and animals. At the same time, speciesism 
provided the participants with readily available solutions to the dilemmas that they 
encountered when thinking about animal exploitation for human needs. While both 
British and Romanian participants endorsed speciesist views and used them to justify the 
exploitation of animals and to draw the human-animal boundary, they used their 
societies' differing economic conditions in very similar ways to suggest the impossibility 
of improving animal welfare. Complicating Inglehart's theory, both characteristics of 
materialist and post-materialist societies provided means of justifying the status quo. At 
the individual level, both poverty and consumerism seemed to force humans to make 
choices that would harm animals, while at the societal level, they both engendered 
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lifestyles and cycles of consumption detrimental to animal welfare. It would thus appear 
that postmaterialist values cannot totally override deeply embedded and all pervasive 
speciesist attitudes, maybe because, as Gamer (2003a) argues, the moral pluralism of 
liberal ideology conceives animal rights as a moral preference rather than as a moral 
obligation. 
If the human-animal boundary is dilemmatic, then what are the implications for 
the operationalization of the concept of dehumanization? Categories such as 'human' and 
'animal' seem to be more fluid than the ideologies that shape them or the social 
inequalities that these ideologies protect. Firstly, the dilemmatic construction of the 
categories 'animal' and 'human' along such dimensions as rational autonomy and 
sentience suggests not only that these should be viewed as ends of a humanity continuum 
(cf. Demoulin et aI., 2004a) but also that one continuum may be not enough. Also, even if 
emotions and traits are placed on a humanity continuum, their places on this continuum 
may not always be the same, but may vary as a function of context or rhetorical purposes. 
Secondly, could the dehumanization of out-groups be dilemmatic too? The 
dehumanization of out-groups may be an ad-hoc phenomenon that varies as a function of 
the in-group's interests. One could argue that just as animals can experience both 
dehumanization and anthropomorphization, so the dehumanization of out-groups may be 
a spontaneous and localized phenomenon, justifying particular ideologies or serving 
certain ad-hoc purposes, something that research on dehumanization might want to 
explore. If it is shown that dehumanization is context-dependent, this might be explained 
in terms of system-justification, for it could be argued that just like speciesism, 
dehumanization may not linked to the perception of the out-group's attributes per se, but 
to the in-group's interests of power and domination. Given that the most excluded 
animals from the scope of justice were the pests, it is possible that dehumanized groups 
are perceived as posing threat to the in-group and be seen as vermin to society, and future 
research on dehumanization might want to explore the link between perceived threat and 
dehumanization. At the same time, given the ideological aspects of speciesism, it could 
also be argued that dehumanization, too, serves to justify the system and to legitimize the 
social exclusion of certain groups, such as the Gypsies. In this sense, dehumanization 
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might be a form of moral exclusion or delegitimization, in line with Opotow's and Bar-
Tal's theorization. 
Interestingly, neither emotions nor traits emerged as the salient point of difference 
between animals and humans in this talk. This suggests that while dehumanization can be 
successfully operationalized in terms of emotions and traits in experimental settings, 
these may play little part when people try to resolve human and animal dilemmas in 
everyday life. At the same time, the lack of emotions and traits in the talk about animals 
suggests that dehumanization may be measured indirectly, through semantic 
constructions which may be equivalent to traits and emotions: e.g. "animals do not have 
reason" may be the equivalent of 'irrational', while "animals can feel the pain but not in 
the same way" may be tantamount to 'insensitive'. The dehumanization of animals can 
also be inferred from other ideological constructions, such as the rights that animals were 
thought to be entitled to, the greater easiness with which the participants accepted the 
animal culling during the foot-and-mouth epidemic compared to euthanasia of terminally 
ill humans, etc. Similarly, the dehumanization of humans was achieved through 
constructions such as humans' attitudes towards animals, e.g. culling stray dogs "may 
seem barbarous", "this suffering of animals that would somewhat be reduced, through 
this anaesthesia or something, is ( ... ) humane". Overall, these findings suggest that, 
firstly, the theorizing of dehumanization needs to move beyond mere trait association 
tasks and examine what dehumanization does to the target. Secondly, they suggest that 
dehumanization may be successfully examined in talk (see Tileaga's discursive analytic 
approach to the dehumanization of the Gypsies, 2005; 2006), and therefore discourse 
analysis may be used to complement the existing experimental approaches to 
dehumanization. A discursive analytic approach has the semantic and ideological 
flexibility to show when dehumanization occurs, even if, say, secondary emotions are not 
used, and has the ability to show why people dehumanize others, and whether they 
experience moral dilemmas when they do so, in other words it can highlight the 'waxing-
and-waning' aspects of dehumanization (see Tajfel, 1981; Billig, 2003). However, what 
such approach may not be able to do is to indicate infrahumanization, given this 




implicit and 'unconscious' associations between target (in-group vs. out-group) and the 
types of emotions. Thus, it may be impossible to observe infrahumanizaiton in talk which 
is by its very nature explicit. 
To conclude, the present study offers insights into the psychological processes 
that accompany the drawing of the human-animal boundary. By showing its dilemmatic 
aspects, the present study challenges the essentialization of the categories human and 
animal and draws attention to the ad-hoc nature of these two categories. The dilemmas 
surrounding the human-animal boundary were resolved by resorting to resources such as 
speciesist views, tradition, religion, lack of postmaterialist values, existential insecurity or 
consumerism. Speciesism generally excluded animals from the scope of justice by 
making humans argue that animals are essentially inferior to humans and that their role 
on earth is to serve humans' needs. At the same time, this study suggests that 
dehumanization may be dilemmatic, too, and that the dehumanization paradigm should 
also take into account the psychological processes associated with the particularization of 
dehumanized groups, as well as discursive analytic approaches. 
3.8 Progression to the next study 
The focus groups discussions on the animal and human dilemmas also reflected 
different ways of conceptualizing humanness. The dilemmas pertaining to human life 
arguably revealed beliefs about what is typically human, such as being physically 
'normal', having physical independence, moral agency and the ability to express choice, 
a healthy mental state and a certain degree of quality of life. By contrast, the dilemmas 
surrounding animal issues revealed beliefs about what makes humans unique, e.g. 
rational autonomy, secondary emotions, but elements of 'human typicality' such as moral 
agency were also used to differentiate humans from animals, thus complicating the 
distinction between human typicality and human uniqueness. However, while uniquely 
human elements may be used to distinguish between humans and animals, elements of 
what is typically human may be used to differentiate between human individuals or 
between humans groups. Therefore aspects of human typicality will be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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As it was discussed in Chapter 2, the human-animal binary has underlain 
much of the conceptualization and operationalization of dehumanization, and this 
binary was explored in greater detailed in Chapter 3. And although the qualitative 
research on the drawing of the human-animal boundary, described in Chapter 3, has 
been informative for the cognitive and ideological bases of dehumanization, the 
dehumanization of out-groups themselves will be examined quantitatively in the 
following studies. This is because a qualitative approach does not lends itself easily to 
experimental settings, which are arguably necessary for identifying the antecedents of 
dehumanization as well as to exploring the mediators and moderators of 
dehumanization and other correlates such as in-group identification. 
The present research will adopt the operationalizations used by the 
infrahumanization and ontologization paradigms, i.e. the differential attributions of 
secondary emotions to in-group and out-group, and of human and animal traits to in-
group and out-group, respectively, because these are relatively well established, lend 
themselves easily to being operationalized, and will make the present results 
comparable to previous research. But before applying these operationalizations, the 
present research will challenge their underlying psychological and methodological 
assumptions. As it was mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, humanity can be measured not 
only in terms of human uniqueness, but also in terms of human typicality (Haslam, 
Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), which opens the possibility of measuring 
dehumanization in terms of human typicality rather than human uniqueness, and the 
possibility of operationalizing dehumanization continuously rather than strictly 
categorically, taking into account variability within the categories 'animal' and 
'human'. This chapter will first examine whether the human and the animal emotions 
and traits are conceptualized as belonging to humanness continua rather than to 
mutually exclusive categories. Secondly it will examine whether the humanity and the 
positive valence of the target emotions and traits are independent or related 
dimensions. Thirdly, it will assess whether the human typicality of the emotions and 
traits is culturally variable or consisted across Romania and Britain. Finally~ this 
chapter will address the methodological concerns relating to the operationalization of 
dehumanization in empirical research. 
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4.2 Categorical vs. continuous operationalization of humanness 
It is important to engage with the issue as to whether humanness and animality 
are discrete categories or ends of the same continuum because the conceptualization 
of humanness as an all-or-nothing category or as a continuum may have implications 
for measuring the phenomenon of dehumanization. In other words, are the 
dehumanized individuals and groups strictly non-human, or are they just less-than-
human or less typically human than the in-group? The analysis of the focus groups 
discussion of human and animal dilemmas showed that the boundary between 
humanness and animality is not clear-cut and essentialized, but rather fluid and open 
to ideological and contextual influences. Moreover, they also suggested variability 
within the categories human and animal: pets are less animalic than vermin, while 
mentally or physically disabled people are less human than fully healthy people. 
Therefore it could be argued that we should conceive of humanness, as well as 
animality, In continuous rather than categorical terms. The continuous 
conceptualization of humanness has been brought to the fore by recent research on the 
attribution of humanness to targets (Haslam et aI., 2005), which suggested that we can 
measure humanness in terms of typicality rather than uniqueness, and that 
dehumanization might involve the denial of what is typically human rather than of 
what is uniquely human. Indeed, it could be argued that while the boundary between 
humans and animals may be drawn along human uniqueness lines, such as rational 
autonomy, the boundary between human groups may involve considerations of human 
typicality, as lesbian and gay people, ethnic minority members and various other 
socially excluded individuals such as nomadic Gypsies or mentally disabled 
individuals may be judged as 'less typical' exemplars of the human category (see 
Kahneman & Miller's norm theory, 1986). Thus, the dehumanization of human 
individuals or groups may involve beliefs about what is typical and normative of 
humans rather than beliefs about the human uniqueness of the targets in question. 
Whether dehumanization involves a denial of human uniqueness or of human 
typicality, and whether the human essence comprises human uniqueness or human 
typicality, has been a point of debate in some dehumanization research. The 
infrahumanization paradigm has argued that infrahumanization involves the 
reservation of the human essence to the in-group, and the denial of uniquely human 




2003). However, other research has challenged the conceptualization of the human 
essence in terms of uniquely human features such as secondary emotions, and has 
argued that we can conceive of humanness as being composed of both human nature 
and uniquely human attributes (Haslam et aI., 2005). Human nature is understood as 
those characteristics central and typical of humans, which may include characteristics 
that are common to animals and humans. Uniquely human characteristics, on the other 
hand, are exclusively human and include attributes relating to culture, civility, social 
learning and symbolic capacities that make humans distinct from animals. In this 
sense, the uniquely human traits are very similar to the secondary emotions and the 
cultural traits. It is worth noting here that the dimension of rational autonomy that 
emerged from the qualitative study described in Chapter 2 somewhat corresponds to 
the uniquely human aspect of humanness, whereas the dimension of sentience, to the 
human nature component. Haslam and colleagues used personality traits based on the 
Five-Factor Model in their operationalization of human nature and of uniquely human 
attributes. The target traits that they used in their studies were not divided into animal 
and human, but were instead rated on 7 -point scales in terms of their being an aspect 
of human nature, being uniquely human, and being desirable or positive. Haslam et aI. 
(2005) found that human nature characteristics referred to cognitive flexibility, 
warmth and emotional responsiveness, while the uniquely human characteristics 
involved morality, self-control, intelligence, openness and sociality. Haslam and 
colleagues found that the human nature traits were indeed essentialized, whereas the 
uniquely human traits were not, and argued that a denial of human essence, as 
envisaged by the infrahumanization paradigm, should take place at the level of human 
nature and not at the level of human uniqueness, contrary to the stipulation of the 
infrahumanization theory. However, as the focus groups discussions suggested, the 
boundary between what is uniquely human and what is human nature may not be 
clear-cut and uncontested, as Haslam et ai. 's study might imply. Instead, it could be 
argued that how individuals perceive and construct certain features as uniquely human 
or as relating to human nature may vary as a function of specific contexts or 
legitimizing myths, e.g. the human nature of the in-group may be constructed in 
different ways from that of the out-group. Therefore it could be argued that while we 
may not be able to draw a clear line between what is human nature and what is 
uniquely human, it is nonetheless useful and ecologically valid to measure humanness 
continuously rather than categorically. 
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The issue of categorical vs. continuous measurement of humanness, be it in 
terms of emotions or traits, is important because it could be argued that humanness is 
not a discrete category but rather one with a graded structure and with 'fuzzy' 
boundaries (see Barsalou, 1985). For example, a person with Down's syndrome may 
be considered less typical of the human category than a 'normal' human. Equally, a 
homosexual person would be judged as less typical than a heterosexual one (Hegarty 
& Pratto, 2001). A categorical approach to what is human is in line with the classical 
view of conceptual structure, where all exemplars of a category share properties 
necessary and sufficient for the exemplars to belong to the category (Medin, Proffitt, 
& Schwartz, 2000). In contrast, a continuous operationalization of humanness is 
arguably more in line with the prototype view, which holds that categories are not 
discrete, and that exemplars of categories can be judged as more or less typical 
instances of the category (Medin et aI., 2000). In this sense, category membership can 
be graded, and the more typical members have more characteristic properties than the 
less typical ones, as indicated by the work of Eleanor Rosch and others. From this 
perspective, emotions and traits could be judged as being more or less typically 
human, rather than necessary and sufficient features of humanness. 
In most research on dehumanization, humanness and animality have been 
conceptualized and operationalized rather in line with the classical view of categories, 
given their usage of mutually exclusive categories such as primary vs. secondary 
emotions (e.g. Leyens et aI., 2000; 2001; Gaunt, Leyes, & Demoulin, 2002), and 
natural vs. cultural, or animal vs. human, attributes in the ontologization paradigm 
(e.g. Perez et aI., 2001). And although the infrahumanization paradigm 
(dehumanization through emotions) has used the human-animal binary in the 
operationalization of infrahumanization, it has envisaged infrahumanization as 
indicating that the infrahumanized target has a less-than-human essence than the in-
group, thus linking the phenomenon to a continuous conceptualization of humanness. 
The categorical classification of emotions into primary and secondary has not taken 
into account potential gradual differences within these two categories, focusing 
instead on the differences bel1l'een the two categories. Similarly, the ontologization 
paradigm (dehumanization through traits) has reflected little on how the boundary 




When operationalizing the differences between primary and secondary 
emotions, research on infrahumanization has adopted a continuous conceptualization 
and measurement of the humanness of the emotions. For example, ratings on a 7-point 
humanity scale from 1 (not uniquely human) to 7 (uniquely human) have indicated 
that primary emotions scored significantly lower on the humanity dimension than 
secondary emotions (Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), 
Similarly, 4-point scale ratings of emotions ranging from 1 (completely common to 
both humans and animals) to 4 (completely unique to humans) have indicated that 
secondary emotions were rated as more unique to humans than primary emotions 
(Viki & Abrams, 2003). However, these studies limited their approach to the 
continuous measure of infrahumanization to pilot studies and did not measure the 
infrahumanization process per se in a continuous way. Therefore it is not known 
whether a continuous operationalization of infrahumanization would have produced 
results convergent to those from the categorical operationalization. 
However, the infrahumanization paradigm has revisited the strict categorical 
distinction between primary and secondary emotions, and has indicated that emotions 
can be conceptualized as belonging to a humanity continuum. Research on the 
dimensions of "uniquely" and "non-uniquely" human emotions found that emotions 
can be perceived as belonging to a continuum of humanity rather than to the mutually 
exclusive categories of primary and secondary (Demoulin, Leyens, Paladino, 
Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, & Dovidio, 2004a). In their study, Demoulin and 
colleagues investigated lay conceptualizations of emotions and conceptualized the 
'uniquely human' dimension "as a graded property rather than as a categorical 
property, that is, some emotions will be called 'uniquely human' not in an absolute 
sense, but in comparison to other emotions that possess relatively less 'uniquely 
human' features" (2004a: 77). They asked participants from 3 countries, Belgium. 
Spain and United States, to rate a total of 448 emotions for 13 characteristics on 7-
point scales. They then computed the humanity scores of the emotions based on their 
average on the dimensions of visibility, cause, morality, cognition, duration, age, and 
culture. which constituted the 'humanity' factor. They also computed the emotions' 
positivity based on average ratings on the dimensions of desirability and acceptabilily 
which represented the 'valence' factor. Demoulin and colleagues concluded that 
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emotions can be viewed along two bipolar factors: primary-secondary, and positiye-
negative, respectively, and that no emotions should be considered 'uniquely human' 
or 'non-uniquely human' in an absolute sense. However, it is not clear from Demoulin 
et al.' s study whether these two bipolar factors representing humanness and valence, 
respectively, are related or not. Besides, this approach does not take into account 
ambiguities which may arise from emotions occurring in the middle of the humanity 
continuum, an issue which has not been addressed by researchers on dehumanization. 
Other recent infrahumanization research has conceptualised the humanity of 
the emotions as a continuum and used the extent to which the target emotions were 
considered as uniquely human as a continuous predictor of the extent to which they 
are attributed to the out-group (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Participants indicated 
the extent to which they believed the out-group members were likely to feel the given 
emotions on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) and the results indicated that 
the humanity of the emotions predicted their attribution to the out-group. Thus it 
would appear that operationalizing infrahumanization continuously rather than 
categorically can capture the infrahumanization phenomenon. However, in the study 
cited above infrahumanization was not measured through the differential attribution of 
humanity to in-group vs. out-group, but only through the attribution of emotions to 
the target out-group. Thus, in the absence of the in-group, which arguably acts as the 
control, the results cannot be fully compared to previous research on 
infrahumanization which relied on the in-group vs. out-group paradigm. Nevertheless, 
they suggest that infrahumanization can be measured continuously as well as 
categorically. 
As for the operationalization of ontologization (dehumanization through traits) 
and the measurement of traits I, research has found that traits, too, can vary along 
dimensions of humanity and positivity. For example, a study examining the structure 
of natural and cultural traits found that natural traits were used more often to describe 
animals than humans, were perceived as more hereditary than learned, and were 
perceived as established very soon in the process of socialization (Aguiar & Lima, 
I Here traits are envisaged as general personality traits, such as intuitive or selfish, without being 
necessarily based on the five-factor model, although more recent research has explored the use of FFM 




2001, unpublished manuscript). In contrast, the cultural traits were more used more 
often to describe humans than animals, were perceived as more learned than 
hereditary, and were seen as being established later in the process of socialization. 
These results are very similar to those obtained by Demoulin et al. (2004) and suggest 
that traits, like emotions, can be used as a valid measure of dehumanization. 
Infrahumanization researchers have chosen to focus on emotions not necessarily 
because emotions are the main feature of humanness, but because emotions are easy 
to operationalize in terms of primary and secondary, and also because other aspects of 
humanness such as language and intelligence had been studied before (see Leyens et 
aI., 2000). 
While it would appear that traits can be placed along a humanity continuum, 
studies on the ontologization of the Gypsies have operationalized dehumanization in 
categorical terms, in terms of the differential attribution of human (or cultural) vs. 
animal (or natural) traits, limiting the continuous measurement of humanity to pilot 
studies (e.g. Perez et aI., 2001). One pilot study employed a within-participants design, 
and requested participants to name positive and negative attributes characterising 
animals more than humans. In the second pilot, the 12 animal-like and 12 human-like 
attributes obtained in the first pilot were judged by another group of participants who 
were required to identify which of these 48 attributes best described the Gypsies, and 
also whether these attributes were positive or negative. Then 20 attributes that best 
described the Gypsies were selected as target traits in the main study, 10 of these 
being more characteristic of humans than of animals,S positive and 5 negative, and 
10 more characteristic of animals than of humans, equally divided into negative and 
positive (Perez et aI., 2001). This example illustrates the imposition of the animal-
human binary to what might have been a continuous measure of humanity, perhaps 
because the ontologization paradigm has not yet engaged with the issue regardipg the 
categorical vs. continuous measure of humanity and hence of dehumanization. Other 
studies using traits as a measure of dehumanization also employed a categorical 
distinction between human or cultural and animal or natural characteristics 
(Deschamps, Val a, Marinho, Costa Lopes, & Cabecinhas, 2005; Marcu & 
Chryssochoou, 2005). Examples of cultural traits are competent, intelligent, honest 
and civilized, while examples of natural ones are intuitire, spontaneous, simple and 
fi·ee. 
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Therefore, given the graded structure of categories and the flexible boundaries 
between humans and animals, I decided to employ a continuous measure of the 
humanness of emotions and traits. This was in line with the qualitative study on the 
human-animal boundary, which had indicated that the human-animal boundary is not 
clear-cut, and that people may have ambiguous and post-hoc representations of the 
cognitive and emotional abilities of animals. The implication of this 
operationalization is that the dehumanized targets would not necessarily be viewed as 
non-human but rather as less-than-human and perhaps less human than the in-group. 
4.3 Humanity and positivity: independent or related dimensions? 
In general, the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through 
emotions) conceives of the negative-positive aspect of the emotions as being 
independent from the humanity of the emotions, with studies indicating no difference 
of valence between the secondary and the primary emotions (e.g. Leyens et al., 2001). 
However, in some other studies on infrahumanization, the valence of the emotions has 
been found to moderate the humanity ratings of the emotions, as positive secondary 
emotions were rated as less human than negative secondary emotions (see Vaes et al., 
2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). However, the existing research is rather 
mixed, as other studies have found that positive secondary emotions were perceived 
as more uniquely human than negative secondary emotions (Viki & Abrams~ 2003). 
Nonetheless, the valence of the primary emotions does not moderate their perceived 
humanity, as negative secondary emotions were still perceived as more unique to 
humans than both positive and negative primary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). 
Other studies which operationalized infrahumanization in a continuous way found a 
non-significant correlation between the humanity and the valence of the emotions, r = 
-.05 (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), which may suggest that the valence of the 
emotions may have less impact on the humanness of the emotions if their humanness 
is assessed continuously instead of categorically. The relative lack of positive and 
strong correlations between the humanness and the positive valence of the emotions 
suggests that infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) is not tantamount 
to negative prejudice. 
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In the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through traits) however few 
questions have been raised on the relationship between the humanity of the traits and 
their valence. Most studies on the dehumanization of the Gypsies have used equal 
numbers of positive and negative human traits, and equal numbers of positive and 
negative animal traits. In some research (Deschamps et aI., 2005), only positive traits, 
both human and animal, were used. Overall, the current results on the relationship 
between the humanity and the valence of the emotions and traits are rather mixed, and 
it is therefore difficult to speculate on how valence might impact on dehumanization. 
One aspect that few researchers have taken into account is whether valence, 
like humanity, may be conceptualized and operationalized as a continuum (but see 
Demoulin et aI., 2004). Thus, instead of traits and emotions falling into the mutually 
exclusive categories of negative and positive, these could be measured along a 
valence continuum ranging from very negative to very positive (e.g. from 1 to 7, or 
from 0 to 100). Since a valence continuum has never been operationalized within the 
dehumanization paradigm, it is difficult to envisage what impact it may have on the 
dehumanization process itself. 
4.4 Study 1: Cultural agreement on the human-animal dichotomy 
This study explored the collective agreement within each country (Britain and 
Romania) on the existence of humanness continua among the emotions and traits, 
respectively. This study was level-oriented (see Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2000), as it 
aimed to examine whether both the British and the Romanian participants envisaged 
humanity in a continuous sense. At the same time, the study acknowledged the 
possibility that the humanity of the emotions and traits may not be exactly the same in 
Britain and Romania. 
4.4.1 Design 
The study had a within-participants and a forced-choice design. The 
participants were asked to judge whether the target emotions and traits were either 
more typical of animals or more typical of humans, and also whether they thought 
each tenn was positive or negative (see Appendix II a for the English version of the 
pilot questionnaire, and Appendix II b for the Romanian version). 
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4.4.2 Participants and procedure 
30 male and 38 female British participants were recruited in the psychology 
department and in various venues on campus (M age = 22). In Romania, 27 male and 
30 female students participated in the pilot study (M age = 21.56). 
4.4.3 Materials 
In this study, 12 emotions were selected from prevIOUS studies on 
infrahumanization (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000): rage, pleasure, aversion, fear, joy, 
satisfaction, compassion, contempt, guilt, admiration, regret and pride. Previous 
research has assumed the first six to be primary, and the second six to be secondary. 
20 traits were also included as targets in this study, being selected from previous 
research on ontologization (e.g. Perez et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), but 
their choice was also influenced by the results from the focus group study which had 
suggested rational autonomy as a key difference between humans and animals. The 
traits were chosen to reflect a continuum of humanness, ranging from more specific to 
humans to common to humans and animals: creative, hypocrite, greedy, efficient, 
intelligent, selfish, prejudiced, logical, friendly, ruthless, simple, wild, dependent, 
affectionate, loyal, brutal, dirty,jree, obedient, and instinctual. 
4.4.4 Results 
Each emotion was given a humanness score and a positive valence rating 
based on the percentage of participants who rated the emotions as typical of humans, 
and as positive, respectively, see Table 4.1 below. 
Taking the 12 emotions as targets, their humanness and positive valence were 
positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .27, ns, in Britain, and r (1, 10) 
= .09, ns, in Romania (cf. Castano & Giner-SoroIla, 2006). Comparing tl\e two 
countries the British and the Romanian humanity ratings of the emotions were , 
positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .66, p < .05, as well as the positive 
valence ratings, r (l, 10) = .86, p < .001, indicating that there was overall cross-
cultural agreement on the human typicality and positive valence of the emotions. 
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Ta.bl~ 4.1 The pe~centage of participants rating the emotions as typically human and as positive in 












































Similarly to the emotions, a humanness score and a positive valence score 
were computed for each trait based on the percentage of participants who rated the 
traits as typical of humans, and as positive, respectively, see Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 The percentage of participants rating the traits as typically human and as positive in Britain 
and Romania 
Traits Britain Romania 
Humanness Positivity Humanness Positivity 
typicality 0/0 valence 0/0 typicality 0/0 valence 0/0 
hypocrite 98.50 7.40 100.00 1.80 
creative 95.60 100.00 91.20 100.00 
intelligent 91.20 100.00 64.90 100.00 
prejudiced 91.20 5.90 100.00 24.60 
greedy 80.90 16.20 50.90 7.00 
selfish 80.90 11.80 87.70 5.30 
logical 77.90 94.10 98.20 96.50 
friendly 69.10 97.10 17.50 100.00 
ruthless 63.20 20.60 75.40 1.80 
efficient 55.90 100.00 84.20 100.00 
brutal 54.40 5.90 64.90 530 
affectionate 52.90 98.50 17.50 98.20 
dependent 48.50 42.60 49.10 28.10 
loyal 29.40 98.50 5.30 100.00 
simple 26.50 64.70 50.90 87.70 
obedient 25.00 77.90 14.00 77.20 
dirty 25.00 7.40 17.50 l.80 
free 16.20 97.10 33.30 98.20 
instinctual 4.40 91.20 5.30 71.90 




As the ratings from both countries indicate, the humanity of the traits was 
continuous rather than categorical, with the more human traits at the higher end of the 
humanity continuum. The results also indicate that there was high agreement within 
each country on the humanness of the more human traits such as hypocrite and 
creative, whereas less human traits received less agreement, e.g. wild, obedient. In 
Romania, intelligent was rated as typical of humans as brutal, which somehow makes 
it difficult to differentiate between the two. This result is indicative of cross-cultural 
variations in human typicality ratings. 
Taking the 20 traits as targets, their human typicality and positive valence 
were negatively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = -.27, ns, in Britain, and r 
(1, 18) = -.21, ns, in Romania, which suggests that the ratings of human typicality 
were not contingent upon their positive valence. Comparing the two countries, the 
British and the Romanian humanness ratings of the traits were positively correlated, r 
(1, 18) = .80, p < .001, as well as their positive valence ratings, r (1, 18) = .94, p 
< .001, indicating high cross-cultural agreement on their humanness and positive 
valence. 
To conclude, this study indicated that there was cross-cultural agreement on 
what is typically human and what is positive, and that humanity is not the same as 
positivity. 
4.5 Study 2: The human typicality of each target emotion and trait 
The first study indicated that people can perceive certain emotions and traits as 
being more typical of humans than others. The fact that the emotions and traits were 
not categorized by all of the participants as either typical of humans or of animals 
arguably suggests that there is no clear-cut, unambiguous and unanimous agreement 
on the distinction between animal-like and human-like traits or emotions. Thus, while 
most people agree creative is typical of humans and wild typical of animals, there are 
many other traits and emotions which are more ambiguous and therefore fall in the 
middle of a humanness continuum, such as greedy in Romania and affectionate in 
Britain. 
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Therefore the second study decided to examine how typical of humans and of 
animals, respectively, each trait and emotion was, on a more detailed continuous scale. 
This study explored the perceived humanness of the target emotions and traits within 
the human and animal categories, respectively. Thus, while the first study assumed 
animal and human to be the logical opposites of each other, the second one looked at 
variations within each category as a function of context, i.e. animal vs. human. 
Some Romanian data for this study was collected on the internet. Regarding 
internet data collectiom, some meta-analytic research suggests a high degree of 
convergence between web-based and lab-based data (Krantz & Dalal, 2000). 
Although collecting psychological data on the internet presents certain disadvantages, 
such as danger of multiple submissions, self-selection of participants, no help being 
available from the experimenter, impossibility of full debriefing, to mention just a few, 
web-based research has some advantages, too, e.g. lack of experimenter effects, 
greater self-disclosure in the absence of interviewer, variety of participants, greater 
convenience to the participants, lesser need of prejudice suppression, etc. (for a more 
detailed discussion of the pros and cons of internet research, see Birnbaum, 2000, 
2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). To counteract potential multiple 
submissions, the IP addresses of the participants were checked. The researcher's 
email address was included in the web survey to enable participants to receive 
feedback, ask for help, or comment on any problems they may have encountered. 
4.5.1 Design 
The study had a between-participants design. The participants were randomly 
allocated to either the 'animal' or the 'human' condition, and were instructed to rate 
how typically animal/human each emotion and trait was on a 1 (not at all typical of 
animals / humans) to 7 (very much typical of animals / humans) scale. The between-
participants design was adopted because a trait which may be considered highly 
typical of humans may not necessarily be highly untypical of animals, such as 
intelligent. As the research by Haslam et al. (2005) suggested, human nature may 
overlap with animal nature to a certain extent, and therefore human typicality may not 
necessarily be the opposite of animal typicality. This study aimed to assess if this was 
the case. The positive valence of the emotions and traits was also measured using a 7-
point scale, in both the animal and human conditions, on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7 
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(positive). (See Appendix II c for the English version of the questionnaire, and 
Appendix II d for the Romanian version.) 
4.5.2 Participants and procedure 
One hundred and thirty eight British nationals took part, 68 females, 69 males. 
and 1 person who did not identify their gender, Mage = 23.68. 110 were of English 
ethnicity, the others of different ethnicities. 116 were students, and 22 were employed 
people of various professions. Most of the participants were students of management, 
economics, mathematics and engineering. 64 participants took part in the animal 
condition, and 74, in the human condition. The participants were recruited on campus, 
and were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions. 
One hundred and twenty-six Romanian nationals took part, 81 females and 45 
males, Mage = 21.52. Of these, 109 were students, and 16 were employed. 38 
completed the questionnaire on the internet, while the rest completed it in class, under 
supervision. 62 participated in the animal condition, while 64, in the human condition. 
4.5.3 Results 
A mean animal typicality score and a mean human typicality score was 
calculated for each emotion based on the animal and human typicality ratings, 
respectively. Similarly, positivity scores were calculated from the positivity ratings in 
the animal and in the human condition, respectively. In each country, an independent-
samples I-test was carried out on the typicality of each emotion, with the experimental 
condition (animals vs. humans) as the between-participants factor. There were 
differences in the typicality ratings between the two conditions for most of the 
emotions, see Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below for the means, the standard deviations, and the 
associated I values and significance levels: 
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Table ~.3 Ratings of.typicality and positivity of the emotions in the animal and human conditions in 
Romama (N = 126) wIth the associated t and E!.. values 
T~~icality Positivity 
Emotions Human Animal Human Animal 
M SD M SD t P M SD M SD t P 
pride 5.84 1.42 3.54 1.83 -7.84 .001 3.78 1.85 3.72 1.58 -0.18 .857 
JOY 5.68 1.40 5.85 1.48 0.65 .516 6.53 0.89 6.30 1.18 -1.20 .229 
pleasure 5.62 1.46 5.36 1.80 -0.90 .368 5.68 1.34 6.01 1.20 1.46 .147 
satisfaction 5.57 1.41 4.43 2.12 -3.54 .001 6.28 1.17 5.90 1.30 -1.71 .089 
rage 5.37 1.63 5.03 1.59 -1.20 .234 l.92 1.24 2.03 1.27 0.50 .622 
admiration 5.25 1.54 2.87 1.75 -8.07 .001 5.87 1.16 5.23 1.56 -2.56 .010 
fear 5.00 1.54 5.50 1.50 l.84 .068 3.18 1.40 3.22 1.69 0.15 .880 
regret 4.90 1.83 2.41 1.42 -8.53 .001 4.39 1.66 3.98 1.68 -1.35 .177 
contempt 4.82 1.78 2.30 1.44 -8.68 .001 1.96 1.17 2.06 1.11 0.48 .632 
compassIon 4.78 1.53 3.52 2.03 -3.90 .001 5.42 1.56 4.95 1.44 -1.74 .084 
guilt 4.18 1.55 3.70 1.84 -l.57 .117 4.07 l.72 3.95 1.73 -0.41 .682 
averSIOn 4.13 1.48 3.46 1.87 -2.16 .033 2.90 1.36 2.62 1.43 -1.10 .274 
Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions. 
Table 4.4 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the emotions in the animal and human conditions in 
Britain (N = 138) with the associated t and p values 
T~~icality Positivity 
Emotions Human Animal Human Animal 
M SD M SD t P M SD M SD t P 
pleasure 5.71 1.64 5.03 1.39 -2.62 .010 6.25 0.84 6.29 0.66 0.31 .759 
pride 5.64 1.27 4.03 1.83 -5.94 .001 4.94 1.54 5.18 1.49 0.93 .353 
guilt 5.58 1.42 2.32 1.36 -13.67 .001 3.01 1.54 3.54 1.50 2.05 .043 
regret 5.51 1.51 2.00 1.12 -15.61 .001 3.24 1.33 3.60 1.51 1.45 .150 
admiration 5.44 1.43 2.90 1.59 -9.82 .001 5.47 1.08 5.35 1.06 -0.62 .534 
JOY 5.41 lAO 4.50 1.50 -3.71 .001 6.51 0.74 6.45 0.66 -0.50 .619 
compassIOn 5.36 1.39 3.15 1.52 -8.83 .001 6.23 0.89 6.29 0.73 0.46 .649 
satisfaction 5.13 1.57 4.50 1.61 -2.34 .021 5.85 1.00 6.01 1.03 0.95 .345 
fear 5.10 l.89 6.03 1.16 -3.48 .001 2.80 l.42 3.04 1.44 1.02 .309 
rage 5.05 l.53 4.90 1.82 0.52 .606 l.87 l.11 2.06 1.17 0.95 .344 
contempt 4.89 1.30 2.73 1.46 -9.18 .001 2.48 1.36 2.57 1.50 0.38 .707 
averSIOn 4.57 1.46 3.82 1.50 -2.93 .004 3.15 l.26 3.31 1.07 0.81 .420 
Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions. 
It is worth noting here that standard deviations are rather large relative to the 
means. However, instead of this being a shortcoming, i.e. suggesting that the mean 
may not be a good representation of the data, it could be argued that the data points' 
distance from the mean suggests variability and lack of consensus regarding the 
human or animal typicality of the emotions. The variability in the participants' ratings 
suggests that there is no precise agreement on how exactly typically human or animal 
an emotion is, and that it may be more difficult to draw the line between what is 
typically human and what is typically animal than current theories might en\isage. 
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What is also interesting to notice in the results is that the majority of the emotions 
were rated as more typically human than as typically animal, despite some of them 
being non-significantly so. This might suggest that emotions, be they primary or 
secondary, may be related to what is typically human rather than to what is uniquely 
human. 
As regarded the positive valence of the emotions, there were very few 
significant differences between the two conditions, see the tables above. This 
arguably shows that the positive valence of the emotions varies little as a function of 
human or animal context. In Britain as well as in Romania, the human typicality 
ratings and the positive valence of the emotions from the 'human' condition were 
positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .49 in Britain, and r = .40 in 
Romania, ns. Similarly, the animal typicality ratings and the positive valence from the 
'animal' condition were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .09 in 
Britain and r = .34 in Romania, ns. Thus, similarly to the first study and in line with 
previous research, the humanity and the positive valence of the emotions seemed to be 
independent, although it should be borne in mind that given the small number of items, 
N = 12, these correlations are not necessarily conclusive. The correlation between the 
human typicality and the animal typicality scores of the emotions was not significant 
in either Britain or Romania, r (1, 10) = -.15, and .44, respectively, ns. In other words, 
the more human the emotions were, they were not necessarily less animal. The human 
positive valence and the animal positive valence scores were very highly correlated, r 
(1,10) = .99,p < .001 in Britain, andr (1,10) = .98,p < .001 in Romania, suggesting 
that the ratings of positivity were independent of condition. 
Comparing the two countries, the British and the Romanian human typicality 
scores of the emotions were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10L .44, 
ns. However, the British and the Romanian animal typicality ratings of the emotions 
were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .86, p < .001. This suggests 
that there was more cross-cultural agreement on the animal than on the human 
typicality of the emotions. At the same time, the positive valence scores from Britain 
and Romania were highly correlated, r (1,10) = .9Lp < .001, in the human condition, 
and r (1,10) = .93,p < .001, in the animal condition. 
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As for the traits, a mean animal typicality and a mean human typicality score 
were calculated for each trait based on the animal and human typicality ratings, 
respectively. Similarly, positive valence scores were calculated from the positi\ity 
ratings in the animal and in the human condition, respectively. In each country, an 
independent-samples (-test was carried out on the animal-human typicality of the 
traits, with the experimental condition (animals vs. humans) as the between-
participants factor. This revealed significant differences for the typicality ratings 
between the 2 conditions for the majority of the traits, but few significant differences 
for the positivity ratings, see the tables below for the means, standard deviations, 
associated ( values and significance levels: 
Table 4.5 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the traits in the animal and human conditions in Britain 
(N = 138) with the associated t and p.. values 
Typicality Positivity 
Traits Human Animal Human Animal 
M SD M SD t P M SD M SD 
creative 5.58 1.21 3.28 1.59 -9.62 .001 6.20 0.86 6.21 0.72 
intelligent 5.52 1.09 4.96 1.05 -3.05 .003 6.33 0.83 6.06 0.97 
prejudiced 5.39 1.21 2.38 1.47 -13.10 .001 1.79 0.89 2.23 1.25 
hypocrite 5.25 1.31 2.01 1.23 -14.72 .001 1.89 0.90 2.06 0.90 
selfish 5.22 1.30 4.04 1.45 -5.03 .001 1.97 0.87 2.03 0.89 
logical 5.10 1.21 3.60 1.60 -6.20 .001 5.40 0.95 5.40 0.99 
friendly 4.95 1.24 4.53 1.12 -2.10 .037 6.29 0.77 6.21 0.98 
greedy 4.91 1.40 5.04 l.36 0.54 .589 l.83 0.96 2.12 1.10 
affectionate 4.89 l.38 5.31 l.24 1.87 .064 5.91 0.87 5.95 0.93 
dependent 4.40 1.40 4.95 1.41 2.27 .025 4.00 1.27 4.23 1.45 
efficient 4.39 1.27 4.45 1.49 0.26 .795 5.79 1.00 5.82 0.83 
loyal 4.31 1.38 5.42 l.15 5.08 .001 5.98 1.02 6.14 0.90 
instinctual 4.05 1.37 6.12 0.93 10.46 .001 4.64 l.16 4.96 1.30 
obedient 4.00 l.31 4.21 1.47 0.92 .358 4.20 1.11 4.68 1.28 
free 3.90 l.65 4.90 l.28 3.99 .001 5.27 1.34 5.26 1.37 
ruthless 3.89 1.44 4.l5 1.67 0.99 .322 2.53 1.25 2.60 1.37 
brutal 3.60 1.32 4.70 1.70 4.16 .001 1.86 1.05 2.31 1.12 
simple 3.25 1.21 4.45 1.56 4.96 .001 3.57 1.33 3.68 1.25 
dirty 3.14 1.20 3.71 1.35 2.62 .010 1.97 1.15 2.00 0.96 
wild 3.06 1.36 5.78 1.11 12.68 .001 3.35 1.26 3.71 1.21 
Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions. 
In Britain, the human typicality and the human positive valence of the traits were 
positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .25, ns, whereas in Romania 
these were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .50, p < .05. The 
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ontologization, as it may be difficult to separate ontologization from the positi\'e-
negative side of prejudice.2 
Table 4.6 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the traits in the animal and human conditions in 
Romania (N = 126) with the associated t and E values 
T~~icality Positivity 
Traits Human Animal Human Animal 
M SD M SD t P M SD M SD 
creative 6.06 1.20 2.72 1.89 -11.83 .001 6.35 0.86 5.50 1.80 
intelligent 5.73 1.19 5.22 1.47 -2.10 .037 6.42 0.97 6.25 1.13 
logical 5.26 1.63 2.29 1.63 -10.22 .001 6.04 0.98 5.04 1.81 
free 5.26 1.51 5.45 1.45 0.70 .484 5.96 1.19 5.40 1.54 
hypocrite 5.20 1.67 1.67 1.09 -14.03 .001 1.85 1.08 1.93 1.06 
affectionate 5.20 1.32 5.67 1.31 2.02 .046 6.04 1.17 6.24 0.95 
selfish 5.18 1.57 3.91 1.72 -4.32 .001 2.68 1.74 2.55 1.56 
greedy 5.10 1.83 5.74 1.38 2.19 .03 1.96 1.52 2.80 1.80 
friendly 5.10 1.37 5.66 1.36 2.26 .025 6.35 0.86 6.41 0.86 
prejudiced 5.01 1.72 1.62 0.97 -13.62 .001 3.55 1.83 2.45 1.34 
efficient 4.90 1.25 4.19 1.95 -2.40 .02 6.06 1.26 5.81 1.23 
dependent 4.76 1.51 4.48 1.61 -1.01 .315 3.35 1.79 3.54 1.89 
instinctual 4.26 1.61 6.17 1.12 7.69 .001 4.51 1.43 4.69 1.79 
brutal 4.10 1.71 4.68 1.57 1.97 .052 1.78 1.21 2.16 1.39 
ruthless 3.98 1.72 3.46 1.67 -1.71 .091 2.31 1.17 2.50 1.61 
simple 3.81 1.42 4.13 2.14 0.98 .327 4.63 1.37 4.48 1.70 
loyal 3.68 1.58 5.96 1.32 8.77 .001 5.85 1.33 6.12 1.14 
obedient 3.32 1.43 4.87 1.31 6.29 .001 3.26 1.53 4.11 1.87 
dirty 3.12 1.57 4.39 1.60 4.47 .001 1.71 1.11 2.65 1.82 
wild 2.95 1.58 5.93 1.31 11.53 .001 2.21 1.32 2.85 1.80 
Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions. 
Similarly to the ratings of emotions, the standard deviations were rather large 
relative to the means. This would suggest great variability of typicality ratings within 
each condition, be it animal or human, and therefore little consensus on how typically 
human or animal each trait was. But instead of this being a drawback, it could be 
argued that the present results reflect how difficult to draw human boundaries may be. 
The animal typicality and the animal positive valence of the traits were 
positively but non-significantly correlated in both countries, r (l, 18) = .38 in Britain. 
ns, and .38 in Romania, ns. Thus, in the animal condition, the animality and the 
positivity of the traits proved to be independent dimensions in both countries. The 
human typicality and the animal typicality ratings were negatively but non-
2 The same study was replicated in Hungary and in Spain and in neither country was the human 
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significantly correlated in both countries, r (l, 18) = -.42 in Britain, ns, -.32 in 
Romania, ns. Although these correlations were based on only 20 items, the present 
results may suggest that as the traits increased their human typicality. they did not 
necessarily decrease their animal typicality, which is in line with Haslam et ai's 
(2005) postulation that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal. 
The human positive valence and the animal positive valence were positively and 
significantly correlated in both countries, r (1, 18) = .99 in Britain and .95 in Romania, 
p < .001, suggesting that the ratings of positivity of the traits were independent of the 
research condition, be it animal or human. 
Comparing the results from the two countries, the British and the Romanian 
human typicality scores of the traits were positiVely and significantly correlated, r (1, 
18) = .86, P < .001, as well as the animal typicality scores, r (1, 18) = .92, p < .OOL 
which suggests that there was cross-cultural agreement on the human typicality and 
the animal typicality of the traits. Similarly, the British and Romanian human positive 
valence scores were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .93, p < .001, 
as well as the animal positive valence scores, r (1, 18) = .96, p < .001. This indicates 
that there was also cross-cultural agreement on the positive valence of the traits. 
Again, one should bear in mind that these correlations are based on only 20 items. 
4.6 Comparing the results from the two studies 
The second study indicated that although we may distinguish between human 
and animal typicality, there is a lot of variation within the categories human and 
animal. Thus, it may not be enough to associated certain features with animals and 
others with humans, one may need to examine how these features vary in terms of 
their typicality within each category. The second study brings support to the argument 
that traits as well as emotions can be seen as varying along a continuum of human 
typicality, with, for example, creative and intelligent at one end and dirty and wild at 
the other. The relatively large standard deviations for the ratings of typicality, for both 
emotions and traits, suggest that the there may be little clear-cut cultural consensus on 
how typically human these attributes are, and that the boundaries of humanness may 




Comparing the results on the emotions from the two studies within each 
country, the humanness ratings of the emotions from Study 1 and Study 2 were 
positively but non-significantly correlated in Britain r (1 10) = .19 d 
" . '-t , ns, an 
negatively but non-significantly correlated in Romania, r (l, 10) = -.15, ns. This could 
be due to the different measures used for assessing the emotions' human typicality. 
However, the humanness ratings of the emotions from Study 1 and the animal 
typicality ratings from Study 2 were negatively but highly significantly correlated in 
both countries, r (1, 10) = -.83, p = .001, in Britain, and r (l, 10) = -.89, p < .001, in 
Romania. These results suggest that there was more agreement between Study 1 and 
Study 2 on the animality rather than on the humanness of the emotions, and raise the 
question as to whether emotions are a salient feature in discriminating humans from 
animals. 
However, as regarded the traits, the human typicality ratings from Study 1 and 
those from Study 2 were positively and significantly correlated in each country, r (1, 
18) = .85, p < .001 in Britain, and r (1, 18) = .59, P < .01 in Romania. Conversely, the 
humanness ratings from Study 1 were significantly but negatively correlated with the 
animal typicality ratings from Study 2, r (1, 18) = -.65, p < .01 in Britain, and r (l, 18) 
= -.85, p < .001 in Romania. These results suggest that traits may be a more robust 
measure of dehumanization as there was generally more agreement on their 
humanness ratings. They also suggest that people may think differently about traits 
and emotions, which may have consequences for their ecological validity in the 
operationalization of dehumanization. 
As for the positive valence, the positivity ratings of the emotions from study 1 
and the positivity ratings in the human condition from study 2 were positively and 
significantly correlated in each country, r (1, 10) = .98 in Britain, and .96 in Romania, 
p < .001. The positive valence ratings from study 1 also correlated positively and 
significantly with the positivity ratings from the animal condition in study 2, r (1, 10) 
= .97 in Britain and .96 in Romania, p < .001, thus suggesting that there was more 
consensus on the emotions' positivity than on their human typicality. The positive 
valence ratings of the traits from study 1 correlated positively and significantly with 
the positivity ratings from the human condition in study 2, r (1. 18) = .96 in Britain 
and .95 in Romania, p < .001, as well as with the positivity ratings from the animal 
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condition in study 2: r (1, 18) = .96 in Britain and .96 in Romania, p < .001. These 
high positive correlations between the results from the two pilots would suggest that 
there is general agreement on the humanity and positive valence of the traits. 
4.7 Operationalizing dehumanization in the present research 
In the infrahumanization paradigm, the infrahumanization of the out-groups 
was inferred from the differential attribution of secondary emotions to out-group and 
in-group. In the research on the ontologization of the Gypsies, it was only the Gypsies, 
and not the in-group, that were attributed traits which had been previously derived 
from the Gypsy stereotype content, e.g. intuitive, noisy (e.g. Perez et aI., 2001). 
However, I adapted the ontologization process and modelled it on infrahumanization. 
Thus, in the present research the ontologization of the out-groups will reside in the 
differential attribution of traits to out-group and in-group. This has been 
operationalized successfully in previous research, e.g. Deschamps et aI., 2005, Marcu 
& Chryssochoou, 2005. The present study acknowledges that with experimental target 
groups the lack of history between in-group and out-group may make the use of the 
term ontologization rather inappropriate. However, the term ontologization will be 
kept to differentiate the dehumanization in terms of traits from infrahumanization, 
which is dehumanization in terms of emotions. 
In contrast to most previous research on dehumanization, the present research 
will measure dehumanization continuously rather than categorically. Thus, each 
emotion and trait will be attributed a human typicality rating based on the results from 
the second study. Furthermore, for each participant a humanity score will be 
calculated for the emotions attributed to the out-group and in-group, respectively. 
Each target emotion or trait that the participants has ascribed to the target, be it in-
group or out-group, will be given a human typicality weighting. Then these 
weightings will be added up and divided by the number of emotions or traits, 
respectively, that the participant ascribed to the target. For example, if a British 
participant selected only the emotions compassion, rage and contempt for the in-
group, their humanity scores were added up and divided by 3 as in the equation 
below: 
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Humanity of emotions to in-group = L in-group-compassion *5.36 + in-group-rage 
*5.05 + in-group-contempt *4.89 + ... / N emotions attributed to in-group = 15.30/ 3 
=5.10 
This means that the less typically human emotions or traits the participants 
ascribe to the target out-groups, the more they dehumanize them. The same procedure 
will be followed for the positivity of the emotions and traits, for out-group and in-
group, respectively. The processes of infrahumanization and of ontologization, 
respectively, will be inferred from the overall mean level of humanity attributed to in-
group and out-group. 
The traits and the emotions used as targets in the pilot studies were all 
included in the studies on dehumanization despite the fact that some traits, for 
example, had been found to be no more typical of humans or of animals. Given that 
each emotion and trait was allocated a score of humanity, on a continuous scale, it 
was deemed unnecessary to exclude those items which failed to be more typical of 
either animals or humans. 
Finally, as a word of caution, it is perhaps worth remembering that what 
infrahumanization and ontologization measure is the attribution of humanity in terms 
of emotions or traits, respectively, to out-group and in-group. One can only infer the 
process of dehumanization from the differential attribution of humanity to in-group 
and out-group. To reduce the possibility that "dehumanization is what 
dehumanization tests measure", to paraphrase E.G. Boring, I will introduce other 
measures of prejudice and will expect convergent validity (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 
1991) between the measures of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice, 
e.g. blatant and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). 
4.8 Progression to the next study 
While this chapter has focused on the operationalization of dehumanization III 
experimental research, the following chapters will explore dehumanization 111 
experimental settings with artificial and with real groups, and will return to the issues 
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5.1.1 Introduction 
As it was mentioned in the extensive review of dehumanization theories and 
research in chapter 2, the researchers working on the ontologization paradigm 
(dehumanization through traits) suggest that only those ethnic minorities which are 
perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the majority will be 
dehumanized, such as the Gypsies (e.g. Perez et aI., 2001). This raises the issue as to 
whether cultural differences between in-group and out-group might be a factor 
leading to dehumanization. Indeed, research has shown that culturally different ethnic 
groups are 'abnorrhalized' by ethnic majority members because their different values, 
beliefs and norms are viewed as deviant from normative basic human values 
(Verkuyten, 2001). While 'abnormalization' may not be tantamount to 
dehumanization, it nonetheless implies that perceived deviation from assumed 
normative humanness can be used as a motive for discrimination. In-group members 
may discriminate against and potentially dehumanize culturally different out-group 
members simply because they perceive dissimilarities in terms of beliefs (see 
Rokeach's belief congruence theory, 1960; 1968), and differences in their hierarchy 
of basic values (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). 
While explanations for the dehumanization of the Gypsies have focused on the 
perceived failure to culturally assimilate, it is conceivable that their poor socio-
economic status can contribute to them being dehumanized. Recent research using 
fMRI scans have shown that homeless people elicited no more prefrontal cortex 
activation than equivalently disgusting objects, suggesting that homeless people are 
dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). A group's economic status can predict the 
content of that group's stereotype (Glick & Fiske, 2001), and in particular it will 
predict whether that group is competent or not, which in tum will make the group be 
associated with traits denoting competence, e.g. intelligent, shrewd, logical. 
ambitious, or lack of it, e.g. incompetent, lazy, animalistic, stupid, unambitious (Glick 
& Fiske, 2001). As the latter traits suggest, it may well be that poor groups are viewed 
as less human than rich groups because their incompetence is taken to reflect their 
less-than-human nature. For example, research conducted on the traits attributed to 
the poor and to the middle-classes has shown the poor are viewed as less intelligent, 
moral,fi'iendly, capable, while at the same as more stupid, dirty, lazy, and violent than 
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the middle-classes (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001), which suggests that the 
poor may be dehumanized and morally excluded (Lott, 2002). Arguably, the 
attributions for the causes of poverty bear the mark of fundamental attribution error 
(Ross, 1977) in the sense that the poor are held responsible for their poor economic 
status while situational explanations, such as discrimination, are discounted. 
Therefore it is possible that the dehumanization of certain ethnic minorities may rest 
not so much on ethnic prejudice as on the social representations of poverty and the 
character of the poor. Nevertheless, there may be alternative explanations for the 
dehumanization of the poor. It could be argued that similarly to the culturally different 
groups' apparent 'deviance' from the norm (Verkuyten, 2001), poor people are 
viewed as less typical or less normative of the category 'human' (see Kahneman & 
Miller's norm theory, 1986). Given that category norms can be used as explanations 
for inter-group differences (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), it may be that the 
dehumanization of the poor and of the culturally different functions as an explanation 
for their divergence from the norm. 
However, culturally different, as well as poor ethnic groups may be 
dehumanized only to the extent that their cultural differences or poverty pose a threat 
to the in-group, thus opening the possibility that perceived threat may be a mediator 
of dehumanization. Going back to the focus groups discussions described in chapter 3, 
these indicated that when animals were perceived as vermin, such as rats, foxes, stray 
dogs, or foot-and-mouth infected cattle, they were most likely to be dehumanized, 
morally excluded and ultimately killed. Although the dehumanization of humans is 
not the same as that of animals, the threat that vermin and pests invoke raises the 
question as to whether the dehumanization of human groups, too, may rest on 
perceptions of threat. 
The concept of perceived threat has figured in research on prejudice against 
ethnic minorities and immigrants, and in particular in the integrated threat theory of 
prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; 
Corenblum & Stephan. 2001; Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, 
McNatt, & Renfro, 2002). Perceived threat can be of two kinds: symbolic or cultural 
threat. and material or realistic threat. Perceived symbolic threat is invoked by ethnic 
minorities or immigrants whose Yalues, beliefs and norms are viewed as different 
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from those of the majority, and as violating the in-group's traditional values, or values 
which the in-group views as basic and culturally universal (Verkuyten, 2001). It is a 
threat to the in-group's worldview (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999, Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000), presumed to stem from the in-group's ethnocentrism and belief in its 
moral rightness (Stephan et aI., 1999), which can lead to negative attitudes and 
discrimination (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). As for perceived material threat, 
this is induced by perceptions of economic competition between in-group and out-
groups ( see LeVine & Campbell's realistic group conflict theory, 1972) and by fears 
relating to the economic and material well-being of the in-group. Research has shown 
that groups perceived as being poor are more discriminated against and more socially 
excluded than out-groups perceived to be rich (e.g. Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 
1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong, 2001; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). It is 
important to stress here that threat is largely perceived and that it does not reside in 
real competition for resources. It should also be highlighted here that both types of 
threat can be invoked simultaneously by the same group (e.g. McLaren, 2003; 
Falomir-Pichastor, Munoz-Rojas, Invemizzi & Mugny, 2004), and indeed some 
studies have found positive and significant correlations between the two types of 
threat (e.g. r = .45, McLaren, 2003; r = .67, Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; r = .84, 
Renfro, Stephan, Duran, & Clason, 2006). 
Given these theoretical premises and empirical findings on dehumanization, 
cultural differences, poverty, and perceived threat, I decided to explore whether 
perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group and an out-group's 
poor economic status might lead to dehumanization. To this purpose, I set up a 
vignette experiment using artificial ethnic minorities as targets which were described 
as either culturally similar to the in-group, or as culturally different. Furthermore, the 
target groups were described as either rich or poor. By using artificial groups I was 
able to manipulate the description of the target groups and thus to predict whether 
cultural differences or poverty can playa part in dehumanization. Artificial immigrant 
groups have been used before as targets in research on perceived threat and prejudice 
(e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Although experimental designs 
suffer generally from criticisms with regard to their supposed lack of external yalidity. 
they are nonetheless very useful tools in process-oriented research which tries to 
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identify the causes of particular phenomena and to test specific hypotheses (see 
Mook, 1983; Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998). 
As for dehumanization, this was measured through the different attribution of 
emotions (infrahumanization) and traits (ontologization) to in-group and out-group. 
The researchers working on the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through 
emotions) argue that all groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-
group and to deny it to the out-groups (e.g. Leyens et aI., 2000; Demoulin et aI., 
2004b). However, the researchers working on the ontologization paradigm 
(dehumanization through traits) suggest that only those ethnic minorities which are 
perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the majority will be 
dehumanized (e.g. Perez et aI., 2001). It was therefore expected that these two 
measures of dehumanization might produce different results. 
5.1.2 Research hypotheses 
In this study I aimed to find out whether cultural differences between ethnic 
minorities and in-group or the ethnic minorities' low economic status may make these 
groups vulnerable to dehumanization. Furthermore, I explored whether 
dehumanization can be explained in terms of the perceived threat, be it symbolic or 
material, that ethnic minorities invoke. It was therefore hypothesised that: 
1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) 
2. the culturally different target groups will be more dehumanized (through 
traits) than the culturally similar ones 




The study had a 2 (culturally similar vs. culturally different ethnic minority) x 
2 (rich vs. poor ethnic minority) factorial design within each national sample, with 
both factors as between-participants factors. The participants were randomly assigned 
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to one of the four conditions. In Britain, the cell sizes varied from 28 to 31, while in 
Romania, from 33 to 35. 
5.2.2 Participants and procedure 
One hundred and eighteen, 77 females and 41 males, British nationals, "\1 age 
= 20.14, age range = 16 to 56, participated in the study. All were of English ethnicity, 
114 of which had been born in Britain. One hundred and thirty-five, 95 females and 
40 males, Romanian nationals took part in the study, Mage = 21.93, age range = 19 to 
37. All participants were of Romanian ethnicity. 
The questionnaire was introduced as part of a study exploring cultural 
diversity in the country. Some fifty-four questionnaires were administered in class 
under supervision, while sixty-seven others were distributed to students in two 
restaurants on campus. Some British undergraduate psychology students who took 
part in the study received one course credit for their participation. The participants 
were debriefed after completing the questionnaire and were not rewarded in any way. 
5.2.3 Materials 
Four vignettes were designed for this study, describing an ethnic minority. For 
the British sample, a fictitious ethnic minority, the Moravians, was chosen so as to 
enable the manipulation of its description (cf. the Sandirians, Esses et aI., 2001). The 
Moravians are inhabitants of the province of Moravia in the Czech Republic, but 
statistics do not indicate them as being a sizeable minority in Britain. 
In Romania, a real but very little known ethnic minority, the Ceangai I, was 
chosen for the same purpose. In two of the vignettes, the target ethnic minority was 
described as culturally similar to the in-group, and either rich or poor, while in the 
other two vignettes it was described as culturally different from the in-group. and 
either rich or poor. A sample vignette will be presented here (see Appendix III a for an 
I The Ceangai minority is of Hungarian origin and has been living in Romania since the 13 th century 
AD, on the border between Transylvania and Moldavia. In the national census of 1002 it numbered 
only 1166 members. Their name comes from the Hungarian csango, meaning "wanderer, person who 
breaks away from the community". They have maintained their language, an archaic form of 
Hungarian, as well as their Catholic religion and their customs. 
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example of the British version of the questionnaire, and Appendix III b for an example 
of the Romanian version). The italicized text in brackets represents the other versions 
of the targets' cultural status and economic status manipulations: 
Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians 
are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been 
born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious 
beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. [The Moravians are very 
religious, and, unlike the English, they usually display their religious beliefs in 
public.] On average the Moravians have two children per family. [On average the 
Moravians have jive children per family.] They consider it normal for women to enter 
education and to have jobs outside the home. [They do not encourage women to have 
jobs. They consider it normal for women to look after the home.] Moravians value 
individual freedom. [The Moravians value family relationships.] They rely on public 
institutions to solve matters of justice. [They do not trust and do not rely on public 
institutions to solve matters of justice.] Just like with the larger British population, 
Moravians vary in character and inclinations. Statistics show that many Moravians 
enter high education and have high career aspirations. The Moravians usually get jobs 
in the economic and banking sectors. They rarely have problems with unemployment. 
[Statistics show that Jew Moravians enter high education and few of them have high 
career aspirations. The Moravians usually get jobs in the lower sectors of the 
economy. They often have problems with unemployment.] 
5.2.3.1 Prejudice measures: manipulation checks, symbolic and material threat, 
dehumanization, delegitimization, blatant prejudice, and resource allocation to 
in-group and out-group 
5.2.3.1.1 Manipulation checks 
A manipulation check item, ranging from 1 (very different) to 7 (very similar), 
assessed the perceived similarity of the target out-group to the in-group: please 
indicate how similar you think the Moravians [Ceangiii} are to your national group 
[Romanians}. 
134 
Chapter 5 Cultural differences and poverty as antecedents of dehumanization 
5.2.3.1.2 Symbolic and material threat 
Five 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Stephan & Stephan's (1999) and 
from McLaren's (2003) symbolic threat scales assessed whether the out-group was 
perceived as posing a symbolic threat to the in-group, e.g. the values held by the 
Moravians are not compatible with those of British citizens. Items 2 and 4 were 
reverse-coded. Separately, five other items measured whether the out-group was 
perceived as posing a material threat or not to the in-group, e.g. the presence of 
Moravians in putting pressure on the British transport system. Items 3 and 5 were 
reverse coded. High scores indicated that the in-group perceived threat from the target 
out-group. 
5.2.3.1.3 Dehumanization: infrahumanization (emotions) and ontologization 
(traits) 
The participants were instructed to choose five emotions that they expected 
the target group to typically feel, and, later in the experiment, five emotions for their 
in-group. The emotions they had to choose from were: compassion, rage, contempt, 
pleasure, guilt, aversion, fear, admiration, regret, pride, joy, and satisfaction. The 
participants were also requested to choose seven traits that best described the target 
group, and, later in the experiment, seven traits for their own group. The traits they 
had to choose from were: creative, hypocrite, simple, wild, greedy, efficient, 
dependent, affectionate, loyal, brutal, intelligent, selfish, dirty, free, prejudiced, 
logical,friendly, ruthless, obedient, and instinctual. 
5.2.3.1.4 Delegitimization 
As a scale of delegitmization was not available, a new scale was constructed 
that tried to measure this form of prejudice, where delegitimizing means placing the 
target outside the realm in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness 
apply (Opotow, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). Five 7-point Likert scale items 
operationalized delegitimization as the refusal of extending equal rights to the out-
group, e.g. if they commit crimes in Britain, Moravians should be sent back to their 
country of origin instead of being sent to a British prison. Items 1 and 4 were reverse-
coded. High scores indicated that the in-group perceived symbolic threat from the 
target out-group. 
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5.2.3.1.5 Blatant prejudice 
Five 7-point Likert scale items measured blatant prejudice (see Pettigre\v & 
Meertens, 1995). These items expressed desire for social distance from the target out-
group, e.g. I would not like a family of Moravians [Ceangiiij to move into my 
neighbourhood. Items 2 and 5 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated the 
desire for social distance from the target out-group. 
5.2.3.1.6 Resource allocation to in-group and out-group 
A five-item scale was constructed in order to measure in-group favouritism in 
the allocation of resources to in-group and out-group. These items were constructed as 
dilemmas, e.g. if ten people from your national group and ten Moravian people were 
in need of NHS hospital beds, and only thirteen beds were available at the local 
hospital, how do you think the thirteen beds should be allocated to the two groups? 
and if ten Ceangai children and ten Romanian children were in need of school places, 
and only fifteen were available in the local school, how do you think the fifteen school 
places should be allocated? The number of items was made deliberately unequal in 
order to induce a dilemma for the participants. The participants had to assign a 
quantity to in-group, and one to out-group, thus deciding who would get more. The 
quantity allocated to the in-group was considered to indicate the percentage of in-
group bias, with high scores indicating a high level of in-group bias. 
5.2.3.2 Ideological measures: postmaterialism, in-group identification and social 
dominance orientation 
Five 7-point Likert scale items adapted from MacIntosh's (1998) 
postmaterialism scale assessed perception of one's country as a postmaterialist 
society, e.g. Britain [Romania] 'is a country where people have a say in how things 
are decided at work and in their communities. Items 3 and 5 were reverse-coded. 
High scores indicated the belief that one's country is a postmaterialist society. 
Seven 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Rutland and Cinnirella's (2000) 
scale for English in-group identification measured in-group identification, e.g. fo what 
extent do you feel pleased to be English [Romanian}? High scores indicated a high 
level of English or Romanian in-group identification, respectively. 
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Sidanius, Levin, Liu and Pratto's (2000) Social Dominance Orientation (SOO) 
7-point Likert 16-item scale items measured the social dominance orientation of the 
participants, e.g. superior groups should dominate inferior groups. Items 9 to 16 were 
reverse-coded. High scored indicated a high level of social dominance orientation. 
5.3 Results 
When analysing the data I explored: (l) whether the experimental 
manipUlations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been 
affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the culturally different 
targets and the poor targets were more dehumanized than the culturally similar and 
the rich targets, respectively; (4) whether the prejudice measures were influenced by 
the experimental manipulations; (4) and whether perceived threat mediated 
dehumanization. These analyses will be described in tum in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Manipulation checks: perceived similarity between the target out-group 
and the in-group 
In each country two-way ANOV As with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. 
different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables 
were conducted on the perceived similarity between the target minority and in-group 
as assessed by the manipUlation check item. In Britain, the culturally similar out-
group were judged as more similar to the in-group than the culturally different out-
groups, F (1, 110) = 81.90, p < .001, 172 = .43, Ms = 5.04 vs. 3.14. The analysis also 
revealed a main effect of the targets' economic status, F (1, 110) = 11.05, p < .001, 172 
= .09, whereby the rich out-groups were judged as more similar to the in-group than 
the poor out-groups, Ms = 4.44 vs. 3.74. There was no significant interaction between 
the targets' culture and economic status, F (1, 110) = 1.76, ns. In Romania, the 
analysis found only a main effect of the targets' cultural status, F (1, 122) = 33.62, p < 
.001, 172 = .21, indicating that the target groups culturally similar to the in-group were 
perceived as more similar to the in-group than those culturally different from the in-
group, Ms = 4.78 vs. 3.42. There was no main effect of the targets' economic status, F 
(1, 122) = 0.91, ns, and no significant interaction, F (1, 122) = 0.01, ns. 
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5.3.2 Ideological measures: postmaterialism, in-group identification, and social 
dominance orientation 
The scale of postmaterialism proved to have inadequate reliability in Britain, 
Cronbach's alpha being .49, but increased to .60 after items 3 and 5 were deleted from 
the scale. The inter-item correlations ranged from .18 to .53, the mean inter-item 
correlation
2 
being. 34. In Romania, too, the scale was unreliable, the Cronbach's 
alpha was .24, and the mean inter-item correlation .10, without item 5. Therefore, this 
scale was not retained for further analyses3. 
The measure of in-group identification was reliable in both countries, the 
Cronbach's alpha was .85 in Britain. In Romania the seventh item failed to load on 
the factor, and was therefore excluded from the scale. The remaining 6 items had a 
Cronbach's alpha of .76. A two-way ANOY A with the targets' cultural similarity to 
in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent 
variables was conducted on in-group identification scores in each country. The results 
indicated that the level of in-group identification was not affected by the experimental 
manipulations in either country, all Fs (l, 114) < 0.3, ns, in Britain, and all Fs (1, 131) 
< 1.4, ns, Romania. 
The SOO (social dominance orientation) measure was reliable in both 
countries, Cronbach's alpha was .90 in Britain, and .84 in Romania. Given that SDO 
measure had the same content in both countries, a three-way ANOYA with nationality 
(British vs. Romanian), the targets' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. 
different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted 
on SOO. The Romanian participants expressed a higher level of SDO than their 
British counterparts, Ms = 3.23 vs. 2.62, F (1, 245) = 26.09, p < .001, 1'/2 = .10. There 
were no other main effects, nor any significant interactions, all Fs < 2.6, ns. In 
Britain, there was a positive and significant correlation between the levels of in-group 
2 Mean inter-item correlations will also be reported here because they can be used as another index of 
reliability, given that a high number of items can artificially increase the alpha coefficient (see Cortina, 
1993; Field, 2005). 
3The British scored higher than the Romanians on the item In [Britain / Romania], people are given a 
say in important government decisions, flIs = 3.55 vs. 2.27. F(l, 251) = 50.3I,p < .001. However, the 
Romanians agreed more than did the British with the items Free speech is not protected in [Britain / 
Romania], Ms = 4.45 vs. 3.50, F (1,251) = 24.99, p < .001, and In [Bri/ain / Romania}, people are 
more concerned about sllrvil'al than about individual self-expression, Ms = 6.11 vs. 4.33, F (I, 251) = 
131.37, p < .001, as indicated by a one-way ANOY A. 
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identification and SDO, r (1, 116) = .24, p < .01, for a two-tailed hypothesis. while in 
Romania there was a negative and non-significant correlation between the levels of 
in-group identification and SDO, r (1,133) = -.11, ns. 
5.3.3 Attributions of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group 
As I explained in Chapter 4, the humanness of the emotions and traits used in 
this study was measured continuously on a 1-7 scale. This gave each emotion and trait 
a weighting of 'humanness'. In this experiment, for each participant a humanness 
score was calculated for the emotions and the traits attributed to the out-group and the 
in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion or trait 
selected by the participant for the target group (in-group or out-group) with its 
humanness score, adding them up and dividing them by the total number of the 
emotions or traits selected for that group. The same procedure was used for 
calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to in-
group and out-groups. For example, if a Romanian participant selected the traits 
creative, friendly and loyal for the in-group, the humanness attributed to the in-group 
by that participant was calculated as: 
Humanness of the traits attributed to the in-group = L (in-group-creative x 6.06 + in-
group-friendly x 5.10 + in-group-loyal x 3.68) / N traits attributed to in-group = 14.84 
/3 = 4.94. 
The positivity attributed by the same participant to the in-group was calculated as: 
Positivity of the traits attributed to the in-group = L (in-group-creative x 6.35 + in-
group-friendly x 6.35 + in-group-loyal x 5.85) / N traits attributed to in-group = 18.55 
/3 = 6.18 
For each national sample, mixed-design ANOVA's were conducted separately 
on the humanness of the emotions and traits. The between-participants factors were 
the target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different from the in-group) and 
economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group vs. out-group) \vas the within-
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participants factor. The dependent variables were the humanness of the emotions and 
traits attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted 
separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions, and traits, 
respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the dependent 
variables. 
5.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions 
In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from :2 to 
7, M= 4.76, and to the in-group, from 2 to 10, M= 6.18. The assumption of sphericity 
was met, and more typically human emotions were overall attributed to the out-group 
than to the in-group, Ms = 5.36 vs. 5.32, F (1, 114) = 4.80, p < .05, '72 = .04, contrary 
to the infrahumanization hypothesis. Furthermore, there were no main effects of the 
targets' cultural or economic status on the attribution of typically human emotions, 
and no significant interactions, all Fs (1, 114) < 3, ns. Also, more positive emotions 
were overall attributed to the out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 5.13 vs. 4.60, F 
(1, 114) = 29.60, p < .001, '72 = .20. The targets' economic status moderated the 
attribution of positive, F(1, 114) = 5.81,p < .05, '72 = .05, as the rich out-groups were 
attributed more positive emotions than the in-group, Ms = 5.21 vs. 4.43, t (1, 58) = 
5.44, p < .001, while the poor4 out-groups were attributed equally positive emotions 
as the in-group, Ms = 5.06 vs. 4.75, { (1, 58) = 2.25, p = .028 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level of .025). 
In Romania, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 
to 7, M = 4.94, and to the in-group, from 4 to 9, M = 6.93. There was no 
infrahumanization of the out-groups, as equally typically human emotions were 
attributed to out-group and in-group, Ms = 5.26 vs. 5.27, F (1, 131) = 0.05, ns. 
Overall, more typically human emotions were attributed when the out-group was rich 
rather than when it was poor, Ms = 5.31 vs. 5.22, F (1,131) = 9.17,p < .01, '72 = .07. 
Subsequent {-tests indicated that while equally human emotions were attributed to in-
group in the two conditions, Ms = 5.30 \'s. 5.24. { (1, 133) = 1.70, ns, significantly 
more human emotions were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, j\Js = 
5.32 vs. 5.20, { (1, 133) = 2.86, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance le\'l~l). 
4 By 'rich' and 'poor' out-groups I mean the groups which were described as rich and as poor. 
respectively. 
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However, as no out-group was infrahumanized relative to the in-group, one cannot 
conclude that the poor groups were infrahumanized. What the results suggest, though, 
is that the poor out-groups were not perceived as being as human as the rich ones. see 
Fig 5.1 below: 
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Fig 5.1 Attribution of typically human emotions in Romania 
Relatively equally positive emotions were attributed to out-group and in-group 
in Romania, Ms = 4.65 vs. 4.63 , F (1 , 131) = 0.10, ns. The targets ' cultural status 
moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F(1 , 131) = 8.I3 , p < .01 , '12 = .06, as 
more positive emotions were attributed to the out-group than to the in-group in the 
'culturally similar' condition, Ms = 4.71 vs. 4.44, t (1 , 67) = 2.61 , p < .025, but 
equally positive emotions were attributed to the out-group and in-group in the 
'culturally different' condition, Ms = 4.60 vs. 4.80, t (1, 66) = 1.59, ns, (Bonferroni-
adjusted level of .025). Also, more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group 
when the out-group was culturally different than when it was culturally similar, Ms = 
4.80 vs. 4.44, t (1, 133) = 2.70, p < .01 , see Fig 5.2a below. Furthermore, more 
positive emotions were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, Ms = 4.90 
vs . 4.41 , while equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group in the two 
conditions, Ms = 4.65 vs. 4.60, F (1 , 131 ) = 6.66, p < .05, 112 = .05, see Fig S.2b 
below: 
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Fig 5.2a Attribution of positive 
emotions in Romania as a function of 












Rich targets Poor targets 
Fig 5.2b Attribution of positive 
emotions in Romania as a function of 
the targets' economic status 
Overall, the results from the two countries indicate that the target out-groups 
were not infrahumanized (dehumanized in terms of emotions). Nonetheless, the poor 
out-groups were perceived in a less positive light than the rich out-groups. The 
humanness of the attributed traits was examined next. 
5.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits 
In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 10, 
M = 4.84, and to the in-group, from 2 to 9, M = 6.60. All out-groups were 
dehumanized by means of traits, as more typically human traits were attributed to the 
in-group than to the out-groups, Ms = 4.77 vs. 4.49, F (1, 114) = 88.24, p < .001, '12 = 
.43. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution of human traits, F (1, 114) 
= 20.28, P < .001, '12 = .15, as more typically human traits were attributed to the rich 
than to the poor out-groups, Ms = 4.61 vs. 4.38, t (1, 116) = 4.48, p < .001, Fig 5.3 
below. The targets' cultural status did not significantly moderate the attribution of 
typically human traits, and there were no significant interactions between the targets' 
cultural and economic status, all Fs < 1, ns. 
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Fig 5.3 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in BritainS 
While the out-groups were generally dehumanized, more positive traits were 
nonetheless attributed to the out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 5.12 vs. 4.32, F (1, 
114) = 54.16, P < .001, 17 2 = .32. Furthermore, more positive traits were attributed to 
the culturally similar than to the culturally different out-groups, Ms = 5.30 vs. 4.90, t 
(1,116) = 3.36,p < .01, while equal positive traits were attributed to the in-group in 
the two conditions, Ms = 4.57 vs. 4.74, t (1, 116) = .17, ns, F (1 ,114) = 4.53 , P < .05 , 
172 = .04. At the same time, more positive traits were attributed to the rich than to the 
poor out-groups, Ms = 5.24 vs. 4.96, t (1, 116) = 2.41 , P < .025, whereas equal 
positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the rich and poor out-groups 
conditions, Ms = 4.18 vs. 4.46, t (1 , 116) = 1.52, ns, F (1 , 114) = 7.86, p < .01 , 172 = 
.06, see Fig 5.4 below. Thus, in Britain, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized 
and viewed in a less positive light than the rich ones, while the culturally different 
out-groups were no more dehumanized than the culturally similar ones, but were 
viewed in a less positive light than them. 
5 As all the target out-groups were dehumanized, the in-group was not included in the graph 
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Fig 5.4 Attribution of positive traits to out-groups in Britain 
In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 4 to 7, 
M = 4.99, and to the in-group, from 4 to 10, M = 7.06. All out-groups were 
dehumanized, as more typically human traits were attributed overall to the in-group 
than to the out-group, Ms = 5.00 vs. 4.70, F(l, 131) = 88.90,p < .001, 1J2 = .40. The 
targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, F (1, 131) = 
4.60, p < .05, 1J2 = .03, as the culturally similar out-groups were attributed more 
typically human traits than the culturally different ones, Ms = 4.77 vs. 4.64, t (l, 133) 
= 2.52, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). The targets' economic status 
also moderated the attribution of traits, F(l, 131) = 18.23,p < .001, 1J2 = .12, as more 
typically human traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, Ms = 
4.83 vs. 4.58, t (1, 133) = 5.06, p < .001. There was no significant interaction between 
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Fig 5.5 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in Romania 
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In Romania, relatively equally positive traits were attributed to out-groups and 
in-group, Ms = 4.86 and 4.94, respectively, F (1, 131) = 0.55, ns. The targets cultural 
status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 131) = 13.62, P < .001, 112 = 
.09, indicating that the culturally similar out-groups were attributed more positive 
traits than the in-group, Ms = 5.10 vs. 4.80, t (1, 67) = 2.58, p < .025, while the 
culturally different ones were ascribed less positive traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.64 
vs. 5.04, t (1, 66) = 2.62, P < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level), see Fig 
5.6a below. The targets' economic status also moderated the attribution of positive 
traits, F (1, 131) = 10.50, P < .01, 1'/2 = .07. This indicated that while the rich out-
groups and in-group were attributed relatively equally positive traits, Ms = 5.10 vs. 
4.84, t (1, 67) = l. 78, ns, but the poor out-groups were attributed significantly less 
positive traits than the in-group Ms = 4.64 vs. 5.04, t (1, 66) = 2.67, p < .025 
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Fig 5.6a Attribution of positive traits 
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Fig 5.6bAttribution of positive traits in 
Romania as a function of the targets' 
economic status 
To sum up, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones in 
each national study. But the hypothesis according to which the culturally different 
groups would be more dehumanized than the culturally similar ones was supported 
only in Romania. The results suggest that poverty may be a more consistent factor in 
dehumanization than cultural differences. Furthermore, the dehumanization of the 
out-groups was more evident in terms of traits rather than emotions, which raises 
questions as to the equivalence of the two measurements of dehumanization. 
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In Britain, although the out-groups were generally dehumanized by means of 
traits, they were attributed more positive traits than the in-group. In Romania, despite 
the overall dehumanization of the out-groups, equally positive traits were attributed to 
in-group and out-group. These results suggest that discriminations in terms of human 
typicality or in terms of positive valence are not the same phenomenon. Furthermore. 
correlation analyses indicated that the positive and the human sides of the emotions 
attributed to each target were positively and significantly correlated: for the out-
group, r (1, 116) = .68, in Britain, and r (1,133) = .70, in Romania,p < .001; for the 
in-group, r (1, 116) = .69, in Britain, and r (1,133) = .64, p < .001. As regarded the 
positive valence and the human typicality- of the traits, these were also positively and 
significantly correlated: for the out-group, r (1, 116) = .65, in Britain, and r (l, 133) = 
.67, in Romania, p < .001; for the in-group, r (1, 116) = .21, p < .05, in Britain. and r 
(1,133) = .39,p < .001, in Romania. The correlation between the human and positive 
sides of the traits attributed to the out-group was greater than the correlation between 
the human and the positive traits attributed to the in-group, Fisher's r-to-z 
transformation = 4.26, p < .001 in Britain, and Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 3.24, p 
< .001 in Romania. These asymmetries would suggest that the motivation to attribute 
human traits to the in-group went beyond their valence. It is not clear, however, why 
this asymmetry occurred with the traits but not with the emotions. 
5.3.4 Prejudice measures: perceived threat, delegitimization, blatant prejudice 
and in-group bias in resource allocation 
5.3.4.1 Symbolic and material threat 
Regarding symbolic threat, In Britain, items 2 and 4 were recoded, and item 5 
was excluded from the scale because it loaded on a second factor. The Cronbach' s 
alpha for the remaining four items was .60, the mean inter-item correlation being .23. 
Similarly, in Romania, items 2 and 4 were recoded and item 5 was excluded. The 
Cronbach's alpha was .54, and the mean inter-item correlation being .23. Gi\'en the 
low reliability coefficients, it was decided to exclude the symbolic threat scale from 
further analyses in both countries. As for material threat, in Britain, items 3 and 5 
were recoded, and the Cronbach's alpha was .70, the mean inter-item cOITelation 
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being .33. In Romania, items 2 and 5 were recoded, and the Cronbach's alpha was .6-+ 
without item 5, the mean inter-item correlation being .30. 
In each country two-way ANOV As with the targets' cultural status (similar \'s. 
different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables 
was conducted on the level of perceived material threat posed by the target minority. 
In Britain, more material threat was perceived in the case of poor ethnic minorities 
than in the case of rich minorities, Ms = 3.11 vs. 2.70, F (1,114) = 4.02,p < .05, 1'/2 = 
.03. However, in Romania, there were no significant main effects, all Fs < 1, ns. Thus, 
the research hypothesis according to which the ethnic minorities described as poor 
would invoke more perceived material threat than those described as rich was 
supported only in the British study. 
5.3.4.2 Deiegitimization 
In both countries items 1 and 4 were recoded. The Cronbach's alpha was .62 
in Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .25) and .71 in Romania (the mean 
inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's explored the effects of the 
targets' culture (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. 
poor) on the level of de legitimization of the target minority in each country. There 
were no significant main effects and no interactions in either country, all Fs (1, 114) < 
2.60, ns in Britain, and all Fs (1, 131) < 1.55, ns in Romania. Thus, neither the 
cultural status, nor the economic status of an ethnic minority played a part in the 
delegitimization of the target ethnic minorities in either country. 
5.3.4.3 Blatant prejudice 
In both countries, items 2 and 5 were recoded. The Cronbach's alpha was .81 
in Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .48), and .68 in Romania (the mean 
inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's with the targets' cultural status 
(similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent factors was 
conducted on the level of blatant prejudice against the target out-group for each 
national sample. There were no significant main effects and no interactions in either 
country, all Fs (1,114) < 2.7, ns in Britain, and all Fs (1,131) < 2.2, ns in Romania. 
These results indicate that the participants were not more likely to feel prejudice 
against the poor or the culturally different out-groups. 
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5.3.4.4 In-group bias in resource allocation to in-group and out-group 
Seven British and eight Romanian participants did not complete this scale, 
therefore their scores were replaced with means. The Cronbach's alpha was .81 in 
Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .50), and .68 in Romania (the mean 
inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's with the targets' cultural status 
(similar vs. different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as 
independent variables was conducted on the level of in-group bias in the allocation of 
resources to in-group and out-group. In Britain there were no main effects and no 
interactions, all Fs (1, 114) < 0.90, ns, nor in Romania, all Fs (1, 131) < 1.10, ns. 
These results indicate that neither the targets' cultural status, nor their economic status 
led to more in-group bias in the allocation of resources to in-group and out-group. 
5.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization 
In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other 
variables, an index of dehumanization was computed for each participant. This 
represented the difference (or distance) in humanity between in-group and out-group, 
and was computed by subtracting the humanity attributed to the out-group from that 
attributed to the In-group. This was computed separately for emotions 
(infrahumanization, or ~ Human emotions) and traits (ontologization, or ~ Human 
traits). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation analyses 
because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores for in-
group and out-group. Similarly, two other composite variables were computed which 
represented the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. These 
were computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group from 
that attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions (~ Positive 
emotions) and traits (~ Positive traits). 
In both countries, infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was 
positively and significantly correlated with the differential attribution of positive 
emotions and traits to out-group and in-group. The fact that infrahumanization 
correlated positively and significantly with in-group identification only in Britain may 
suggest that only the British participants perceived their group as superior to the target 
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out-groups. Ontologization (dehumanization through traits) correlated positi\'ely and 
significantly with most of the dependent measures of prejudice in both countries , 
which suggests that ontologization is more clearly related to prejudice. Interestingly, 
ontologization and infrahumanization were non-significantly correlated, which further 
suggests that they are different phenomena. 
Table 5.1. Cor:e~ations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice 
measures m Bntam (N = 118) ~ 
/1 Human /1 Human /1 Positive 11 Positive 
emotions traits emotions traits 
Material threat -.04 .26** .07 .. 24** 
Delegitimization -.06 .23* -.10 .27** 
Blatant prejudice -.09 .23* -.02 .30** 
In-group bias In -.11 .006 -.10 .12 
resource allocation 
In-group .19* -.003 .17 .35** 
identification 
SDO -.06 .05 -.1 0 .06 
*p < .05; **p < .01 6 
Table 5.2 Correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice 
measures in Romania (N = 135) 
/1 Human /1 Human /1 Positive 11 Positive 
emotions traits emotions traits 
Material threat -.007 .04 .11 .15 
Delegitimization .19* .23** .30** .34** 
Blatant prejudice .25** .26** .38** .38** 
In-group bias In .002 .30** .12 .31 ** 
resource allocation 
In-group .06 .04 .18* .26** 
identification 
SDO -.08 .03 -.006 .06 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
To analyse the possible mediators of dehumanization, the composite variables 
representing infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and 
ontologization (dehumanization through traits), respectively, were used as criterions 
in the regression analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the 
two sets of scores for in-group and out-group. Mediation analyses were carried out in 
6 Throughout the present research, to enable consistency and easy interpretation, correlations 
significant at the .OS level will be marked with one asterisk, correlations significant at the ,01 level will 
be marked with t\\'o asterisks, and correlations significant at the ,001 level will be marked with 3 
asterisks. 
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line with the suggestions by Baron and Kenny (1986), and Preacher and Hayes 
(2004). The regression analyses that examined the mediators of infrahumanization 
and ontologization, respectively, were informed by the results obtained in the 
ANOVA's on infrahumanization and ontologization, and on the other dependent 
variables such as perceived material threat and the positive emotions and traits 
attributed to in-group and out-group. The dependent variables selected as potential 
mediators of dehumanization were only those on which the cultural or the economic 
status of the out-group had significant main effects. 
In Britain more material threat was perceived in the case of poor out-groups, 
and the poor out-groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones, therefore it was 
decided to analyse whether perceived material threat mediated the ontologization of 
poor out-groups. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' 
economic status on ontologization via perceived material threat was not significantly 
greater than zero, Aroian's z = 1.33, ns, therefore material threat did not mediate the 
ontologization of the poor out-groups in Britain, see the table below: 










Constant -.27 .11 
Economic status .24 .06 .35*** 
Material threat .06 .03 .20* 
Note: R2= .15 for Step 1 (p < .001); LlR2 - .19 for Step 2 (p < .05). *p < .05; ***p < .001 
However, dehumanization mediated perceived material threat from poor 
groups, Aroian's z = 2.05,p < .05, see table 5.4 below: 
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Table 5.4 Dehumanization mediates perceived material threat from poor groups in Britain (S - 118) 






















The fact that dehumanization (through traits) mediated perceived material 
threat reinforces the finding that dehumanization is not a reaction to threat, and 
secondly it suggests that perceived threat may be a consequence rather than an 
antecedent of prejudice. 
In Britain, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized and were also 
attributed less positive traits than the rich ones. Therefore the differential attribution 
of positive traits to in-group and out-group (/1 Positive traits) was explored as a 
potential mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' 
economic status on ontologization via the attribution of positive traits to out-group 
was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's z = l.51, ns, see the table below: 











Economic status .23 .06 .33*** 
/1 Positive traits .06 .03 .21 * 
Note: R2 = .15 for Step 1 (p < .001); LlR2 = .04 for Step 2 (p < .05). * p < 05; ***p < .001 
However, dehumanzation (i1 Human traits) was found to mediate the 
differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group, Aroian' s z = 2.07, 
p < .05, see table 5.6 below. This result, together with the findings on the mediation of 
perceived material threat, suggests that dehumanization can be an antecedent of 
prejudice, rather than a consequence of it. 
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Table 5.6 Dehumanization mediates the attribution of positive traits to poor groups in Britain (N 1 18) 









Constant -1.54 .34 
.24** 
Economic status .36.23 .15 
~ Human traits .79 .33 .23* 
Note: Rl .06 for Step 1 (p < .01); L1R2 - .05 for Step 2 (p < .05). * p < 05; **p < .01 
In Romania, the culturally different out-groups were attributed less human 
traits but also less positive traits. The difference in the attribution of positive traits to 
in-group and out-group (~ Positive traits) was explored as a potential mediator of the 
dehumanization of culturally different groups. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect 
effect of the out-groups' cultural status on ontologization via the differential 
attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group was significantly greater than 
zero, Aroian's z = 3.50, p < .001, meaning that ~ Positive traits mediated 
ontologization, see the table below: 
Table 5.7 Positive traits mediate the dehumanization of the culturally different groups in Romania (N = 
135) 
B SEB B 
Step 1 
Constant .09 .11 
Cultural status .14 .07 .18* 
Step 2 
Constant .30 .09 
Cultural status -.01 .06 -.01 
~ Positive traits .20 .02 .64*** 
Note: R2 = .03 for Step 1 (p < .05); L1R2 = AD for Step 2 (p < .001). *p < .05; ***p < .001 
However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, I.e. the 
possibility that the criterion may predict the mediator, another regression analysis was 
conducted with the targets' cultural status as the predictor, ~ Positive traits as the 
criterion and dehumanization as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect , 
effect of the out-groups' cultural status on ~ Positive traits via dehumanization (~ 
Human traits) was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's z = 1.94, P = .052. It 
would thus appear that the culturally different groups were dehumanized because they 
were viewed in a negative light. 
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In Romania, the economic status of the target out-groups also had a main 
effect on ontologization and on the attribution of positive traits to out-groups. :-\ 
regression analysis included the economic status as predictor, ontologization as the 
criterion, and !1 Positive Traits as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect 
effect of the out-groups' economic status on ontologization via the differential 
attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group was significantly greater than 
zero, Aroian's z = 2.95,p < .01. 
Table 5.8 Positive traits mediating the dehumanization of the poor out-groups in Romania (N = 135) 
B SEB B 
Step 1 
Constant -.11 .1 0 
Economic status .27 .06 .35*** 
Step 2 
Constant .06 .08 
Economic status .15 .05 .19** 
!1 Positive traits .18 .02 .59*** 
Note: R2= .12 for Step 1 (p < .001);L1R2=.44 for Step 2 (p < .001). **p < .01; ***p < .001 
However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, another 
regression analysis was conducted with the targets' economic status as the predictor, 
!1 Positive traits as the criterion, and ontologization as the mediator. A Sobel test 
indicated that the indirect effect of the out-groups' economic status on !1 Positive 
traits via ontologization was significantly greater than zero, Aroian's z = 3.96, P < 
.001, see table 5.9 below. Given this feedback, it cannot be safely concluded that !1 
Positive traits mediated the ontologization of poor groups, but the results suggest that 
dehumanization can be an antecedent of prejudice. 
Table 5.9 Dehumanization mediates the attribution of positive traits to poor out-groups in Romania (N 
= 135) 
B SEB B 
Step 1 
Constant -.92 .33 
Economic status .66 .21 .27** 
Step 2 
Constant .70 .27 
Economic status .13 .18 .05 
!1 Human traits 1.97 .23 .62*** 
Note: R2 = .07 for Step 1 (p < .01); L1R2 = .34 for Step 2 (p < .001). **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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To sum up the findings on the mediating role of perceived threat, neither in 
Britain nor in Romania did perceived threat mediate dehumanization. Thus, the 
dehumanization of poor and of culturally different artificial out-groups is not a result 
of perceived threat. On the contrarty, the dehumanization of poor targets predicted 
perceived material threat against them, in Britain, as well as the attribution of less 
positive traits, in both countries, thus suggesting that dehumanization can be a 
precursor to prejudice. 
5.4 Discussion 
How has this vignette experiment contributed to the existing knowledge of 
dehumanization? I will examine here how this experiment has addressed the research 
hypotheses, discuss alternative interpretations for the results, examine this 
experiment's contribution to threat theories, briefly examine the cross-cultural results 
on the ideological measures, and conclude with the directions for the next study. 
The premises of this study were the suggestions that culturally different ethnic 
groups can be 'abnormalized' (Verkuyten, 2001) and dehumanized (Perez et aI., 
2001) by majority members, and the belief that a group's poor economic status can 
lead to it being attributed dehumanizing traits (Lott, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006). 
Secondly, studies on attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities have shown 
that perceived threat, be it symbolic or material, can predict negative prejudice against 
these groups (e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Stephan et aI., 1999), 
thus opening the possibility that perceived threat could mediate dehumanization. 
So what has this study shown? It has found that ethnic groups culturally 
different from the in-group can be more dehumanized than those culturally similar to 
the in-group. This finding was supported only by the Romanian data, but it 
nonetheless corroborates the research on the 'abnormalization' of immigrants and the 
dehumanization of culturally non-assimilated ethnic minorities. Also, this study has 
found that poverty can indeed predispose ethnic groups to being dehumanized, as in 
both Romania and Britain the poor groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones. 
Thus, both he research hypotheses were supported by this experiment. Concerning the 
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findings on the dehumanization of the culturally different groups, the results from the 
Romanian sample support the hypothesis according to which perceived dissimilarity 
between in-group and out-group at the level of values can lead to the dehumanization 
of the out-group (see Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Howevec given that the differential 
attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group totally mediated the 
dehumanization of the culturally different out-groups in Romania, it could be argued 
that the dehumanization of the culturally different out-groups was not due to their 
cultural status per se, but to how positively they were viewed by the in-group. The 
fact that the culturally different targets were dehumanized only in Romania might be 
due to the fact that the target group was presented as an ethnic minority rather than as 
an immigrant group. As an ethnic minority living in the country for hundred of years, 
the target group may have been expected to have already culturally assimilated. 
Alternatively, the lack of dehumanization of the culturally different groups in Britain 
may indicate that the British participants were more tolerant of cultural diversity than 
their Romanian counterparts, or more aware of norms of prejudice suppression 
regarding cultural discrimination (see Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall 
& Eshleman, 2003). The fact that the British participants dehumanized all the out-
groups while nonetheless attributing them more positive traits than to their in-group is 
also indicative of norms of social desirability. Thus, prejudice suppression may be 
more likely in postmaterialist than in materialist societies. 
The finding that the poor groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones 
was also in line with the research hypotheses, and thus supports recent research which 
has found that the poor are dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Given that the 
greater dehumanization (through traits) of the poor target groups was not mediated by 
but instead mediated perceived material threat, it could be argued that dehumanization 
was not a response to the threat perceived from the poor groups, but rather to their 
status as poor. It may be that representations of poverty (see Lott, 2002; Cozzarelli et 
al., 2001) and of the character of the poor, e.g. being lazy, can lead to poor people 
being viewed as less typically human. Their dehumanization can ultimately justify 
their moral and social exclusion, as for example in the case of the homeless and of the 
Gypsies. An alternative interpretation would be that poor people may be considered 
less 'typically human' and as yiolating norms of human behayiour. and thus the 
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dehumanization of the poor would function as an explanation for the poor's deviance 
from middle-class 'norms' (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). 
However, given that all the target groups were dehumanized (through traits), 
the present findings raise the question as to whether cultural differences and poverty 
are in fact moderators of dehumanization rather than predisposing factors. In other 
words, they may increase or decrease the strength of dehumanization but may not 
explain why it occurs. Arguably, there may be three alternative explanations for the 
overall dehumanization found in this experiment. Firstly, the results suggest that 
merely being an ethnic minority can make a group vulnerable to dehumanization 
because the status of being a minority can induce beliefs of deviance from the norm. 
As experimental research has shown, not only typicality beliefs, but also group size 
can affect judgements of normativity and explanations for 'deviance' (Hegarty & 
Pratto, 2001). Thus it could be argued that at least in certain circumstances minority 
groups may be dehumanized simply because their minority status implies deviance 
from human typicality. Secondly, dehumanization may be due to the use of artificial 
groups, which arguably elicited prejudice through their description as ethnic 
minorities. It may be that artificial groups are more likely to be dehumanized than real 
groups, a possibility which this research will consider in the next experiments (see 
chapter 7). Thirdly, instead of focusing on the lesser attribution of human typicality to 
the out-groups as 'the effect to be explained', one could alternatively analyse the 
greater overall attribution of more typically human traits to the in-group, and it could 
be argued that dehumanization (through traits) may function as a form of in-group 
favouritism. 
But there are problems associated with this explanation, too. First, the greater 
attribution of human typicality to the in-group was not significantly correlated with 
in-group identification in either country (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above). Second, 
although more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group, more positive 
traits were attributed to the out-group in Britain and equally positive traits \\ere 
attributed to in-group and out-group in Romania. Besides, the correlation between the 
human typicality and the positivity of the traits attributed to the out-groups was 
greater than the correlation between the same factors regarding the in-group (see 
section 5.3.3.2 above). Thirdly, the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through 
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traits) does not stipulate that dehumanization is a form of in-group bias. whereas the 
infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through emotions) makes this claim. 
Indeed, the index of infrahumanization was positively and significantly (although not 
highly) correlated with in-group identification in Britain. In this sense. the present 
findings are more in line with the infrahumanization theory which postulates that 
groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-group and to deny it to 
the out-groups. Interestingly, this hypothesis was supported by the operationalization 
of dehumanization in terms of traits rather than emotions. On this point, the present 
experiment did not support the tenet of the infrahumanization paradigm according to 
which individual are motivated to attribute more human emotions to their in-group 
than to the out-groups. 
In this experiment the scale of perceived symbolic threat did not achieve 
adequate internal reliability, therefore it was not possible to test whether perceived 
symbolic threat mediated the dehumanization of culturally different groups. However, 
the scale of perceived material threat was reliable in both national samples and further 
analyses were possible. Perceived material threat did not mediate the dehumanization 
of poor groups in Britain, somewhat contrary to the existing research on perceived 
threat which holds that perceived material threat is a predictor of prejudice in inter-
group relations (e.g. Stephan et aI., 2000). On the contrary, it was the dehumanization 
of the poor groups that mediated perceived material threat, thus indicating that 
dehumanization can be an antecedent of perceived threat and prejudice. Moreover, 
this result casts doubt on whether perceived material threat is indeed related to 
perceptions of competition for resources, or may in fact be a justification for prejudice 
against groups. The roles of perceived material and symbolic will be further explored 
in the next chapters. 
Concerning the ideological measures of in-group identification and SDO 
(social dominance orientation), overall these were not correlated with the two 
measures of dehumanization, except for the index of infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) which was positively, significantly but weakly 
correlated with in-group identification in the British sample. However, in-group 
identification was positively and significantly correlated with the differential 
attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group in both Britain and Romania. These 
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results suggest that in-group identification may be more related to the positive-
negative dimension of prejudice rather than to the human one. Also, they suggest that 
dehumanization may not necessarily be related to out-group derogation or downward 
group comparison, nor to the need to maintain group inequality. 
The present results also suggest ideological asymmetry between the British 
and the Romanian participants. The Romanian participants expressed significantly 
higher levels of SDO than their British counterparts. Also, in-group identification and 
SDO were significantly and positively correlated in Britain, but negatively and non-
significantly correlated in Romania. From the perspective of social dominance theory 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Sidanius, 
Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), the different valences in the correlations between in-
group identification and SDO in the two countries are indicative of anisotropic 
ideological asymmetry between members of dominant and of subordinate groups. 
Although the British participants were not a dominant group relative to the 
Romanians, they may have perceived their in-group as having a relatively high status 
and therefore felt motivated to identify with it. Conversely, the Romanian participants 
may have perceived their group as a relatively low status one and consequently 
distanced themselves from it. 
Furthermore, according to the infrahumanization theory, infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) should be related to in-group identification (e.g. 
Demoulin, et aI., 2004b). In the present experiment, in-group identification was 
positively and significantly correlated with infrahumanization but only in the British 
sample, while in the Romanian sample the correlation was positive but non-
significant. This suggests that only the British may have perceived their group as 
being superior to the out-groups, which ties in with the findings on the ideological 
asymmetry between Britain and Romania. Moreover, previous research has found that 
only the British participants engaged in the infrahumanization of out-groups (Marcu 
& Chryssochoou, 2005). Thus, while infrahumanization may be related to out-group 
derogation in both high-status and low-status groups (e.g. it correlated positiyely with 
the attribution of less positive emotions to out-groups), it may be linked to in-group 
favouritism only in the high-status groups. 
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To conclude, the present experiment contributes to the existing research on 
dehumanization by showing that perceived cultural differences between groups as 
well as perceptions poverty can lead to the dehumanization of ethnic minorities. 
However, given that all groups were dehumanized, the present experiment also raises 
the issues as to whether dehumanization can function as a fonn of in-group 
favouritism, and also whether cultural differences and poverty function as moderators 
of dehumanization. The rather mixed results on infrahumanization (dehumanization 
through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits) raise the issue 
as to whether infrahumanization and ontologization are equivalent phenomena. 
5.5 Progression to the next study 
As the measure of perceived symbolic threat failed to achieve adequate 
internal reliability, I decided to refonnulate the scale of symbolic threat in more 
threatening terms and to explore its potential mediating role in dehumanization in a 
follow-up experiment. Given that the culturally different groups invoked more 
dehumanization, I decided to include a scale that specifically measured perceived 
cultural differences between in-group and out-group. Furthermore I explored 
endorsement of multicultural ideology as an antecedent to dehumanization, and the 
endorsement of particular acculturation strategies for the out-group as correlates of 
dehumanization. These will be described in the next chapter. 
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6.1.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 1, through the use of artificial ethnic groups as targets, I 
showed that being culturally different from the majority or being poor can predispose 
an ethnic minority group to being dehumanized. I had hypothesised in Experiment 1 
that one might explain dehumanization in terms of perceived threat from the out-
group. However, I was not able to show this because the scale of perceived symbolic 
threat failed to reach adequate internal reliability, in both Britain and Romania. 
Furthermore, all target groups were dehumanized, and perceived material threat was 
not found to mediate dehumanization. These findings raised the issues as to whether 
perceived threat does indeed playa part in dehumanization, and whether simply being 
different and 'deviant' from the norm may be an antecedent to dehumanization. 
Therefore, I deemed necessary to replicate Experiment 1 in order to include a measure 
of perceived differences between in-group and out-group, and to construct a more 
reliable scale of perceived symbolic threat. Last but not least, I explored whether the 
dehumanized ethnic targets are more likely to be excluded and segregated by means 
of the acculturation strategies that the majority would endorse in their case. 
Values, alongside stereotypes and emotions, have been theorized to be a 
determinant of inter-group attitudes (see Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). Prejudice 
against groups at the level of norms, beliefs and values can also be viewed as a form 
of subtle prejudice, also termed symbolic racism (see Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 
2003; McConahay & Hough, 1976), which has been argued to emerge due to the 
changing norms of political correctness (see Crandall et aI., 2002; Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). The suggestion that prejudice can be caused by perceived 
differences between in-group and out-group at the level of values was also put 
forward by the belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960). Moreover, perceived 
differences between in-group and out-group in terms of norms and beliefs has been 
assumed to lead to the dehumanization of the out-group (Struch & Schwartz, 1989) 
because the humanity of a group has been assumed to be reflected in the basic values 
that its members endorse, where basic values encapsulate the goals that out-group 
members strive to achieve and the behaviours that they consider desirable (see 
Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). 
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However, it is not clear whether the dehumanization of a group on the basis of 
its different values rests on category norms and typicality judgements, or whether a 
group's values can indeed reflect how 'human' that group is. It is possible that a 
group's values, norms and beliefs may be indicative of how 'civilized' a group is, 
although it could be argued that what is considered 'civilized' may vary as a function 
of context, culture, and ad-hoc goals (see Larrain, 1994). As it was mentioned in 
Chapter 2, primitive has been considered the polar opposite of a variety of concepts, 
including Western, civilized, advanced, prosperous, modern (Berndt, 1968) and it 
may well be that a dehumanized group's values, beliefs and norms are not perceived 
as 'civilized', 'advanced' and 'modem' as those of the in-group. Nevertheless, it may 
be argued that constructing the dehumanized group's values as uncivilized and as less 
human than those of the in-group may be as much a consequence as an antecedent of 
dehumanization. 
In the present experiment I also explored the link between the perceived 
entitativity of the out-group and its dehumanization. Essentialist beliefs about social 
categories have been found to function as explanations and rationalizations of the 
existing social order (see Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Keller, 2005). Theories of 
psychological essentialism (e.g. Campbell, 1958; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; 2002) and of entitativity (e.g. Yzerbyt, Rocher, & 
Schadron, 1997) have highlighted that "the degree of entitativity of social groups is 
likely to be a key determinant of social attribution" (Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2001: 106), 
and in the present experiment social attribution is envisaged as the attribution of 
typical humanness to the target out-groups. At the core of essentialistic beliefs is the 
assumption that social categories such as ethnic groups have an essence, and this 
assumption is also found in the ontologization theory, which holds that certain ethnic 
minorities such as the Gypsies have a different essence and hence a different ontology 
from that of the majority group ( Perez et aI., 2001). Therefore, I expected that 
essentialist beliefs and dehumanization would be correlated. 
In this experiment I also introduced measures of the acculturation strategies 
that host society members might prefer for the target groups. This was done in order 
to measure whether the targets' cultural and economic status, and ultimately their 
dehumanization, might influence the degree to which these groups would be socially 
162 
Chapter 6 Perceived cultural differences as mediator of dehumanization 
excluded. The measures of integrationism, assimilationism, segregationism, 
exclusionism and individualism were constructed largely in line with theories of 
acculturation (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995), and specifically in line with the interactive 
acculturation model} (Bourhis, MoYse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). I also investigated 
whether preferences for acculturation orientations would vary according to the 
cultural and economic status of the target groups (see Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). I 
hypothesised that perceptions of out-group entitativity might influence the 
endorsement of particular acculturation strategies, as essentialist beliefs about ethnic 
minorities have been found to relate to lower endorsement of multiculturalism among 
majority members (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). 
6.1.2 Research hypotheses 
In the present experiment I examined the roles of perceived cultural 
differences, perceived material and symbolic threats, and perceived entitativity of the 
target out-groups in dehumanization. I formulated the following specific hypotheses: 
1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) 
2. the culturally different target groups will be more dehumanized (through 
traits) than the culturally similar ones 
3. the poor target groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the 
rich ones 
4. exclusionary acculturation strategies should be more preferred in the case of 
the culturally different targets and in the case of the poor targets 
I According to this model, a preference for integration ism indicates an acceptance of the immigrant 
out-groups' culture, while a preference for assimilationism indicates the desire that the out-groups 
should abandon their culture in favour of the host society's culture. Segregationism implies that out-
groups are allowed keep their culture as long as they do not mix with host society members, while a 
preference for exclusionism indicates outright intolerance for out-groups, regardless of :",h~ther they 
keep their own culture or adopt the host society's culture. Endorsement of individualism mdlcate~ that 
host society members do not perceive themselves or out-group members as members of particular 
ethnic groups, but as individuals, therefore individualists should prefer colour-blind rather than culture-
specific ideologies. 
163 
Chapter 6 Perceived cultural differences as mediator of dehumanization 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Design 
The study had a 2 (culturally similar vs. culturally different ethnic minority) x 
2 (rich vs. poor ethnic minority) factorial design within each national sample, with 
both factors as between-participants factors. The participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the four conditions. In the British sample, the cell sizes varied from 20 to 23, 
while in the Romanian one, from 32 to 40. 
6.2.2 Participants and procedure 
One hundred and forty-eight, 110 females and 38 males, Romanian nationals, 
Mage = 21, age range = 19 to 37, participated in the study. Eighty-four, 38 females 
and 46 males, British nationals, Mage = 22, age range = 18 to 44, also took part in the 
study. The participants were recruited on university campus and were told they were 
taking part in a study exploring the experience of cultural diversity in their country. 
The participants were debriefed after completing the questionnaire. 
6.2.3 Materials 
The same vignettes and targets groups as in Experiment 1 were employed in 
the present experiment (see Chapter 5). However, instead of the targets' economic 
status being described in words, their economic status was stated in numbers 
purportedly representing the targets' average household income, per annum in Britain, 
and per month in Romania (see Appendix IV a for the British version of the 
questionnaire, and Appendix IV b for the Romanian version). In the 'rich out-group' 
condition, the targets' income was higher than the national average, while in the 'poor 
out-group' condition, the targets' income was lower than the national average, see the 
extract below. The italicized text in brackets represents the targets' economic status in 
the 'poor' condition: 
National Statistics show that the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a. 
[£17,000 p.a.], compared to the national average household income of £23,200 p.a .. 
thus suggesting that the Moravians are not putting a strain on the social welfare 
system [thus suggesting that the Moravians are putting a strain on the social welfare 
system]. 
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6.2.3.1 Prejudice measures: manipulation checks, perceived cultural differences 
between in-group and out-group, material and symbolic threat, dehumanization, 
perceived out-group entitativity, blatant prejudice, and preferred acculturation 
strategy for the out-group 
6.2.3.1.1 Manipulation checks 
2 manipulation check items, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), 
assessed the perceived similarity of the target out-group to the in-group: how similar 
you think the Moravians [Ceangai] are to the your national group [Romanians}?, and 
the perceived burden they posed on the system of social benefits: do you think that the 
Moravians [Ceangai] have a negative impact on the national economy? 
6.2.3.1.2 Perceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group 
Five 7-point Likert scale items were developed to assess the perceived cultural 
differences between in-group and target out-group, e.g. The Ceangai's way of thinking 
is not compatible with that of the Romanians. This scale drew on studies suggesting 
that the greater the discrepancy in basic values between in-group and out-group, the 
less human the out-group is likely to be perceived (e.g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989). 
Items 2 and 3 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated high perceived cultural 
differences between in-group and out-group. 
6.2.3.1.3 Material and symbolic threat 
The same scale for perceived material threat as in Experiment 1 was used in 
this experiment (see Chapter 5). Items 2 and 5 were reverse-coded, and high scores 
indicated high levels of perceived material threat. As for symbolic threat, for this 
experiment five new items were constructed in order to measure perceived symbolic 
threat from the target out-group. Instead of simply measuring whether the out-group' s 
values and beliefs were different from those of the in-group, it measured whether the 
out-group's values and beliefs posed a threat to the Romanian / British society, e.g. 
the Ceangai's cultural beliefs represent a danger for Romanian society. Items 2 and 4 
were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated high levels of perceived symbolic 
threat. 
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6.2.3.1.4 Dehumanization 
Dehumanization was measured the same as in Experiment 1. However, unlike 
Experiment 1 where the emotions and traits were listed separately, in the present 
experiment the emotions and the traits were mixed in the same list, and the 
participants were asked to choose 12 features that they thought best described the 
target (out-group, and in-group, respectively). This change was made in order to make 
the infrahumanization process subtler2. At the same time, this rearrangement allowed 
the participants to choose whether they represented the target groups (out-group and 
in-group, respectively) in terms of emotions or traits, and consequently whether they 
found it easier to dehumanize in terms of traits rather than emotions, or vice-versa. 
6.2.3.1.5 Perceived out-group entitativity 
For this experiment a scale of perceived entitativity of the out-group was 
constructed, which meant to test the hypothesis that groups which are dehumanized 
are also perceived as being more entitative. Five 7-point Likert scale items assessed 
whether the out-group was essentialized, and were adapted from Verkuyten and Brug 
(2004), and Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000), e.g. the Ceangiii are very similar 
to one another in they way they think and behave. Items and 2 and 5 were reverse-
coded and high scores indicated high perceived out-group entitativity. 
6.2.3.1.6 Blatant prejudice 
The same scale of blatant prejudiced as the one used in Experiment 1 was 
included in the second experiment. Items 2 and 5 were reversed, and high scores 
indicated the desire for social distance from the target out-group. 
6.2.3.1. 7 Preferred acculturation strategy for the out-group 
Ten 7-point Likert scale items measured the participants preferred 
acculturation strategy for the out-group, in line with theories of acculturation (Berry, 
2001; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001) and with the interactive acculturation model 
(Bourhis, MoIse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). The orientations of assimilationism, 
integrationism, segregationism, exclusionism and individualism were measured for 
2 The emotions and the traits were mixed following suggestions from Professor J-P. Leyens. 
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two domains each: cultural and economic. One item measuring integrationism at the 
cultural level was: I think that the Ceangiii should maintain their culture of origin but 
at the same time adopt Romanian culture. One item measuring integrationism at the 
economic level was: When a job is available, employers should be as likely to hire a 
Moravian as a British candidate, and this regardless of the cultural habits of the 
Moravians. High scores indicated preference for that particular acculturation strategy. 
6.2.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification, SDO, and endorsement of 
multicultural ideology (EMI) 
The same scales for in-group identification and SDO as those used in 
Experiment 1 were employed in the second experiment. The items were measured on 
a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). High scores indicated a high level 
of in-group identification and of social dominance orientation, respectively. 
Ten 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Arends-T6th and Van de Vijver's 
(2003) scale of multiculturalism assessed the participants' endorsement of 
multicultural ideology (henceforth, EMI), e.g. British people should recognise that 
British society is made up of different cultural groups. Items 3, 5, 6, 7, and 10 were 
reverse-coded, with high scores indicating endorsement of multiculturalism and 
tolerance of cultural diversity. 
6.3 Results 
When analysing the data I explored: (1) whether the experimental 
manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been 
affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the culturally different 
targets and the poor targets were more dehumanized than the culturally similar and 
the rich targets, respectively; (4) whether the prejudice measures varied as a function 
of the experimental manipulations; (4) whether perceived threat mediated 
dehumanization; (5) and whether dehumanization could predict the endorsement of 
acculturation strategies preferred for the out-group. The analyses will be reported in 
turn in the following sections. 
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6.3.1 Manipulations checks: perceived group similarity and perceived pressure 
on the economy 
In Romania, the two manipulation checks items, perceived similarity to the in-
group, and perceived pressure put by out-group on the economy, were negatively and 
non-significantly correlated, r (1, 146) = -.09, ns. A two-way ANOVA with the out-
groups' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich 
vs. poor) as independent variables, was conducted on each of the two manipulations 
checks items. The out-groups described as culturally similar were judged as more 
similar to the in-group than the out-groups described as culturally different, Ms = 5.08 
vs. 3.56, F (1,143) = 35.61,p < .001, 1'/2 = .20. The poor target groups were perceived 
as putting more pressure on the economy than the rich ones, Ms = 3.03 vs. 2.32, F (1, 
143) = 7.12,p < .01, 1'/2 = .05. 
In Britain, the two manipulation checks items were negatively and non-
significantly correlated, r (1, 82) = -.21, ns. The out-groups described as culturally 
similar were judged as more similar to the in-group than the out-groups described as 
culturally different, Ms = 5.22 vs. 3.25, F (1, 80) = 43.54,p < .001, 1'/2 = .35. However, 
the rich out-groups were also perceived as more similar to the in-group than the poor 
ones, Ms = 4.76 vs. 3.71, F (1, 80) = 12.42, p < .01, 1'/2 = .13. Also, the poor groups 
were perceived as putting more pressure on the economy than rich groups, Ms = 3.23 
vs. 1.90, F (1, 79) = 18.75, p < .001, 1'/2 = .19. To sum up, the manipulation checks 
indicate that the experimental manipulations were successful in both countries. 
6.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification, SDO, and EMI 
The measure of in-group identification was reliable in both countries, 
Cronbach's alpha being .76 in Romania and .88 in Britain. A two-way ANOVAs, 
with the out-groups' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and 
economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables, were conducted on in-group 
identification. In Britain, there were no main effects of the targets' economic and 
cultural status on in-group identification, all Fs < 2, ns. However, in Romania there 
was an interaction between the cultural and the economic statuses of the out-groups 
which had a significant effect on in-group identification, F (1, 144) = 4.30, p < .05, 1]2 
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= .03. This meant that when the out-group was culturally different, in-group 
identification was higher when the out-group was poor than when it was rich, Ms = 
5.83 vs. 5.27, t (1,77) = 2.31, p = .024 (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance 
= .025), whereas when the out-group was culturally similar, equal in-group 
identification was expressed in the rich and poor conditions, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.24, t (1, 
67) = 0.58, ns. This result would suggest that the Romanian participants were more 
motivated to identify with their in-group when, by comparison to the out-group, they 
perceived their in-group to be culturally superior and more successful. There were no 
other main effects for the in-group identification, both Fs < 2.20, ns. Thus, it would 
appear that in Romania in-group identification may be a covariate of the dependent 
measures of prejudice, and it should be included in the analyses exploring the effects 
of the experimental manipulations (e.g. conducting ANCOVAs instead of ANOVAs). 
The SDO measure was reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha being .84 
in Romania and .90 in Britain. Given that SDO measure had the same content in both 
countries, a three-way ANOV A with nationality (British vs. Romanian), the targets' 
cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. 
poor) as independent variables was conducted on SDO. There were no main effects of 
the targets' cultural and economic statuses on the levels of SDO in either country, all 
Fs < 1.50, ns. There was only a main effect of nationality, F (1,224) = 17.90,p < .001, 
1'/2 = .07, indicating that the Romanians expressed higher levels of SDO than did the 
British, Ms = 2.83 vs. 2.32 (similarly to the findings from Experiment 1). 
As for the endorsement of multicultural ideology (EMI), this measure was 
reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha being .71 in Romania and .80 in Britain. 
A three-way ANOV A with nationality (British vs. Romanian), the targets' cultural 
similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as 
independent variables was conducted on EM!. There were no significant main effects 
of the targets' cultural or economic status on EMI, all Fs < 1, ns. The British and the 
Romanians endorsed multiculturalism rather equally, Ms = 4.86 vs. 4.75, F (1, 224) = 
0.88, ns. However, the Romanians were more in favour of multiculturalism when the 
target was rich than when it was poor, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.62, F (1, 224) = 7.05, P < .01, 
1'/2 = .03. These results would suggest that EMI may not be an independent measure of 
prejudice as it seems to be contingent upon the economic status of the target out-
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groups. However, more studies are needed to determine whether this is a chance result , 
or whether it is a phenomenon specific to relatively poor countries such as Romania. 
The implications of this result is that in Romania EMI, just like in-group identification, 
may be a covariate of the prejudice measures, which should be taken into account in 
those analyses exploring the effects of the experimental manipulations. Running 
ANCOVAs instead of ANOVAs can increase the experimental control by taking into 
account the confounding variables, thus producing a better measure of the effect of 
the experimental manipulation (see Field, 2005). 
Most of the individual factors in prejudice were significantly inter-correlated. 
Only in Britain was in-group identification positively and significantly correlated with 
SDO, r (1,82) = .23,p < .05, and with EMI, r (1,82) = -.39,p < .001, the correlations 
being non-significant in Romania, r (1,146) = -.11 and .03, ns, respectively. However, 
SDO was negatively and significantly correlated with EMI in both countries, r (1, 
146) = -.38,p < .01, in Romania, and r (1,82) = -.50,p < .001, in Britain. Looking at 
the correlations by experimental condition, in Romania in-group identification 
correlated negatively and significantly with SDO when the target out-groups were 
culturally similar to the in-group, r (1, 67) = -.29, p < .05, but non-significant when 
the out-groups were culturally different from the in-group, r (1, 77) = .001, ns. In 
Britain, in-group identification correlated negatively and significantly with EMI when 
the out-groups were culturally different, r (1, 82) = -.53, p < .001, but non-
significantly when the out-groups were culturally similar, r (1, 82) = -.27, ns. 
6.3.3 Attributions of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group 
Similarly to Experiment 1 (see Chapter 5), for each participant an average 
'humanness' score was calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the out-group 
and in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion / trait 
selected by the participant for the respective group (in-group or out-group) with its 
humanness weighting (see Chapter 4), adding them up and dividing them by the 
number of the emotions / traits attributed to the target (in-group or out-group). The 
same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, 
respectively, attributed to in-group and out-groups. 
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In each country mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the 
attribution of typically human emotions and typically human traits. The between-
participants factors were the target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different 
from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group vs. 
out-group) was the within-participants factor. The dependent variables were the 
typically human emotions, and respectively traits, attributed to the out-group and to 
the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted separately for the attribution of 
positivity. In the analyses of dehumanization in Romania, in-group identification and 
endorsement of multicultural ideology, which were found to vary as a function of the 
experimental manipulations, were not included as covariates because neither of these 
measures correlated simultaneously with the humanness (be it in emotions or traits) 
attributed to the out-group or to the in-group. 
As to whether the participants were more likely to choose emotions rather than 
traits, or vice-versa, to represent the target group (out-group and in-group, 
respectively), see the table below for a summary of the mean emotions and traits 
chosen per target. Given that there were 20 traits but only 12 emotions to chose from 
for each target, the percentages of emotions and respectively traits were calculated 
that the means represented, e.g. out of 12 emotions, the percentage of emotions 
chosen for the out-group on average was 27% in Romania. As it can be seen in Table 
6.1 below, the participants were more likely to choose traits rather than emotions. 
Table 6.1 Means and percentages of emotions and traits ascribed to the out-group and in-group, 

















6.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions 
In Romania, although the total number of emotions chosen for the out-group 
and the total number of emotions chosen for the in-group were normally distributed, 
the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 1 to 10, and to the in-
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group, from 1 to 7. Eight participants ascribed only 1 emotion for the out-group, and 
seventeen participants, only 1 emotion for the in-group. It is possible that some 
participants chose few emotions because the emotions were mixed with the traits, and 
the participants may not have focused on the emotions. Those participants who 
ascribed only 1 emotion per target, be it out-group or in-group, had their scores 
replaced by means. 
The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, 
more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, 
Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.29, F (1, 144) = 1l.41, p = .001, r;2 = .07, thus supporting the 
infrahumanization hypothesis. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution 
of typically human emotions, F (1,144) = 7.39,p < .01, r;2 = .05, as equally typically 
human emotions were attributed to the in-group and out-group in the 'rich out-group' 
condition, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.36, t (1, 75) = 0.58, ns, whereas more typically human 
emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group in the 'poor out-group' 
condition, Ms = 5.40 vs. 5.21, t (1, 71) = 3.92, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level = .025). In other words, only the poor out-groups were 
infrahumanized, see Fig. 6.1 below. There were no other significant main effects or 












Fig. 6.1 Attribution of typically human emotions 
to rich and poor groups in Romania 
As for the positive emotions in Romania, again the scores of those participants 
who had only ascribed one emotion per target were replaced by means. A mixed-
design ANOV A, where the assumption of sphericity was met, revealed that overall 
equally positive emotions were attributed to in-group and out-group, Ms = 5.11 vs. 
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5.11, F (1, 144) = 0.005, ns. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of 
positive emotions, F (1, 144) = 6.27, p < .05, 1'/2 = .04, indicating that more positive 
emotions were attributed to the culturally similar than to the culturally different out-
groups, Ms = 5.30 vs. 4.94, t (1, 146) = 2.53, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level). There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 
2.50, ns. Thus, in Romania the targets' economic status played a part in their 
dehumanization, while their cultural status influenced the attribution of positive 
emotions. These results would suggest that dehumanization was not influenced by the 
positive valence of the emotions. 
In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 1 to 
6, and for in-group, from 1 to 7. Eight participants ascribed only 1 emotion for the 
out-group, and four participants, only 1 emotion for the in-group. Those participants 
who ascribed only 1 emotion per target, be it out-group or in-group, had their scores 
replaced by means. In the mixed-design ANOV A on the attribution of typically 
human emotions the assumption of sphericity was met. Overall more typically human 
emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.35, F 
(1, 80) = 4.66, p < .05, 1'/2 = .06, thus supporting the infrahumanization hypothesis. 
The targets' cultural status moderate the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 
80) = 5.30, p < .05, 1'/2 = .06, as equally typically human emotions were attributed to 
the in-group and out-groups in the 'culturally similar' condition, Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.38, 
but more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-
group in the 'culturally different' condition, Ms = 5.40 vs. 5.32, t (1, 39) = 2.76, p 
= .009 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). There were no other 
significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.10, ns. Thus, in Britain only the culturally 
different targets seemed to be dehumanized, see Fig. 6.2 below. 
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Fig. 6.2 Attribution of typically human emotions to culturally similar 
and culturally different groups in Britain 
As for the attribution of positive emotions in Britain, again the scores of those 
participants who had only ascribed one emotion per target were replaced by means. A 
mixed-design ANOVA, where the assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that 
overall equally positive emotions were attributed to the out-group and the in-group, 
Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.08, F (1, 80) = 3.89, ns. The targets' economic status moderated the 
attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 80) = 5.69, p < .02, 172 = .07. This meant that 
equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group and poor targets, Ms = 5.21 
vs. 5.17, t (1, 40) = 0.29, ns, but more positive emotions were attributed to the rich 
targets than to the in-group, Ms = 5.45 vs. 4.94, t (1, 42) = 3.14, p = .003, 
(Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). Furthermore, the between-
participants effects indicated that more positive emotions were attributed to the 
culturally similar targets than to the culturally different ones, Ms = 5.60 vs. 5.00, F (1, 
82) = 15.40,p < .001, 172 = .16. 
Thus, contrary to Romania, in Britain the targets' cultural status played a role 
in their infrahumanization, while both their economic and cultural status influenced 
the attribution of positive emotions. To sum up, the results on infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) in the present experiment generally support the 
infrahumanization hypothesis as in both countries more human emotions were overall 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group. However, in Romania only the poor 
out-groups were infrahumanized, whereas in Britain only the culturally different out-
groups were infrahumanized. These results suggest that infrahumanization may not be 
an expression of in-group bias but rather of out-group derogation. 
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6.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits 
In Romania, the total number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 5 
to 15, and to the in-group, from 6 to 13. The assumption of sphericity was met, and 
the mixed-design ANOVA indicated that overall more human traits were attributed to 
the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.97 vs. 4.74, F (1,144) = 74.86,p < .001, 172 
= .34. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of traits, F (1, 144) = 
13.81, p < .001, 172 = .09, as more typically human traits were attributed to the in-
group when the out-group was culturally different than when it was similar, Ms = 5.00 
vs. 4.93, t (1, 146) = 2.28, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). At the 
same time, more typically human traits were attributed to the culturally similar than to 
the culturally different targets, Ms = 4.82 vs. 4.67, t (1, 146) = 3.22, p < .01. Thus, 
while all out-groups were ontologized, the culturally different ones were even more so, 
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Fig. 6.3 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in Romania 
As for the positive traits in Romania, a mixed-design ANOVA, where the 
assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that relatively equally positive traits were 
attributed to the out-group and the in-group, Ms = 5.07 vs. 4.97, F (1, 144) = 1.43, ns. 
The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 144) = 
6.96, p < .01, 172 = .05, as equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the 
culturally different out-group, Ms = 4.97 vs. 4.84, t (1, 78) = 0.99, ns, but less positive 
traits were attributed to the in-group than to the culturally similar out-group, Ms = 
4.95 vs. 5.31, t (1, 68) = 2.99, p = .004 (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance 
= .025). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.50, ns. 
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As for dehumanization in Britain, the assumption of sphericity was met, and 
overall more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-
group, Ms = 4.75 vs. 4.58, F (1, 80) = 27.71, p < .001, 172 = .26. The targets' cultural 
status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, F (1, 80) = 4.86, p < .05, 172 
= .06, indicating that equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group 
and the culturally similar out-groups, Ms = 4.73 vs. 4.63, t (1, 43) = 2.12, p = .04, 
whereas more human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the culturally 
different out-group, Ms = 4.77 vs. 4.53, t (1,39) = 5.07,p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level of .025). Thus, only the culturally different out-groups were 
ontologized in Britain, see Fig. 6.4a below. The targets' economic status also 
influenced the attribution of traits, F (1, 80) = 4.31, p < .05, 172 = .05, as equally 
typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and the rich out-groups, Ms = 
4.73 vs. 4.63, t (1, 42) = 2.09, p = .04, whereas more typically human traits were 
ascribed to the in-group than to the poor out-group, Ms = 4.77 vs. 4.53, t (1, 40) = 
5.10, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level = .025). In other words, only 














Fig. 6.4a Attribution of typically 
human traits to culturally similar and 













Fig. 6.4b Attribution of typically 
human traits to rich and poor groups in 
Britain 
As for positive traits in Britain, a mixed-design ANOV A where the 
assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that overall more positive traits were 
attributed to the out-group than to the in-group, Ms = 5.08 vs. 4.38, F (1, 80) = 56.54, 
p < .001,172 =.41. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive 
traits, F (1, 80) = 8.39, p < .01, 172 = .10, as more positive traits were attributed to the 
culturally similar than the culturally different out-groups, Ms = 5.45 vs. 4.72, t (1,82) 
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= 5049, p < .001, whereas equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the 
two experimental conditions, Ms = 4046 vs. 4.29, t (1, 82) = 0.94, ns (Bonferroni-
adjusted significance level = .025). The targets' economic status also moderated the 
attribution of positive traits, F (1, 80) = 18.05, p < .001, 1]2 = .18, as more positive 
traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, Ms = 5.31 vs. 4.89, t (1, 
82) = 2.71, p = .008 (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025), whereas equal 
positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.19 vs. 4.58, 
t (1,82) = 2.16,p = .034. Thus, in Britain, the groups which were particular targets of 
ontologization were also attributed less positive traits. 
To sum up the present results on ontologization, this experiment found that 
while more human traits were generally attributed to the in-group than to the out-
groups, the culturally different target out-groups were a particular target of 
ontologization in both Romania and Britain, a finding which is in line with the 
hypothesis of ontologization. At the same time, the poor out-groups were a target of 
ontologization, but only in Britain. The present results tie in with the results from 
Experiment 1, which had found that the culturally different groups as well as the poor 
ones were a particular target of ontologization. 
6.3.4 Prejudice measures: material and symbolic threat, blatant prejudice, and 
preference of acculturation strategies for the target out-group 
Most of the dependent measures had reliable scales, apart from the perceived 
out-group entitativity, which had very low reliability in both countries and was 
therefore excluded from further analyses, see the table below for a summary: 
Table 6.2 Summary of the internal reliabilities and the mean inter-item correlations of the scales 
Romania (N= 148) Britain (N= 84) 
Cronbach's Mean inter-item Cronbach's Mean inter-
alpha correlation alpha item 
correlation 
Cultural differences .64 .27 .85 .53 
Material threat .65 (3 items) .38 .66 (4 items) .33 
Symbolic threat .65 .28 .74 .39 
Blatant prejudice .67 .30 .78 042 
Out-group .51 .21 Al .16 
entitativity 
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In Romania, ANCOVAs (and where appropriate, MANCOVAs) were 
conducted out on the dependent variables, with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. 
different) and the targets' economic status (rich vs. poor) as the independent factors, 
and with Romanian in-group identification and EMI (endorsement of multicultural 
ideology) as covariates. In-group identification and EMI were not correlated with 
each other, thus they did not decrease the power of the M / ANCOVA tests (see 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, to be included as covariates, in-group 
identification and EMI needed to be correlated with the respective dependent 
variables (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It was found that in-group identification 
correlated with no measures of prejudice, whereas EMI correlated with all of them. 
Therefore only EMI was included as a covariate in the analyses of prejudice measures 
in Romania. In Britain, two-way ANOV As were carried out on the dependent 
variables, with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different) and the targets' 
economic status (rich vs. poor) as the independent factors. In Britain, in-group 
identification, SDO and EMI were not included as covariates because these three 
variables had not been influenced by the experimental manipulations. 
6.3.4.1 Perceived cultural differences between out-group and in-group 
In Romania, an ANCOVA was conducted with the targets' cultural status 
(similar vs. different) and the targets' economic status (rich vs. poor) as the 
independent factors, EMI as covariate, and perceived cultural difference between out-
group and in-group as the dependent variable. EMI did not have a significant main 
effect, F (1, 143) = 3.82, ns. The culturally different targets were judged as more 
culturally different from the in-group than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 4.03 vs. 
3.19, F(1, 143) = 26.38,p < .001, yt2 = .17. There was no main effect of the targets' 
economic status, and no significant interaction between the factors, both Fs < 1. 
In Britain, a two-way ANOVA indicated that the culturally different targets 
were judged as more different from the in-group than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 
3.99 vs. 2.49, F (1, 80) = 49.87, p < .001, yt2 = .38. Also, the poor groups were judged 
as more different from the in-group than the rich ones, Ms = 3.47 vs. 3.00, F (1, 80) = 
4.86, p < .05, yt2 = .06. There was no significant interaction between the targets' 
cultural and the economic status, F < 1. Thus, while in both countries the culturall y 
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different groups were perceived as more different from the in-group than the 
culturally similar ones, in Britain the poor groups were also perceived as more 
different than the rich ones. 
6.3.4.2 Perceived material and symbolic threat 
In Romania, the scale of perceived material threat had only three items as two 
items were excluded in order to improve the reliability of the scale. An ANCOV A 
with EMI as covariate indicated only a main significant effect of EMI on perceived 
material threat, F (1, 143) = 21.13, p < .001, 1'/2 = .13. There were no main effects, nor 
any significant interactions, all Fs < 1. The parameter estimates indicated that for 
every 1 unit increase in EMI there should be 0.57 units of decrease in perceived 
material threat. 
As for perceived symbolic threat in Romania, the ANCOVA indicated a main 
effect of EMI, F (1, 143) = 14.92, p < .001, 1'/2 = .09, meaning that for every 1 unit of 
increase in EMI there would be a 0.40 units of decrease in perceived symbolic threat. 
There was also a main effect of the targets' cultural status after the effect of EMI was 
controlled for, F (1, 143) = 12.79, p < .001, 1'/2 = .08, meaning that the culturally 
different targets invoked more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 
3.07 vs. 2.44. There were no other significant effects or interactions, both Fs < 1.50. 
To test the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, i.e. the assumption that 
the overall relationship between the covariate and the DV is true for all groups of 
participants, the ANCOV A was rerun with a customized model, including EMI as a 
covariate and the targets' cultural status as the fixed factor. The analysis indicated a 
significant main effect of EM I, F (1,144) = 16.25,p < .001, 1'/2 = .10, but no longer a 
main effect of the targets' cultural status, F (1, 144) = 0.48, ns. Importantly, the 
analysis indicated no significant interaction between EMI and the targets' cultural 
status, F (1, 144) = .01, ns, which means that the assumption of homogeneity of 
regression slopes was not broken. Thus, it was concluded that only the endorsement 
of multicultural ideology predicted perceived symbolic threat. 
In Britain, one item was excluded from the perceived material threat scale in 
order to improve its reliability. The culturally different groups invoked more material 
threat than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 3.02 vs. 2.64, F (1, 80) = 4.24, p < .05, 1/2 
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= .05. Also, the poor groups invoked more material threat than the rich ones, Ms = 
3.02 vs. 2.65, F (1, 80) = 4.00, p < .05, 112 = .05. There was no significant interaction 
between the independent factors, F < 1. As for symbolic threat, the culturally different 
targets invoked more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 2.69 vs. 
2.11, F (1, 80) = 8.56, p < .01, 112 = .10. There were no other significant effects or 
interactions, both Fs < 2. 
6.3.4.3 Blatant prejudice 
In Romania, an ANCOVA with EMI as covariate revealed no significant main 
effects of the targets' cultural and economic status, both Fs < 1.50, and only a main 
effect of EMI, F (1, 143) = 15.83, p < .001, 112 = .10. The parameter estimates 
indicated that for every 1 unit increase in EMI, there would be 0.46 units of decrease 
in blatant prejudice. In Britain the poor target groups invoked more prejudice than the 
rich ones, Ms = 2.56 vs. 2.12, F (1,79) = 6.10,p < .05, 112 = .07. There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions, both Fs < 4, ns. 
Overall, there were positive and significant correlations between the 
dependent measures of prejudice and the three individual factors in prejudice, see 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below. Perceived symbolic and material threat were positively and 
significantly correlated at r (1,82) = .62,p < .001 in Britain, but at r (1,146) = .39,p 
< .001, in Romania. The difference between the correlations coefficients in the two 
countries was significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.26, p < .05. 
Table 6.3 Correlations between the prejudice and ideological measures in Romania (N = 148) 
Cultural Material Symbolic Blatant 
differences threat threat prejudice 
Cultural difference 
Material threat .38*** 
Symbolic threat .35*** .39*** 
Blatant prejudice .22** .40*** .51 *** 
In-group identification .09 .10 .13 .02 
SDO .13 .21 * .03 .22** 
EMI -.17* -.36*** -.32*** -.32*** 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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The two items making up each acculturation strategy (cultural and economic 
domains) were averaged to create a composite variable. In Romania, a two-way 
MANCOV A was carried out on the five acculturation strategies. The between-
participants independent variables were the targets' culture (similar vs. different from 
the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor), with in-group identification and 
EMI as covariates. In-group identification was included in the analysis because it 
correlated positively with segregationism. The analysis indicated a main effect of in-
group identification on segregationism, F (1, 142) = 5.57, p < .05, 112 = .04, meaning 
that for every 1 unit increase in in-group identification there should be a 0.24 units 
increase in preference for segregationism. There was also a main effect of EMI on all 
acculturation strategies except integrationism. Concerning assimilationism, F (1, 142) 
= 45.40, p < .001, 112 = .24, the effect of EMI meant that for every 1 unit increase in 
EMI, there should be a 0.80 units decrease in preference for assimilationism. In the 
case of segregationism, F (1, 142) = 23.70,p < .001, 112 = .14, for every 1 unit increase 
of EM I it is expected a 0.62 decrease in segregationism. Regarding exclusionism, F (1, 
142) = 14.60,p < .001, 112 = .09, for every 1 unit increase in EMI one should expect a 
0.41 units decrease in exclusionism. As for individualism, F (1, 142) = 6.77, p < .05, 
112 = .05, for every 1 unit increase in EMI there should be 0.30 units increase in 
preference for individualism. 
After the effects of in-group identification and EMI were partialled out in 
Romania, individualism was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for the out-
group when the out-group was culturally similar to the in-group than when it was 
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different, Ms = 6.37 vs. 5.91, F (1,142) = 5.63,p < .05, 172 = .04. There were no other 
main effects of the targets' cultural status on the other four acculturation strategies, all 
Fs < 3.50, ns. Integrationism was more preferred when the out-group was poor than 
when it was rich, Ms = 6.02 vs. 5.68, F (1, 142) = 4.36, p < .05, 172 = .03, and so was 
assimilationism, Ms = 3.20 vs. 2.56, F (1, 142) = 4.86, p < .05, 172 = .03. There were 
no main effects of the targets' economic status on the other acculturation strategies, 
all Fs < 1, ns. 
To test the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, the MANCOV A 
was rerun with a customized model, including in-group identification and EMI as 
covariates and the targets' cultural and economic statuses as fixed factors. There was 
a main effect of in-group identification on segregationism, and a main effect of EMI 
on all acculturation strategies except integrationism. The targets' cultural and 
economic status, however, no longer had a main effect on the acculturation strategies. 
Importantly, there was no significant interaction between either of the covariates and 
the targets' statuses. These results suggest that the assumption of homogeneity of 
regression slopes was not broken, and that in-group identification and endorsement of 
multicultural ideology were the main predictors of preferences for acculturation 
strategies in Romania. 
In Britain, a two-way MANOV A with the targets' culture (similar vs. different 
from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as the between-participants 
factors was conducted on the five preferred acculturation strategies. Segregationism 
was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for the culturally different out-groups 
than for the culturally similar ones, Ms = 2.21 vs. 1.85, F (1, 80) = 4.74, p < .05, Yf2 
= .06. By contrast, individualism was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for 
the culturally similar than for the culturally different out-groups, Ms = 6.23 vs. 5.81, F 
(1, 80) = 4.32, p < .05, 172 = .05. Individualism was also more preferred for the rich 
than for the poor groups, Ms = 6.26 vs. 5.79, F (1,80) = 5.49,p < .05, 172 = .06, and so 
was integrationism, Ms = 5.71 vs. 5.25, F (1,80) = 4.37,p < .05, 172 = .05. 
To sum up the present results on the preferences for acculturation strategies, in 
Romania the main predictors of these preferences were in-group identification and 
endorsement of multicultural ideology. In Britain, however, the targets' cultural and 
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economIc statuses influenced the host majority's preferences for acculturation 
strategies for the targets. This revealed that the culturally different groups were more 
likely to be segregated, while the culturally similar targets were more likely to benefit 
from a colour-blind attitude to acculturation. At the same time, the rich groups were 
more like to benefit from integrationist and individualist attitudes to acculturation 
than the poor groups. 
Similarly to previous studies (e.g. Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001), there were 
positive correlations between integrationism and individualism, on the one hand, and 
among assimilationism, segregationism and exclusionism, on the other hand, see 
Table 6.5 below. These two sets of positive inter-correlations support the suggestion 
that acculturation orientations may be two-dimensional, involving either an 
acceptance of the out-groups' culture, or a rejection of it (cf. Montreuil & Bourhis, 
2001), and may correspond to either an endorsement or rejection of multiculturalism. 
Table 6.5 Correlations among the five acculturation orientations in Romania (N = 148) and Britain (N 
= 84) 
Integrationism Assimilationism Segregationism Exclusionism 
RO UK RO UK RO UK RO UK 
Integrationism 
Assimilationism .15 -.23* 
Segregation ism -.18* -.35*** .34** .44*** 
Exc1usionism -.30** -.36*** .31 ** .08 .34** .38*** 
Individualism .37** .37*** -.10 -.19 -.22** -.29** -.34** -.17 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
6.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization 
In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other 
variables and to explore the mediators of dehumanization, an index of dehumanization 
was computed for each participant because it was not be possible to use 
simultaneously the two sets of average humanness attributed to in-group and out-
group, respectively. The new variables represented the difference in humanness 
between in-group and out-group, and were computed by subtracting the humanness 
attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group, separately for 
emotions (infrahumanization) and traits (ontologization). By similar means, two other 
composite variables were computed which represented the differential attribution of 
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positivity to in-group and out-group, denoted t1 Positive emotions and t1 Positive 
traits. 
Table 6.6 Correlations between dehumanization, positivity, and the ideological measures in Romania 
(N = 148) and Britain (N = 84) 
f1 Human f1 Human f1 Positive f1 Positive 
emotions traits emotions traits 
RO UK RO UK RO UK RO UK 
f1 Human traits .46*** .26** 
f1 Positive .50*** .57*** .37*** .16 
emotions 
f1 Positive traits .51*** .33** .60*** .23* .71 *** .64*** 
In-group .17* .06 .17* .07 .17* -.09 .30*** .03 
identification 
SDO .07 -.01 .10 .19 .19* .07 .19* .12 
EMI -.08 -.11 -.16 -.09 -.17* .07 -.24** .05 
* P < .05; ** p < .01; *** P < .001. 
The overall lack of correlation between the measures of dehumanization and 
SDO and EMI, respectively, suggests that these ideological measures may not 
predispose people to dehumanize others. For the correlations between dehumanization, 
positivity, and the prejudice measures, see Table 6.7 below: 
Table 6.7 Correlations between dehumanization, positivity and the prejudice measures in Romania 
(N = 148) and Britain (N = 84) 
f1 Human emotions f1 Human traits f1 Positive f1 Positive traits 
emotions 
RO UK RO UK RO UK RO UK 
Cultural difference .20* .34** .34*** .21 .24** .36** .28** .43*** 
Material threat .14 .12 .23** .12 .36*** .24* .27** .47*** 
Symbolic threat .25** .20 .25** .16 .38*** .23* .38*** .42*** 
Blatant prejudice .24** .24* .26** .35** .23** .27* .26** .34** 
Integrationism -.05 -.03 -.01 -.27* -.12 -.04 -.08 -19 
Assimilationism .03 .15 .12 .22* .16* .09 .19* .14 
Segregationism .14 .14 .20* .36** .20* .18 .19* .28** 
Exclusionism .16* .02 .10 .22* .24** -.07 .15 .02 
Individualism -.09 -.26* -.14 -.19 -.20* -.17 -.25** -.30** 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** P < .001. 
In order to explore the prejudice measures as mediators of dehumanization it 
was necessary to take into account the main effects of the experimental manipulations 
had on these measures. Regarding infrahumanization (dehumanization through 
emotions), in Romania the ANOVA analyses had indicated that only the poor groups 
were infrahumanized. But the poor groups did not invoke more threat, either material 
or symbolic, nor more blatant prejudice or perceived cultural differences, nor were 
they more dehumanized through traits. At the same time, even though 
infrahumanization was positively correlated with the differential attribution of 
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positive emotions to in-group and out-group, the ANOVA had indicated only a main 
effect of the targets' cultural status on this variable. Therefore, no mediation analysis 
on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was possible in Romania. 
In Britain, the ANOVA analyses had found that the culturally different groups 
were infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions), whereas the culturally similar 
ones were not. At the same time, the culturally different groups invoked more 
perceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group, more material threat, 
and more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones. The culturally different 
groups were also attributed less positive emotions than the culturally similar ones. 
However, in Britain, infrahumanization did not correlate with either material or 
symbolic threat, so these variables were excluded from mediation analyses. Instead, 
infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was significantly correlated 
with the perceived cultural difference between the out-group and the in-group, blatant 
prejudice, and the differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-
group (~ Positive emotions). However, the ANOVA had revealed no main effects of 
the experimental manipulations on blatant prejudice, therefore this variable was 
excluded, too. Also, a preliminary regression analysis indicated that the targets' 
cultural status did not significantly predict 11 Positive emotions, therefore this variable 
was not considered as a mediator of infrahumanization. 
Thus, the only potential mediator of infrahumanization In Britain was 
perceived cultural differences between out-group and in-group. The mediation 
analysis indicated that perceived cultural differences mediated the infrahumanization 
of culturally different groups, Aroian's z = 2.14, p < .05, see Table 6.8 below. To test 
for the possibility of feedback in mediation chains, i.e. the possibility that the 
dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression analysis was carried 
out with perceived cultural difference as the criterion, cultural status of the out-group 
as the predictor, and infrahumanization as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that 
infrahumanization did not mediated the perceived cultural differencea, Aroian's z = 
1.56, ns. Given this result, it can be concluded that perceived cultural differences 
between in-group and out-groups mediated the infrahumanization (dehumanization 
through emotions) of culturally different groups in Britain. 
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!able 6.8. P.erceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group mediated the 
mfrahumamzatlOn of culturally different groups in Britain (N = 84) 
Step 1 
B SEB fJ 
Constant 
-.09 .06 
CuI tural status .08 .04 
Step 2 
Constant .02 .05 
CuI tural status .04 .02 
Perceived differences 
-.09 .06 




As for ontologization (dehumanization through traits), in Romania all groups 
were dehumanized, in particular the culturally different groups. At the same time, the 
targets' cultural status had main effects on perceived cultural differences between in-
group and out-group, and on the attribution of positive traits (/1 Positive traits), 
therefore these variables were examined separately as potential mediators of 
dehumanization. It was found that perceived cultural differences mediated the 
dehumanization of culturally different out-groups, Aroian's Z = 2.62, p < .01, see 
Table 6.9 below. 
Table 6.9 Perceived cultural difference mediated the ontologization of culturally different groups in 
Romania (N = 148) 
B SEB fJ 
Step 1 
Constant -.08 .09 
Cultural status .20 .05 .30*** 
Step 2 
Constant .13 .06 
Cultural status .08 .03 .20* 
Perceived differences -.08 .09 .26** 
Note: R2 = .09 for Step 1 (p < .001); JR2 = .06 for Step 2 (p < .01); * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
However, dehumanization also mediated the perceived cultural differences 
between out-group and in-group, Aroian's z = 2.33, p < .05, therefore it may not be 
safe to conclude that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group 
mediated the dehumanization of culturally different groups in Romania. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued that it is more likely that perceived cultural differences mediated 
dehumanization rather than the other way around because the target groups were 
artificial and the participants had no a-priori dehumanizing beliefs about them, thus 
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their perceived cultural differences could only have been informed by the 
experimental manipulation. 
Next I analysed whether the differential attribution of positive traits to in-
group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of culturally different targets in 
Romania. Indeed, 11 Positive traits mediated the dehumanization of culturally different 
targets in Romania, Aroian's z = 3.59,p < .001, see Table 6.10 below. 
Table 6.10 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group mediated the 







11 Positive traits 














Note: R2 = .05 for Step 1 (p < .01); L1R2 = .31 for Step 2 (p < .001); ** p < .01; *** P < .001 
However, dehumanization also mediated the effect of the targets' cultural 
stauts on 11 Positive traits, Aroian's z = 2.53, p < .05. Thus, it cannot be concluded 
that the positive side of the traits mediated the dehumanization (through traits) of 
culturally different groups, see Table 6.11 below. 
Table 6.11 Dehumanization mediated the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and to 
culturally different groups in Romania (N = 148) 









Constant .12 .04 
.30*** 
Cultural status .1 7 .02 .18 * * 
11 Human traits -.08 .09 .56*** 
Note: R2 = .09 for Step 1 (p < .001); L1R2 = .30 for Step 2 (p < .001); ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
The culturally different groups were the only ones to be dehumanized (through 
traits) in Britain, and they also invoked greater perceived cultural differences, material 
and symbolic threat, and less positive traits. However, of these potential mediators 
only 11 Positive traits correlated significantly with the index of dehumanization, 
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therefore only this variable was explored as a mediator. The regression analysis 
indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' cultural status on dehumanization via !:1 
Positive traits was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's z = 1.30, ns, therefore 
the positive valence of the traits did not mediate the dehumanization (through traits) 
of culturally different groups in Britain. 
The poor target out-groups were also dehumanized (through traits) in Britain, 
and they invoked more perceived cultural differences, material threat, blatant 
prejudice, and less positive traits than the rich targets. However, the index of 
dehumanization correlated significantly only with blatant prejudice and fl. Positive 
traits, therefore only these two variables were considered as mediators. A regression 
analysis conducted with the targets' economic status as the predictor, blatant prejudice 
as the mediator, and dehumanization as the criterion indicated that the indirect effect 
of the targets' economic status on dehumanization via blatant prejudice was not 
significantly different from zero, Aroian's z = 1.76, ns. Therefore blatant prejudice did 
not mediate the dehumanization of the poor targets. A second regression analysis was 
conducted with fl. Positive traits as the mediator, but it revealed that !:1 Positive traits 
did not mediate the dehumanization of the poor targets, Aroian's z = 1.30, ns. Thus, 
the targets' economic status was the only predictor of the dehumanization (through 
traits) of poor groups in Britain. 
6.4 Discussion 
How has this study further the knowledge of dehumanization? I will examine 
here how this study has addressed the research hypotheses, discuss alternative 
interpretations for the results, examine this study's contribution to threat theories and 
dehumanization theories, and conclude with the directions for the next study. 
The premises for this experiment were the findings from Experiment 1 which 
had found that all artificial groups were dehumanized, regardless of their cultural or 
economic status, although the targets' cultural and economic status moderated 
dehumanization, making the culturally different groups and the poor groups particular 
targets of dehumanization. I hypothesised that the target groups were dehumanized 
merely by being different from the in-group, and therefore explored perceived 
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differences between in-group and out-group as a mediator of dehumanization. Also, I 
aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1. 
So what did Experiment 2 reveal? Firstly, it indicated that, while overall all 
the targets were dehumanized, the poor groups and the culturally different groups are 
a particular target of dehumanization, thus supporting the results from Experiment 1. 
However, the results are more mixed than in the previous experiment. In Romania, all 
groups were dehumanized (through traits), the culturally different groups more so 
than the culturally similar one. However, in Britain, only the culturally different 
groups were dehumanized (through traits), and only the poor groups. The second 
experiment produced significant results regarding the emotions measure of 
dehumanization: in Romania only the poor targets were infrahumanized 
(dehumanized through emotions), while in Britain, only the culturally different targets 
were infrahumanized. Overall, these results show that perceived cultural differences 
between in-group and out-group, as well as the out-group's poor socio-economic 
status, can predispose a group to being dehumanized. 
Secondly, as to what may have mediated dehumanization, the present 
experiment found that the infrahumanization of culturally different groups in Britain 
was mediated by the perceived cultural differences between in-group and target out-
groups. However, no mediation analysis was possible in Romania regarding 
infrahumanization. Furthermore, the dehumanization (through traits) of the culturally 
different groups in Romania was also mediated by the perceived cultural differences 
between in-group and out-group. But in Britain, there were no mediators of the 
dehumanization of the culturally different and of the poor targets, respectively. 
Overall, these results are in line with Rokeach's (1970) belief congruence theory and 
with Struch and Schwartz's (1989) postulation that perceived differences at the level 
of values and beliefs might lead to the dehumanization of out-groups. Overall, though, 
the two measures of dehumanization correlated with perceived cultural differences, 
with perceived material and symbolic threats (mostly in Romania), as well as with 
some of the preferred acculturation strategies. 
Regarding the role of perceived material and symbolic threat in 
dehumanization, the present experiment found that neither measure of perceived 
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threat correlated with the indices of dehumanization in Britain, although the culturally 
different groups invoked more symbolic threat and the poor groups invoked more 
material threat. In Romania, the measures of perceived threat were positively and 
significantly correlated with the indices of dehumanization, but only EM! 
(endorsement of multicultural ideology) had been found to be a predictor of the two 
types of threat3. The results so far suggest that perceived threat may not playa part in 
dehumanization. 
As to how the present results support the infrahumanization hypothesis, in 
Romania, only the poor groups were infrahumanized (dehumanized through 
emotions), whereas in Britain only the culturally different groups were 
infrahumanized. Thus, the present results do not fully support the hypothesis 
according to which all groups would be infrahumanized (e.g. Leyens et aI., 2000). 
They also do not agree with those from Experiment 1, where there was no 
infrahumanization of the out-groups in either national sample. One possible 
explanation for the different results on infrahumanization in the present study is that, 
differently to Experiment 1 where the economic status was expressed in terms of the 
jobs occupied by the target group, in experiment 2 the economic status of the out-
groups was expressed in numbers purportedly indicating the annual average 
household income of the targets. This may have influenced the process of 
infrahumanization. Another possible explanation (and arguably a more plausible one) 
is that in Experiment 2, contrary to experiment 1, the target emotions were mixed with 
the traits. The participants were asked to choose the characteristics instead of the 
emotions that they thought best described the out-group / in-group, and it may be 
argued that the present experiment employed a more subtle measure of 
infrahumanization than Experiment 1. 
Regarding the preferences for acculturation strategies, the present results are 
in line with previous research which indicated that pro-multiculturalist attitudes such 
as individualism and integrationism were more strongly endorsed for the 'valued' 
groups, such as the culturally similar or rich groups, than for the 'devalued groups', 
such as the culturally different or poor targets (see Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). 
3 This is because EMI had been found to vary function of the experimental manipulations and had to be 
included as a covariate in the ANOV As on perceived material and symbolic threat, respectively. 
190 
Chapter 6 Perceived cultural differences as mediator of dehumanization 
Equally, anti-multiculturalist attitudes such as segregationism were more endorsed for 
the culturally different than for the culturally similar target groups. The preferences 
for acculturation strategies were predicted by the targets' cultural and economic status, 
individual variables such as SDO and EMI, and by perceived material and symbolic 
threats. 
Concerning the results on the ideological measures, the present results mirror 
those from Experiment 1, as the correlation between SDO and in-group identification 
was negative and non-significant in Romania, but positive and significant in Britain, 
in line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (Mitchell & Sidanius, 1993; 
Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994; Sidanius et aI., 2001). The correlation between 
EMI and in-group identification was significant and negative in Britain, but non-
significant in Romania. Previous research had found that endorsement of 
multiculturalism correlates negatively with in-group identification among host society 
members (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Although in this experiment the Romanians 
were not a minority group relative to the British, the different pattern of correlations 
between in-group identification and EMI rather mirrors that between in-group 
identification and SDO. It could perhaps be argued that the results on EMI are in line 
with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis, and suggest that the British viewed their 
group as a dominant one, whereas the Romanians viewed their group as a subordinate 
one. 
To conclude, the present experiment found that the poor groups and the 
culturally different groups are a particular target of dehumanization, thus supporting 
the results from Experiment 1. Moreover, perceived cultural differences between in-
group and out-group mediated dehumanization, which in turn predicted blatant 
prejudice against the dehumanized groups. Perceived threat was not found to playa 
part in dehumanization. These results suggest that dehumanization may not be a 
reaction to perceived threat, but rather to the perceived cultural differences between 
in-group and out-group. 
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6.5 Progression to the next study 
The present experiment revealed that perceived cultural differences between 
in-group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of the target groups. Perceived 
threat was not found to play a part in dehumanization, partly because the necessary 
mediation analyses could not be conducted. An alternative explanation may be that 
the artificial targets used in the experiment did not induce as much threat as real 
groups might have. Therefore I decided to improve the threat measure and to combine 
the two types of threat into a single scale. Furthermore, I decided to study the 
dehumanization of artificial groups in conjunction with the dehumanization or real 
groups, to examine whether the relationship between perceived threat and 
dehumanization is different in the two cases. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the previous two experiments I found that artificial out-groups were overall 
dehumanized, but that their dehumanization was not mediated by the threat they 
invoked. While the artificial out-groups were generally dehumanized in both Britain 
and Romania, they were not infrahumanized in either country. This raised the 
possibility that the infrahumanization phenomenon may not be applicable to artificial 
groups. Indeed, using a minimal group paradigm, Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-
Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Paladino, et aI., (2002) found that infrahumanization did not 
occur in the non-meaningful condition, and argued that mere categorization is 
insufficient to produce infrahumanization (see also Demoulin, Rodriguez-Torres, 
Rodriguez-Perez, Vaes, Paladino, Gaunt, et aI., 2004b). However, while the 
infrahumanization research usually uses real groups as targets, artificial groups such 
as extraterrestrial aliens can be infrahumanized (see Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). 
As for the dehumanization through traits, this has never been studied with artificial 
groups, although traits have been applied to artificial groups such as the Sandirians 
(Esses et aI., 2001) or aliens (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). 
Given that the artificial target groups in the previous two experiments were 
generally dehumanized, the results raised the possibility that dehumanization may 
also function as a rationalization of the targets' status (cf. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). 
Just as participants ascribed gender-typical traits to artificial groups performing 
gender-specific roles, such as the Ackmians and the Orinthians in Hoffman and 
Hurst's study (1990), it could be argued that attributing less typically human traits (or 
emotions) to the target artificial groups may have functioned as a rationalization of 
their status as poor or as culturally different from the in-group. In this sense, 
dehumanization may be contingent upon social representations of poverty and of 
culturally different groups, or upon ideologies that justify the social exclusion of 
marginalized groups. 
However, even though the dehumanization of artificial groups might indicate a 
rationalization of their status as described in the experimental manipulations, in the 
case of real groups dehumanization may include emotional as well as social and 
historical elements. This is because real groups are linked to the group to which the 
194 
Chapter 7 Dehumanization as rationalization of group status 
participants belong in terms of power, social status, history, culture, etc., and in some 
cases the out-group may serve as a point of reference for the in-group' s ethnic or 
national identity. Equally, if the dehumanization of artificial groups indicates a 
socially-conditioned propensity for categorizing groups according to their cultural and 
economic status, or, alternatively, ideological representations of cultural differences 
and of poverty, the dehumanization of real groups may indicate justification for their 
discrimination, or legitimization of their status relative to that of the in-group. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that the dehumanization of the artificial groups, 
in particular of the poor and of the culturally different ones as it was observed in the 
preVIOUS two experiments (see Chapters 5 and 6), was driven by the threat they 
induced, even though perceived threat was not found to be a mediator of 
dehumanization (in some cases no mediation analysis was possible). However, in the 
case of real groups it may be difficult to establish a clear cause-effect relationship 
between perceived threat and dehumanization, because perceived threat may be a 
consequence as much as an antecedent of dehumanizing beliefs, i.e. one is more likely 
to perceive threat from a dehumanized than from a non-dehumanized group. In the 
case of real groups, unlike artificial ones, it may be more difficult to disentangle the 
relationships between prejudice, perceived threat, and dehumanizing beliefs. 
Therefore, given the potential role of perceived threat as consequence rather 
than antecedent of dehumanization, I decided to use real groups along with artificial 
ones. I hypothesised that perceived threat should playa role in the dehumanization of 
artificial groups, whereas both prejudice and perceived threat should be antecedents of 
the dehumanization of real groups. I also took into account the possibility that in the 
case of real groups dehumanization may in fact predict the perceived threat from them 
and blatant prejudice against them. Moreover, in the case of artificial groups 
perceived threat might predict blatant prejudice against them, whereas in the case of 
real groups, it could be blatant prejudice that predicts perceptions of threat from them. 
Thus the present study I took into account the possibility that with real groups 
dehumanization should stem from both prejudice and perceptions of threat. 
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7.1.1 Threatening groups: results from a an exploratory threat study 
First I conducted a pilot study in both Romania and Britain in order to find out 
which real groups would invoke high versus low levels of material and symbolic 
threat, and be suitable target groups for examining dehumanization. In both Britain 
and Romania 21 groups representing ethnic minorities and immigrant groups were 
selected as targets. This pilot study was presented to the participants under the guise 
of a study on "how information is deduced". The participants were told that previous 
studies had found that some groups weakened the country's economy and had a 
negative effect of the country's way of life. The participants were required to 'guess' 
which of the target groups had been found by the assuming previous studies to 
weaken or strengthen the economy (material threat), and to have a negative or a 
positive effect on the country's way of life (symbolic threat). Each target group was 
rated on a 7 -point Likert scale, with low ratings indicating more perceived threat from 
that group. The study had a within-participants design, and the order of the threat 
questions was reversed for half of the participants. Ten of the target groups were the 
same, e.g. Chinese, Gypsies, Kurds, Jews, while the other eleven target groups were 
different for each country, reflecting the local ethnic make-up and immigration history 
(see Appendix V a for the British version of the pilot questionnaire, and Appendix V b 
for the Romanian version). 
7.1.1.1 Design 
A single item measured perceived material threat: "please guess which of the 
following groups were found to weaken or strengthen the British/Romanian economy, 
and to what extent". The answers for each target group were measured on a 1 to 7 
point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly weakens" to "strongly strengthens". 
Another single item measured perceived symbolic threat: "please guess which of the 
following groups were found to have a negative or a positive impact on the 
British/Romanian way of life, and to what extent'~. The answers for each target out-
group were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from negative to positive. 
7.1.1.2 Participants and procedure 
Sixty-six Romanian nationals, 23 women and 43 men (AI age = 26.69, age 
range = 18 to 47 years) took part, as \Yell as eighty-nine British nationals, 45 males 
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and 43 females, 1 gender data missing, (M age = 20, age range = 18 to 28). In each 
country, half of the participants answered the material threat question first, the other 
half, the symbolic one first. 
For practical reasons, all the Romanian participants completed the 
questionnaire on line, and were recruited through internet forums and through the 
researcher's network of Romanian acquaintances. 40 British participants were 
recruited on various campus locations (M age = 19.83) by being invited to take part in 
the study, while 49 completed the questionnaire on line (M age = 20.16). All 
participants were told they were taking in part in a study that investigated the way 
information is deduced, and were required to guess which of the target groups had 
been found to have a negative effect on the country's economy and on the country's 
way of life. 
7.1.1.3 Results 
High ratings indicated a positive effect on the economy and the country's way 
of life, whereas low ratings indicated a negative effect and therefore perceived threat. 
In Romania, the group that was perceived as most strongly strengthening the 
Romanian economy were the Germans, M = 5.96, whereas the group perceived as 
most strongly weakening the Romanian economy were the Gypsies, M = 1.38. The 
group perceived to have the most positive effect on the Romanian way of life were the 
Germans, M = 5.90, whereas the group viewed as having the most negative effect 
were the Gypsies, M = 1.49. 
In Britain, the group that was perceived as most strongly strengthening the 
British economy were the Chinese, M = 5.10, whereas the group viewed as most 
strongly weakening the British economy were the Gypsies, M = 2.25. The group that 
was perceived as having the most positive effect on the British way of life were the 
Australians, M = 5.22, whereas the group viewed to have the most negative effect 
were the Gypsies, M = 2.39. The Chinese invoked less material than symbolic threat, t 
(1,87) = 3.09,p < .01, the Australians invoked less symbolic than material threat, t (1, 
87) = 2.27, p < .05. The Gypsies invoked equal material and symbolic threat, t (1, 87) 
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= 1.34, ns, in Britain, and t (1,64) = 0.75, ns, in Romania, and so did the Germans, t 
(1,87) = 1.59, ns, in Britain, and ((1, 64) = 0.39. ns, in Romania l . 
Thus, the Gypsies were the group that invoked the most threat of both forms in 
both countries. In Romania the Germans were the group that posed the least threat, 
but in Britain, no single least-threatening group emerged. Given the need for a certain 
degree of comparability between Britain and Romania, it was decided to choose the 
Germans as the non-threatening target group for both the Romanian and the British 
participants. The Germans were 5th in terms of strengthening the British economy (M 
= 4.73), and also 5th in terms or having a positive effect on Britain's way of life (M = 
4.48). In other words, the Germans did not represent a high threat for the British. In 
each country, the Gypsies invoked more material threat than did the Germans, Ms = 
2.25 vs. 4.73, ((1,88) = 16.77,p < .001, in Britain, and Ms = 1.38 vs. 5.96, ((1,64) = 
20.82, p < .001, in Romania. Also, the Gypsies invoked more symbolic threat than did 
the Germans, Ms = 2.39 vs. 4.48, t (1, 88) = 12.85, p < .001 in Britain, and Ms = 1.49 
vs. 5.90, ((1,64) = 20.78,p < .001, in Romania. 
Taking the 21 target groups as units of analysis, the material and the symbolic 
threat were very significantly positively correlated in Romania: r (1, 18) = .96, p 
< .001, as well as in Britain: r (1, 18) = .91, p < .001. These results suggest that 
groups which invoked material threat also invoked symbolic threat, and vice versa. 
However, given that the pilot study used a within-participants design, the high 
correlation between the material and symbolic threats items might indicate carry-over 
effects. Given that half the participants (in each country) answered the material threat 
question first, and the other half, the symbolic threat question first, correlations were 
conducted on the material and symbolic threat questions that were answered first in an 
attempt to counteract potential carry-over effects. Material and symbolic threat were 
I Comparing the online to the pen-and-paper participants in the British study, an independent samples 
(-test indicated no significant differences in the levels of perceived material or symbolic threat for any 
of the target groups except the Gypsies, who invoked more material threat to the online participants 
than to the pen-and-paper ones, Ms = 2.04 vs. 2.52, t (1, 87) = 2.31, p < .05. Given the lack of 
systematic differences between the two sub-samples of British participants it could be argued that they 
are equivalent. At the same time, the pen-and-paper participants did not express lower levels of 
perceived threat which would have indicated prejudice suppression. The lack of differences suggests 
that the online Romanian responses may not be very different from the responses people would have 
given in a pen-and-paper format. 
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still very significantly positively correlated: in Romania: r (1,18) = .95,p < .001, and 
in Britain, r (1,18) = .87,p < .0012. 
To conclude, the findings from the threat study suggest that while some 
research in certain societies has distinguished theoretically and empirically between 
material and symbolic threat, in the present countries and with the present target 
groups the two threats seemed to co-occur. Although there is the possibility that one 
type of threat might be the side effect of the other, it is beyond the purpose of the 
current study to establish which threat is driving the other. Thus, both material and 
symbolic threat will be combined in a single scale (cf. Florack et al., 2003). In the 
previous two experiments, symbolic and material threats were measured with separate 
scales, but both had rather low internal reliabilities. 
7.1.2 Implications of the exploratory threat study for the current experiment 
Given the results of the perceived threat exploratory study, I decided to 
employ the Germans as the non-threatening group, and the Gypsies as the threatening 
group, in both countries. Although in Britain the Germans did not rank top in terms of 
having a positive effect on the country's economy and way of life, they were chosen 
as target group in order to enable the comparison between the two countries. In 
Britain3, the Germans have been used in other studies as a target of infrahumanization 
(Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004; Viki, Winchester, Titshall, 
Chisango, & Pina, 2006), of prejudice (e.g. Barrett, Wilson, & Lyons, 2003), or of 
national comparison (e.g. Hopkins & Moore, 2001; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). 
Generally, research indicates that Germans are a disliked out-group for the British, 
and are stereotypically perceived as aggressive and hardworking by the English 
(Barrett et al., 2003), and as arrogant, loud, industrious, rude, greedy, aggressive, 
efficient and ambitious by the Scottish (Hopkins & Moore, 2001). As for Gypsies, 
previous research has indicated that they are a target of dehumanization in both 
Britain and Romania (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). 
2 The present threat study was replicated in Hungary and Spain, revealing that the Gypsies were the 
highest threatening group and the Germans the lowest threatening group in both countri~s. Material and 
symbolic threat were very significantly positively correlated, r (1, 18) = .90, P < .001, In Hungary, and 
r(I,I8)=.91,p<.00I,inSpain. 
1 No data from Romania regarding stereotypes of the Germans was available at the time of this study. 
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As for the artificial target groups in the present study, these were described as 
In the second experiment, except that the third experiment no longer had the 2 
(culturally similar vs. different) x 2 (rich vs. poor) factorial design. Instead, the 
culturally similar out-group was also described as rich, while the culturally different 
one was also described as poor. Thus, the experimental manipulations "culturally 
similar x poor" and "culturally different x rich" were dropped in order to make the 
artificial out-groups comparable to the real ones, which simultaneously elicited the 
two types of threat, material and symbolic. On the negative side, the combination of 
the two threats into a single one made it somewhat impossible to know which of the 
two factors, cultural status or economic status, might influence dehumanization. 
However, on the positive side, combining the two types of threat into one arguably 
achieved higher ecological validity as they better mirrored the real out-groups. 
7.1.3 Research hypotheses 
The present study examined the following hypotheses: 
1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) 
2. the culturally different and poor artificial groups will be more dehumanized 
(through traits) than the culturally similar and rich artificial groups 
3. the Gypsies will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the Germans 
4. the Gypsies as well as the poor and culturally different artificial groups will 
invoke more threat and blatant prejudice than the other target groups 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Design 
The design of the study had a 2 (real vs. artificial out-group) x 2 (high-threat 
target vs. low-threat target) format. Thus it was a combination of experimental and 
survey designs. The real groups were the Germans and the Gypsies in both Britain 
and Romania. The artificial groups were the Moravians, in Britain, and the Abkhaz4, 
in Romania. 
4 In the previous two experiments the Romanian artificial group was the Ceangai, whi~h i.s a real b~t 
very little know ethnic minority in Romania. However, in order to mirror better the ~rtlficla.l gr~up In 
Britain, in the present experiment the Romanian artificial group was changed to bemg an ImmIgrant 
group. 
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7.2.2 Participants and procedure 
One hundred and ninety-seven British nationals, 106 females and 91 males, M 
age = 25.78, age range = 16 to 74 years, participated in the experiment. 99 
participants took part in the artificial group conditions (51 in the low-threat, and 48 in 
the high-threat group condition), while 98 participated in the real group conditions (47 
in the Germans condition, and 51 in the Gypsies condition). 
One hundred and ninety-seven Romanian nationals, 121 females and 76 males, 
Mage = 21.51, age range = 18 to 45 years, participated in the study. 93 participants 
took part in the artificial group conditions (48 in the low-threat, and 45 in the high-
threat group condition), while 104 took part in the real group conditions (51 in the 
Germans condition, and 53 in the Gypsies condition). 
The participants were recruited on campus and in various other locations, e.g. 
pubs, students' accommodation, and received a questionnaire that was introduced as 
part of a study exploring cultural diversity in their country. The participants were 
debriefed. 
7.2.3 Materials 
Two vignettes were used in this experiment in the artificial group conditions, 
and they were identical in content to the vignettes used in Experiment 2. In order to 
mirror better the real groups which had been found by the pilot study to induce 
material and symbolic threat simultaneously, the artificial groups were described 
either as culturally similar to the in-group and rich, or as culturally different from the 
in-group and poor (see Appendix V c for the British version of the vignette, and 
Appendix V d for the Romanian version). In the analysis, the 'culturally similar and 
rich' targets were termed 'low-threat' targets, and the 'culturally different and poor' 
targets were termed 'high-threat' targets. In the real group conditions, there was no 
experimental manipulation, the participants being merely required to focus on the 
particular target group (see Appendix V e for a British version of the questionnaire, 
and Appendix V ffor the Romanian version). 
7.2.3.1 Manipulation checks 
2 manipulation check items ranging from I (not at all) to 7 (very much) 
assessed the perceived similarity of the out-group to the in-group: how similar you 
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think the Moravians [Abkhaz} are to the British [Romanians}?, and the burden they 
posed on the system of social benefits: do you think that the Moravians [Abkhaz} have 
a negative impact on the national economy? 
7.2.3.2 Dehumanization 
Dehumanization was measured in similar ways to Experiments 1 and 2, 
including traits and emotions measures. In Experiment 2 the target emotions and traits 
were mixed in the same list. Due to this, few emotions were chosen as features 
describing the target (in-group or out-group), therefore in the present experiment the 
traits and emotions were listed separately, similarly to Experiment 1. 
7.2.3.3 Prejudice measures: perceived threat and blatant prejudice 
Twelve 7 -point items measured perceived threat, but in this experiment the 
material and symbolic threat items were combined in a single scale. The threat items 
were the same as in Experiment 2, with two new items being added. Six items related 
to material, and other 6 to symbolic threat. Items 4, 5, 8, 9 and 12 were reverse-coded 
in both countries, with high scores indicating highly perceived threat. 
The same 7-point scale of blatant prejudice as the one used in experiments 1 
and 2 was used, with one additional item being: I would not mind if a German 
[Moravian, Abkhaz, Gypsy} joined my family by marriage. Items 2, 3 and 5 were 
reverse-coded, and high scores indicated a desire for social distance from the target 
out-group. 
7.3 Results 
When analysing the data I explored: (l) whether the experimental 
manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the poor and culturally different 
artificial targets were more dehumanized than the rich and culturally similar artificial 
targets; (3) whether the Gypsies were more dehumanized than the Germans; (4) 
whether the Gypsies and the poor and culturally different artificial targets invoked 
more perceived threat and blatant prejudice than the other two targets; (5) whether 
perceived threat or blatant prejudice mediated dehumanization. The analyses will be 
reported in turn in the following sections. 
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7.3.1 Manipulation checks 
A MANOV A with the threat status of out-groups as the between-participants 
factor, and the two manipulations checks items as the dependent variables was 
conducted in the artificial target conditions. In Britain, more negative impact on the 
national economy was invoked by the poor and culturally different than by the rich 
and culturally similar out-group, Ms = 3.41 vs. 1.98, F(I, 97) = 30.05,p < .001. Also, 
the rich and culturally similar out-group was seen as more similar to the in-group than 
the poor and culturally different one, Ms = 5.17 vs. 3.14, F (l, 97) = 55.13, p < .001. 
The two manipulation check items were negatively and significantly correlated, r (I, 
97) = -.50, p < .001, indicating that the more similar the out-group was perceived to 
the in-group, the less negative impact it was perceived to have on the economy. 
In Romania, more negative impact on the national economy was invoked by 
the poor and culturally different artificial target than by the rich and culturally similar 
one, Ms = 3.77 vs. 2.33, F (I, 90) = 15.37, p < .001. As for the perceived similarity 
between out-group and in-group, there was no significant difference between the two 
artificial targets, Ms = 4.35 vs. 4.04, F (l, 90) = 0.88, ns. The two manipulation check 
items were negatively and significantly correlated, r (1, 90) = -.28, p < .01, indicating 
that the more similar the out-group was perceived to the in-group, the less negative 
impact it was perceived to have on the economy. 
7.3.2 Attribution of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group 
Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2 (see Chapters 5 and 6), for each participant 
an average 'humanness' score was calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the 
out-group and in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each 
emotion / trait selected by the participant for the respective group (in-group or out-
group) with its humanness weighting (see Chapter 4), adding them up and dividing 
them by the number of the emotions / traits attributed to the target (in-group or out-
group). The same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions 
and traits, respectively, attributed to in-group and out-groups. 
Mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the attribution of 
human emotions and traits in each country. The between-participants factors were the 
target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different from the in-group) and 
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economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group \'s. out-group) was the within-
participants factor. The dependent variables were the typically human emotions. and 
respectively traits, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses 
were conducted separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions~ 
and traits, respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the 
dependent variables. 
7.3.2.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions 
In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 
7, M = 4.98, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 9, M = 5.26. The 
assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, more 
typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 
5.36 vs. 5.31, F (1,193) = 12.54,p < .001, ,,2 = .06, in line with the infrahumanization 
hypothesis. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of typically human 
emotions, F (1, 193) = 9.10, p < .01, ,,2 = .04, as in the real targets conditions more 
typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, Ms = 
5.38 vs. 5.30, t (1,97) = 4.18,p < .001, whereas in the artificial targets conditions 
equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the artificial 
out-groups, Ms = 5.34 vs. 5.33, t (1, 98) = 0.30, ns. There targets' threat status also 
moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 193) = 19.68, p < .001, 
,,2 = .09, as in the low-threat targets conditions equally typically human emotions 
were attributed to the in-group and the low-threat out-groups, Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.36, t (1, 
97) = 0.72, ns, but more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group 
than to the out-groups in the high-threat out-group conditions, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.27, t (L 
98) = 5.60, p < .001. Thus, the high-threat groups were infrahumanized. The low-
threat groups, i.e. the Germans and the rich and culturally similar artificial out-groups, 
were overall attributed more typically human emotions than the high-threat groups, 
Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.32, F (1, 193) = 6.04, p < .05, ,,2 = .03, as indicated by the between-
participants effects. Examining in more detail the real groups, the Germans were 
attributed equally typically human emotions as the in-group. Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.38, t (1. 
46) = 1.04, ns, whereas the Gypsies were attributed less typically human emotions 
than the in-group, Ms = 5.25 vs. 5.38, t (L 50) = 4.90, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.1 a below. As for the artificial groups. the low-
threat targets were attributed relatively equally typically human emotions as the in-
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group, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.32, t (1,49) = 2.28, p = .027, whereas the high-threat targets 
were attributed less typically human emotions than the in-group, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.37, f 










Fig. 7.1a Attribution of typically 













Fig. 7.1h Attribution of typically 
human emotions to artificial groups 
in Britain 
To sum up the British results on the emotions measure of dehumanization, 
only the Gypsies and the high-threat artificial target were infrahumanized. At the 
theoretical level, these results suggest that infrahumanization may be due to the 
perceived threat from the out-group. 
As for the attribution of positive emotions in Britain, equal positive emotions 
were overall attributed to out-groups and in-group, Ms = 4.85 vs. 4.91, F (1, 193) = 
0.71, ns. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F 
(1,193) = 16.49,p < .001, 1J2 = .08, indicating that in the real targets conditions, more 
positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.96 vs. 
4.61, t (1, 97) = 3.44, p < .025, whereas in the artificial targets conditions, more 
positive emotions were attributed to the out-group than to the in-group, Ms = 5.09 vs. 
4.86, t (1, 98) = 2.22, p > .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). The 
targets threat status also moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 193) = 
22.14, p < .001, 1J2 = .10, as more positive emotions were attributed the low-threat 
targets than to the in-group, Ms = 5.12 vs. 4.84, t (1, 97) = 2.89, p < .025, wherea 
more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the high-threat target , 
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Ms = 4.98 vs. 4.58, t (1, 98) = 3.66, p < .025. There was a significant interaction 
between the targets' reality and threat statuses, F (l, 193) = 4.29, p < .05, '72 = .02. 
This indicated that less positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the 
equivalent artificial group, Ms = 4.85 vs. 5.39, and less positive emotions were 
attributed to the Gypsies than to the equivalent artificial group, Ms = 4.37 \'s. 4.79. At 
the same time, more positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the 
Gypsies, Ms = 4.85 vs. 4.37, and more positive emotions were attributed to the non-
threatening artificial group than to the threatening one, Ms = 5.39 vs. 4.79. 
In Romania, the number of emotions attributed to the out-group varied from 2 
to 7, M = 5.23, and those ascribed to the in-group from 2 to 11, M = 5.27. The 
assumption of sphericity was met, and, overall, equally typically human emotions 
were attributed to in-group and out-group, Ms = 5.27 vs. 5.26, F (1, 193) = .006, ns. 
However, more typically human emotions were overall attributed to the out-groups 
than to the in-group in the real targets condition, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.22, while more 
typically human emotions were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-
groups in the artificial targets condition, Ms = 5.31 vs. 5.23, F (1, 193) = 16.43, p 
< .001, 1J2 = .08. More typically human emotions were overall attributed in the low-
threat targets conditions than in the high-threat ones, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.23, F (l, 193) = 
11.87,p < .001, 1J2 = .06. There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs 
< 3.60, ns. Concerning the real groups, paired-samples (-tests indicated that the 
Romanian participants attributed equally typically human emotions to the Gypsies and 
to the in-group, Ms = 5.22 vs. 5.22, t (l, 52) = 0.05, ns, whereas they attributed more 
typically human emotions to the Germans than to the in-group, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.21, t 
(1, 50) = 3.96, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 
7.2a below. As for the artificial groups, although they were overall attributed less 
typically human emotions than the in-group, paired-samples (-tests indicated that the 
low-threat targets were attributed relatively equal humanness as the in-group, Ms = 
5.27 vs. 5.35, ( (1, 46) = -2.17, P = .035, and the same was true for the high-threat 
targets, Ms = 5.19 vs. 5.28, ( (1, 43) = -2.00, p = .052 (Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.2b below. 
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Fig. 7.2h Attribution of typically 
human emotions to artificial groups in 
Romania 
To sum up the results on infrahumanziation (dehumanization through 
emotions) in Romania, the artificial targets were both infrahumanized, regardless of 
their threat status. But as regarded the real groups, the Romanian participants 
attributed equally typically human emotions to their in-group and the Gypsies, but 
more typically human emotions to the Germans than to their in-group . 
As for the attribution of positive emotions III Romania, relatively equal 
positive emotions were attributed to in-group and out-group, Ms = 4.54 vs . 4.59, F (1 , 
193) = 0.56, ns. However, the targets' threat status moderated the attribution of 
positive emotions, F (1,193) = 14.16, p < .001 , 1'/2 = .07, indicating that more positive 
emotions were attributed to the non-threatening out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 
4.88 vs. 4.56, t (1, 98) = 3.10, p < .025, whereas more positive emotions were 
attributed to the in-group than to the threatening out-groups, Ms = 4.52 vs. 4.29, t (1, 
97) = 3.34, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level) . There was also a 
significant interaction between the targets ' reality and threat statuses on the attribution 
of positive emotions, F (1 , 193) = 11.09, p < .001 , '12 = .05. Thus, more positi\e 
emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the in-group, Ms = 4.87 \'s. 4.30, but 
more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Afs = 4.43 
vs. 4 .0l. Furthermore, the artificial out-groups were ascribed more positive emotions 
than the real out-groups, Ms = 4.76 vs . 4.43, F (1, 193) = 18.63, p < .001, '12 = .09. 
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The low-threat targets were attributed more positive emotions than the high-threat 
ones, Ms = 4.88 vs. 4.29, F (1, 193) = 15.36, p < .001, 172 = .07. 
7.3.2.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits 
In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 10, 
M = 6.76, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 15, M = 7.36. More typically 
human traits were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, ;\1s = 4.78 
vs. 4.47, F (1, 193) = 204.79, p < .001, 172 = .51. The targets' reality status moderated 
the attribution of traits, F (1,193) = 7.27,p < .01, 172 = .04, as more typically human 
traits were attributed to the artificial than to the real targets, Ms = 4.50 vs. 4.43, f (1, 
195) = 2.21, p < .05, but equally typical human traits were attributed to the in-group 
in the two conditions, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.76, t (1, 195) = 1.59, ns. 
The targets' threat status also moderated the attribution of traits, F (1, 193) = 
75.10, p < .001, 172 = .28. This indicated that more typically human traits were 
attributed to the in-group when the out-group was threatening than when it was not, 
Ms = 4.82 vs. 4.74, t (1,195) = 3.40,p < .01, while more typically human traits were 
attributed to the low-threat targets than to the high-threat ones, Ms = 4.61 vs. 4.32, f (1, 
195) = 8.30, p < .001. Thus, the high-threat groups were more dehumanized than the 
low-threat ones. Regarding the real groups, the Germans were attributed equally 
typically human traits as the in-group, Ms = 4.63 vs. 4.74, t (1, 46) = 2.28, p = .027, 
whereas the Gypsies were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, Ms 
= 4.23 vs. 4.86, t (1, 49) = -13.97, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level 
of .0125), see Fig. 7.3a below. As for the artificial groups, the low-threat ones were 
attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.60 vs. 4.73, t (1, 49) = 
-3.26, p = .002, and so were the high-threat ones, Ms = 4.42 vs. 4.78, t (1, 46) = -9.56, 
P < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.3b below. 
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Fig. 7.3b Attribution of typically 
human traits to artificial groups in 
Britain 
As for the attribution of positive traits in Britain, these were ascribed equally 
to in-group and out-group, Ms = 4.63 vs. 4.69, F (1, 193) = 0.40, ns. The targets ' 
reality status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 193) = 17.47, p < .001, 
'72 = .08, as more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the real out-
groups, Ms = 4.67 vs. 4.39, t (1, 97) = 2.69, p < .025, whereas more positive traits 
were attributed to the artificial out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 4.98 vs. 4.60, t 
(1, 98) = 3.00, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). 
The threat status of the out-groups also moderated the attribution of positive 
traits, F (1,193) = 33.15,p < .001, '72 = .15, indicating that more positive traits were 
attributed to the non-threatening out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 5.15 vs. 4.63, t 
(1, 97) = 4.43, p < .025, whereas more positive traits were attributed to the in-group 
than to the threatening out-groups, Ms = 4.64 vs. 4.22, t (1, 98) = 3.52, p < .025 
(Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). There was also a significant interaction 
between the targets' reality and threat statuses, F (1, 193) = 5.24, p < .05, '72 = .03. 
This indicated that the Germans were attributed less positive traits than their artificial 
equivalent group, Ms = 4.88 vs. 5.42, and the Gypsies were attributed less positive 
traits than their artificial counterpart, Ms = 3.90 vs. 4.54. The Germans were 
attributed more positive traits than the Gypsies, Ms = 4.88 vs. 3.90, and the non-
threatening artificial group was attributed more positive traits than the threatening one. 
!l1s = 5.42 vs. 4.54. 
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In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from .f to 1 L 
M = 7.15, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 15, M = 7.69. More typically 
human traits were attributed overall to the in-group than to the out-group, .\!Y = 4.87 
vs. 4.68, F (1,193) = 56.55,p < .001, 172 = .22, but the targets' threat status moderated 
the effect of human traits, F (1, 193) = 30.40, p < .001, 172 = .13. This indicated that 
equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and the low-threat out-
groups, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.90, t (1, 98) = 1.28, ns, but less typically human traits were 
attributed to the high-threat out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 4.47 vs. 4.80, I (1, 
97) = 8.93, p < .001. 
More typically human traits were attributed in the low-threat than in the high-
threat targets condition, F (1, 193) = 98.24, p < .001, 172 = .34, Ms = 4.92 vs. 4.64. 
This meant that the low-threat out-groups were ascribed more typically human traits 
than their high-threat counterparts, Ms = 4.90 vs. 4.46, t (1, 195) = 1l.46, p < .OOL 
while the in-group, too, was attributed more typically human traits in the low-threat 
than in the high-threat condition, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.80, t (1, 195) = 3.40, p < .Ol. Thus, 
similarly to the British results, the high-threat groups were more dehumanized than 
the low-threat ones, in line with the research hypothesis. 
As regarded the real groups, the Germans were attributed relatively equally 
typically human traits as the in-group, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.88, t (1, 49) = 1.44, ns, whereas 
the Gypsies were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.37 vs. 
4.68, t (1,51) = -5.84,p < .001 (Bonferroni-corrected significance level of .0125), see 
Fig. 7.4a below. As for the artificial groups, the low-threat targets were attributed less 
typically human traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.84 vs. 5.02, t (1, 46) = -3.78,p < .001, 
and so were the high-threat targets, Ms = 4.56 vs. 4.94, t (1, 43) = -6.86, p < .001 
(Bonferroni-corrected significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.4b below. 
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Fig. 7.4b Attribution of typically 
human traits to artificial groups in 
Romania 
As for the positive traits in Romania, these were attributed equally to in-group 
and out-group, Ms = 4.51 vs. 4.52, F (1, 193) = 0.07, ns. However, the threat status of 
the out-groups moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 193) = 24.17,p < .001, 
'72 = .11, as more positive traits were attributed to the low-threat out-groups than to the 
in-group, Ms = 5.12 vs. 4.67, t(1, 98) = 3.58,p < .01 , whereas less positive traits were 
attributed to the high-threat out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 3.99 vs. 4.40, t (1, 
97) = 3.43,p < .01 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). 
There was also a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat 
statuses, F (1,193) = 20.32,p < .001, '72 =.10 for the within-participants effects. This 
meant that when the out-group was low-threat, there was no difference in the positive 
traits given to real and artificial out-groups, Ms = 5.15 vs. 5.09, but when the out-
group was threatening, the Gypsies were attributed less positive traits than the 
artificial high-threat group, Ms = 3.25 vs. 4.70. The Germans were attributed more 
positive traits than the Gypsies, Ms = 5.15 vs. 3.25, and the low-threat artificial group 
was attributed more positive traits than the high-threat one, Ms = 5.09 vs. 4.70. 
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7.3.3 Prejudice measures: perceived threat and blatant prejudice 
7.3.3.1 Perceived threat 
As regarded perceived threat, in Britain an exploratory factor analysis on the 
perceived threat scale investigated whether there were distinct factors relating to 
material and symbolic threat. The analysis found three factors explaining 45.68%. 9%), 
and 8.53% of the variance, respectively. Most of the items loaded on the first factor 
(cf. Renfro, Stephan, Duran, & Clason, 2006). A second factor analysis with Oblimin 
rotation and asking for a 2-factor solution revealed two factors, the first one explainng 
45.70% of the variance, and the second one, 9%. According to the Pattern Matrix, 
most threat items loaded on the first factor, with some of the reverse-coded items 
loading on the second factor and some loading negatively on the first, see table 7.2 
below. The two factors were correlated at -.38. Items 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 were recoded, 
and the resulting scale had an internal reliability of .89. The inter-item correlations 
ranged from .11 to .68, and the mean inter-item correlation was .40. 
Table 7.1 Factor loadings of the items pertaining to material and symbolic threat in Britain (N = 197) 
Component 
1 2 
1. The Germans get more from this country than they contribute. M 
2. The presence of Germans spoils the traditional British countryside. S 
3. The Germans' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society. S 
4. The Germans are not squeezing British people out of council housing. M 
5. The Germans' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life. S 
6. The presence of Germans on the job market reduces employment opportunities for 
British people. M 






8. When the Germans make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits. M -.59 
9. The Germans' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society. S -.35 
10. The Germans are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits. M .82 
11. The Germans are taking advantage of Britain's economy. M .73 
12. The Germans' way of life is not destroying the traditional British way of life. S -.74 
.72 
.84 
Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. KMO me~sure of samp~ing adequacy .89, 
p < 0.001. The letters M or S in bold indicate the type of threat, materIal or symbolIc. 
Given the lack of a clear empirical distinction between material and symbolic 
threat, the present threat items were averaged to create a composite scale of perceived 
threat. A two-way ANOY A with the targets' reality status (real vs. artificial) and 
threat status (low-threat vs. high-threat) as the independent factors was conducted on 
perceived threat. The high-threat groups invoked more perceived threat than the low-
threat ones, Ms = 3.56 vs. 2.67, F (1. 193) = 46.82,p < .001. Il~ = .20. in line with the 
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research hypotheses. The real groups invoked more threat than the artificial ones, J/s 
= 3.37 vs. 2.87, F (1, 193) = 14.48, P < .001, 172 = .07. There \vas a significant 
interaction between the reality and the threat statuses of the targets, meaning that the 
Gypsies invoked more perceived threat than the artificial high-threat group, ;\1s = 3.95 
vs. 3.18, whereas the Germans did not invoke more threat than the artificial low-threat 
group equivalent, Ms = 2.80 vs. 2.56, F (l, 193) = 4.25, P < .05, 17 2 = .02. 
In Romania, a factor analysis on the threat items with Direct Oblimin rotation 
revealed three factors explaining 35.83%, 12.53% and 10.280/0 of the variance , 
respectively. Rerunning the analysis and asking for a 2-factor solution revealed two 
factors explaining 36% and 12.53% of the variance, respectively, which were 
correlated at -.31. Most items loaded on the first factor, with some of the reverse-
coded items loading on the second, see table 7.3. Items 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 were recoded, 
and the resulting scale had an internal reliability of .82. The inter-item correlations 
ranged from -.09 to .62, and the mean inter-item correlation was .27. 
Table 7.2 Factor loadings of the items pertaining to material and symbolic threat in Romania (N = 197) 
Component 
1 2 
1. The Germans get more from this country than they contribute. M 
2. The presence of Germans spoils the traditional British countryside. S 
3. The Germans' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society. S 
4. The Germans are not squeezing British people out of council housing. M 
5. The Germans' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life. S 
6. The presence of Germans on the job market reduces employment opportunities for 
British people. M 






8. When the Germans make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits. M -047 
.65 
.81 
9. The Germans' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society. S -.39 .50 
10. The Germans are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits. M .82 
11. The Germans are taking advantage of Britain's economy. M .73 
12. The Germans' way oflife is not destroying the traditional British way of life. S .68 
Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. KMO measure of sampling adequacy - .89, 
P < 0.001. The letters M or S in bold indicate the type of threat, material or symbolic. 
In Romania, a two-way ANOV A with the out-groups reality (real vs. artiticial) 
and threat status (high vs. low) as the independent factors was conducted on perceived 
threat. The real and the artificial groups invoked similar levels of perceived threat. l\1S 
= 3.30 vs. 3.34, F (1,193) = .14, ns. However. the high-threat groups invoked more 
threat than the low-threat ones, Ms = 3.90 vs. 2.74, F (1. 193) = 82.46, p < .001, '72 
= .30, in line with the research hypotheses. There was also a significant interaction 
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between the targets' reality and threat statuses, indicating that the Gypsies invoked 
more treat than the high-threat artificial group Ms = 4 22 \'S 3 58'h th 
' "', \\ ereas e 
Germans invoked less threat than the low-threat artificial target, Ms = 2.36 \·s. 3.11. F 
(1,193) = 29.53,p < .001, 172 = .13. 
7.3.3.2 Blatant prejudice 
Concerning blatant prejudice, in both countries, ANOV As with the targets' 
reality status (real vs. artificial) and threat status (high vs. low) were conducted on the 
blatant prejudice scores. In Britain, the blatant prejudice scale had an internal 
reliability of .86. The high-threat groups invoked more prejudice than the low-threat 
ones, Ms = 3.80 vs. 2.64, F (1, 193) = 50.16, p < .001, f12 = .20, in line with the 
research hypotheses. The real groups invoked more blatant prejudice than the artificial 
ones, Ms = 3.55 vs. 2.90, F (1, 193) = 15.19, p < .001, 172 = .07. There was a 
significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, indicating that 
the Gypsies invoked more prejudice than the high-threat artificial group, Ms = 4.43 vs. 
3.18, while the Germans did not elicit more prejudice than the low-threat artificial 
group, Ms = 2.66 vs. 2.62, F (1,193) = 13.53,p < .001, f12 = .07. 
In Romania, the blatant prejudice scale had an internal reliability of .75. The 
real and artificial groups invoked similar levels of prejudice, Ms = 2.93 vs. 3.11, F (1, 
193) = 1.43, ns. However, the high-threat groups invoked more prejudice than the 
low-threat ones, Ms = 3.S8 vs. 2.47, F (1,193) = 56.0S,p < .001, f12 = .22, in line with 
the research hypothesis. There was also a significant interaction between the targets' 
reality and threat statuses, indicating that the Gypsies invoked more prejudice than the 
artificial high-threat group, Ms = 3.89 vs. 3.25, whereas the Germans invoked less 
prejudice than the low-threat artificial group, Ms = 1.96 vs. 2.96, F (1, 193) = 30.32, p 
< .001, f12 = .13. 
To assess whether perceived threat mediated blatant prejudice in the case of 
artificial groups, and whether blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat in the case 
of real groups, mediation analyses were conducted separately for real and artificial 
groups, with the groups' threat status as the predictor and with percein:d threat and 
blatant prejudice being in turn dependent variables and mediators, respectively. In 
Britain, in the case of artificial groups, perceived threat mediated blatant prejudice. 
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Aroian's z = 2.92, p < 0.01, but blatant prejudice also mediated percei ved threat, 
Aroian's z = 2.55, p < .05, therefore the results are rather inconclusive. As for the real 
groups in Britain, blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat, as predicted, Aroian' s : 
= 5.64, p < .001, but perceived threat also mediated blatant prejudice. Aroian's : = 
5.44, p < .001, therefore no clear conclusions can be drawn from these results. 
In Romania, in the case of artificial groups, no mediation analysis was 
possible because the targets' threat status and blatant prejudice were not significantly 
correlated. As for the real groups, blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat. 
Aroian's z = 4.59, p < .001, but perceived threat also mediated blatant prejudice, 
Aroian's z = 4.55,p < .001, therefore the results from Romania are inconclusive, too. 
To sum up, the British and Romanian results supported the hypothesis 
according to which the artificial group described as poor and culturally different from 
the in-group would invoke more perceived threat and more prejudice than the other 
artificial group described as rich and as culturally similar to the in-group. The results 
also supported the hypothesis according to which the Gypsies would elicit more 
perceived threat than the Germans. Regarding the differences between the British and 
the Romanian results, in Britain the real groups overall invoked more perceived threat 
and prejudice than the artificial ones, whereas in Romania the real groups and the 
artificial ones elicited similar levels of perceived threat and prejudice. The Germans 
invoked the same level of threat as the low-threat artificial group in Britain, but in 
Romania the Germans invoked less threat and less prejudice than their artificial 
counterpart. A closer look at the data indicates the Romanians perceived less threat 
from the Germans than did the British, Ms = 2.36 vs. 2.78, t (1,96) = 2.30, p < .05, 
while the Romanians and the British perceived similar levels of threat from the 
Gypsies, Ms = 4.22 vs. 3.95, t (1, 102) = 1.54, ns. 
Perceived threat and blatant prejudice were significantly and positively 
correlated, r (1,195) = .74, P < .001 in Britain, and r (1,195) = .66, p < .001 in 
Romania. In the case of artificial groups, it could be argued that perceived threat is 
due to the information in the experimental vignette; hov,;ever, in the case of real 
groups, it is possible that perceived threat may be an expression of prejudice. It was 
decided to examine the correlations between perceived threat and prejudice separately 
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for real and for artificial groups. In Britain, the correlation between percei\'ed threat 
and prejudice for artificial groups was r (1, 97) = .60, p < .001, but r (L 96) = .80, p 
< .001 for real groups, the difference between the two correlation coefficients beina 
b 
significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.80, p < .01. In Romania, the correlation 
between perceived threat and blatant prejudice for artificial groups was r (1, 91) = ,51, 
P < .001, and r (1, 102) = .72, p < .001, for real groups, the difference between the 
two correlation coefficients being significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.34, P 
< .05. The results from the two countries suggest that in the case of real groups it is 
more difficult to disentangle perceived threat from prejudice. 
7.3.4 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization 
In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other 
variables, an index of dehumanization was computed for each participant, as in the 
previous two experiments. This represented the difference (or distance) in the human 
typicality attributed to the in-group and the out-group, and was computed by 
subtracting the human typicality attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the 
in-group. This was computed separately for emotions (infrahumanization) and traits 
(ontologization). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation 
analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores 
for in-group and out-group. Similarly, two other composite variables were computed 
which represented the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. 
These were computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group 
from that attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions, ~ Positive 
emotions, and for traits, ~ Positive traits. See the table below for the correlations 
between the indices of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice: 
Table 7.3 Correlations between the dehumanization and the prejudice measures in Britain (N = 197) 
and Romania (N = 197) 
A Human emotions A Human traits A Positive A Positive traits 
emotions 
UK RO UK RO UK RO UK RO 
~ Human traits .32*** .39*** 
~ Positive .74*** .63*** .30*** 047*** 
emotions 
~ Positive traits .55*** .35*** 040*** .62*** .64*** .59*** -
Perceived threat 043 * * * .30*** .36*** .39*** .46** * .38*** .59*** .5'+*** 
Blatant .45*** .32*** ..12*** .36*** .43*** .38*** .5'+*** .51 *** 
prejudice 
*** p < .001 
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The rather moderated correlations between dehumanization and perceived 
threat and blatant prejudice suggest that dehumanization is not the same thing as 
prejudice (although it could also be argued that the different measurement of 
dehumanization and prejudice may account for the observed moderate correlations). 
The correlation between ontologization and the differential attribution of 
positive traits to in-group and out-group was higher in Romania than in Britain, as 
indicated by a Fisher's r to z transformation = 2.97, p < .01. This may be due to the 
fact that the positivity and the humanity of the Romanian traits were positively and 
significantly correlated, r (l, 19) = .50, p < .05, as indicated by the previous pilot 
study on the humanity and positivity of emotions and traits (see chapter 4). However, 
these results do not necessarily indicate that ontologization is an effect of positivity: 
in Britain there was a significant and positive correlation between ontologization and 
the positivity of the traits, even though the human and the positive sides of the traits 
were non-significantly correlated in the pilot study. 
Given that previous analyses had found differences between real and artificial 
groups, such as significantly different correlations between perceived threat and 
blatant prejudice between real and artificial groups, it was decided to analyse the 
correlations between the two measures of dehumanization and the other measures of 
prejudice separately for real and artificial groups, in each country, see the two tables 
below: 
Table 7.4 Correlations between the dehumanization and the prejudice measures for real (N = 98) and 
artificial (N - 99) grouQs in Britain 
L\ Human L\ Human traits L\ Positive emotions L\ Positive traits 
emotions 
Real Artificial Real Artificial Real Artificial Real Artificial 
~ Human .32*** .26** 
traits 
~ Positive .74*** .73*** .28** .26* 
emotions 
~ Positive .57*** .50*** .33*** .43*** .60*** .62*** 
traits 
Perceived .45 * * * .33*** .42*** .21 * .43*** .41*** .60*** .53*** 
threat 
Blatant .50*** .29** .50*** .22* .47*** .30** .65*** .34*** 
Qrejudice 
* p < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001. Significant differences in correlation coefficients are in bold. 
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As it can be noted in the table above, in the British sample the correlations between 
the measures of dehumanization and perceived threat and prejudice were overall 
greater for the real than for the artificial groups, although not significantly so. As 
regarded infrahumanization, the correlations with the other measures were not 
significantly different for real and artificial groups. For ontologization, only the 
correlations with blatant prejudice were significantly different for real and artificial 
groups, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.25, p < .05. 
Ta.ble.7.5 Correlations b~tween the dehumanization and the prejudice measures for real (N= 104) and 
artIfiCial (N = 93) groups In Romania 
A Human A Human traits A Positive emotions A Positive traits 
emotions 
Real Artificial Real Artificial Real Artificial Real Artificial 
11 Human .34*** .37*** 
traits 
11 Positive .65*** .66*** .53*** .40*** 
emotions 
11 Positive .38*** .36*** .63*** .64*** .60*** .56*** 
traits 
Perceived .34*** .25* .42*** .34*** .51 *** .14 .69*** .23* 
threat 
Blatant .37*** .22* .43*** .22* .44*** .27** .63*** .27** 
Erejudice 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Significant differences in correlation coefficients are in bold. 
As it can be seen in the table above, in the Romanian sample the correlations between 
the measures of dehumanization and perceived threat and prejudice were overall 
greater but not significantly greater for the real than for the artificial groups 
Regarding the potential mediators of dehumanization, the indexes of 
dehumanization were used in regression analysis. Mediation analyses were carried out 
in line with the suggestions by Baron and Kenny (1986), and Preacher and Hayes 
(2004). The regression analyses that examined the mediators of dehumanization were 
informed by the results obtained in the ANOV As conducted on infrahumanization and 
ontologization, and on the other measures of prejudice, i.e. perceived threat, blatant 
prejudice, and the differential attribution of positive emotions and traits to in-group 
and out-group. The variables selected as potential mediators of dehumanization \\·ere 
the ones on which the threat status of the out-group had a main effect. The main 
predictor of interest is the threat status of the out-group. Given that dehumanization 
may play different functions in real and artificial groups, separate analyses \\·ere 
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carried out for real and for artificial targets. Given the high correlation bet\veen 
perceived threat and blatant prejudice, it was decided to analyse these two potential 
mediators separately. 
Regarding infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), in Britain 
the ANOVA analyses had found that the high-threat out-groups were infrahumanized 
whereas the low-threat ones were not. At the same time, the high-threat groups 
invoked more perceived threat and more blatant prejudice than the low-threat ones. 
Therefore it was decided to examine whether perceived threat and blatant prejudice 
may mediate the infrahumanization of high-threat groups. The differential attribution 
of positive emotions to in-group and out-group (~ Positive emotions) could not be 
explored as a possible mediator of infrahumanization, because a preliminary 
regression analysis indicated that the threat status of the group was not a predictor of 
positive emotions. 
Regarding perceived threat and the infrahumanization (dehumanization 
through emotions) of real groups in Britain, a Sobel test indicated that perceived 
threat mediated their infrahumanization, Aroian's z = 3.37,p < .001, see Table 7.6. 
Table 7.6 Perceived threat mediated the infrahumanization of the real groups in Britain (N = 98) 
B SE B fJ 
Step 1 
Constant -.08 .06 
Threat status .11 .04 .27** 
Step 2 
Constant .01 .04 
Threat status .08 .02 .03 
Perceived threat -.08 .06 .43*** 
Note: R2= .07 for Step 1 (p < .01); LlRl - .13 for Step 2 (p < .001); ** P < .01; *** P < .001 
However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, I.e. the 
possibility that the dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression 
analysis was carried out with perceived threat as the criterion and infrahumanization 
as the mediator. Infrahumanization was found to mediate perceived threat Aroian' s z 
= 2.22, p < .05, see Table 7.7, therefore it cannot be concluded that perceiyed threat 
mediated the infrahumanization of real groups in Britain. 
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Table 7.7 Infrahumanization mediated the perceived threat from the real groups in Britain (S 98) 









Constant .98 .18 
.55*** 
Threat status 1.80 .45 .46*** 
~ Human emotions l.63 .29 .33*** 
Note: R2 .30 for Step 1 (p < .001); LfR2 - .10 for Step 2 (p < .001); *** p < .001 
As for blatant prejudice, this was found to mediate the infrahumanization of 
real groups, i.e. the Gypsies, Aroian's z = 3.67,p < .001, see Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 Blatant prejudice mediated the infrahumanization of the real groups in Britain (N - 98) 
Step 1 
B SE B fJ 
Constant -.08 .06 
Threat status .11 .04 .27* * 
Step 2 
Constant -.01 .04 
Threat status .06 .01 -.02 
Blatant prejudice -.08 .06 .51 * * * 
Note: R2= .07 for Step 1 (p < .01); LfR2= .18 for Step 2 (p < .001); ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
However, infrahumanization was equally found to mediate blatant prejudice, 
Aroian's z = 2.33, p < .05, therefore it cannot be concluded that the infrahumanization 
of real groups in Britain was mediated by blatant prejudice, see Table 7.9. 










Constant l.46 .24 
Threat status 2.96 .63 .47*** 
~ Human emotions .89 .42 .37*** 
Note: R2 = .33 for Step 1 (p < .001); LfR2 = .13 for Step 2 (p < .001); *** p < .001 
Similar regression analyses were conducted on artificial groups III Britain. 
Perceived threat was not found to mediate infrahumanization, Aroian's ~ = 1.65, ns. 
Similarly, blatant prejudice did not mediate the infrahumanization of artificial groups, 
Aroian's z = 1.26. In Romania, the ANOY A analysis had found that only the artificial 
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groups were infrahumanized, and that the targets' threat status did not play a part in 
their infrahumanization. Furthermore, the targets' reality status did not moderate 
either perceived threat or blatant prejudice, therefore a mediation analysis was not 
deemed applicable. 
As for the second measure of dehumanization, the dehumanization through 
traits, in Britain it had been found that the high-threat groups were more dehumanized 
than the low-threat ones. The mediation analysis examined whether perceived threat, 
blatant prejudice, or the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-
group mediated the dehumanization of high-threat groups. In Britain, in the case of 
the real groups, perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization, Aroian's Z = 0.98, 
ns, neither did blatant prejudice, Aroian's z = 1.60, ns, nor did !!l Positive traits, 
Aroian's z = 1.67, ns. Conversely, the dehumanization of the real groups (Gypsies) 
did not significantly predict perceived threat nor blatant prejudice, the targets' threat 
status being the main predictor of these two prejudice measures. 
As for the artificial groups in Britain, perceived threat did not mediate their 
dehumanization, Aroian's z = 0.92, ns, neither did blatant prejudice, Aroian's z = 
1.15, ns. !!l Positive traits was found to mediate the dehumanization of artificial 
groups, Aroian's z = 2.92,p < .01, but dehumanization also mediated!!l Positive traits, 
Aroian's z = 2.37, p < .05, therefore it cannot be concluded that !!l Positive traits was a 
mediator of dehumanization. However, given that these were artificial groups, the 
participants could not have had any a-priori dehumanizing beliefs about the target 
groups. Therefore it may be likely that the positive attitudes they formed about the 
artificial target groups during the experimental manipulation may explain why they 
dehumanized the target groups. 
Concerning the artificial groups in Romania, perceived threat did not mediate 
their dehunlanization, Aroian's z = 1.91, ns. Blatant prejudice and !!l Positive traits 
were not significantly predicted by the targets' threat status, so no mediation analyses 
were possible in their case. 
Regarding real groups 111 Romania, perceived threat did not mediate their 
dehumanization, Aroian's z = 1.72, ns, and conversely dehumanization was not found 
to be a significant predictor of perceived threat. However. blatant prejudice mediated 
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the dehumanization of real groups, i.e. the Gypsies Aroian' s 7' = 2 '4 < 05 
, -.- ,p . ,see 
Table 7.10 below. 
Table 7.10 Blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization ofthe real groups in Romania (N 









Constant .25 .10 
.45*** 
Threat status .07 .03 .30* 
Blatant prejudice -.46 .12 .23* 
Note: R2 .21 for Step 1 (p < .001); LlR2 - .03 for Step 2 (p < .05); * P < .05; *** p < .001 
104) 
However, dehumanization did not mediate blatant prejudice, Aroian's z = 
1.84, ns, see Table 7.11. The absence of feedback in the mediation chain indicates that 
the dehumanization of the Gypsies was due to the prejudice against them. 








~ Human traits 














Note: R2 =.44 for Step 1 (p < .001); LlR2= .02 for Step 2 (p < .05); * p < .05; *** P < .001 
~ Positive traits was also explored as a mediator, and was found to mediate 
dehumanization, Aroian's Z = 3.97, p < .001, but dehumanization, too, mediated ~ 
Positive traits, Aroian's z = 3.68, p < .001, therefore it cannot be concluded that ~ 
Positive traits mediated the dehumanization. 
To sum up, no significant mediators of dehumanization were found for either 
the real or the artificial groups in either country. Only the dehumanization of real 
groups, i.e. the Gypsies, was found to be mediated by blatant prejudice in Romania. 
This is in line with the hypothesis of this study which stipulated that in the case of real 
groups, other factors than perceived threat such as prejudice are likely to playa part in 
the dehumanization of real groups. 
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7.4 Discussion 
How has the inclusion of real groups alongside artificial ones contributed to 
the understanding of the relationship between perceived threat, blatant prejudice and 
dehumanization? I will examine here how this study has addressed the research 
hypotheses, discuss alternative interpretations for the results, examine this study's 
contribution to threat theories and dehumanization theories, and conclude \vith the 
directions for the next study. 
The premises of this study was the hypothesis that the dehumanization of 
artificial groups may function as rationalization of the out-groups' poor and culturally 
different status, whereas the dehumanization of real groups may be an expression of 
prejudice. Also, I had hypothesised that perceived threat may mediate and explain the 
dehumanization of artificial groups, whereas in the case of real groups, it is their 
dehumanization that might mediate and explain the perceived threat from them. 
So which groups were dehumanized? Concerning the artificial groups, these 
were generally dehumanized (through traits) in both countries, but the high-threat 
ones (poor and culturally different from the in-group) were more dehumanized than 
the low-threat ones (rich and culturally similar to the in-group), as indicated by the 
lower attribution of typically human traits. The findings on the dehumanization of 
artificial groups are very similar to those from the previous two experiments which 
had revealed that poor groups and culturally different groups are a particular target of 
dehumanization. This suggests that poverty and cultural differences are indeed 
antecedents of dehumanization. However, similarly to the previous two experiments, 
the artificial groups were dehumanized (through traits) regardless of their threat status, 
which raises alternative interpretations for the dehumanization effect. Firstly, it could 
be argued that the dehumanization of artificial groups may rest upon judgements of 
human typicality (see Chapters 5 and 6), and that the in-group may implicitly be 
assumed to represent the human norm. Secondly, it could be argued that as the 
artificial targets were presented as minorities, they may have elicited certain social (or 
ideological) representations about minority groups, and their minority status may have 
induced a lesser attribution of human typicality than the in-group. Thirdly, it may be 
argued that the dehumanization of the artificial groups functioned as a form of in-
group favouritism. This interpretation would be in line with the infrahumanization 
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thesis (e.g. Leyens et aI., 2000) which stipUlates that indi\'iduals are motiYJtl?d to 
'reserve' the human essence to their in-group and to deny it to out-groups. Last but 
not least, it may be argued that the high-threat artificial groups were more 
dehumanized than the low-threat ones because of the threat they induced. although 
perceived threat was not found to mediated their dehumanization. As for the 
infrahumanization measure (dehumanization through emotions), this indicated that the 
artificial groups were overall infrahumanized in Romania, while in Britain only the 
high-threat group was infrahumanized (attributed less typically human emotions than 
the in-group), which suggests that the two measures of dehumanization were rather 
similar. 
However, as regarded the real groups, the Gypsies and the Germans, only the 
Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) in both countries. This finding is in line 
with the existing research on the dehumanization of the Gypsies (e.g. Perez et aI., 
2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Given that the pilot study had found the 
Gypsies to be a threatening group at both the material and symbolic levels, it is 
perhaps not surprising that they were also dehumanized. The Gypsies were also 
dehumanized through emotions (infrahumanized) but only in Britain. However, the 
fact that the Germans were not dehumanized, neither through traits nor through 
emotions) raises issues as to the functions of dehumanization. Firstly, the results from 
the real groups bring support to the ontologization thesis (dehumanization through 
traits) according to which only those groups perceived as having failed to be 
culturally assimilated would be dehumanized (Perez et aI., 2001). It may well be that 
the dehumanization of the Gypsies functions as a rationalization of their low socio-
economic status. The findings on the dehumanization of the Gypsies also suggest that 
real groups and artificial groups elicit rather different responses. 
Secondly, it could be argued that dehumanization is not a form of in-group 
favouritism, at least not in the case of real groups, otherwise, the Germans would have 
been dehumanized. Although other studies have found the Germans to be 
infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) by groups such as the Italians 
(Paladino et aI., 2004) or the British (Viki et aI., 2006). in the present survey neither 
the British nor the Romanians infrahumanized the Gemlans. The Romanian 
participants even attributed the Germans more typically human emotions than to their 
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own group, thus suggesting that infrahumanization may function differently in 
relatively lower-status groups such as the Romanians (see the findings on the 
ideological asymmetry between the British and the Romanians in Chapters 5 and 6). 
and suggest that the Gennans were perceived as a higher-status group, hence their 
'over-humanization' . 
What mediated the dehumanization of artificial and real groups, respectively? 
Concerning the artificial groups, neither perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice 
mediated their dehumanization (either through traits or emotions) in either country, 
which brings support to the interpretation that their dehumanization functioned as a 
rationalization of their status (poor and culturally different from the in-group). As for 
the real groups, in Britain neither perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice mediated 
their dehumanization (through traits), whereas in Romania blatant prejudice mediated 
the dehumanization (through traits) of the Gypsies. This is in line with that Tajfel's 
(1981) conceptualization of dehumanization as being an extreme form of prejudice, 
and suggests that ontologization may go beyond issues of cultural assimilation 
(although in this study perceived failed cultural assimilation was not measured as a 
potential mediator). Interestingly and contrary to the research hypotheses, in the case 
of real groups dehumanization did not predict perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice, 
in neither country, which suggests that dehumanization may not be an antecedent of 
these measures of prejudice. However, regarding the emotions measure of 
dehumanization (infrahumanization), the mediation analyses indicated that in Britain. 
where only the Gypsies were infrahumanized, perceived threat mediated their 
infrahumanization. In a separate analysis, blatant prejudice mediated the 
infrahumanizatin of the Gypsies. However, the infrahumanization of the Gypsies also 
mediated perceived threat and blatant prejudice, respectively, therefore the results are 
rather unclear. Nonetheless, they do suggest that the dehumanization of real groups 
may be motivated by different factors than the dehumanization of artificial groups. 
As to the present findings on perceived threat, these are rather interesting and 
relevant to the integrated threat theory (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al.. 
2000). Firstly, the pilot study on the threatening and non-threatening groups indicated 
that groups can elicit (or not) the two types of threat rather simultaneously, and that 
the two types of perceived threat, material and symbolic, are vcry highly relatcd. 
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Secondly, when the material and symbolic threat items were included together in a 
single scale, as in the present study, the different items failed to load on two distinct 
factors, thus suggesting that while it is possible to distinguish theoretically between 
the two types of threat, it may be difficult to distinguish between the two empirically. 
These results tie in with previous research which had found that the material and 
symbolic threat items loaded on a single factor (Renfro et aI., 2006) and that only 
when they were combined in the same vignette did material and symbolic threat 
manipulations produce negative attitudes (Stephan et aI., 2005). It is possible that one 
type of threat may drive the other, although it was beyond the scope of the present 
research to investigate this. It could also be argued that perceived threat is not so 
much a matter of perception but rather an expression or justification for prejudice. 
Overall, the present findings suggest that perceived threat should perhaps be 
operationalized as a combined measure of both material and symbolic threat. 
To conclude, the present results suggest that, in line with the previous two 
experiments, poverty and cultural differences are antecedents of dehumanization at 
least in the case of artificial groups. However, given that, overall, perceived threat and 
blatant prejudice were not found to play a mediating role in dehumanization, the 
dehumanization of both artificial and real groups may also function as a 
rationalization of the targets' relative socio-economic status. In the case of real groups, 
dehumanization may function as a rationalization of their relative socio-economic 
status, but also of their relative power status, given their relationship with the in-group. 
7.S Progression to the next study 
The present study found that not all real groups are dehumanized, only those 
perceived as having a negative effect on the country's economy and way of life. The 
lack of mediation from perceived threat suggests that dehumanization may go beyond 
prejudice and reflect a rationalization or a legitimization of the out-groups' status. 
Given that the pilot study revealed a kind of group hierarchy, with the Gypsies at the 
bottom and with the Germans and other groups at the top, it may be that 
dehumanization functions as explanations for the groups' relative status in group 
hierarchy. Therefore the present research will next examine the relationship between 
dehumanization and perceptions of power and of group status in the case of real 
groups. 
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8.1.1 Introduction 
In the previous three experiments with artificial groups (see Chapters 5. 6 and 
7), I had found that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group 
and the targets' poor economic status predisposed the artificial groups to being 
dehumanized. As for the real groups, the questionnaire survey described in Chapter 7 
revealed that the Gypsies were dehumanized by the both the British and the 
Romanians participants, whereas the Germans were not dehumanized by either group 
of participants. The Germans were not infrahumanized (dehumanized through 
emotions), and the Romanian participants even infrahumanized their own group 
relative to the Germans. These results suggest that the British may have viewed their 
group as equal in status relative to the Germans, whereas the Romanians may have 
viewed their group as equal or lower in status relative to the Germans, while both the 
British and the Romanians viewed the Gypsies as a lower-status group. In this final 
experiment I examined whether perceptions of group status and perceptions of the 
out-group's legitimacy might explain the dehumanization of real groups such as the 
Gypsies. 
How might perceived group status explain why a group is dehumanized? 
Status denotes "the prestige and honour publicly ascribed to particular positions and 
occupations within society" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999: 380). In inter-group contexts, 
group status is associated with differences in power, influence, and access to or 
allocation of resources. Moreover, group status involves beliefs about status, and 
judgements of social worth of the individuals or groups in question. As the status 
construction theory suggests (Ridgeway, 1991), certain nominal attributes, such as 
ethnicity, gender, or profession, can acquire status value if the members of that 
particular category are associated with certain attributes, e.g. access to resources. 
Dehumanization has been suggested to be related to social classification and 
stratification (Moscovici, 1979; Perez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002), as well as to 
beliefs about the 'essence' of groups, therefore it may well be that dehumanization is 
more linked to perceptions of group status than the existing theories of dehumanized 
have stipulated. 
But status itself invol\'es a process of social comparison bet\\'een in-group and 
the out-groups. And as it has been noted, "relative group status refers to the value or 
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prestige typically accorded to one social group or category compared to another" 
(Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 2002: 269-270). Howe\'er, 
for social comparisons to take place between groups, there needs to be a certain 
degree of similarity between the groups involved, or a certain degree of perceived 
legitimacy of the relationship between the two groups. Therefore it could be argued 
that one cannot separate considerations of relative group status from considerations of 
either similarity between groups or the legitimacy of the relationship between them. 
As for legitimacy, this has been defined as "a psychological property of an 
authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe 
that it is appropriate, proper, and just" (Tyler, 2006: 375), with status hierarchies and 
inequalities of status lending themselves to being legitimized (Zelditch, 2001). 
Legitimacy is largely perceived, in the sense that is constitutes "an individual's 
subjective appraisal that the social hierarchy defining the relative status of different 
groups is fair in that it is based on actual differences in ability or effort between those 
groups" (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001: 783, emphasis added). 
Beliefs about status and the perceived legitimacy of status differences are inextricably 
linked, because without their social validity and apparent widespread acceptance, 
status beliefs would be undermined (Ridgeway, 2001). Legitimacy has also been 
defined as one of the bases of social power, where social power refers to the ability or 
the potential of an individual or a group to induce or prevent change in another 
individual or group (Raven, 1999; French & Raven, 1958). Unlike other sources of 
social power such as reward or coercion, legitimacy, although dependent on the 
influencing agent, is assumed not to require surveillance by the influencing agent, 
thus suggesting that legitimacy can be accepted and internalized by the individuals or 
groups subjected to change. Legitimate power is assumed to be based on a structural 
relationship between the source of the influence and the target, and to involve beliefs 
about obligation, commitment, contract, etc. as well as feelings of obedience (Raven, 
1999). For the influencing agent, occupying a position of power may be enough to 
influence the target, thus exercising 'authority pressure' (Cialdini, 1988). 
How might group status influence the process of dehumanization? The 
infrahumanization paradigm holds that both high-status and low-status groups engage 
in infrahun1anization. and that the status of the out-group is not a moderator or a 
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mediating factor (Leyens et aI, 2001; Leyens et aI, 2002; Demoulin et aI, 2005), 
because all human groups are assumed to be motivated to reserve the human essence 
to their in-group. For example, research has shown that Italian participants 
infrahumanized the Germans relative to their in-group (Paladino, Vaes, Castano. 
Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004), while Belgian and Italian participants associated 
secondary emotions more with their in-groups than with North-African targets (Vaes, 
Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). 
However, some other research suggests that status may be a mediating factor, because 
when in-group and out-group are of equal status, i.e. French vs. Germans, and 
Germans vs. French, there is no differential attribution of secondary emotions, 
(Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, unpublished manuscript). While 
the infrahumanization research has established the infrahumanization effect, it has not 
delved deeply on how beliefs about group status or legitimacy might moderate the 
phenomenon (arguably because it has envisaged infrahumanization as a form of in-
group bias). As for the ontologization paradigm, although it views dehumanization as 
reflecting beliefs about group stratification, it, too, has failed to take into account 
beliefs about group status or legitimacy, choosing to focus instead on issues related to 
cultural assimilation and social integration. 
Given the possible impact of perceived legitimacy of status differences in 
inter-group relations, I proposed to examine the roles that perceived group status and 
perceived legitimacy of the out-group might play in dehumanization. I retained 
perceived threat from the out-group as a variable because it was expected to influence 
perceptions of legitimacy. However, unlike the previous three experiments where 
threat was conceived as symbolic and material, in the current study threat was 
conceived as threat to the in-group's social identity (e.g. Tajfel, 1982; Grant & 
Brown, 1995; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Voci, 2006). I set up a 
vignette experiment using the Gypsies and the Germans as target out-groups, and I 
manipulated threat under the form of political pressure from the out-group on the in-
group, formulated as a policy put forward by the out-group and likely to be adopted 
by the in-group's government. In the high-threat condition the out-group' s proposed 
policy involved changes on the part of the in-group to accommodate the out-group' S 
requirements. In the low-threat condition. the out-group's policy required fe\v changes 
on the part of the out-group. 
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8.1.2 Research hypotheses 
If dehumanization is linked to social comparisons between in-group and out-
group, then we would expect the relative status of the groups and the perceived 
legitimacy of status differentials to have an influence on dehumanization. If the out-
group is lower in status than the in-group, it is likely to be dehumanized, regardless of 
perceptions of legitimacy. However, if the out-group is higher in status than the in-
group, we would expect it to be dehumanized only if its high status is perceived as 
illegitimate. I expected that perceived threat would influence the perceptions of 
legitimacy: the more threatening the out-group, the less legitimate it should be 
perceived. I also hypothesised that the Germans would be rated as a high-status group, 
whereas the Gypsies as a low-status one. I examined the following hypotheses: 
1. both groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) 
2. the Gypsies will be more dehumanized than the Germans (through traits) 




The study had a 2 (Gypsies vs. Germans) x 2 (high threat vs. low threat) 
factorial design. In Romania, the cell sizes varied from 34 to 53, and in Britain, from 
21 to 23. 
8.2.2 Participants and procedure 
One hundred and seventy-one Romanian nationals, 97 females and 74 males 
males, and 2 participants who did not declare their gender, Mage = 30.13, age range = 
18 to 67, participated in the study. All of them were of Romanian nationality, 165 of 
Romanian ethnicity, 5 of Hungarian ethnicity and 1 of Turkish ethnicity. In Romania. 
87 participants completed the 'Germans' questionnaires (53 in the high-threat 
condition and 34 in the low-threat one), and 84 participants filled in the . Gypsy 
(Roma), questionnaires (40 in the high-threat condition, and 44 in the low-threat one). 
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Eighty-six British participants, 53 females and 33 males, Mage = 26.33, agc 
range = 18 to 61, took part in the study. 65 participants \vere of English ethnicity. the 
remaining 21 being of various ethnicities. 54 were university students and 32 \\"cre 
people of various professions. In Britain, 42 participants completed the 'Gennans' 
questionnaires (21 in the high-threat condition and 21 in the low-threat one). and 44 
participants filled in the 'Gypsy (Roma)' questionnaires (21 in the high-threat 
condition, and 23 in the low-threat one). 
The participants received a questionnaire that wa.s introduced as part of a study 
exploring perceptions of group equality in their country. Some of the questionnaires 
were completed online, while others were administered to students in class under 
supervision. Those student participants were recruited in class, and through snowball 
sampling. Some British participants took part in exchange for a course credit. To 
counteract potential multiple submissions, the IP addresses of the participants were 
checked. The researcher's email address was included in the web survey to enable 
participants to receive feedback, ask for help, or comment on any problems they may 
have encountered. 
8.2.3 Materials 
Four vignettes were designed for this study, two of them referring to the 
Germans and the other two to the Gypsies (Roma). A sample vignette from the 
'Gypsy condition' will be presented here representing the low-threat version of the 
threat manipulation (see Appendix VI a, for an example of the British version of the 
questionnaire, and Appendix VI b, for an example of the Romanian version). The 
italicized text in brackets represents the high-threat version of the threat manipulation: 
A recent report from the EU monitoring organization European Diversity in Education 
has highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) pupils in schools. [It has found 
that exclusion is particularly bad in Britain / Romania.] The European Roma Rights 
Office has used this report to recommend [persuade] the European Commission to 
propose a new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU and the 
EU accession countries. If adopted by each EU member state and accession country, 
this directive \vill not be binding, but will give local education authorities the option 
and f1exibility [if adopted by each EU member state and EU accession country. this 
232 
Chapter 8 Perceived low group status explains dehumanization 
will require the local education authorities] to reserve special school places to Roma 
pupils, to offer Romani language schooling to Roma pupils, to offer free access for 
Roma pupils to compulsory and post-compulsory education where affordable, 
including higher education, and to introduce topics addressing Roma culture and 
history. The directive has been formulated in such way that if it is passed. it will not 
require additional funding from the taxpayer, nor will it reduce the number of school 
places available to non-Roma children. [However, if the directive is adopted, if }tJill 
require additional funding from public money, and will also reduce the number of 
school places available to non-Roma children.] It is also unlikely to put an additional 
burden on any under-staffed state schools. [Some British / Romanian politicians have 
expressed concern that it will also put an additional burden on some under-staffed 
state schools.] 
In the 'Germans condition', the participants were told that the German 
Parliament had used the report to persuade the European Commission to propose a 
new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU. Their motive was 
to 'promote the German model of multiculturalism'. 
8.2.3.1 Ideological measures: in-group identification and social dominance 
orientation 
In-group identification and social dominance orientation were measured 
exactly as in Experiments 1 and 2. High scores indicated a high level of in-group 
identification, and of social dominance orientation, respectively. 
8.2.3.2 Prejudice measures: manipulation check, perceptions of the out-group, 
and dehumanization 
8.2.3.2.1 Manipulation check: the perceived likelihood of the out-group's 
suggested policy 
Three items ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (ycry much) measured the 
perceived likelihood of the out-group's suggested policy of being implemented, e.g. 
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How likely do you think it is that this directive will be adopted by the British 
[Romanian] government? 
8.2.3.2.2 Perceptions of the out-group 
Seven items ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) assessed the 
perceived legitimacy of the target out-group, e.g. How legitimate do you think it is for 
the Germans [Gypsies] to initiate this directive? None of the seven items was reverse-
coded. 
The participants also completed open-ended measures of perceptions of group 
status. They were informed that 'some groups are more advanced than others' and 
were required to rank nine target groups on seven indicators of status, e.g. being 
economically developed. The ranking varied from 1 to 9, where 1 indicated the most 
advanced group, while 9, the least advanced group. The groups included the Gypsies, 
the Germans, the Romanians, the British, plus five 'filler' groups, e.g. French, 
Moldovans. 
8.2.3.2.3 Dehumanization 
Dehumanization was measured similarly to the previous experiments, using 
the same target emotions and traits as in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The traits were listed 
before the emotions, and the participants selected traits and emotions to represent the 
target out-group and the in-group. 
8.3 Results 
When I analysed the data, I explored: (1) whether the experimental 
manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been 
affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the Gypsies were more 
dehumanized than the Germans; (4) whether the Gypsies were perceived as less 
legitimate and lower in status than the Germans; (5) whether perceived threat or 
perceived legitimacy mediated dehumanization. The analyses will be reported in turn 
in the following sections. 
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8.3.1 Manipulation checks: perceived likelihood of out-group's policy 
The measure of likelihood was reliable, a = .70 in Romania, and a = .80 in 
Britain. A three-way ANOV A, with the participants' nationality (Romanian V5. 
British), and the targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. 
low) as independent variables, was conducted on perceived likelihood scores. The 
Romanians perceived the implementation of the out-groups' policy as more likely 
than did their British counterparts, Ms = 3.67 vs. 3.15, F(1, 248) = 9.28,p < .01, 1]2 = 
.04. The implementation of the out-group's policy was perceived as more likely when 
the threat invoked by the policy was low rather than high, Ms = 3.63 vs. 3.19, F (1. 
248) = 6.98, p < .01, 1]2 = .03. There was also a significant interaction between 
nationality and threat status, F (1, 248) = 7.49, p < .01, 1]2 = .03, indicating that when 
the threat was high, the Romanians perceived the implementation as more likely than 
did the British, Ms = 3.67 vs. 2.70, t (1, 132) = 4.10, p < .001, whereas when the 
threat was low, the Romanians and the British perceived the implementation of the 
policy equally likely, Ms = 3.66 vs. 3.61, t (1, 120) = 0.26, ns. There were no other 
significant effects of ethnicity and no other significant interactions, all Fs < 1.50, ns. 
8.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification and SDO 
The in-group identification scale was reliable in Romania, a = .88, and in 
Britain, a = .88. Two-way ANOV As, with the out-groups' ethnicity (Germans vs. 
Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as independent variables, were conducted on 
in-group identification scores in each country. In Britain, there were no significant 
main effects and no interactions for in-group identification, all Fs < 2, ns. However, in 
Romania there was a main effect of the out-groups' threat level, F (1, 167) = 18.34, p 
< .001, 1]2 = .10, meaning that the Romanian participants identified more with their in-
group when the out-group's proposed directive was threatening for their in-group than 
when it was not, Ms = 5.54 vs. 4.73. There were no other main effects or interactions. 
These results suggest that in Romania in-group identification should be included as a 
covariate in the analyses of the other dependent variables, e.g. conducting ANCOVAs 
instead of ANOV As, in order to increase the experimental control. 
As regarded SDO, the scale was reliable in Romania, a = .82, and in Britain, U 
= .90. A three-way ANOV A, with the participants' nationality (Romanian vs. British), 
the targets' ethnicity (Germans \'s. Gypsies) and threat status (high \'s. low) as 
235 
Chapter 8 Perceived low group status explains dehumanization 
independent variables, was conducted on SDO scores. The Romanians expressed 
higher levels of SDO than did the British, Ms = 3.35 vs. 2.48, F (l, 249) = 48.35, p < 
.001, '72 = .16. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2. 
In Romania, SDO and in-group were negatively and non-significanly correlated, r (1. 
169) = -.09, ns, (similarly to the findings from the experiments 1 and 2). In Britain in-
group identification and SDO were positively but marginally significantly correlated. 
r (1,84) = .21, p = .057. However, despite the marginal statistical significance, the 
correlation coefficient in Britain is in line with the correlation coefficients from 
Experiment 1, r = .24 and Experiment 2, r = .23. 
Given that in-group identification, as well as its relationships to other group-
related variables, may vary as a function of the threat to the social identity of the in-
group, it was decided to analyse the correlations between in-group identification and 
the other variables by threat condition, see the table below: 
Table 8.1 Correlations between in-group identification and the dependent variables in Romania (N 




Human emotions out-group 
Human emotions in-group 
Positive emotions out-group 
Positive emotions in-group 
Human traits out-group 
Human traits in-group 
Positive traits out-group 
Positive traits in-group 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** P < .001. 
In-group identification 
Romania Britain 
High threat Low threat High threat Low threat 
-.08 -.02 .44** .00 
.03 .20 .08 .04 
-.06 -.01 -.13 -.03 
-.02 -.21 -.18 -.19 
.41*** .12 .05 .16 
-.04 -.03 -.20 -.21 
.43*** .29* .05 .27 
.14 .02 -.11 .04 
.14 .14 .17 .28 
.05 -.09 -.35* -.25 
.36*** .40*** .45** .34* 
As it can be seen in the table above, in-group identification and the positive 
traits attributed to the in-group were positively and significantly correlated regardless 
of the targets' threat status, and also regardless of the participants' in-group status, 
suggesting that the relationship between in-group identification and in-group 
favouritism may not be strengthened nor weakened by out-group threat, in either low-
status (Romania) or high-status groups (Britain). Interestingly. SOO and in-group 
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identification were significantly and positively correlated in Britain only in the high-
threat condition, and given that both SDO and in-group identification were measured 
after the threat manipulation, it could be argued that the relationship between the two 
variables functioned as a defence against the out-group's threatening policy. This 
result supports the suggestions that SDO may vary as a function of social threat (e.g. 
Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) and that rather than being a general psychological orientation. 
SDO reflects support for specific forms of dominance and inequality that are salient in 
specific contexts (e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007). 
8.3.3 Attributions of humanness and of positivity to out-group and in-group 
As in the previous experiments, for each participant a 'humanness' score was 
calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the out-group and in-group, 
respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion / trait selected by the 
participant for the respective group (in-group or out-group) with its humanness 
weighting, adding them up and dividing them by the number of the emotions / traits 
attributed to the target (in-group or out-group. The same procedure was used for 
calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to m-
group and out-group. 
Mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the attribution of 
human emotions and traits in each country. The between-participants factors were the 
targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies), and the targets' threat status (high vs. low). 
Target group (in-group vs. out-group) was the within-participants factor. The 
dependent variables were the typically human emotions, and respectively traits, 
attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted 
separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions, and traits, 
respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the dependent 
variables. In Romania, in-group identification was not included as a covariate because 
it correlated significantly only with the typically human emotions and traits attributed 
to the in-group. 
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8.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human and positive emotions 
In Romania, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 
to 8, M = 4.94, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 9, 1..1 = 5.23. The 
assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that reiati\'ely equally 
typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the out-group, A1s = 
5.22 vs. 5.19, F (l, 167) = 1.17, ns. However, the target' ethnicity moderated the 
attribution of typically human emotions, F (l, 167) = 6.59, p < .02, 1'/2 = .04: equally 
typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 
5.22 vs. 5.25, t (1, 84) = 0.70, ns, whereas more typically human emotions were 
attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 5.22 vs. 5.13, t (l, 81) = 2.54, P = 
.013 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level = .025). Thus, only the Gypsies were 
infrahumanized. The Germans were attributed more typically human emotions than 
the Gypsies, Ms = 5.25 vs. 5.13, whereas equally typically human emotions were 
attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 5.23 vs. 5.22, as indicated by the 
between-participants effect, F (1, 167) = 5.69, p < .05, 1'/2 = .03, see Fig. 8.1 below. 
The targets' threat status also moderated the attribution of typically human 
emotions, F (l, 167) = 4.17, p < .05, 1'/2 = .02, as more typically human emotions were 
attributed to the in-group when the out-group was threatening than when it was not, 
Ms = 5.25 vs. 5.19. Furthermore, there was no interaction between the out-group's 












Fig. 8.1 Attribution of typically human emotions in Romania 
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As for the attribution of positive emotions in Romania, the assumption of 
sphericity was met. The analysis indicated that overall more positi\'e emotions were 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.52 vs. 4.07, F (1, 167) = 
30.71, p < .001, 1]2 = .16. The targets' ethnicity moderated the attribution ofpositiye 
emotions, F (1, 167) = 23.63, p < .001, 172 = .12. Paired-samples (-tests (with 
Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally positive 
emotions were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 4.54 \'S. 4.46, I (1, 
84) = 0.71, ns, whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to 
the Gypsies, Ms = 4.52 vs. 3.70, t (1, 81) = 7.l9, p < .001. At the same time, more 
positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, as indicated by 
the between-participants effects, F(I, 167) = 2l.75,p < .001, 172 = .12, Ms = 4.46 vs. 
3.70, but equal positive emotions were attributed to the in-group in the two 
conditions, Ms = 4.54 vs. 4.52. There were no other main effects or significant 
interactions, all Fs < 3, ns. 
In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 
6, M = 4.83, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 8, M = 5.01. The 
assumption of sphericity was met. Overall, more typically human emotions were 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.32, F (1,82) = 8.03,p 
< .01,172 = .09. The targets' ethnic status moderated the attribution of typically human 
emotions, F (1, 82) = 26.50, p < .001, 172 = .24. Paired-samples I-tests (with 
Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally typically 
human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 5.36 vs. 5.40, 
I (1, 41) = l.60, ns, whereas more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-
group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.24, t (1, 43) = 6.06, p < .001. Thus, 
similarly to Romania, only the Gypsies were infrahumanized, see Fig. 8.2 below. 
There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 1. The Gypsies were 
also attributed less human emotions than the Germans, Ms = 5.24 vs. 5.40, as 
indicated by the between-participants effects, F (1, 82) = 18.12, P < .OOL 17 2 = .18. 
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Fig. 8.2 Attribution of typically human emotions in Britain 
As for the attribution of positive emotions In Britain, the assumption of 
sphericity was met. The analysis indicated that overall more positive emotions were 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.05 vs. 4.50, F (1, 82) = 23, P < 
.001, ",2 = .22. The out-groups' ethnicity moderated the attribution of positive 
emotions, F(1, 82) = 8.73,p < .01, ",2 = .10. Paired-samples I-tests (with Bonferroni-
adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally positive emotions were 
attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 5.01 vs. 4.81, 1(1,41) = 1.18, ns, 
whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, 
Ms = 5.09 vs. 4.20, f (1, 43) = 6.30, p < .001. The Gypsies were also attributed less 
positive emotions than the Germans, Ms = 4.20 vs. 4.81, F(1, 82) = 4.70,p < .05, ",2 = 
.05. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, both Fs < 1, ns. 
To sum up, in both Romania and Britain the Gypsies were infrahumanized 
(dehumanized through emotions) and were also attributed less positive emotions than 
the in-group and than the Germans l . The infrahumanization of the Gypsies was not 
moderated by perceptions of threat. In Romania the correlation between the human 
and the positive emotions attributed to the Gypsies was r (1,82) = .67,p < .001, while 
for the Germans it was r (1, 85) = .80, p < .001, the difference between correlation 
coefficients being non-significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 1.72, ns. In Britain 
the correlation between the human and the positive emotions attributed to the Gypsie 
I In Romania, a secondary analysis using the primary vs. secondary emotions dichotom) indicated that 
the Germans were attributed equal secondary emotions as the in-group, ""hile the Gypsies \\ere 
attributed less secondary emotions than the in-group. In Britain, a similar analysis revealed that the 
British participants attributed more secondary emotions to the Germans than to their in-group, \\ herea . 
they ascribed more secondary emotions to their in-group than to the G) psie . 
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was r (1,42) = .70,p < .001, while for the Germans it was r (1, 40) = .5Lp < .01. the 
difference between correlation coefficients being non-significant Fisher's /"-to-z 
transformation = 1.36, ns. 
8.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human and positive traits 
In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 11. 
M= 6.97, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 13, M= 7.49. The assumption 
of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that more typically human traits were 
overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.93 vs. 4.66, F (1, 167) 
= 88.80,p < .001, 1J2 = .3S. The out-groups' ethnic status moderated the attribution of 
typically human traits, F (1, 167) = 97.20, p < .001, 1J2 = .37. Paired-samples I-tests 
(with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .02S) indicated that equally typically 
human traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.91, t 
(1, 86) = 0.43, ns, whereas more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group 
than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.41, t (1, 83) = 11.90, p < .001. Thus, only the 
Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits), in line with the research hypothesis, see 
Fig. 8.3 below. 
The targets' threat status did not moderated the attribution of typically human 
traits, F (1, 167) = 2.6S, ns. More typically human traits were attributed to the 
Germans than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.91 vs. 4.41, while equally typically human traits 
were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.9S, F (1, 167) = 
6l.30, p < .001, 1J2 = .30. However, there was a significant interaction between the 
out-groups' ethnicity and threat statuses, F (1, 167) = 4.08, p < .OS, ,,2 = .02. This 
indicated that when the target out-group was the Gypsies, more typically human traits 
were attributed to the in-group in the high-threat than in the low-threat condition, Jis 
















Fig. 8.3 Attribution of typically human traits in Romania 
As for the attribution of positive traits In Romania, the assumption of 
sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, more positive traits were 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.86 vs. 4.22, F (1, 167) = 
46.70, p < .001, '72 = .22. The out-groups' ethnic status moderated the attribution of 
positive traits, F (1, 167) = 70.26, p < .001, '72 = .30, indicating that equally positive 
traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.93, whereas 
more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.92 vs. 
3.5l. There was also a main effect of the out-groups' ethnicity for the between-
participants effects, F (1, 167) = 70.50, p < .001, '72 = .30, which indicated that more 
positive traits were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.93 vs. 3.51, 
but equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 
4.80 vs. 4.92. There were no other main effects or interactions. 
In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 3 to 18, 
M= 6.79, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 10, M= 7.0l. The assumption 
of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that more typically human traits were 
overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.73 vs. 4.42, F (1,82) = 
94.90, p < .001, 172 = .54. The out-groups ethnic status moderated the attribution of 
typically human traits, F (1, 82) = 49.10, p < .001, '7 2 = .38. Paired-samples {-test 
(with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally typically 
human traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Als = 4.70 \ s. 4.62, { 
(1, 41) = 1.80, ns, whereas more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group 
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than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.23, { (1, 43) = 12.93 , p < .001. Thus only the 
Gypsies were dehumanized in Britain, see Fig. 8.4 below. The Germans \vere 
attributed more typically human traits than the Gypsies, Ms = 4.62 vs. 4.23 , while the 
in-group was attributed equally typically human traits in the two conditions. }v!s = 
4.70 vs. 4.80, F (1,82) = 23.30, p < .001, 172 = .22. There were not other significant 














Fig. 8.4 Attribution of typically human traits in Britain 
As for the attribution of positive traits in Britain, the assumption of sphericity 
was met. Overall, equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the out-
groups, Ms = 4.84 vs. 4.62, F (1, 82) = 2.49, ns. The out-groups' ethnic status 
moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 82) = 21.17, p < .001, 172 = .21. 
Paired-samples {-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) 
indicated that, equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, 
Ms = 4.73 vs. 5.15, {(1, 41) = 1.94, ns, whereas more positive traits were attributed to 
the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.09, ( (1,43) = 4.98, p < .001. The 
Gypsies were also attributed less positive traits than the Germans, Ms = 4.09 vs. 5.15, 
whereas the in-group was attributed equally positive traits in the two conditions Ms = 
4.94 vs. 4.73, F(l, 82) = 13.54,p < .001, 172 = .14. There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1, ns. 
To sum up, in both Romania and Britain the Gypsies were attributed Ie 
typically human as well as less positive traits than the in-group and than the German . 
The dehumanization of the Gypsies was not to be moderated by perceptions of threat 
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from them. The hypothesis according to which the Germans would be dehumanized if 
they are perceived as illegitimate was not supported in either country. In Britain, the 
correlation between the human typicality and the positive valence of the traits 
attributed to the Gypsies was r (1, 42) = .30, p < .05, while the human typicality and 
the positive valence of the traits attributed to the Germans were correlated at r (1. 40) 
= .77, p < .01. In Britain, the difference between the two correlations was significant. 
Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 3.18, p < .00 l. In Romania, the correlation between 
the human typicality and the positive valence of the traits attributed to the Gypsies 
was r (1,82) = .70,p < .001, while for the Germans it was r (1,85) = .48,p < .001. 
The difference between the two correlations was also significant in Romania, Fisher's 
r-to-z transformation = 2.18, p < .05. These results firstly suggest that the attribution 
of typically human traits to the out-groups was not necessarily dependent on their 
positive valence. Secondly, the asymmetry between the correlations in Romania and 
Britain suggests that the overlap between human typicality and positive valence may 
not be dependent only on the out-group's status, but also on that of the in-group. 
8.3.4 Prejudice measures: perceived likelihood of out-group's policy and 
perceptions of the out-group 
Although in Romania m-group identification varied as a function of the 
targets' threat status, in-group identification was not included as a covariate in the 
analyses on the dependent variables because it did not correlate with any of the 
dependent variables. 
The scale of perceived legitimacy of the out-group was reliable in both 
countries, a = .89 in Romania, and a = .86 in Britain. A three-way ANOVA, with the 
participants' nationality (Romanian vs. British), the targets' ethnicity (Germans \'s. 
Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as independent variables, was conducted on 
perceived legitimacy scores. The targets were perceived as more legitimate when they 
induced low rather than high threat, Ms = 4.26 vs. 3.58, F (1, 249) = 13.11, P < .001, 
'12 = .05. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3, ns. 
Thus, the targets' ethnicity did not playa part in the perceptions of legitimacy. only 
their threat status. Therefore, the hypothesis according to which the Germans would 
be perceived as more legitimate than the Gypsies was not supported. 
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Regarding the perceived status of the out-group, the responses were coded into 
"out-group is a low-status group" if the participants ranked their in-group higher than 
the target out-group, and "out-group is a high-status group~' if the participants ranked 
their in-group lower than the target out-group. Thus, the data was categorical and not 
ordinal. Given that there were three categorical variables, ethnicity (Germans vs. 
Gypsies), threat level (high vs. low), and out-groups~ rated status (higher vs. lower 
than in-group), loglinear analysis was used to analyse the data (see Field, 2005). The 
assumption that all cells have expected frequencies greater than 1 was met. Loglinear 
analysis was conducted separately on each of the seven status items. 
In Romania, for all seven questions pertaining to the out-groups~ status the 
analysis indicated that the highest-order interaction ethnicity x threat level x out-
groups' status was not significant. Among the two-way interactions for all seven 
questions, only the interactions between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated 
status were found to be significant. Overall, the results indicated that the threat level 
induced by the out-groups' proposed policy did not have an effect on, nor did it 
moderate, the status ratings of the target out-groups. The interaction between the out-
groups' ethnicity and their rated status indicated that the Germans were rated as a 
higher status group than the in-group, whereas the Gypsies were rated as a lower 
status group than the in-group, see the table below with the chi-square values for the 
interactions between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status~ and the 
associated effect sizes (z) and odds ratios for all seven status items. As it can be seen 
from the odds ratios, the Gypsies were much more likely than the Germans to be 
considered a lower-status group relative to the Romanians. 
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Table 8.2 Chi-~quar.e, odds ra.tios and effect sizes of the interactions between ethnicity and rated status 
for each status Item In Romama (N = 171) 
Items N X2 (1)* Z odds** 
Gypsies Germans 
1. Being technologically advanced 167 219 6.37 n/a n/a*** 
2. Contributing positively to 166 110.72 
European culture 
7.69 76 0.013 
3. Being economically developed 166 201.34 6.60 n/a n/a 
4. Being a model to other groups 163 160.32 8.17 377 0.003 
5. Making contributions to scientific 162 182 6.27 950 0.001 
development 
6. Having modem and liberal values 161 133.06 7.74 136.54 0.007 
7. Being able to influence other 162 177.15 6.81 1290.90 0.0007 
groups or countries 
* p < .001. ** The odds ratios indicate low likely each group was to be considered a lower status group. 
*** The odds could not be calculated because one of the values was 0 (the Gypsies did not receive any 
ranking as a higher status group). 
In Britain, similarly to Romania, for all seven questions pertaining to the out-
groups' status the analysis indicated that the highest-order interaction ethnicity x 
threat level x out-groups' rated status was not significant, thus indicating that the out-
groups' threat level did not have an effect on the status ratings of the target groups. 
Also similarly to Romania, there was a significant interaction between the out-groups' 
ethnicity and their status ratings, for all items except item 6. However, differently 
from Romania, in Britain there was also a main effect of status rating for all seven 
items. This indicated that all out-groups were consistently rated as lower in status than 
the in-group. For item 2, pertaining to the groups' contribution to European culture, 
there was an additional significant interaction between the out-groups' threat status 
and the status ratings. This indicated that while the Gypsies were rated as low-status 
group, the Germans were rated as a low-status group when they induced a high threat 
to the in-group, but were rated as a high-status group when they invoke a low threat to 
the in-group, see the table below with the chi-square values for the interactions 
between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status, and the associated effect sizes 
(z) and odds ratios for all seven status items. In many instances the odds ratios could 
not be calculated because the Gypsies did not receive any rankings as a higher-status 
group. 
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!abl~ 8.3 .C~i-square, effect sizes of the interactions between ethnicity and rated status for each status 
Item m Bntam (N =86) 
Items N X2 (1)* Z odds** 
Gypsies Germans 
1. Being technologically advanced 80 32.34 3.42 nJa n/a*** 
2. Contributing positively to 80 21.73 3.19 17.12 0.06 
European culture 
3. Being economically developed 79 24.98 3.08 nJa n/a 
4. Being a model to other groups 79 35.60 3.56 nJa n/a 
5. Making contributions to scientific 81 20.86 2.86 nJa n/a 
development 
6. Having modem and liberal values 79 3.41, ns 1.75 2.63 0.38 
7. Being able to influence other 80 21.32 2.89 nJa n/a 
groups or countries 
* p < .001. ** The odds ratios indicate low likely each group was to be considered a lower status group. 
* * * The odds could not be calculated because one of the values was 0 (the Gypsies did not receive any 
ranking as a higher status group). 
Thus, the results indicate that in both countries the Gypsies were considered a 
low-status group. But while in Romania the Germans were rated as a group higher in 
status than the in-group, in Britain the Germans were rated lower in status than the in-
group2. This data corroborates the findings from the previous experiments, such as the 
findings on the ideological asymmetry, which had suggested that the British thought 
of themselves as a high-status group, whereas the Romanians thought of themselves 
as a low-status group. 
Furthermore, by averaging the scores on the seven status items, a new variable 
was created that indicated the average status of the target out-group, be it Germans or 
Gypsies, with higher values indicating a higher perceived status of the out-group. The 
seven status items had a reliability index of .97 in the Romanian sample (mean inter-
item correlation = .82) and of .66 in the British sample (mean inter-item correlation = 
.22). Direct comparisons between Romania and Britain indicated that the Romanian 
participants regarded the Germans as higher in status than did the British participants, 
Ms = l.94 vs. 1.41, t (1,127) = 18.85,p < .001. However, both the Romanians and the 
British equally regarded the Gypsies as low in status, Ms = 1.04 vs. 1.04, t (1, 126) = 
2 Incidentally, the Romanian participants mostly rated the British as a higher-status group than 
themselves, whereas the British participants mostly rated the Romanians as a lower-status group than 
their in-group. However, given the present study'S focus on the prejudices against the Gypsies and the 
Gemlans within each countf\' the data on the Romanians' and British' ratings of each other were not . , 
analysed. 
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-0.17, ns. This new variable, termed Perceived high out-group's status to indicate the 
direction of correlations, was found to correlate negatively and significantly in both 
countries with the indices of dehumanization, ontologization and infrahumanization, 
respectively, see Table 8.4 below. Thus, the lower the perceived status of the target 
out-group was, the higher the difference in humanity and positivity between in-group 
and out-group. 
Table 8.4 Correlations between the perceived out-group's status and the indices of dehumanization in 
Romania (N = 171) and Britain (N = 86) 
/j. Human traits 
/j. Human emotions 
/j. Positive traits 
/j. Positive emotions 




-.56*** -.61 *** 
-.36* * * -.38** 
**p < .01; *** P < .001. 4 missing data in Romania and 5 missing data in Britain were replaced with 
the mean status rating of the respective target. 
In Britain, the higher in status the out-group was perceived, the higher the 
level of perceived legitimacy of the policy suggested by the out-group, r (1,84) = .27, 
P < .05, while in Romania this correlation was not significant, r (1, 169) = 0.02, ns. 
The perceived status of the out-group correlated significantly and negatively with in-
group identification but only in Britain, r (1, 84) = -.32, p < .01, suggesting that the 
higher in status the participants perceived the out-group, the less they identified with 
their in-group. At the same time, the perceived status of the out-group correlated 
significantly and negatively with the human traits, but not with the human emotions, 
attributed to the in-group, see Table 8.5 below: 
Table 8.5 Correlations between the perceived out-group's status and the humanity and positivity 
attributed to the in-group and out-group, respectively, in Romania (N = 171) and Britain (N = 86) 
Perceived high out-group status 
Romania Britain 
Human traits in-group -.17* -.23* 
Positive traits in-group -.10 -.37*** 
Human emotions in-group -.01 -.12 
Positive emotions in-group -.002 -.11 
Human traits out-group .67*** .53*** 
Positive traits out-group .69*** .57*** 
Human emotions out-group .25** A.f*** 
Positive emotions out-group .48*** .39*** 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** P < .001. 4 missing data in Romania and 5 missing data in Britain were 
replaced with the mean status rating of the respective target. 
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There are certain issues arising from these sets of correlations. Firstly, as one 
might have expected, the higher in status the target out-groups were perceived, the 
more humanness they were attributed, both in terms of traits and emotions. But, at the 
same time, the higher in status the participants perceived their own in-group, the more 
human traits they attributed to it. Given that the human traits ascribed to the in-group 
also correlated positively and significantly with the level of in-group identification, it 
would appear that the humanness given to the in-group may be a function not only of 
in-group bias but also of relative in-group status. Secondly, the lack of significant 
correlations between the out-group's status rating and the human emotions attributed 
to the in-group does not support the tenet of infrahumanization theory according to 
which infrahumanization is linked to in-group bias or favouritism. Instead, it would 
appear that the in-group bias is expressed by means of traits rather than emotions, 
although in-group bias has never been a focus of the ontologization theory itself. 
8.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization 
In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other 
variables, indexes of dehumanization were computed for each participant, similarly to 
the previous three experiments. This represented the difference in humanity between 
in-group and out-group, and was computed by subtracting the humanity attributed to 
the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was computed separately for 
emotions (infrahumanization, fl. Human emotions) and traits (ontologization, fl. 
Human traits). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation 
analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores 
for in-group and out-group. 
Similarly, two other composite variables were computed which represented 
the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. These \\ere 
computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group from that 
attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions, fl. Positive 
emotions. and traits, fl. Positive traits. See Table 8.6 below for the correlations 
between the indices of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice: 
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Table ~.6 Correlations bet:ve~n dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice measures in 
RomanIa eN = 171) and Bntam eN = 86) 
.1 Human traits 
.1 Positive 
emotions 














.72*** .71 *** 
A8*** .44*** 





















.1 Positive traits 
emotions 
RO UK RO UK 
.60*** A7*** 
.28*** .27* .23** A3*** 











* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. In bold, the significantly different correlation coefficients between 
Romania and Britain. 
As it can be seen in the table above, in both countries infrahumanization (~ 
Human emotions) was positively and significantly correlated with the differential 
attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group, which suggests that 
infrahumanization may be linked to the positive-negative side of prejudice. 
In both countries, ~ Human emotions was positively and significantly 
correlated with In-group identification, In line with the hypothesis that 
infrahumanization is linked to in-group favouritism and in-group identification (e.g. 
Demoulin et aI., 2004b). However, the lack of significant correlation between ~ 
Human traits and in-group identification in both countries suggests that 
dehumanization is not related to in-group bias, but is rather on the status of the out-
group. 
The correlations between perceived legitimacy and the two measures of 
dehumanization suggest that the more legitimate the out-group was perceived, the less 
dehumanized it was. However, it was not possible to explore the mediating role of 
perceived legitimacy in dehumanization, neither in Romania nor in Britain, because in 
neither countries was the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups predicted by their 
ethnicity. Instead, perceived legitimacy was predicted by the threat status of th~ out-
groups. However. it could be argued that, given the impact of the out-groups' 
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ethnicity on dehumanization, the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups is likely to be 
an effect of dehumanizing beliefs rather than vice-versa. 
Nonetheless, gIven that in the present study only the Gypsies \\'ere 
dehumanized, it could be argued that ethnicity acted as a mediator of the 
dehumanization of the present target groups. As to what may have mediated the 
dehumanization of the Gypsies, the present study cannot explore the mediating role of 
perceived legitimacy. Instead, it can explore the moderators of the Gypsies' 
dehumanization, i.e. those factors that decrease or increase their dehumanization, by 
examining the correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideology 
and prejudice measures. Correlations were preferred to median splits, and although 
they do not conform to proper moderation analysis which involves interactions 
between independent factors in ANOVA (see Baron & Kenny, 1986), it can be argued 
that the correlates of the Gypsies' dehumanization indicate how much more their 
dehumanization is increased (or decreased) in the presence of other factors, see Table 
8.7 below. 
Table 8.7 Correlates of the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania (N= 84) and Britain (N= 44) 
L1 Human traits fl Human emotions 
Romania Britain Romania Britain 
L1 Human emotions .36** -.06 
L1 Positive traits .67*** .27 .50*** .07 
L1 Positive emotions .33** -.24 .68*** .69*** 
In-group identification .08 -.12 .32** .06 
SOO .22* .34* .10 -.14 
Perceived legitimacy -.50*** -.21 -.31 ** .19 
Perceived high out- -.28* .16 -.21 -.16 
group status 
* p < .05; * * p < .0 I; * * * p < .00 l. 
As it can be seen in the table above, the higher levels of SOO the participants 
expressed, in both countries, the more they dehumanized (through traits) the Gypsies, 
in line with the hypothesis that ontologization can act as a principle of social 
classification (Perez et aI., 2002). Interestingly, in the case of the Germans, SOO 
correlated positively and significantly with their dehumanization (through traits) only 
in Britain, r (1,84) = .33,p < .05, not in Romania, r (1,169) = -.16, ns. This may be 
explained by the fact that the British participants had rated the Germans as lower in 
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status than themselves while the Romanian participants had rated them as higher in 
status than their in-group. 
In Romania, the dehumanization (through emotions) of the Gypsies was also 
'moderated' by in-group identification, suggesting that the more the participants 
identified with their in-group, the more likely they were to dehumanize the Gypsies. 
However, the correlations between L1 Human emotions and L1 Positive emotions in 
both countries suggest that the positive valence of the emotions may have mediated 
infrahumanization. This possibility will be explored through mediation analyses. 
Regarding the mediators of infrahmanization (dehumanization through 
emotions), in Romania, the ANOV As indicated a main effect of the targets' ethnicity 
on infrahumanization and also on the attribution of positive emotions to in-group and 
out-group. A stepwise regression was carried out, with the out-groups' ethnicity as the 
predictor, L1 Human emotions as the criterion, and L1 Positive emotions as the 
mediator. The analysis indicated that L1 Positive emotions mediated the effect of the 
out-groups' ethnicity on L1 Human emotions, Aroian's z = 4.22, p < .001, see Table 
8.8 below. 
Table 8.8 The differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the 
infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Romania (N = 171) 
B SE B fJ 
Step 1 
Constant -.13 .07 
Ethnic status .11 .05 .17* 
Step 2 
Constant -.05 .04 
Ethnic status .21 .02 -.07 
L1 Positive emotions -.13 .07 .74*** 
Note: Rl = .03 for Step 1 (p < .05); iJR 1 = .49 for Step 2 (p < .001). *p < .05; ***p < .00 I 
However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, I.e. the 
possibility that the dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression 
analysis was carried out with L1 Positive emotions as the criterion, ethnic status of the 
out-groups as the predictor, and L1 Human emotions as the mediator. A Sobel test 
indicated that L1 Human emotions mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on 
L1 Positive emotions, Aroian's z = 2.16, p < .05, see Table 8.9 below. 
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Table 8.9 Infrahumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive emotions to the' _u 











Constant .48 .12 
fJ 
.33*** 
Ethnic status 2.46 .19 .21 *** 
~ Human emotions -.69 .26 .68*** 
Note: R2 - .11 for Step 1 (p < .001); L1R2 - .45 for Step 2 (p < .001). ***p < .001 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that ~ Positive emotions mediated the 
infrahumanization of the Gypsies. Given the high correlation between the index of 
infrahumanization and ~ Positive emotions in Romania, it may be difficult to separate 
the human and the positive sides of the emotions. 
In Britain, the ethnic status of the out-groups played a part III their 
dehumanization, whereas their threat status played a part in their perceived 
legitimacy. Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups could not be 
analysed as a mediator of dehumanization. 
However, the differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-
group, ~ Positive emotions, had also been influenced by the out-groups' ethnic status, 
therefore ~ Positive emotions was explored as a mediator of infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions). The analysis indicated that ~ Positive emotions 
mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on infrahumanization, Aroian's z = 
2.81,p < .01, see Table 8.10 below. 
Table 8.10 The differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the 
infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Britain (N = 86) 
B SE B fJ 
Step 1 
Constant -.22 .06 
Ethnic status .18 .04 .49*** 
Step 2 
Constant -.18 .04 
Ethnic status .11 .03 .30*** 
~ Positive emotions .11 .01 .62*** 
Note: R2 = .24 for Step 1 (p < .001); L1R2 = .35 for Step 2 (p < .001). ***p < .001 
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However, infrahumanization was also found to mediate the effect of the out-
groups' ethnicity on ~ Positive emotions, Aroian's z = 3.93, p < .001, See Table 8.11 
below. Thus it cannot be safely concluded that ~ Positive emotions mediated the 
infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Britain. 
Table 8.11 Infrahumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive emotions to the in-group 
and the GyPsies in Britain (N = 86) ~ 
Step 1 
B SE B f3 
Constant -.46 .36 
Ethnic status .67 .23 .31 ** 
Step 2 
Constant .50 .29 
Ethnic status -.12 .19 -.06 
~ Human emotions 4.32 .52 .74*** 
Note: R2 = .10 for Step 1 (p < .01); LlR2 = .41 for Step 2 (p < .00 I). **p < .01; ***p < .001 
As for the mediators of dehumanization through traits, in Romania there had 
been only a significant main effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on dehumanization, as 
only the Gypsies were dehumanized. The out-groups' ethnic status also had a main 
effect on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), and on the 
attribution of positive traits to the in-group and out-group. Firstly, ~ Positive traits 
was analysed as a possible mediator. A regression analysis was conducted with the 
out-groups' ethnicity as the predictors, ~ Human traits as the criterion and ~ Positive 
traits as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that ~ Positive traits mediated the 
dehumanization of the Gypsies, Aroian's z = 6, p < .001, see Table 8.12 below. 
Table 8.12 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the 
dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania (N = 171) 
B SE B f3 
Step 1 
Constant -.57 .09 
Ethnic status .56 .06 .60*** 
Step 2 
Constant .29 .05 
Ethnic status .18 .02 .31*** 
~ Positive traits -.57 .09 .55*** 
Note: R2= .36 for Step I (p < .001); JR2= .22 for Step 2 (p < .001). ***p < .001 
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However, L1 Human traits also mediated L1 Positive traits, Aroian~s ~ = 6.58, p 
< .001, see Table 8.13 below, therefore it is impossible to conclude \Yhether ~ 
Positive traits mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania. 
Table 8.13 Dehumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the 
Gypsies in Romania (N = 171) 









Constant .45 .27 
.53*** 
Ethnic status 1.958 .19 .15* 
L1 Human traits -1.96 .21 .62*** 
Note: R2 - .28 for Step 1 (p < .001); iJR2=.25 for Step 2 (p < .001). *p < .05; ***p < .001 
In Britain, similarly to Romania, the out-groups' ethnic status had a main 
effect on both dehumanization (L1 Human traits) and L1 Positive traits, so L1 Positive 
traits was analysed as a possible mediator of dehumanization. L1 Positive traits 
mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on L1 Human traits, Aroian's z = 3.17, 
P < .01, see Table 8.14 below. 
Table 8. t 4 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the 
dehumanization of the Gypsies in Britain (N = 86) 
B SE B fJ 
Step 1 
Constant -.36 .10 
Ethnic status.45 .06 .61 *** 
Step 2 
Constant -.21 .1 0 
Ethnic status .33 .07 .45*** 
L1 Positive traits .09 .02 .35* * * 
Note: R2= .37 for Step 1 (p < .001); iJR2=.1O for Step 2 (p < .001). ***p < .001 
However, L1 Human traits also mediated L1 Positive traits, Aroian's z = 3.41. p 
< .001, thus making it impossible to conclude whether L1 Positive traits mediated L1 
Human traits, see Table 8.15 below. 
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Tabl~ 8.! 5 D.eh~manization mediates the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the 











Constant -l.1 0 .44 
fJ 
.45* * * 
Ethnic status .53 .32 .19 
!1 Human traits 1.68 .44 .44*** 
Note:R 2 .21 for Step 1 (p<.001);L1R2-.12forStep2(p<.OOl). ***p<.OOl 
8.4 Discussion 
So how has the present vignette experiment contributed to understanding the 
dehumanization of the Gypsies? I will examine here how this experiment has 
addressed the research hypotheses, how it has informed theories of dehumanization, 
and conclude with the directions for future studies. 
The premises of this experiment were the findings from the previous study 
(see Chapter 7) which had indicated that the Gypsies were dehumanized, in both 
Britain and Romania, whereas the Germans were not. I hypothesised that, given the 
lack of mediation from perceived threat in the dehumanization of the Gypsies, their 
dehumanization may be explained in terms of perceptions of relative group status. In 
this vignette experiment I tried to manipulate the status of the Gypsies by giving them 
a higher power status, to examine whether this would influence their dehumanization. 
So what has this experiment shown? It found that the Gypsies were 
dehumanized (both through traits and emotions), while the Germans were not, in both 
Britain and Romania. The Gypsies were also rated as a lower-status group relative to 
the Romanian and the British participants. Regarding the perceived legitimacy of the 
out-groups, the results from both Romania and Britain indicated that the out-groups' 
ethnicity did not playa part in the perceptions of legitimacy. Instead, the out-groups 
were perceived as more legitimate when their proposed changes were non-threatening 
than threatening to the in-group. Thus, the perceptions of legitimacy \\ere not 
moderated by the out-groups' ethnic status, which meant that I could not explore 
\vhether the perceived legitimacy of the Gypsies played a part in their 
dehumanization. Looking at the patterns of correlations between the dehumanization 
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of the Gypsies and the other prejudice measures, I was able to observe that the 
dehumanization (through traits) of the Gypsies correlated negatively and significantly 
with their perceived legitimacy, in both countries. The ontologization of the Gypsies 
was not moderated by perceptions of threat from them, suggesting that ontologization 
(or at least the ontologization of the Gypsies) is not linked to perceived threat, 
similarly to the findings from the previous experiments. Given that the Gypsies were a 
real group, and that their dehumanization is a well-observed phenomenon (see Perez 
et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005; Moscovici & Perez, 2007), it could be 
argued that the dehumanization of the Gypsies prevented them from being perceiving 
in a legitimate light. This suggests that dehumanized groups may be denied a 
legitimate voice when it comes to formulating policies that promote their rights, and 
that higher-status and more 'legitimate' groups should have the duty to promote the 
rights of the dehumanized minorities. 
The present results contribute to the existing research on dehumanization by 
suggesting that dehumanization can lead to the moral and social exclusion of certain 
groups. They also indicate that not all groups are dehumanized, and that 
dehumanization does not necessarily function as a form of in-group favouritism. 
Relevant to this point is the fact that although the British participants rated the 
Germans as lower in status than themselves, they nonetheless did not dehumanize 
them. It could perhaps be argued that the British participants' ratings of the Germans 
as being lower in status than their in-group reflected in-group favouritism rather than 
beliefs about the Germans' humanness. This suggests that being relatively lower in 
status than the in-group does not automatically predispose a group to being 
dehumanized. Also relevant is the fact that dehumanization (through traits) was not 
significantly correlated with in-group identification in either country. 
As for the findings on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), 
the present experiment indicated that the Gypsies were infrahumanized in both 
countries, and that the Germans were not. The results on the lack of infrahumanization 
of the Germans tie in with the results from the previous study (see Chapter 7), and 
they fail to support the infrahumanization thesis according to which all out-groups arc 
infrahumanized. Although the British participants rated the Germans as lo\\'er in 
status than themselves they did not infrahumanize them, thus suggesting that rclatin? 
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status is not necessarily a predictor of infrahumanization. Overall, the index of 
infrahumanization (~ Human emotions) was correlated with in-group identification, 
thus bringing support to the postulation that infrahumanization is linked to in-group 
favouritism (Demoulin et aI., 2004b). However, the infrahumanization of the Gypsies 
was significantly correlated with in-group identification only in Romania, thus raising 
questions as to the role that in-group identification plays in infrahumanization. The 
present results suggest that infrahumanization may function in similar ways to 
ontologization, in the sense of being contingent on certain features of the out-group, 
such as relatively low status, rather than on in-group bias. Also, the results suggest 
that when a low-status group is at stake, infrahumanization is not necessarily a 'lesser 
form of dehumanization', but rather a full expression of dehumanization, especially as 
the Gypsies were also dehumanized through the traits measure. 
As for the threat manipulations, the Romanian participants perceived the 
changes likely in the threatening condition, whereas the British participants perceived 
them likely in the non-threatening condition. Arguably this indicates that the 
Romanians, as a lower-status group, perceived themselves powerless, whereas the 
British, as a higher-status group, perceived their group powerful and able to resist the 
threatening changes. In Britain, the higher the participants were in SDO, the less 
likely they perceived the out-groups' proposed changes, and the less legitimate they 
perceived the out-groups, whereas in Romania such relationship, although also 
negative, was not significant. Also, only in Britain was SDO positively and 
significantly correlated with the index of dehumanization (through traits) and with the 
differential attribution of positive traits to the in-group and the out-group. These 
findings would suggest that, in line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (see 
Sidanius Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), the British participants may ha\'e perceived 
themselves as a dominant group, whereas the Romanian participants, as a subordinate 
group. 
As regards the correlates of dehumanization, there are a few things worth 
discussing. Firstly, the indexes of infrahumanization (dehumanization through 
emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits) are significantly and 
positively correlated in both countries, suggesting that the t\\'o forms of 
dehumanization are related. However, given the small correlation coefficients, it can 
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be argued that infrahumanization and ontologization are not exactly the same 
-' 
phenomenon. Secondly, both infrahumanization and ontologization are positively. 
significantly and highly correlated with the differential attribution of positivity to in-
group and out-group. This suggests that the process of dehumanization is closely 
linked to the positive-negative dimension of prejudice. Thirdly, the index of 
infrahumanization correlated positively and significantly with in-group identification 
in both countries. These results bring support to the infrahumanization's hypothesis 
that the more individuals identify with their in-group, the more they should feel 
inclined to infrahumanize the out-group. The index of ontologization, however, was 
not significantly correlated with in-group identification, which suggests that 
ontologization may not be contingent on in-group favouritism. 
8.5 Conclusions 
To sum up the present results, dehumanization seems to be linked to 
perceptions of relative group status rather to in-group identification, perceived 
legitimacy, or perceived threat to social identity. Given the presents results, I would 
suggest that infrahumanization researchers should reformulate the infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) theory to reflect the fact that only certain groups 
are the target of infrahumanization, and to focus on the conditions that lead certain 
stigmatized groups such as the Gypsies to being infrahumanized. At the same time, I 
would suggest the ontologization researchers to explore the dehumanization of the 
Gypsies as a legitimization of their stigmatized status in society, and as a justification 
for their social exclusion. 
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9.1 Key issues of the present research 
The focus of the present research has been the dehumanization of ethnic 
groups in the context of culturally diverse societies. The aim was to identify the 
factors that predispose ethnic minority and immigrant groups to being dehumanized 
by majority members. In this sense, potential antecedents of dehumanization such as 
cultural differences between in-group and out-group, the out-group's poor socio-
economic status, perceived threat (material or symbolic), and the relative po\\er status 
of the out-group were at the core of the investigation. At the same time, the present 
research was concerned with whether dehumanization may function as a form of in-
group favouritism or whether it is contingent upon certain features of the out-group, 
e.g. poverty or low status. Also, given the influence of postmaterialist values, 
economic development, relative power status, immigration experience, multicultural 
ideology, and Western norms of prejudice suppression, the present research was 
conducted in Romania and in Britain. 
However, the focus of this study was not limited to inter-group relations. In 
order to understand the process of dehumanization itself, the present research also 
included investigations of the human-animal paradigm, which has been at the core of 
dehumanization research in recent years. The human-animal binary was revisited for 
two main reasons: firstly, to examine how the constructions of similarities and 
differences between humans and animals may help the operationalization of 
dehumanization in quantitative research, and secondly, to explore how the ideologies 
shaping humans' perceptions of animals and their relationship with them may inform 
theories of dehumanization. 
Last but not least, in the present research I attempted to include a continuous 
measure of dehumanization, based on judgements of the human typicality of target 
emotions and traits. Measuring emotions and traits in terms of how typically human 
they are takes into account the ambiguous and shifting nature of the human-animal 
boundary, as highlighted in the focus group studies. 
261 
Chapter 9 General discussion and conclusions 
9.2 Summary of the main findings 
9.2.1 Humans, animals, and speciesism: A blueprint for dehumanization 
Most of the current research on dehumanization such as the infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) and the ontologization (dehumanization through 
traits) paradigms have employed the human-animal binary as a model for the 
theorization and operationalization of dehumanization. However, little attention has 
been generally paid to how the differences and similarities between animals and 
humans are constructed as a function of ideology, and how ideas about the animals' 
presumed inferiority might influence beliefs about human and animal nature. Equally, 
most of the dehumanization research has overlooked how prejudice against animals 
might serve as a model for prejudice against dehumanized humans. Given that "the 
very act of 'treating humans like animals' would lose its meaning if animals were 
treated well" (Pious, 2003: 510), I re-examined humans' treatment of animals to 
understand why animals are often placed in positions of inferiority and exploitation. 
In this sense, I revisited the ideology of speciesism (e.g. Singer, 1990), which is a set 
of beliefs that place human life above animal life, and I attempted to draw parallels 
between the beliefs about animals inferiority and those directed at dehumanized 
groups, and between speciesism and dehumanization as ideologies that justify the 
exploitation and moral exclusion of certain social categories. 
The human-animal distinction is not clear-cut or value-free. Humans' position 
of power can influence humans' knowledge and perceptions of animals (see Chapter 
3). I defamiliarized the categories animal and human and to take into account the 
power relationship between humans and animals as well as humans' production of 
knowledge about animals. Focus group discussions with 42 participants from 
Romania and Britain showed that rational autonomy was used as a dimension to make 
human distinct from and superior to animals, while sentience was used to explain the 
similarities between animals and humans and to acknowledge that animals had 
interests to stay alive and be free from pain. While most of the participants put 
humans' interests above those of animals, they nonetheless acknowledged that the 
exploitation and killing of animals was morally wrong in certain circumstances. The 
participants' reflections on how animals should be entitled to protection from haml on 
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the basis of their ability to feel pam, distress and suffering, suggest that 
dehumanization, as an extreme form of prejudice, may rest on the denial of primary 
rather than secondary emotions. Theoretically, this raises question as to whether the 
denial of secondary emotions to out-groups is a precursor to dehumanization or just a 
form of in-group bias that is unrelated to dehumanizing ideologies. If so, then 
studying secondary emotions cannot be an effective tool in the understanding of 
dehumanization. Secondly, the moral dilemmas reflected in the participants' debates 
over animal use and exploitation suggests that the dehumanization of animals is not 
an all-or-nothing, automatic phenomenon, but rather one that involves motivation, 
emotions, cognition, and ideology. I want to argue that dehumanization, too, is driven 
by specific needs, interests, and ideologies, and therefore social psychologists should 
take into account its cognitive aspects, as Tajfel (1981) would have advised. Thirdly, 
just as animals can be classified into pets, farm animals, laboratory animals and 
vermin, it may well be that dehumanized groups can vary in the degree to which they 
are dehumanized: some may be more morally and socially excluded than others, 
depending on their status relative to the in-group, the threat they invoke, and the 
benefits of exploiting them. 
The ideology of speciesism, i.e. the belief that humans are inherently superior 
to animals and therefore entitled to exploit them, underlay the dehumanization of 
animals and it should be informative to the dehumanization paradigm, too. Firstly, 
speciesism brings to the fore the motives to dominate and exploit the 'other'. Just as 
speciesism legitimizes the use of farm animals for food and of laboratory animals for 
medical experimentation, dehumanization may legitimize the exploitation and 
domination of lower-status and powerless groups, such as the Gypsies and the poor. 
Secondly, speciesism justified the killing of animals perceived as pests, e.g. foxes, 
stray dogs, rats. Given these underlying motives of perceived threat and disgust, it 
could be argued that the dehumanization of humans, too, might rest upon feelings of 
disgust and of perceived threat, as in the dehumanization of the homeless (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006). Therefore future studies should explore how these motives of 
domination and of perceived threat (and perhaps others that underpin speciesism) 
drive the dehumanization of vulnerable, stigmatized and shunned social groups. 
263 
Chapter 9 General discussion and conclusions 
9.2.2 Attributions of human typicality to in-group and out-group: A valid and 
reliable measure of dehumanization 
Generally, in previous research on dehumanization, dehumanization has been 
assessed categorically, through the differential association of in-group and out-group 
members with animal-like versus human-like attributes (e.g. Deschamps et aI., 2005), 
or with secondary versus primary emotions (e.g. Cortes et aI., 2005). As the focus 
group discussions revealed that the distinctions between animals and humans are not 
clear-cut, and also in light of the research on human nature and human uniqueness as 
components of humanness (Haslam et aI., 2005), I decided to employ a continuous 
measure of dehumanization. Thus, the target emotions and traits used in the present 
research were rated in terms of their human typicality and also in terms of their 
animal typicality (in a between-participants study) on 1-7 Likert scales, in both 
Britain and Romania (see Chapter 4). The positive valence of the emotions and traits 
was measured similarly on a 1-7 Likert scale, in each country. I contrasted the ratings 
of human typicality and those of animal typicality, and found that what is typically 
human is not necessarily un-typically animal, as for some emotions and traits there 
were no significant differences in the ratings between the human and animal 
conditions. Nevertheless, for most of the traits and emotions there were significant 
differences between the two conditions, in each country. There was a positive and 
highly significant correlation between the human typicality ratings of the target traits 
between Romania and Britain, thus suggesting that in each language and culture the 
target traits could be seen as varying in their human typicality. As for the emotions, 
the animal typicality ratings from the two countries were positively and significantly 
correlated, whereas their human typicality ratings were not, thus suggesting that 
emotions may relate more to animal than to human typicality, and less to human 
typicality than the traits. Thus dehumanization was operationalized in terms of how 
much human typicality was attributed to the in-group and to the out-group, 
respectively, and it was calculated separately for the emotions and the traits. As there 
were significant results on dehumanization in all of the eight experiments, in 
particular with regard to the human typicality of the traits, I would argue that such 
measure is a valid and reliable way of assessing dehumanization. By using such 
measure one can examine how the target is viewed as being less human than the in-
group without necessarily being attributed more animality. 
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9.2.3 Antecedents of dehumanization: cultural differences poverty and relative , . , 
group status 
The series of 4 experiments replicated across Britain and in Romania 
examined the effects of an ethnic group's cultural differences from the in-group, its 
poverty and its relative power status on its dehumanization. The moderating roles of 
each of these factors will be examined in tum. The experiments with real and artificial 
groups did not employ a categorical measure of dehumanization such as human vs. 
animal attributes, but a continuous measure of human typicality (see Chapter 4). 
Firstly, the experiments using artificial groups indicated that those groups 
described as culturally different from the in-group were more dehumanized (through 
traits) than the groups described as culturally similar to the in-group (in Romania, 
Experiment 1; in both countries, Experiments 2 and 3). It was also found that 
perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the 
infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) of culturally different artificial 
groups in Britain, and the dehumanization (through traits) of culturally different 
artificial groups in Romania (Experiment 2). These findings bring support to the 
ontologization (dehumanization through traits) hypothesis (e.g. Perez et aI., 2001; 
Perez et aI., 2007) which stipulates that those groups perceived as having failed to 
culturally assimilate will be dehumanized in the sense that a different, less-than-
human essence will be attributed to the them to explain their failure. Similarly, the 
results on the dehumanization of the culturally different groups support previous 
research which has shown that immigrants holding different values and beliefs are 
viewed as deviant from the norm and are 'abnormalized' (Verkuyten, 2001). Equally, 
the present results corroborate research which has found that perceived differences 
between out-group and in-group in the hierarchies of basic values can lead to the 
dehumanization of out-groups (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Thus, it is arguably safe to 
conclude that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group can be 
an antecedent to dehumanization. Moreover, the fact that among the real groups only 
the Gypsies were dehumanized brings support to previous findings on their 
dehumanization (cf. Perez et aL 2001; Marcu & Chryssocchou, 2005). Ho\\'e\t~r. it is 
not clear whether the perceived cultural differences between them and the in-group 
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played a part in their dehumanization as measures of perceived cultural differences 
were not included in the experiments conducted with real groups. 
Secondly, as regarded the role of poverty in dehumanization, the experiments 
revealed that the artificial groups described as poor were more dehumanized (through 
traits) than those described as rich (in both countries, Experiments 1 and 3: in Britain, 
Experiment 2). These findings support past research on the dehumanization of the 
homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006), and on research on internal attributions for causes of 
poverty (Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Lott, 2002). By being attributed less humanness than 
the in-group and the rich groups, the poor groups may be viewed as animalistic as 
research on the content of stereotypes suggests (cf. Glick & Fiske, 2001). Overall, 
research on the perceived causes of poverty indicates that people usually endorse 
individualistic (internal) rather than situational explanations for the poor's fate, e.g. 
being lazy, lack of drive and motivation due to welfare, alcohol and drug abuse, lack 
of thrift, etc. (see Feagin, 1972; Smith & Stone, 1989; Zucker & Weiner, 1993; 
Cozzarelli et al., 2001). This apparent fundamental attribution error (see Ross, 1977) 
arguably suggests that the poor are attributed an 'essence' that serves to explain (or 
justify) their condition as poor. In this sense, it could be argued that the 
dehumanization of the poor functions similarly to the dehumanization of the culturally 
different groups insofar as it serves to explain the poor's failure to be abide by 
normative human behaviour. One may argue that the dehumanization of the Gypsies, 
too, may be due to internal attributions of poverty, given the Gypsies' general low 
socio-economic status and marginal position at the fringes of economy. 
Thirdly, with respect to the role of relative power status of the groups, this was 
examined only in the case of real groups, the Gypsies and the Germans (Experiment 
4). A previous questionnaire survey employed alongside Experiment 3 had found that 
the Gypsies were the only group to be dehumanized in both countries. Perceived 
threat was not found to be a mediator of the dehumanization of the Gypsies, but 
blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania. Perceived 
low group status was not found to be a mediator of the dehumanization of the Gypsies 
(Experiment 4, in both countries). However, open-ended measures indicated the 
Gypsies were seen as a low-status, low-power group, and the Germans as a relatively 
high-status, high-power group. The dehumanization of the Gypsy minority may have 
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been due to the position as a relatively low-status, low-power group, and to the 
prejudice against them (see the results from Romania, Experiment 3. Chapter 7). And 
their relatively low-status may be due partly to their poor socio-economic status, 
partly to their cultural idiosyncrasies, and partly to other factors which were not 
explored in the present research (e.g. perceived immorality and propensity for 
criminal behaviour). 
As to the role of perceived threat, the 8 experiments revealed that perceived 
threat, either symbolic or material, did not play a part in dehumanization. In many 
cases, the scales of perceived threat could not be entered into mediation analyses 
because they had not been significantly affected by the experimental manipulations 
(i.e. the out-groups' cultural or economIC status). In one instance, it was 
dehumanization that mediated the effect of target groups' economic status on 
perceived threat (Experiment 1, Britain). Similarly, in the case of real groups 
(Experiment 3), perceived material and symbolic threat, combined in one scale, did 
not mediate the dehumanization of the Gypsies. Only in Britain did perceived threat 
mediate the infrahumanization of the Gypsies, but the infrahumanization of the 
Gypsies also mediated the perceived threat from them. Overall, these results raise the 
question as to whether we can conceptualize threat as a something that is 'perceived' 
and acts as a precursor to dehumanization. Perhaps we should view it instead rather as 
an ideological resource that is brought into play when prejudice against groups needs 
to be justified. 
9.2.4 Dehumanization: In-group favouritism or out-group derogation? 
In most of the experiments it was found that more typically human traits were 
attributed to the in-group than to the out-group. While the out-groups' cultural, 
economic, or power status explained to a certain extent why certain out-groups were 
dehumanized, or more dehumanized than others, the fact that more human typicality 
was overall attributed to the in-group requires some analysis, too. The greater 
attribution of typical humanity to the in-group is arguably in line with the 
infrahumanization hypothesis (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000) which stipulates that 
individuals are motivated to reserve the human essence to their own group. This 
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seems to be indeed the case when the out-groups were artificial groups. Howc\'er, in 
the case of real groups, only the Gypsies were attributed less humanness than the in-
group, which leads to three issues to be considered: first, why the artificial groups 
were attributed less human typicality than the in-group; second, why the real groups 
did not elicit the same responses; and third, whether research with artificial groups 
can contribute meaningfully to our understanding of dehumanization. 
Firstly, concerning the artificial groups, these were generally dehumanized 
(through traits) in both countries, regardless of their cultural or economic status, 
although in some cases the culturally different groups and the poor ones were more 
dehumanized than the other groups. These results would suggest that the British and 
the Romanian participants were motivated to attribute more typically human traits to 
their in-group. However, it is hard to see how a motivation such as in-group 
favouritism may arise in the context of artificial groups, when there is a lack of 
history and of inter-group contact. Instead, it may be argued that artificial groups 
presented as minorities elicited judgements of lesser typicality than the in-group 
because the in-group functions as the norm. Thus, the in-group may have been viewed 
as the premise, and the out-group as the conclusion. Indeed, research has shown that 
individuals form judgements of typicality from their own group to other groups (e.g. 
Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005), and that a group's relative size can affect 
judgements of normativity and can lead to perceptions of 'deviance' (e.g. Hegarty & 
Pratto, 2001). Research in inter-group relations has also indicated that individuals 
project in-group attributes onto super-ordinate categories (e.g. Mummendey & 
Wenzel, 1999), and the same may be true of the super-ordinate category 'humans'. If 
the category' humans' has a graded structure and the in-group is its prototype, then all 
other groups will be less typically human than the in-group, which may explain why 
all the artificial groups were dehumanized (through traits) in both countries. The same 
argument could also perhaps explain why researchers on infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) have argued that all human groups are motivated 
to reserve the human essence to the in-group. It may well be that instead of reserving 
the "human essence' to the in-group and instead of engaging in dehumanization as a 
form of prejudice, individuals are in fact attributing less human typicality to out-
groups because their in-group is taken as the prototype or the norm. Future studies on 
dehumanization might extrapolate from the central tendency and the ideal of a 
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category, and explore whether a 'typically human' group is modelled on the in-group 
as the prototype, or is based on some ideal essence of humanness. Equally. future 
studies should examine if and when attributing more human typicality to the in-group 
is tantamount to dehumanization as a form of prejudice and moral exclusion. 
Furthermore, in the case of artificial groups, in-group identification was 
positively and significantly correlated with the positive emotions and traits attributed 
to the in-group (Experiments 1 and 2, in both countries). Only in some instances was 
in-group identification significantly correlated with dehumanization, e.g. in Romania, 
in the case of culturally different out-groups (Experiment 2), or with the humanness 
attributed to the in-group (Experiment 2, Britain, emotions, in the case of rich 
groups). Overall, the lack of significant correlations between in-group identification 
and the measures of dehumanization suggests that dehumanization is not necessarily 
an instance of in-group favouritism in the case of artificial groups. 
With regard to the real groups, the in-group was attributed more humanness 
than the Gypsies, in both Romania and Britain, but not more humanness than the 
Germans. As the Germans were not dehumanized (through traits), it would appear that 
dehumanization does not necessarily function as in-group favouritism, but rather as 
out-group derogation in relation to specific groups. In Experiment 4, the Germans 
were rated as a higher-status group by the Romanian participants, but as a lower-
status group by the British participants. Moreover, in Romania, social dominance 
orientation was not significantly correlated with the dehumanization of the Germans 
nor with the typically human traits attributed to them. By contrast, in Britain, social 
dominance orientation was negatively and significantly correlated with the typically 
human traits ascribed to the Germans, and positively and significantly correlated with 
their dehumanization. Despite their relatively lower status, the Germans \\cre not 
dehumanized by the British, therefore it could be argued that in-group favouritism and 
relative low-status are not preconditions for dehumanization. Interestingly, in the case 
of real groups (Experiment 4), in-group identification was only in some cases 
correlated with the measures of dehumanization. In Romania, in-group identification 
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was positively and significantly correlated with the index) of infrahumanization 
(dehumanization through emotions) in both the Gypsies and the Germans conditions, 
thus bringing support to the thesis that infrahumanization functions as a form of in-
group favouritism. In Britain, in-group identification was positively and significantly 
correlated with the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group2, 
in both the Germans and the Gypsies conditions. In both countries. in-group 
identification was positively and significantly correlated with the positive traits 
attributed to the in-group. Overall, these results suggest that in the case of real groups 
dehumanization (through traits) does not necessarily function as in-group favouritism. 
Drawing on my prevIOUS research on the dehumanization of real groups 
(Marcu, 2003, unpublished manuscript; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), which 
revealed that only the Gypsies were dehumanized, but not other target groups such as 
the Pakistanis in Britain or the Hungarians in Romania, I would argue that 
dehumanization functions as out-group derogation only in the case of certain out-
groups. Thus, dehumanization is not necessarily an instance of reserving the human 
typicality to the in-group, but rather a denial of human typicality to certain 
stigmatized groups such as the Gypsies. Similarly to the artificial ethnic minority 
groups in the present experiments, the stigmatized real groups may be perceived (or 
rather, ideologically constructed) as deviant from the 'human' norm, which may 
explain their dehumanization. However, in the case of the Gypsies, the inter-group 
relations are rather more complicated. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the Gypsies 
have been an oppressed minority in many European countries, and in Romania they 
were slaves until the middle of the 19th century. Moreover, they were deported to and 
massacred in Nazi concentration camps from many parts of Europe as well as in other 
places as the Trans-Dniester during the Second World War. Currently, the Gypsies are 
still segregated and discriminated against in education, housing, health, employment, 
etc. It is impossible to overlook these factors when we examine their dehumanization, 
as it may sound naIve to suggest that their dehumanization is due merely to 
'perceptions' of lesser humanity or to • deviance' from basic human norms. I would 
argue that their dehumanization also functions as an ideology that helps the majority 
I The index of infrahumanization was calculated by subtracting the human typicality attributed to th~ 
out-group from the human typicality attributed to the in-group (in terms of emotions). . . . . 
2 The index of differential attribution of positive traits was calculated by subtractll1g the pOSltl\ It)' 
attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group (in terms of traits). 
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to deny any sense of guilt or responsibility with regard to their mistreatment, and 
similarly to the dehumanization of the poor (see Loti, 2002), the dehumanization of 
the Gypsies contributes to cognitive and behavioural distancing from them. Just as 
speciesism helps justify the exploitation of animals, so the dehumanization of the 
Gypsies helps legitimize the injustices committed against them. Although the 
ideological aspects of the dehumanization of the Gypsies were not directly assessed in 
the present study, it is nonetheless telling that social dominance orientation was 
positively and significantly correlated with their dehumanization, but negatively and 
significantly correlated with the typically human traits attributed to the Gypsies in 
both countries (see Experiment 4, Chapter 8). Interestingly, in-group identification did 
not correlate significantly with dehumanization or with the typically human traits 
attributed to the Gypsies in either country, thus suggesting that dehumanization is not 
necessarily a form of in-group favouritism. 
As to whether artificial groups can mIrror real groups and meaningfully 
inform dehumanization, it would appear that they elicit slightly different responses 
than the real groups. The different results on dehumanization (through traits) from the 
real and the artificial groups suggest that different psychological resources and 
different motivations are brought into play when the participants are faced with real or 
with artificial groups. It could be argued that in the case of artificial groups, 
participants can only draw on their own group to make judgements about the out-
group, and this may involve judgements of typicality and of normativity. By contrast, 
in the case of real groups, participants can rely on other resources, such as history, 
inter-group contact, personal knowledge of out-group members, existing stereotypes 
and ideologies, power relations, etc. to make judgements of human typicality and to 
dehumanize. 
However, that is not to say that artificial groups are totally inadequate for 
studying dehumanization. If they had been, the poor and the culturally different 
artificial groups would not have been more dehumanized than the rich and than the 
culturally similar groups, respectively. But I need perhaps to be cautious \\'hl?n 
arguing that the artificial groups were 'dehumanized': they \\"ere attributed less human 
typicality than the in-group, but would this be tantamount to dehumanization, as in tht.' 
dehumanization of the Gypsy minority? The theory of ontologization 
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(dehumanization through traits, e.g. Perez et aI., 2001) suggests that dehumanization 
involves a historical dimension: the evaluative prejudice against a group becomes 
categorical due the group's perceived failure to become culturally assimilated after 
the host majority's efforts at assimilating them. Clearly, this historical dimension is 
lacking in the case of artificial groups, yet we were able to observe the 
dehumanization effect. Could there be alternative explanations to this effect? As it 
was mentioned earlier, in-group favouritism did not playa part in the dehumanization 
of artificial groups, but judgements of human typicality and of normativity centred on 
the in-group might be an explanation. An alternative answer may be that the 
dehumanization of the artificial groups functioned as a rationalization of their status 
as culturally different and as poor, respectively, similarly to the rationalization of 
gender roles of artificial groups (cf. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). The interpretation of 
the dehumanization of artificial groups as rationalization of the out-groups' status is 
supported by the fact that perceived threat and blatant prejudice did not generally play 
a part in dehumanization. It could perhaps be argued that the dehumanization of 
artificial and or real groups is similar to the extent that it serves to rationalize and 
legitimize the out-group's socio-economic and power status and the observed cultural 
differences between in-group and out-group (cf. Struch & Schwartz, 1989). 
9.2.5 Traits: A better operationalization of dehumanization than emotions? 
Two measures of dehumanization were used in this research. One measure 
involved emotions, in line with the infrahumanization paradigm (e.g. Leyens et aI., 
2000; 2003), and the other involved traits, in line with the ontologization paradigm 
(Perez et aI., 200 I). The target emotions and traits were selected from previous 
research on dehumanization, and also in light of the findings on rational autonomy 
and sentience as dimensions discriminating between humans and animals. However, 
the target emotions and traits were not placed into mutually exclusive categories such 
as 'primary' and 'secondary', or 'animal-like' and 'human-like'. Instead, they were 
measured on a continuum of human typicality, and each emotion and trait was given a 
human typicality weighting. Thus dehumanization was operationalized as the lesser 
human typicality attributed to the out-group relative to the human typicality attributed 
to the in-group. 
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The studies on the human typicality and the animal typicality. respectively, of 
the emotions and traits that were used in the present research indicated that some 
emotions and traits can be judged as more typical of humans than of animals, e.g. 
creative, while others can be judged as more typical of animals than of humans. e.g. 
dirty. However, for some traits and emotions, the human typicality and the animal 
typicality ratings were not significantly different from each other, thus showing that 
human typicality is not necessarily animal un-typicality (cf. Haslam et aL 2005). 
These results raise the issue as to whether animal is necessarily the opposite of 
human, and whether we can operationalize dehumanization in terms of \-vhat is 
typically rather than uniquely human. In this sense, we can measure dehumanization 
through the attribution of lesser humanness rather than through the attribution of 
animality, similarly to the infrahumanization paradigm. However, it should be noted 
here that there does not exist a single, clear-cut method of operationalizing 
dehumanization, and future studies may want to contrast and compare varIOUS 
methodologies, be they in terms of emotions, traits, or other dimensions. 
An important issue that the studies on human typicality revealed was that there 
was more agreement on the human typicality of the traits than of the emotions, 
between studies 1 and 2 (see Chapter 4). In the first study on the human typicality of 
emotions and traits, the human typicality ratings were positively and significantly 
correlated between the two countries. However, in the second study, there were some 
differences. The human typicality ratings of the traits as well as their animal typicality 
ratings were positively and highly significantly correlated between Romania and 
Britain. However, as regarded the emotions, only their animal typicality ratings were 
significantly and positively correlated between the two countries. Furthermore, while 
the human typicality ratings from study 1 and study 2 were positively and 
significantly correlated within each country, the human typicality ratings of the 
emotions were not. Instead the human typicality ratings from study and the animal 
typicality ratings from study 2 were negatively but highly significantly correlated 
within each country. Thus, it would appear that while there is some cross-cultural 
agreement to a certain extent on the human and animal typicality of the traits, there is 
less agreement on the human typicality of the emotions. The fact that the emotions' 
animal typicality ratings from the two countries were positively and highly 
significantly correlated while their human typicality ratings were not arguably 
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indicates that emotions may be better used as a measure of animality than of 
humanness. 
Furthermore, throughout the eight experiments, the traits emerged as a more 
robust indicator of dehumanization than the emotions as they produced less 
ambiguous results. In the case of the artificial groups, the attribution of typically 
human traits to out-group varied more than the attribution of emotions as a function of 
the experimental manipulations, i.e. the out-groups' cultural and economic status. The 
traits measure indicated that the culturally different artificial groups were a target of 
dehumanization in three instances (Experiment 1, Romania, Experiment 2, Romania 
and Britain), whereas the emotions measure did this only in one instance (Experiment 
2, Britain). Similarly, the traits measure indicated that the poor artificial groups were a 
particular target of dehumanization in three instances (Experiment 1, Romania and 
Britain, Experiment 2, Britain), whereas the emotions measure revealed a main effect 
of poverty on dehumanization only in one instance (Experiment 2, Britain). 
As regards the artificial groups from experiment 3, the results on the traits and 
emotions were more similar to each other than in the previous two experiments. In 
experiment 3 the target groups were described either as culturally similar and rich, or 
as culturally different and poor (the two dimensions of cultural difference and 
economic status being combined to mirror better the real groups used as targets in the 
same study). The traits measure revealed overall dehumanization of both groups in 
both countries, with the 'threatening' groups (poor and culturally different) being 
more dehumanized than their rich and culturally similar counterparts, which was in 
line with the experimental hypotheses. The emotions measure produced rather similar 
results, but while both threatening and non-threatening groups were dehumanized in 
Romania, only the threatening group was dehumanized in Britain. Nonetheless, in 
Britain, the 'threatening' group (poor and culturally different) was also attributed less 
typically human emotions than the 'non-threatening' group, in line with the results on 
the attribution of typically human traits. The greater similarity between the results 
produced by the emotions and traits, respectively, in experiment 3 may be due to the 
fact that in this experiment the targets' cultural and economic status were 
simultaneously either threatening (poor and culturally different from the in-group) or 
non-threatening (rich and culturally similar to the in-group). In this sense. they 
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mirrored better the real groups which simultaneously either invoked or did not invoke 
both material and symbolic threat, as indicated by the pilot study on threatening real 
groups (see Chapter 7). 
As for the real groups, the results are slightly more conclusive using the traits 
measure. They indicated that only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) in 
both countries, in Experiments 33 and 4. The Germans were not dehumanized and , 
were attributed more typically human traits than the Gypsies in both studies. The 
emotions measure produced very similar results in Experiment 4, where only the 
Gypsies were dehumanized (infrahumanized, through emotions) in each country. 
However, in Experiment 3, the results on the emotions were rather mixed: the British 
participants dehumanized the Gypsies, but the Romanian participants did not. 
Besides, the Romanian participants dehumanized their own group relative to the 
Germans (through emotions). Thus, the results on traits and those on emotions from 
Experiment 3 in Romania are rather contradictory. 
In sum, operationalizing dehumanization through traits rather than emotions 
may be a more valid and reliable measure of this phenomenon. Traits have been 
widely used in research on stereotypes, prejudice, in a variety of contexts, and it may 
be that they induce more experimental realism than a measure of dehumanization 
using emotions. Arguably, a measure of dehumanization involving traits has more 
mundane as well as psychological realism (see Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998) 
than one involving emotions, as participants are more likely to think about the 
character and thus the 'essence' of a group than about the emotions the group 
members are prone to feel. Emotions are more likely to be seen as reactions to 
specific situations, whereas traits are more likely to be perceived as innate, inherent 
and enduring features of a particular group. Of course, emotions and traits do not exist 
in isolation from each other: the emotions one is likely to feel are linked to one's traits 
of character, and one's traits may be determined by one's emotional predisposition. 
While the issue as to whether emotions precede traits or vice-versa is beyond the 
scope of the present research, it might be argued that one should examine how 
3 In Experiment 3 there was no experimental manipulation involving real groups, but real groups were 
studied alongside artificial ones. 
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emotions and traits are represented in group stereotypes before they 
operationalized in empirical research in dehumanization. 
are 
However, an alternative interpretation may be that emotions do not lend 
themselves easily to a continuous measurement of dehumanization, and that using the 
typical categorical distinction between primary (common to humans and animals) and 
secondary (exclusively human) emotions might be a more adequate measure of 
infrahumanization (i.e. dehumanization through emotions), as it has usually been done 
in this type of research (e.g. Vaes et aI., 2006). I would actually argue against 
measuring infrahumanization categorically. Researchers in the infrahumanization 
paradigm have claimed that infrahumanization is a subtle phenomenon and a 'lesser 
form of dehumanization'. In that case, I would argue that, as a 'lesser fonn of 
dehumanization', infrahumanization should be measured continuously instead of 
categorically precisely in order to capture the 'lesser humanity' attributed to the out-
groups. Given the conceptualization of humanness as a category with a graded 
structure, and given the possibility that some groups may be viewed as more typically 
human than others, it would seem right to measure infrahumanization continuously. 
The present research employed a continuous measure of the human typicality of the 
emotions, which is arguably better suited to measuring the lesser attribution of 
humanness to the out-group. In this sense, I would argue that a heavy use of implicit 
association tests in the measurement of infrahumanization (e.g. Paladino et aI., 2002; 
Vaes et aI., 2006; Boccato et aI., 2007) might be counterproductive: given their forced 
choice and categorical distinctions they may not be suitable to capturing the presumed 
lesser degree of humanness that is attributed to out-groups. 
9.2.6 Studying dehumanization cross-culturally: similarities and differences 
between Britain and Romania 
Studying dehumanization III both Britain (starting point of research) and 
Romania (fieldwork) presented challenges but at the same time advantages. The aim 
was not to make the process of dehumanization directly comparable betv;el'Il 
Romania and Britain. Instead the focus was on what the antecedents of 
dehumanization may be within in each country and the functions that dehumanization 
may fulfil within each context. As mentioned in detail in Chapkr 2, the cross-cultural 
276 
Chapter 9 
General discussion and conclusions 
format of the investigation aimed to take into account potential external influences on 
dehumanization, such postmaterialist values, relative economic development, relative 
power status, immigration experience, multicultural ideology, and Western norms of 
prejudice suppression. 
There were many similarities in the Romanian and British data. Firstly. the 
focus group discussions on human and animal issues (see Chapter 3) revealed moral 
dilemmas between ethical and speciesist values in both countries. Secondly, the 
human typicality ratings of the emotions and the traits indicated cross-cultural 
agreement on their human typicality, in particular regarding the traits (see Chapter 4). 
This suggests that dehumanization was functionally equivalent in the two countries. 
Similarly, the positive ratings of the target emotions and traits were positively and 
highly significantly correlated between the two countries. Thirdly, there were 
similarities regarding the dehumanization of artificial groups. In each country, the 
artificial groups were generally dehumanized (through traits), and the culturally 
different out-groups as well as the poor ones were more dehumanized than the 
culturally similar and the rich groups, respectively. Fourthly, concerning the real 
groups, in both countries only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) and in 
experiment 4 they were the only group to be also infrahumanized (dehumanized 
through emotions). 
There were also some differences between the two countries, too. In the focus 
groups discussions, the Romanian participants explained and justified their speciesist 
views by invoking their society'S lack of money and modem values with regard to 
animal life. The British participants, instead, suggested that living in a predominantly 
consumers' society like Britain forced them to make unethical choices that harmed 
animals' rights. The experiments revealed differences between the British and thl? 
Romanian participants regarding their perceptions of their own group's status as there 
was a positive and significant correlation between in-group identification and social 
dominance orientation in Britain, but not in Romania. In line with the ideological 
asymmetry hypothesis (e.g. Sidanius et aI., 2001), the British participants may hav\.? 
viewed their group as a relatively high-status group, whereas the Romanian 
participants may have considered their group a relatively low-status one. This 
ideological asymmetry may explain why the Romanian participants ranked the 
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Germans as higher in status than themselves, whereas the British participants rated the 
Germans as lower in status than their in-group. Furthermore, it may explain why the 
typically human traits attributed to the Germans were negatively and significantly 
correlated with social dominance orientation in Britain but not in Romania 
(Experiment 4), and why the British participants perceived more threat from the 
Germans than did the Romanian participants (Experiment 3). Finally. the ideological 
asymmetry may explain why the Romanian participants perceived the out-group's 
policy as more likely when it was threatening than when it was non-threatening, while 
the opposite was true for the British participants (Experiment 4). Given that the 
process of dehumanization may be sensitive not only to the out-group's status, but 
also to the status of the in-group, I would argue that it mayan advantage to study the 
process of dehumanization cross-culturally in countries which differ in their power 
status, economic development, postmaterialist values, etc. In this sense, it is perhaps 
telling that the Romanian participants infrahumanized (dehumanized through 
emotions) their own group relative to the Germans whereas the British participants 
did not (Experiment 3), and that the Romanian participants attributed slightly (but not 
significantly) more typically human traits to the Germans than to their own group, 
while the opposite was true for the British participants (Experiments 3 and 4). 
9.3 Conclusions and directions for future studies 
To conclude, in the present research it has been revealed that dehumanization 
is not necessarily a form of in-group bias and that a group's economic status, its 
relative power status, and its cultural status, i.e. being culturally similar or different 
from the in-group, can contribute to the group being dehumanized. Generally, the 
dehumanization of groups, be they artificial or real, was not mediated by perceived 
threat, but in some instances it was mediated by perceived cultural differences, by the 
differential attribution of positive traits, and by blatant prejudice. The results 
produced by the traits measure were more consistent than those produced by the 
emotions measure, suggesting that operationalizing dehumanization through traits 
rather than emotions may be a more valid and reliable assessment of this 
phenomenon. 
During this research, a number of hypotheses for future research \\crc 
identified and these will be discussed below. Firstly. concerning the opcrationalization 
278 
Chapter 9 General discussion and conclusions 
of dehumanization in terms of the human-animal binary, it is possible to configure-
dehumanization by means of other binaries such as human-machine, or human-
monster (cf. Haslam, 2006), or indeed typical human vs. less-typical human, as it was 
done in the present research. Future studies might want to explore whether the 
dehumanization in terms of humans vs. machines can produce meaningful results and 
whether this type of dehumanization has the same consequences as the one involving 
humans vs. animals. At the same time, future research on dehumanization may want 
to explore in more detail what 'typically human' means, and whether there are strong 
correlations between in-group typicality and human typicality. Thus, one may take 
into account whether typical humanness is based on group typicality or on some ideal 
of humanness. On a related note, future studies may want to address the issue of 
whether it is better to measure dehumanization continuously rather than categorically, 
as a direct comparison between these two methods was not the focus of the present 
research. However, one does not necessarily have to operationalize dehumanization in 
terms of emotions and traits, and alternative measures of dehumanization may be 
investigated. Last but not least, dehumanization could also be explored in discourse 
(see Tileaga, 2005; 2006), and therefore one should not exclude qualitative methods 
in the exploration of dehumanization. 
Secondly, concerning the antecedents of dehumanization, future studies may 
want to explore other factors that might account for the dehumanization of the Gypsy 
minority, such as perceived deviance from normative morality, or perceived refusal to 
socially integrate. Conversely, one may want to examine other ideological factors that 
might predispose individuals to dehumanize, such as right-wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1988), particularly when the focus is on ethnic minorities which have 
'failed' to be culturally assimilated, or Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988), 
particularly in relation to the dehumanization of the poor. Future studies could also 
take into account dispositional vs. situational attributions for poverty. socially 
'deviant' behaviour, or 'failed' cultural assimilation, thus exploring the role of the 
fundamental attribution error (see Ross, 1977) in dehumanization. Furthermore, one 
could also examine if the in-group members are dehumanized when they are 
perceived as deviating fronl the norm: would they be considered atypical members of 
the in-group, and would they be dehumanized? Thus, one could also explore the role 
279 
Chapter 9 General discussion and conclusions 
of ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979) and examine if the deviant in-group 
members and deviant out-group members are dehumanized to the same extent. 
Last, but not least, future studies might explore whether dehumanization is 
linked to beliefs in a just world (see Lerner, 1977; 1997) and whether it sen'es a 
palliative function (e.g. Kay & Jost, 2003) in the sense of enabling individuals to cope 
with social injustices when they are not able to change them. Thus, dehumanization 
may have an 'adaptive' function (see Bernard et aI., 1965) and may serve as a 
rationalization of the status quo. 
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Appendix I a, focus group study, British questions 
The questions for the British participants in the focus groups interviews: 
1. It has been argued that animal testing should not be allowed. I would like your 
opinion on this. 
2. Do you think fox hunting should be banned or not? 
3. During the foot and mouth epidemic many uninfected animals were culled. What do 
you think? 
4. Sometimes when two conjoint twins are born only one of them has survival chances. 
When the operation to separate them is carried out it is known in advance that one of 
them will die. What do you think? 
5. Foetuses revealed to have malformations or various genetic disorders are sometimes 
aborted. I would like your opinion on this. 
6. Euthanasia has been suggested as a way of ending the suffering of terminally ill 
patients. How do you feel about this? 
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Appendix I b, focus group study, Romanian questions 
The questions for the Romanian participants in the focus groups interviews: 
1. Two years ago the mayor of Bucharest suggested that stray dogs claimed by no 
one should be euthanised. I would like you to comment. [Acum doi ani primarul 
Bucure$tiului propunea sa fie eutanasia{i cdinii vagabonzi pe care nu-i revendica 
nimeni. V-a$ ruga sa comenta{i.] 
2. At the beginning of the year 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food issued the 
order 425 which stipulated that animals taken to the abattoir should not be 
subjected to any unnecessary suffering or pain during the killing. What do you 
think? [La inceputul anului 2003 a fost emis ordinul 425 al Ministerului 
Agriculturii # Alimenta{iei care stipuleaza ca animalele duse la abator sa nu fie 
supuse nici unei suferin{e sau dureri inutile in timpul sacrificarii. V-a$ ruga sa 
comenta{i. ] 
3. Some people consider animal experiments necessary for scientific progress. I 
would like your opinion on this. [Unii oameni considera experimentele pe 
animale necesare progresului $tiin{ei. V-a$ ruga sa comentali.] 
4. Sometimes two conjoint twins are born with complications, and only one of them 
has survival chances. When the operation of separation takes place, it is known 
that the other twin is going to die. What do you think? [Uneori se nasc doi 
gemeni siamezi cu complicafii, $i numai unul dintre ei are $anse de supravieluire. 
Cdnd se efectueaza opera{ia de separare se $tie ca celalalt geaman urmeaza sa 
moara. V-a$ ruga sa comentafi.] 
5. Euthanasia has been suggested as a means of ending the suffering of terminally ill 
patients who are dependent on life-support machines. What do you think? 
[Eutanasia a fost propusa ca un mod de a pune capat suferinfelor pacienfilor 
bolnavi terminal, dependen{i de ventilator $i perfuzii. V-a$ ruga sa comentafi.] 
6. Foetuses that will be born with malformations or genetic diseases are usually 
aborted. I would like your opinion on this. [Fe{ii care se vor na$te cu malformafii 
sau boli genetice sunt de obicei avorta{i. V-a$ ruga sa comentali.] 
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Appendix II a, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 1, British questionnaire 
Social 
~~~fFgy Department of Psychology U n i S 
The present study is being carried out at the Social Psychology European Research 
Institute at the University of Surrey and it is investigating people's perceptions of 
animals and humans. I would be grateful if would fill in the questionnaire below. 















Appendix II a, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 1, British questionnaire 
1) Below you will find a list of emotions. Please indicate with a cross x the emotions 
that you think are more typical of animals, and the emotions that you think are more 
typical of humans. Please also indicate if you think the emotion is positive or 
negative. Please tick only 1 category per emotion! 
Emotions More typical of animals More typical of humans 













2) Below you will find a list of characteristics. Please indicate with a cross x the 
characteristics that you think are more typical of animals, and the characteristics that 
you think are more typical of humans. Please also indicate if you think the 
characteristic is positive or negative. Please tick only 1 category per characteristic! 
Characteristics More typical of animals More typical of humans 

































.- . -- --- -- ----
Instinctual 
~- --- - --
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Institute Department of Psychology U n i S 
Acest studiu este Intreprins de Institutul European de Cercetare In Psihologia Sociala 
de la Universitatea Surrey din Anglia, ~i cerceteaza modul in care sunt percepuli 
oamenii ~i animalele. Am nevoie de ajutorul dvs. pentru realizarea acestui studiu ~i 
v-a~ fi recunoscatoare daca ali completa acest chestionar. 









ANUL DE STUDIU 
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Appendix II b, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 1, Romanian questionnaire 
1) Mai jos Yeti gasi 0 serie de emotii. Va rog sa bifati emotiile pe care Ie considerati 
specifice animalelor, ~i emotiile pe care Ie considerati specifice oamenilor. De 
asemenea, va rog sa indicati daca considerati emotiile respective pozitive sau negative. 
Va rog sa bifati 0 singura categorie pentru fiecare emotie! 
Emotii Specifice animalelor Specifice oamenilor , 













2) Mai jos Yeti gasi 0 serie de trasaturi. Va rog sa bifati trasaturile pe care Ie 
considerati specifice animalelor, ~i trasaturile pe care Ie considerati speci~ce 
oamenilor. De asemenea, va rog sa indicati daca considerati trasaturile respectIve 
pozitive sau negative. Va rog sa bifati 0 singura categorie pentru fiecare 
trasatura! 
Trasaturi Specifice animalelor Specifice oamenilor 






































Appendix II c, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, British questionnaire 
Department of Psychology 
The present study is investigating people's perceptions of animals and humans. Your 
help is needed and I would be grateful if could fill in the questionnaire below. 
I. Some emotions are more typical of humans than others. On the following scale, 
please indicate how typically human you think the following emotions are: 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all 
typical of humans 
Compassion 1 2 3 
Rage 1 2 3 
Contempt 1 2 3 
Pleasure 1 2 3 
Guilt 1 2 3 
Aversion 1 2 3 
Fear 1 2 3 
Admiration 1 2 3 
Regret 1 2 3 
Pride 1 2 3 
Joy 1 2 3 










































typical of humans 
Appendix II c, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, British questionnaire 
II. Some emotions have a more positive meaning than others. On the following scale. 
please indicate how positive you think the following emotions are: 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Compassion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contempt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pleasure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aversion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Admiration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Regret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pride 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Joy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix II c, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, British questionnaire 
III. Some traits are more typical of humans than others. On the following scale, please 
indicate how typically human you think the following traits are: 
1 2 3 4 
Not at all 
typical of humans 
Creative 1 2 3 
Hypocrite 1 2 3 
Simple 1 2 3 
Wild 1 2 3 
Greedy 1 2 3 
Efficient 1 2 3 
Dependent 1 2 3 
Affectionate 1 2 3 
Loyal 1 2 3 
Brutal 1 2 3 
Intelligent 1 2 3 
Selfish 1 2 3 
Dirty 1 2 3 
Free 1 2 3 
Prejudiced 1 2 3 
Logical 1 2 3 
Friendly 1 2 3 
Ruthless 1 2 3 
Obedient 1 2 3 


































































typical of humans 
Appendix II c, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, British questionnaire 
IV. Some traits have a more positive meaning than others. On the following scale, 
please indicate how positive you think the following traits are: 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Creative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hypocrite 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wild 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Greedy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Affectionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Brutal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dirty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Free 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prejudiced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Logical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ruthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Obedient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Instinctual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself: 
GENDER M F AGE Years 
-----
NATIONALITY 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH 0 SCOTTISH 0 WELSH 0 
OTHER 0 Please specify ___________ _ 
RELIGION 
STUDENT YES 0 NO 0 OCCUPATION 
DEPARTMENT YEAR OF STUDY ____ _ 
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Appendix II d, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, Romanian questionnaire 
Chestionar 
Acest chestionar face parte dintr-un studiu psihologic care cerceteaza modul In care 
sunt perceputi oamenii ~i animalele. Am nevoie de ajutorul dvs. pentru realizarea 
acestui studiu ~i v-a~ fi recunoscatoare daca l-ati completa. 
I. Unele emotii sunt mai caracteristice animalelor decat altele. A vand ca model scara , 
de mai jos, va rog sa indicati cat de caracteristice animalelor credeti ca sunt emotiile 
urmatoare. Va rog sa bifati cu un X In tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru 
fiecare emotie. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deloc Foarte 
caracteristica animalelor caracteristica animalelor 
Compasiune 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Furie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dispret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PHicere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Vinovatie , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aversiune 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Frica 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Admiratie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , 
Regret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mandrie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bucurie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Satisfactie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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II. Unele emotii au 0 conotatie pozitiva In timp ce altele au 0 conotatie negativa. 
Avand ca model scara de mai jos, va rog sa indicati cat de pozitive credeti ca sunt 
emotiile urmatoare. Va rog sa bifati cu un X In tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei d\'. 
pentru fiecare emotie. 
F oarte negativa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Foarte pozitiva 
Compasiune 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Furie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dispret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Placere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Vinovatie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aversiune 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Frica 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Admiratie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Regret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mandrie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bucurie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Satisfactie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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III. Unele trasaturi sunt mai caracteristice animalelor decat altele. A vand ca model 
scara de mai jos, va rog sa indicati cat de caracteristice animalelor credeti ca sunt 
trasaturile urmatoare. Va rog sa bifati cu un X in tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei 


































Cu prej udecati 1 
Logic 1 
Prietenos 1 





































































Appendix II d, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, Romanian questionnaire 
IV. Unele trasaturi au 0 conotatie pozitiva in timp ce altele au 0 conotalie negativa. 
Avand ca model scara de mai jos, va rog sa indicali cat de pozitive credeli ca sunt 
trasaturile urmatoare. Va rog sa bifati cu un X in tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei 
dv. pentru fiecare trasatura. 
Foarte negativa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Foarte pozitiva 
Creativ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ipocrit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Simplu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Salbatic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lacom 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Afectuos 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Brutal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Inteligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Egoist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Murdar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Liber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cu prejudecati 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Logic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prietenos 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
N eindurator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Supus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Instinctiv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Chapter 5: Cultural differences and poverty: Two antecedents of the 
dehumanization of artificial groups 
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The Social Psychology European Research Institute is carrying out a survey on the 
experience of ethnic minorities in Britain. This is part of a larger suryey financed by 
the Council of Europe which examines the experience of ethnic minorities in the EU 
member states. Your help is needed, and we would like you to complete the following 
questionnaire. Your answers will be anonymous and will remain confidential, and 
your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. 







WERE YOU BORN IN ENGLAND? 






Please specify ________ _ 
RELIGION 
STUDY YEAR OF STUDY __ _ 
I. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
123 













1. Britain is a country where people have a say in how things are decided at work and 
in their communities. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6-- 7 -Strongly agree 
2. In Britain, people are given a say in important government decisions. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6-- 7 -Strongly agree 
3. Free speech is not protected in Britain. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - oj -5 - 6-- 7 -Strongly agree 
4. Britain progresses towards a less impersonal and more humane society. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - oj -5 - 6-- '/ -Strongly agree 
5. In Britain, people are more concerned about survival than about individual self-
expresSIOn. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 -- oj -5 - 6-- - -Strongly agree 
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Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. ~fora\'ians 
are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been 
born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious 
beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians 
have two children per family. They consider it nonnal for women to enter education 
and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value indiyidual freedom. They rely on 
public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British 
population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. Statistics show that many 
Moravians enter high education and have high career aspirations. The Moravians 
usually get jobs in the economic and banking sectors. They rarely have problems with 
unemployment. 
II. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate how similar you think the 
Moravians are to your national group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Different Somewhat Neither different Somewhat Similar Very 
Different Different Nor similar Similar Similar 
III. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Rather Neither agree Rather Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Nor disagree Agree Agree 
1. The values held by the Moravians are not compatible with those of British citizens. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - ./ -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
2. The Moravians are enriching the cultural life of Britain. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
3. The religious practices of the Moravians are threatening Britain's way of life. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
4. Moravians attitudes to education are in line with those of the British population. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
5. The presence of Moravians in Britain changes the nature of British society. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - ./ -5 - 6- 7 -Strongzl' agree 
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IV. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to vour 
opinion for each statement. . 
2 3 
Strongly Disagree Rather 
Disagree Disagree 
4 










1. The presence of Moravians is putting pressure on the British transport system. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
2. The Moravians are taking advantage of Britain's economic boom. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
3. The Moravians are not squeezing British people out of council housing. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
4. The presence of Moravians on the job market reduces employment opportunities 
for British people. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
5. When the Moravians make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
V. Which of the following emotions would you expect to be more typical of 
Moravians' feelings? Please tick only 5. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Guilt 0 Joy 0 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction 0 
VI. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the Mora\'ians? 
Please tick only 7. 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 
Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 
Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual 0 
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VII. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. . 
2 3 













1) Moravians should be entitled to the same state benefits as the British. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
2) If they commit crimes in Britain, Moravians should be sent back to their country of 
origin instead of being sent to a British prison. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
3) Moravians should not be entitled to the same health care benefits as the British. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
4) Moravians should be allowed to have political representation. 
Strongly disagree - J- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
5) Moravians should not be allowed to have Moravian language schooling. 
Strongly disagree - J- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
VIII. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
OpInIOn. 
123 













1. I would not like a Moravian family to move into my neighbourhood. 
Strongly disagree - 1- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
2. I would like to have Moravians among my colleagues at work. 
Strongly disagree - J- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
3. I would never agree to date a Moravian. 
Strongly disagree - J- 2 - 3 - .f -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
4. I would not like to make friends among Moravians. 
Strongly disagree - /- 2 - 3 - 4 -5 - 6- 7 -Strongly agree 
5. I would not mind if my GP were a Moravian. 
Strongly disagree - /-- 2 - 3 - .f -5 - 6- "7 -Strongly agree 
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IX. Sometimes in life things cannot be divided perfectly equally. Please read the 
following scenarios and answer by filling in the space provided with the number that 
represents your option. 
1. If ten people from your national group and ten Moravian people were in need of 
NHS hospital beds, and only thirteen beds were available at the local hospital, how do 
you think the thirteen beds should be allocated to the two groups? 
__ beds to the people from own national group and __ to the Moravians. 
2. If ten Moravian children and ten children from your national group were in need of 
school places, and only fifteen places were available at the local school, how do you 
think the fifteen school places should be split between the two groups? 
__ school places to the Moravian children and __ to the children from own 
national group. 
3. If ten families from your national group and ten Moravian families were in need of 
council housing, and only eleven council houses were available in the area, how do 
you think the eleven council houses should be allocated? 
council houses to the families from own national group and __ to the 
Moravian families. 
4. If ten Moravian offenders and ten offenders from your national group were in need 
of state-provided lawyers, and only thirteen lawyers were available, how do you think 
the lawyers should be allocated? 
__ lawyers to the Moravians and __ to the people from own national group. 
5. If ten Moravian couples and ten couples from your national group were in need of 
NHS sponsored IVF treatment, and there were sponsorships for only eleven couples, 
how do you think the sponsorships should be allocated between the twenty couples? 
sponsorships to the Moravian couples and __ to the couples from own 
national group. 
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X. Which of the following emotions would you expect to be more typical of the 
feelings of people from your national group? Please tick only 5. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Guilt 0 Joy 0 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction 0 
XI. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the people from 
your national group? Please tick only 7. 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 
Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 
Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual D 
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XII. Please read the following questions and circle the number that represents your 
answer. 




2 3 4 
I don't 
know 
5 6 7 
Very 
Much 






















4 How similar do you think you are to the average English person? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not I don't Very 
At all know Much 
5 How important to you is being English? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not I don't Very 
At all know Much 




2 3 4 
I don't 
know 
5 6 7 
Very 
Much 
7 When you hear a non-English person criticising English people, to what extent do 
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XIII. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
. . ....... .. OpInIOn. 
2 3 4 




1. Some groups of people are just more 
worthy than others. 
2. In getting what your group wants, it 
is sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups. 
3. Superior groups should dominate 
inferior groups. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups of people stayed in 
their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
6. It is probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their 
place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be 
kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if all groups could 
be equal. 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 
11. All groups should be given an 
equal chance in lifu. 
12. We should do what we can to 
equalize conditions for different 
groups. 
13. Increased social equality. 
14. We would have fewer problems if 
we treated different groups more 
equally. 
15. We should strive to make incomes 
more equal. 
16. No one group should dominate in 
society. 






























































































































Institute Department of Psychology UniS 
Institutul European de Cercetare in Psihologia Sociala de la Universitatea Surrey, 
Anglia, intreprinde un studiu despre diversitatea etnica ~i cultural a in Romarua. Am 
nevoie de ajutorul dv., ~i v-a~ ruga sa completali urmatorul chestionar. Raspunsurile 
dv. sunt anonime ~i vor ramane confidenliale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciata. 
Pentru a va face raspunsurile valide, va rog sa completali toate sectiunile 
chestionarului. 





F (Incercuiti dupa caz) 
NATIONALITATEA ________ _ 
V -A TI NA.SCUT iN ROMANIA? DA NU , 





1. Va rog sa citili declaraliile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Romania e 0 lara unde oamenii pot 
influenta felul in care se iau decizii la , 
locul de munca ~i in comunitatile lor. 
2. In Romania oamenilor Ii se cerere 
parerea in deciziile importante luate de 
guvem. 
3. Libertatea de expresle nu este 
protej ata in Romania. 
4. Romania devine 0 societate din ce in 
ce mai putin impersonala ~i mai umana. 
5. In Romania oamenii sunt mai 
preocupati de supravietuire decat de 
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Acum a~ vrea sa va atrag atentia asupra minoritatii etnice ceangaie~ti din Romania. 
Ceangaii sunt 0 minoritate putin cunoscuta care traie~te de mult in Romania. Ceangaii 
sunt foarte religio~i ~i, spre deosebire de romani, au obiceiul sa-~i arate credinta in 
public. Familiile ceangaie~ti au in medie cate cinci copii. De obicei femeile 
ceangoaice nu au servici pentru ca ceangaii cred ca rolul femeii e de a avea grija de 
casa. Ceangaii pun multa valoare pe relatiile de familie. Ceangaii nu au incredere in 
institutiile publice ~i nu apeleaza la ele pentru a-~i rezolva problemele de justitie. Ca 
~i romanii, ceangaii variaza in caracter ~i inclinatii. Statisticile arata ca putini ceangai 
urmeaza 0 facultate sau asp ira la cariere de prestigiu. De obicei ceangaii se angajeaza 
in sectoarele de jos ale economiei. Deseori au probleme cu ~omajul. 




















III. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Valorile culturale ale ceangailor nu 
sunt compatibile cu cele ale romanilor. 
2. Ceangaii imbogatesc viata cultural a 
a Romaniei. 
3. Obiceiurile religioase ale ceangailor 
" pericol modul de viata al pun In , 
romanilor. 
4. Atitudinile ceangailor fata de 
educatie se potrivesc cu cele ale 
romanilor. 
5. Prezenta ceangailor " Romania In , 
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IV. Va rog sa cititi declaratii1e de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 

















1. Ceangaii ingreuneaza sistemul de 
transport dej a precar din Romania. 
2. Ceangaii nu submineaza economia 
Romaniei. 
3. Ceangaii reduc ~ansele romanilor de 
a obtine locuinte sociale. 
4. Prezenta ceangailor pe piata 
locurilor de munca reduce ~ansele de 
angajare ale romanilor. 
5. Cand ceangaii prospera, economIa 






2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
V. Care dintre emotiile urmatoare considerati dv. ca sunt caracteristice simtirilor 
moravilor? Va rog sa bifati 5. 
Compasiune D Frica D 
Furie D Admiratie , D 
Dispret D Regret D 
PHicere D Mandrie D 
Vinovatie D Bucurie D 
Aversiune D Satisfactie D , 
VI. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare considerati dv. ca ii descriu eel mai bine pe 
moravi? Va rog sa bifati 7. 
Creativi D Inteligenti D 
Ipocriti D Egoi~ti D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudecati D 
Eficienti D Logici D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D N einduratori D 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instinctivi D 
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VII. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde 









l. Ceangaii ar trebui sa aiba dreptul la 
acelea~i ajutoare sociale ca romanii. 
2. Ceangaii n-ar trebui sa aiba acelea~i 
prioritati ca romanii la acordarea de 
locuri de munca. 
3. Ceangaii nu ar trebui sa aiba dreptul 
la acelea~i servicii medicale ca romanii. 
4. Ceangaii ar trebui sa aiba dreptul la 
reprezentanta politica. 
5. Ceangaii n-ar trebui sa aiba dreptul 


































VIII. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa Incercuiti cifra care corespunde 









l. M-ar deranja daca 0 familie de 
ceangai s-ar muta pe strada mea. 
2. Mi-ar placea sa am colegi ceangai la 
serVlClU. 
3. N -a~ fi niciodata de acord sa am 0 
relatie cu un ceangau / 0 ceangoaica. 
4. Nu mi-ar placea sa am prieteni 
~. 
ceangal. 
5. Nu m-ar deranja daca medicul meu 
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IX. Uneori in viata unele lucruri nu pot fi impartite perfect egal. Va rog sa cititi 
urmatoarele situatii ~i sa completati spatiile goale cu cifra care corespunde optiunii dv. 
1. Daca zece bolnavi romani ~i zece bolnavi ceangai ar avea nevoie de paturi in spital, 
~i numai treisprezece paturi ar fi libere, cum credeti ca ar trebui impartite cele 
treisprezece paturi? 
_ paturi pentru romani ~i _ pentru ceangai. 
2. Daca zece copii ceangai ~i zece copii romani ar avea nevoie de ~colarizare, ~i 
numai cinsprezece locuri ar fi libere la ~coala din cartier, cum credeti ca ar trebui 
impartite cele cinsprezece locuri la ~coala? 
_ locuri pentru copiii ceangai ~i _ pentru copiii romani. 
3. Daca zece familii romane ~i zece familii ceangaie~ti ar avea nevoie de locuinte 
sociale, ~i numai unsprezece locuinte ar fi libere in cartierul respectiv, cum credeti ca 
ar trebui impartite cele unsprezece locuinte sociale? 
_ locuinte sociale pentru familiile romane ~i _ pentru familiile ceangaie~ti. 
4. Daca zece infractori ceangai ~i zece infractori romani ar avea nevoie de avocati din 
oficiu, ~i numai treisprezece avocati ar fi disponibili, cum credeti ca ar trebui alocati 
cei treisprezece avocati? 
_ avocati pentru infractorii ceangai ~i _ pentru infractorii romani. 
5. Daca zece studenti ceangai ~i zece studenti romani ar avea nevoie de camere la 
camin, ~i numai unsprezece camere ar fi disponibile, cum credeti ca ar trebui acestea 
impartite? 
_ camere pentru studentii ceangai ~i _ pentru studentii romani. 
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X. Care dintre emotiile urmatoare considerati dv. di sunt caracteristice simtirilor 
romanilor? Va rog sa bifati 5. 
Compasiune 0 Frica D 
Furie D Admiratie D 
Dispret D Regret D 
Placere D Mandrie D 
Vinovatie D Bucurie D 
Aversiune D Satisfactie D , 
XI. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare considerati dv. ca ii descriu eel mai bine pe 
romani? Va rog sa bifati 7. 
Creativi D Inteligenti D 
Ipocriti D Egoi~ti D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudecati D 
Eficienti D Logici D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D Neinduratori D 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instinctivi D 
XII. Va rog sa cititi declaratii1e de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde 
opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declaratie. 
1 
Deloc 
2 3 4 
Nu 
~tiu 
1. In ce masura va simtiti roman? 
5 
2. In ce masura simtiti ca aveti legaturi 
putemice cu romanii? 
3. In ce masura va simtiti bucuros I 
bucuroasa ca sunteti roman I romanca? , 
4. Cat de asemanator I asemanatoare 
credeti ca sunteti romanului obi~nuit? 
5. Cat de important este pentru dv. sa 
fiti roman? 
6. In ce masura sunt opiniile dv. despre 
ce Inseamna sa fii roman imparta~ite 
de alti romani? 
7. Cand auziti un strain criticandu-i pe , 





















4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
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XII. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde 









1. Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur ~i 
simplu mai merituoase decat altele. 
2. Ca grupul tau sa obtina ceea ce vrea, 
e uneori necesar sa foloseasca forta , 
impotriva altor grupuri. 
3. Grupurile superioare ar trebui sa Ie 
domine pe cele inferioare. 
4. Pentru a 0 lua inainte in viata, e 
uneori necesar sa calci in picioare alte 
grupun. 
5. Daca anumite grupuri ar sta la locul 
lor, am avea mai putine probleme. 
6. E probabil un lucru bun ca unele 
grupuri sunt la varf, iar altele la baza. 
7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie sa stea 
la locullor. 
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie tinute la 
locullor. 
9. Ar fi bine daca toate grupurile ar fi 
egale. 
10. Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui 
sa fie idealul nostru. 
11. Toate grupurile trebuie sa aiba 
~anse egale in viata. 
12. Ar trebui sa facem tot ce putem 
pentru a egaliza conditiile pentru 
grupuri diferite. 
13. Ar trebui sa tindem catre egalitate 
sociala. 
14. Am avea mai putine probleme daca 
am trata grupurile diferite in mod egal. 
15. Ar trebui sa ne straduim sa facem 
veniturile cat mai egale. 
16. Societatea nu ar trebui sa fie 

























Va multumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare ~i pentru timpul acordat. 
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Chapter 6: Perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group: 
A mediator of the dehumanization of artificial groups 
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Institute Department of Psychology UniS 
The Social Psychology European Research Institute is carrying out a survey on the 
experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is needed, and we would like 
you to complete the following questionnaire. Your answers will be anonymous and 
will remain confidential, and your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. To make 
your answers valid, please fill in ALL the sections of the questionnaire. 




WERE YOU BORN IN ENGLAND? 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH D 
OTHER D 
RELIGION 









Please specify _______ _ 
YEAR OF STUDY __ _ 
Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians 
are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been 
born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious 
beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians 
have two children per family. They consider it normal for women to enter education 
and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value individual freedom. They rely on 
public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British 
population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. National Statistics show that 
the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a., compared to the national 
average household income of £23,200 p.a., thus suggesting that the Moravians are not 
putting a strain on the social welfare system. 
I. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not I don't Very 
At all know Much 
1. How similar do you think the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moravians are to your national group? 
2. How much of a negative impact do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
you think the Moravians have on the 
national economy? 
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II. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Rather Neither agree Rather Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Nor disagree Agree Agree 
1. The beliefs held by the Moravians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
are not compatible with those of 
British citizens. 
2. Moravians' morals are similar to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
those of the British. 
3. Moravians' aspirations coincide 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
with those of the British. 
4. Moravians' approach to life is very 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
different from that of British people. 
5. The values endorsed by the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moravians are not the same as those 
endorsed by British society. 
III. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
4 123 




1. The presence of Moravians IS 
putting pressure on the British 
transport system. 
2. The Moravians are taking advantage 
of Britain's economic boom. 
3. The Moravians are not squeezing 
British people out of council housing. 
4. The presence of Moravians on the 
job market reduces employment 
opportunities for British people. 
5. When the Moravians make 
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IV. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
123 




N or disagree 
1. Moravians' cultural beliefs are a 
threat to British society. 
2. Moravians' moral norms are not 
threatening the British way of life. 
3. Moravians' family values have a 
negative impact on British society. 
4. Moravians' attitudes to human rights 
are not posIng a threat to British 
society. 
5. Moravians' attitudes to work are 



































V. After reading about the Moravians, what is your opinion about this group? Please 
choose from the following list the characteristics that best reflect your impression of 
the Moravians. Please tick 12. 
Compassion D Fear D 
Creative D Intelligent D 
Hypocrite D Selfish D 
Rage D Admiration D 
Simple D Dirty D 
Wild D Free D 
Contempt D Regret D 
Greedy D Prejudiced D 
Efficient D Logical D 
Pleasure D Pride D 
Dependent D Friendly D 
Affectionate D Ruthless D 
Guilt D Joy D 
Loyal D Obedient D 
Brutal D Instinctual D 
Aversion D Satisfaction D 
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VI: ~elow is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
OpInIOn. 
1 2 3 




N or disagree 
1. I would not like a Moravian family 
to move into my neighbourhood. 
2. I would like to have Moravians 
among my colleagues at work. 
3. I would never agree to date a 
Moravian. 
4. I would not like to make friends 
among Moravians. 



































VII. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly Disagree Rather 
Disagree Disagree 
N either agree 
Nor disagree 
1. The Moravians are very much alike 
in how they think and act. 
2. There is not a strong sense of unity 
and commonality among the 
Moravians. 
3. The Moravians' culture determines 
very much the way the Moravians are. 
4. In spite of any outward differences 
between the Moravians, In essence 
they are all the same. 
5. You cannot predict how a Moravian 
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VIII. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. 
1 2 3 4 




1. I think Moravians should maintain 
their heritage culture while also 
adopting the British culture. 
2. When a job is available, only the 
individual merits of the candidate 
should be considered, whether the 
candidate is British or Moravian. 
3. I think Moravians should give up 
their culture of origin for the sake of 
adopting the British culture. 
4. When a job is available, employers 
should always refuse to hire Moravian 
candidates. 
5. I think Moravians can maintain their 
culture of origin as long as they do not 
mix it with the British culture. 
6. When a job is available, employers 
should be as likely to hire a Moravian 
as a British candidate, and this 
regardless of the cultural habits of the 
Moravians. 
7. I think Moravians should not 
maintain their culture of origin, nor 
adopt the British culture. 
8. When a job is available, employers 
should hire Moravian candidates only 
if the latter conform to the work habits 
of the British. 
9. I think that whether the Moravians 
maintain their cultural heritage or 
adopt the British culture makes no 
difference because each person is free 
to adopt the culture of their choice. 
10. Certain job domains should be 
reserved only for British candidates 
while other job domains should be 
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IX. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the people from 
your national group? Please tick 12. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 
Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Guilt 0 Joy 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual 0 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction 0 









1. To what extent do you feel English? 
2. To what extent do you feel you have 
strong ties with the English? 
3. To what extent do you feel pleased 
to be English? 
4. How similar do you think you are to 
the average English person? 
5. How important is it to you to be 
English? 
6. How much are your views about 
Englishness shared by other English 
people? 
7. When you hear a non-English 
person criticising English people, to 










































Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire 
XI: ~elow are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
OpInIOn. 
1 2 3 4 




1. Some groups of people are just more 
worthy than others. 
2. In getting what your group wants, it 
is sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups. 
3. Superior groups should dominate 
inferior groups. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups of people stayed in 
their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
6. It is probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their 
place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be 
kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if all groups could 
be equal. 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 
11. All groups should be given an 
equal chance in life. 
12. We should do what we can to 
equalize conditions for different 
groups. 
13. We should fight for increased 
social equality. 
14. We would have fewer problems if 
we treated different groups more 
equally. 
15. We should strive to make incomes 
more equal. 
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XI~ .. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
opInIOn. 
1 2 3 4 




1. The British should recognize that 
British society consists of groups with 
different cultural backgrounds. 
2. Ethnic minorities should be helped 
to preserve their cultural heritage in 
Britain. 
3. It is best for Britain if all people 
forget their different cultural 
backgrounds as soon as possible. 
4. A society that has a variety of 
cultural groups is more able to tackle 
new problems as they occur. 
5. The unity of this country IS 
weakened by British people of 
different cultural backgrounds sticking 
to their old ways. 
6. If British people of different cultural 
origins want to keep their own culture, 
they should keep it to themselves. 
7. A society that has a variety of 
cultural groups has more problems 
with national unity than societies with 
one or two basic cultural groups. 
8. British native should do more to 
learn about the customs and heritage of 
different cultural groups In this 
country. 
9. Immigrants parents must encourage 
their children to retain the culture and 
traditions of their homeland. 
10. People who come to live in Britain 
should change their behaviour to be 
more like the British. 



































































Institute Department of Psychology UniS 
Instit~tu~ European de Cer~etare in Psihologia SociaHi de la Universitatea Surrey, 
Angha, Intrepnnde un stUdlU despre diversitatea etnica ~i cultural a in Romania. Am 
nevoie de ajutorul dv., ~i v-a~ ruga sa completati urmatorul chestionar. Raspunsurile 
dv. sunt anonime ~i vor ramane confidentiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciata. 
Pentru a va face raspunsurile valide, va rog sa completati toate sectiunile 
chestionarului. 






F (lncercuiti dupa caz) 
, ----------------------
V-ATI NA.SCUT IN ROMANIA? , DA NU 
ETNIA 
RELIGIA 
FACULTATEA _________ ANUL DE STUDIU 
Acum a~ vrea sa va atrag atentia asupra minoritatii etnice ceangaie~ti din Romania. 
Ceangaii sunt 0 minoritate putin cunoscuta care traie~te de mult in Romania. Ceangaii 
sunt foarte religio~i ~i, spre deosebire de romani, au obiceiul sa-~i arate credinta in 
public. Familiile ceangaie~ti au in medie cate cinci copii. De obicei femeile 
ceangoaice nu au servici pentru ca ceangaii cred ca rolul femeii e de a avea grija de 
casa. Ceangaii pun multa valoare pe relatiile de familie. Ceangaii nu au incredere in 
institutiile publice ~i nu apeleaza la ele pentru a-~i rezolva problemele de justitie. Ca 
~i romanii, ceangaii variaza in caracter ~i inclinatii. Statisticile arata ca ceangaii 
ca~tiga in medie 15.500.000 de lei pe luna, in comparatie cu venitul national mediu 
lunar de 7.500.000 lei, ceea ce sugereaza ca ceangaii nu sunt 0 povara pentru sistemul 
de ajutoare sociale. 
I. Pe urmatoarea scara de la 1 la 7 va rog sa indicati: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deloc Nu Foarte 
~tiu mult 
l. Cat de asemanatori romanilor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
credeti ca sunt ceangaii? 
2. Credeti ca ~ .. efect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ceangall au un 
negativ asupra economiei nationale? 
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II. Va rog sa cititi dec1aratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Modul de a gandi al ceangailor nu 
este compatibil cu eel al romanilor. 
2. Moravurile ceangailor sunt 
asemanatoare cu cele ale romanilor. 
3. Aspiratiile ceangailor coincid cu 
cele ale romanilor. 
4. Modul de viata al ceangailor este 
foarte diferit de eel al romanilor. 
5. Valorile sustinute de ceangai nu sunt 



































III. Va rog sa cititi dec1aratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Ceangaii ingreuneaza sistemul de 
transport dej a precar din Romania. 
2. Ceangaii nu submineaza economia 
Romaniei. 
3. Ceangaii reduc ~ansele romanilor de 
a obtine locuinte sociale. , , 
4. Prezenta ceangailor pe piata 
locurilor de munca reduce ~ansele de 
angajare ale romanilor. 
5. Cand ceangaii prospera, economla 
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IV. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 

















1. Credintele culturale ale ceangailor 
reprezinta un pericol pentru societatea 
romaneasca. 
2. Valorile morale ale ceangailor nu 
dauneaza modului de viata al 
romanilor. 
3. Normele de familie ale ceangailor au 
un impact negativ asupra societatii 
romane~ti. 
4. Atitudinile ceangailor fata de 
drepturile omului nu constituie 0 
amenintare pentru societatea 
romaneasca. 
5. Atitudinile ceangailor fata de munca 






V. Dupa ce ali cititi despre ceangai, care este parerea dv. despre acest grup? Va rog sa 
alegeti de pe lista urmatoare trasaturile care reflecta eel mai bine impresia dv. Despre 
ceangai. Va rog sa bifati 12. 
Compasiune D Frica D 
Creativi D Inteligenli D 
Ipocriti D Egoi~ti D 
Furie D Admiratie D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Dispret D Regret D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudecati D 
Eficienti D Logici D 
Placere D Mandrie D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D Neinduratori D 
Vinovatie D Bucurie D , 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instinctivi D 
Aversiune D Satisfactie D , 
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VI. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 







1. M-ar deranja daca 0 familie 




2. Mi-ar placea sa am colegi ceangai la 
servlclU. 
3. N-a~ fi niciodata de acord sa am 0 
relatie cu un ceangau / 0 ceangoaica. 
4. Nu mi-ar placea sa am prieteni 
~. 
ceangal. 
5. Nu m-ar deranja daca medicul meu 


































VII. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde 









1. Ceangaii se aseamana foarte mult 
unul cu altulin felulin care gandesc ~i 
se comporta. 
2. Nu exista un sentiment putemic de 
unitate ~i de fratie intre ceangai. 
3. Cultura ceangailor determina in 
mare parte felul de a fi al acestora. 
4. In ciuda diferentelor exterioare 
dintre ceangai, in esenta toti sunt la fei. 
5. Nu se poate prezice gandirea sau 
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VIII. Va rog sa cititi dec1aratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde 









I.Cred ca ceangaii ar trebui sa-~i 
pastreze cultura de onglne dar in 
acela~i timp sa adopte ~l cultura 
romaneasca. 
2. Cand un loc de munca lese la 
concurs, numai meritele individuale ale 
candidatului trebuie luate in 
considerare, fie ca e roman sau 
ceangau. 
3. Cred ca ceangaii ar trebui sa-~i 
abandoneze cultura de origine pentru a 
adopta cultura romaneasca. 
4. Cand un loc de munca lese la 
concurs, patronii ar trebui intotdeauna 
sa refuze sa angajeze ceangai. 
5. Cred ca ceangai au dreptul sa-~i 
pastreze cultura de origine atata timp 
cat nu 0 amesteca cu cea romaneasca. 
6. Cand un loc de munca lese la 
concurs, ceangaii ar trebui sa aiba 
acelea~i ~anse de angajare ca romanii, 
indiferent de obiceiurile culturale ale 
ceangailor. 
7. Cred ca ceangaii ar trebui sa nu-~i 
pastreze cultura de origine, nici sa n-o 
adopte pe cea romaneasca. 
8. Cand un loc de munca lese la 
concurs, ceangaii ar trebui sa fie 
angajati numai daca se conformeaza 
felului de a munci romanesc. 
9. Cred ca nu e nici 0 diferenta daca 
ceangaii i~i pastreaza cultura de origine 
sau 0 adopta pe cea romaneasca pentru 
ca fiecare om e liber sa-~i aleaga ce 
cultura dore~te. 
10. Unele slujbe ar trebui alocate 
numai candidatilor romani, in timp ce 
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IX. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare considerali dv. ca Ii descriu eel mai bine pe 
romani? Va rog sa bifali 12. 
Compasiune D Frica D 
Creativi D Inteligenli D 
Ipocrili D Egoi~ti D 
Furie D Admiralie D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Disprel D Regret D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudecali D 
Eficienli D Logici D 
Placere D Mandrie D 
Dependenli D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D N einduratori D 
Vinovatie D Bucurie D , 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instinctivi D 
Aversiune D Satisfaclie D 
X. Va rog sa citili declaraliile de mai jos ~i sa incercuili cifra care corespunde opiniei 
dv. pentru fiecare declaralie. 
1 
Deloc 
2 3 4 
Nu 
~tiu 
1. In ce masura va simlili roman? 
5 
2. in ce masura simlili ca aveli legaturi 
putemice cu romanii? 
3. in ce masura va simtiti bucuros / , , 
bucuroasa ca sunteti roman / romanca? , 
4. Cat de asemanator / asemanatoare 
credeli ca sunteli romanului obi~nuit? 
5. Cat de important este pentru dv. sa 
fiti roman? , 
6. in ce masura sunt opiniile dv. despre 
ce inseamna sa fii roman imparta~ite 
de a1li romani? 
7. Cand auziti un strain criticandu-i pe 
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XI. Va rog sa cititi dec1aratiile de mai jos ~i sa Incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur ~i 
simplu mai merituoase decat altele. 
2. Ca grupul tau sa 0 btina ceea ce vrea, 
e uneori necesar sa foloseasca forta , 
Impotriva altor grupuri. 
3. Grupurile superioare ar trebui sa Ie 
domine pe cele inferioare. 
4. Pentru a 0 lua Inainte in viata, e 
uneori necesar sa ca1ci In picioare alte 
grupun. 
5. Daca anumite grupuri ar sta la locul 
lor, am avea mai putine probleme. 
6. E probabil un lucru bun ca unele 
grupuri sunt la varf, iar altele la baza. 
7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie sa stea 
la locullor. 
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie tinute la 
locullor. 
9. Ar fi bine daca toate grupurile ar fi 
egale. 
10. Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui 
sa fie idealul nostru. 
11. Toate grupurile trebuie sa aiba 
~anse egale In viata. 
12. Ar trebui sa facem tot ce putem 
pentru a egaliza conditiile pentru 
grupuri diferite. 
13. Ar trebui sa tindem catre egalitate 
sociala. 
14. Am avea mai puline probleme daca 
am trata grupurile diferite In mod egal. 
15. Ar trebui sa ne straduim sa facem 
veniturile cat mai egale. 
16. Societatea nu ar trebui sa fie 
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XII. Va rog sa cititi dec1arafiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuifi cifra care corespunde 









1. Romfmii ar trebui sa recunoasca ca 
societatea romaneasca e constituita din 
grupuri culturale diferite. 
2. Minoritafile etnice din Romania ar 
trebui ajutate sa-~i pastreze cultura de 
ongme. 
3. Ar fi eel mai bine pentru Romania 
daca toti strainii ~l-ar uita cat mal 
repede cultura de origine. 
4. 0 societate care are 0 diversitate de 
grupuri culturale e mult mai capabila 
sa-~i rezolve problemele cand apar. 
5. Unitatea acestei tari este slabita de 
cetatenii romani de diferite culturi , 
care-~i pastreaza vechile obiceiuri. 
6. Daca cetatenii romani de culturi , 
diferite vor sa-~i pastreze cultura de 
origine, sa ~i -0 pastreze pentru ei in~i~i. 
7. Societatile care au 0 diversitate de , 
grupun culturale au mal multe 
probleme cu unitatea nationala decat 
societatile care au unul sau doua , 
grupuri culturale principale. 
8. Romanii ba~tina~i ar trebui sa faca 
mal multe eforturi sa invete despre 
obiceiurile ~l traditiile diferitelor 
grupuri culturale din aceasta fara. 
9. Imigranfii care au copii ar trebui sa-i 
indemne pe ace~tia sa pastreze cultura 
~i tradifiile tarii lor de origine. 
10. Strainii care Vln sa traiasca in 
Romania ar trebui sa-~i schimbe 




















Va mulfumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare ~i pentru timpul acordat. 
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APPENDIX V 
Chapter 7: Dehumanization of real and artificial groups: Prejudice or 
rationalization of their status? 
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Department of Psychology, University of Surrey 
This study explores the way in which information is deduced. Your help is needed 
and I would be grateful if you could fill in the following questionnaire. 
Britain is an increasingly 'multicultural' society. Some studies show that the presence 
of some minority groups strengthens the British economy, while the presence of 
others weakens the British economy. We are interested in how well people can guess 
the results of these studies. On the following scale please guess which of the 
following groups were found to weaken or strengthen the British economy, and to 
what extent. 
2 3 4 
Strongly Weakens Rather Neither weakens 
Weakens Weakens Nor strengthens 
Americans 1 2 3 
Indians 1 2 3 
Poles 1 2 3 
Iraqis 1 2 3 
Chinese 1 2 3 
Gypsies 1 2 3 
French 1 2 3 
Jews 1 2 3 
South Africans 1 2 3 
Romanians 1 2 3 
Pakistanis 1 2 3 
Germans 1 2 3 
Turks 1 2 3 
West Indians 1 2 3 
Russians 1 2 3 
Nigerians 1 2 3 
Irish 1 2 3 
Saudis 1 2 3 
Australians 1 2 3 
Somalis 1 2 3 
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Appendix V a Experiment 3, Threat pilot, British questionnaire 
Britain is an increasingly 'multicultural' society. Some studies show that the presence 
of some minority groups has a positive effect on the British \vay of life, while the 
presence of others has a negative effect. We are interested in whether people can 
guess the results of these studies. On the following scale please guess which of the 
following groups were found to have a negative or a positive impact on the British 
way of life, and to what extent. 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Americans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Indians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Poles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Iraqis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chinese 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gypsies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
French 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Jews 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
South Africans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Romanians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pakistanis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Germans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Turks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
West Indians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Russians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nigerians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Saudis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Australians 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Somalis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bangladeshis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Finally, please fill in the following infonnation about yourself: 
GENDER M F AGE Years 
NA TIONALITY 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH 0 SCOTTISH 0 WELSH 0 
OTHER D Please specify 
RELIGION 
STUDENT YES 0 NOD OCCUPATION 
DEPARTMENT YEAR OF STUDY 
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Chestionar 
Romania e 0 societate din ce in ce mai multiculturaHi. Unele studii arata ca anumite 
grupuri minoritare ajuta la cre~terea economiei romane~ti, In timp ce alte grupuri 0 fac 
sa slabeasca. Ne intereseaza cat de bine se pot deduce rezultatele acestor studii. 
Avand ca model scara de mai jos, va rog sa deduceti care din urmatoarele grupuri s-au 
dovedit a avea un efect negativ sau pozitiv asupra economiei Romaniei, ~i cat de mare 
este acesta. 
Slabesc economia 1 2 34567 Ajuta la cre~terea economiei 
Italieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Libanezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unguri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Indieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moldoveni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irakieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chinezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Greci 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rromi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Francezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evrei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pakistanezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sarbi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Turci 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ucrainieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Armeni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sirieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Somalezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Germani 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Machedoni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Kurzi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Acele~i studii arata ca anumite grupuri minoritare au un efect pozitiv asupra modului 
de via!a al romanilor, 1n timp ce altele au un efect pozitiv. Ne intereseaza cat de bine 
se pot deduce rezultatele acestor studii. A vand ca model scara de mai jos, va rog sa 
deduceti care din urmatoarele grupuri s-au dovedit a avea un impact negativ sau 
pozitiv asupra modului de via!a al romanilor, ~i cat de mare este acesta. 
Efect negativ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Efect pozitiv 
Italieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Libanezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unguri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Indieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moldoveni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irakieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chinezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Greci 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rromi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Francezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evrei 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pakistanezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sarbi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Turci 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ucrainieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Armeni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sirieni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Somalezi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Germani 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Machedoni 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Kurzi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
La final v-a~ ruga sa men!iona!i: 
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Department of Psychology, University of Surrey 
This study is investigating the experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is 
needed and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Your response will be anonymous and your cooperation will 
be greatly appreciated. To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL sections of 
the questionnaire. 
Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians 
are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been 
born here. The Moravians, like the British, do not usually display their religious 
beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians 
have two children per family. They consider it normal for women to enter education 
and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value individual freedom. They rely on 
public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British 
population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. National Statistics show that 
the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a., compared to the national 
average household income of £23,200 p.a., thus suggesting that the Moravians are not 
putting a strain on the social welfare system. 
I. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not I don't Very 
At all know Much 
l. How similar do you think the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Moravians are to your national group? 
2. How much of a negative impact do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
you think the Moravians have on the 
national economy? 
II. Now please read the statements below and circle the number that corresponds to 
your opinion for each statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree Rather N either agree Rather Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Nor disagree Agree Agree 
1. The Moravians get more from this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
country than they contribute. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2. The presence of Moravians spoils 
the traditional British countryside. 
4 5 6 7 3. Moravians' cultural beliefs are a 1 2 3 
threat to British society. 
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4. Moravians are not squeezing British 
people out of council housing. 
5. Moravians' moral norms are not 
threatening the British way of life. 
6. The presence of Moravians on the 
job market reduces employment 
opportunities for British people. 
7. Moravian family values have a 
negative impact on British society. 
8. When the Moravians make 
economIC gaIns, the overall British 
economy benefits. 
9. Moravians' attitudes to human rights 
are not posIng a threat to British 
society. 
10. Moravians are a drain on the 
system of unemployment benefits. 
11. Moravians are taking advantage of 
Britain's economy. 
12. Moravians' way of life is not 











3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 










III. When thinking about the Moravians, which of the following traits do you think 
best reflect their character? Please choose at least 7. 
Creative D Intelligent D 
Hypocrite D Selfish D 
Simple D Dirty D 
Wild D Free D 
Greedy D Prejudiced D 
Efficient D Logical D 
Dependent D Friendly D 
Affectionate D Ruthless D 
Loyal D Obedient D 
Brutal D Instinctual D 
IV. When thinking about the Moravians' feelings, which of the following emotions do 
you think are most typical of their feelings? Please choose at least 5. 
Compassion D Fear D 
Rage D Admiration D 
Contempt D Regret D 
Pleasure D Pride D 
Guilt D Joy D 
Aversion D Satisfaction D 
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V .. ~elow is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
oplmon. 
1 2 3 
Strongly Disagree Rather 
Disagree Disagree 
4 
N either agree 
Nor disagree 
1. I would not like a Moravian family 
to move into my neighbourhood. 
2. I would not mind if a Moravian 
joined my close family by marriage. 
3. I would like to have Moravian 
among my colleagues at work. 
4. I would not like to make friends 
among the Moravians. 
5. I would not mind if my GP were a 
Moravian. 








































VI. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do you 
think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7. 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 
Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 
Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual 0 
VII. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do 
you think are most typical of its feelings? Please choose at least 5. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Guilt 0 Joy 0 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction 0 
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Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself: 
GENDER 
NATIONALITY 
M F AGE 
WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN? YES 0 NO 0 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH 0 SCOTTISH 0 WELSH 0 




YES 0 NO 0 
Thank you for your help! 
OCCUPATION 
YEAR OF STUDY 
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Chestionar 
Acest studiu cerceteaza experienta diversitatii culturale in Romania. Am nevoie de 
ajutorul dv., ~i v-a~ ruga sa completati urmatorul chestionar. Raspunsurile dv. sunt 
anonime ~i vor ramane confidentiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciata. Pentru a 
va face raspunsurile valide, va rog sa completati toate sectiunile chestionarului. 
Acum a~ vrea sa va atrag atentia asupra minoritatii etnice abhaze din Romania. 
Abhazii sunt 0 minoritate etnica in Georgia, dar datorita situatiei politice instabile din 
Georgia, ~i datorita faptului ca Romania se afia pe ruta balcanica a migratiei, multi 
abhazi au emigrat in Romania in ultimii zece ani. De~i initial abhazii intentionau sa 
emigreze mai departe spre Europa de Vest, din diverse motive multi dintre ei au 
ramas ~i s-au stabilit in Romania. Astazi, abhazii traiesc printre romani ~i un studiu 
etnografic a observat modul in care ace~tia s-au integrat in societatea romaneasca. 
Abhazii, ca romanii, nu-~i arata credinta religioasa in public pentru ca 0 considera un 
lucru personal. Familiile abhaze au in medie cate doi copii. Abhazilor Ii se pare 
normal ca femeile sa urmeze 0 educatie ~i sa aiba un servici. Ei apreciaza libertatea 
individuala. Abhazii apeleaza la institutiile publice pentru a rezolva chestiuni de 
justitie. Ca ~i romanii, abhazii variaza in caracter ~i inclinatii. Statisticile arata ca 
abhazii ca~tiga in medie 15.500.000 de lei pe luna, in comparatie cu venitul national 
mediu lunar de 7.500.000 lei, ceea ce sugereaza ca abhazii nu sunt 0 povara pentru 
sistemul de ajutoare sociale. 
I. Pe urmatoarea scara de la 1 la 7 va rog sa indicati: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deloc Nu Foarte 
~tiu mult 
1. Cat de asemanatori romanilor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
credeti ca sunt abhazii? 
2. Credeti , ca abhazii au un efect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
negativ asupra economiei nationale? 
II. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 









1. Abhazii profita de aceasta tara mai 
mult decat contribuie. 
2. Prezenta abhazilor strica aspectul 
traditional al mediului rural romanesc. 
3 Credintele culturale ale abhazilor . , 














2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. Abhazii nu reduc ~ansele romanilor 
de a obtine locuinte sociale. 
5. Valorile morale ale abhazilor nu 
dauneaza modului de viata al 
romanilor. 
6. Prezenta abhazilor reduce ~ansele de 
angajare ale romanilor. 
7. Normele de familie ale abhazilor au 
un impact negativ asupra societatii 
romane~ti. 
8. Cand abhazii prospera, economIa 
romaneasca are de ca~tigat. 
9. Atitudinile abhazilor fata de 
drepturile omului nu constituie 0 
amenintare pentru societatea 
romaneasca. 
10. Abhazii sunt 0 povara pentru 
sistemul de ajutoare de ~omaj. 
11. Abhazii profita de economla 
Romaniei. 
12. Modul de viata al abhazilor nu 











III. Cand va ganditi la abhazi, care din urmatoarele trasaturi credeti ca retlecta eel mai 
bine caracterullor? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 7. 
Creativi D Inteligenti D 
Ipocriti D Egoi~ti D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudecati D 
Eficienti , D Logici D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D Neinduratori 0 
Loiali D Supu~i 0 
Brutali D Instinctivi 0 
IV. Cand va ganditi la sentimentele abhazilor, care dintre emotiile urmatoare credeti 
ca ace~tia sunt mai dispu~i sa simta? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 5. 
Compasiune D Frica ~ 
Furie D Admiratie I: c_" 
Dispret D Regret 
Placere D Mandrie 
Vinovatie D Bucurie 
Aversiune 0 Satisfactie 
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V. Va rog sa cititi dec1aratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 







1. M-ar deranja daca 0 familie 




2. Nu m-ar deranja daca un abhaz / 0 
abhaza s-ar alatura familiei mele prin 
casatorie. 
3. Mi-ar placea sa am colegi abhazi la 
servlclU. 
4. Nu mi-ar plaeea sa am prieteni 
abhazi. 
5. Nu m-ar deranja daca medieul meu 
de familie ar fi abhaz. 
6. N-a~ fi niciodata de acord sa am 0 







































VI. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare credeti ea refleeta eel mal bine earaeterul 
romanilor? Va rog sa alegeti cel putin 7. 
Creativi D Inteligenti D 
Ipocriti D Egoi~ti D 
Simpli D Murdari D 
Salbatici D Liberi D 
Lacomi D Cu prejudeeati D 
Efieienti D ' Logiei D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D 
Afectuo~i D N einduratori D 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instineti vi D 
VII. Care din emotiile urmatoare credeti ca sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor 
romanilor? 
Compasiune D Friea D 
Furie D Admiratie D , 
Dispret D Regret D 
Placere D Mandrie D 
Vinovatie D Bucurie D 
Aversiune 0 Satisfactie D 
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La final, cateva informatii despre dv.: 
Sexul M F Varsta 
------
Nationalitatea , 
V -ati nascut in Romania? 
Etnia Romana D 
Da D Nu D 
Rroma D Maghiara D 




DaD NuD Ocupatia 
Anul de studiu 
Va multumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare ~i pentru timpul acordat. 
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Department of Psychology, University of Surrey 
This study is investigating the experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is 
needed and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Your response will be anonymous and your cooperation will 
be greatly appreciated. To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL sections of 
the questionnaire. 
I. Britain is a multi ethnic and multicultural society. Of the many ethnic minorities 
living in Britain, I would like to focus your attention on the Roma (Gypsy) minority. 
Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion 
for each statement. 
4 123 




1. The Gypsies get more from this 
country than they contribute. 
2. The presence of Gypsies spoils the 
traditional British countryside. 
3. The Gypsies' cultural beliefs are a 
threat to British society. 
4. The Gypsies are not squeezmg 
British people out of council housing. 
5. The Gypsies' moral norms are not 
threatening the British way of life. 
6. The presence of Gypsies on the job 
market reduces employment 
opportunities for British people. 
7. The Gypsy family values have a 
negative impact on British society. 
8. When the Gypsies make economic 
gaIns, the overall British economy 
benefits. 
9. The Gypsies' attitudes to human 
rights are not posing a threat to British 
society. 
10. The Gypsies are a drain on the 
system of unemployment benefits. 
11. The Gypsies are taking advantage 
of Britain's economy. 
12. The Gypsies' way of life is not 
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II. When thinking about the Gypsies, which of the following traits do you think best 
reflect their character? Please choose at least 7. 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 
Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 
Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual 0 
III. When thinking about the Gypsies' feelings, which of the following emotions do 
you they are most likely to feel? Please choose at least 5. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Guilt 0 Joy 0 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction 0 
IV. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your 
opInIOn. 
4 123 




1. I would not like a Gypsy family to 
move into my neighbourhood. 
2. I would not mind if a Gypsy joined 
my close family by marriage. 
3. I would like to have Gypsies among 
my colleagues at work. 
4. I would not like to make friends 
among the Gypsies. 
5. I would not mind if my GP were a 
Gypsy. 
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VI. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do YOU 
think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7. . 
Creative 0 Intelligent 0 Hypocrite 0 Selfish 0 Simple 0 Dirty 0 
Wild 0 Free 0 
Greedy 0 Prejudiced 0 
Efficient 0 Logical 0 
Dependent 0 Friendly 0 
Affectionate 0 Ruthless 0 
Loyal 0 Obedient 0 
Brutal 0 Instinctual 0 
VII. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do 
you think are most typical of its feelings? Please choose at least 5. 
Compassion 0 Fear 0 
Rage 0 Admiration 0 
Contempt 0 Regret 0 
Pleasure 0 Pride 0 
Guilt 0 Joy D 
Aversion 0 Satisfaction D 
Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself: 
GENDER M F AGE 
NA TIONALITY 
WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN? YES 0 NO 0 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH 0 SCOTTISH 0 WELSH 0 




YES 0 NO 0 
Thank you for your help! 
OCCUPATION 
YEAR OF STUDY 
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Chestionar 
Acest studiu cerceteaza experienta diversitatii culturale in Romania. Am nevoie de 
ajutorul dv., ~i v-a~ ruga sa completati urmatorul chestionar. Raspunsurile dv. sunt 
anonime ~i vor ramane confidentiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciata. Pentru a 
va face raspunsurile valide, va rog sa completati toate sectiunile chestionarului. 
I. Romania este 0 societate multietnica ~i multiculturala. Dintre multele minoriHiti 
etnice care traiesc in Romania, a~ vrea sa va atrag atentia asupra minoritatii germane. 
Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. 









1. Germanii profita de aceasta tara mai 
mult decat contribuie. 
2. Prezenta germanilor strica aspectul 
traditional al mediului rural romanesc. 
3. Credintele culturale ale germanilor 
reprezinta 0 amenintare pentru 
societatea romaneasca. 
4. Germanii nu reduc ~ansele 
romanilor de a obtine locuinte sociale. , , 
5. Valorile morale ale germanilor nu 
dauneaza modului de viata al 
romanilor. 
6. Prezenta germanilor reduce ~ansele 
de angajare ale romanilor. 
7. N ormele de familie ale germanilor 
au un impact negativ asupra societatii 
romane~ti. 
8. Cand germanii prospera, economia 
romaneasca are de ca~tigat. 
9. Atitudinile germanilor fata de 
drepturile omului nu constituie 0 
amenintare pentru societatea 
romaneasca. 
10. Germanii sunt 0 povara pentru 
sistemul de ajutoare de ~omaj. 
11. Germanii profita de economla 
Romaniei. 
12. Modul de viata al germanilor nu 
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II. Cand va ganditi la germani, care din urmatoarele trasaturi eredeli ea reflecta eel 
mai bine earaeterullor? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 7. 
Creativi 0 Inteligenti 0 
Ipoeriti 0 Egoi~ti 0 Simpli 0 Murdari 0 
Salbatici 0 Liberi 0 
Laeomi 0 Cu prejudeeati 0 
Eficienti 0 Logiei 0 
Dependenti 0 Prieteno~i 0 
Afeetuo~i 0 N elnduratori 0 
Loiali 0 Supu~i 0 
Brutali 0 Instineti vi 0 
III. Cand va ganditi la sentimentele germanilor, care dintre emoliile urmatoare eredeli 
ea aee~tia sunt mai dispu~i sa simta? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 5. 
Compasiune 0 Frica 0 
Furie 0 Admiratie 0 
Dispret 0 Regret 0 
Plaeere 0 Mandrie 0 
Vinovatie 0 Bueurie 0 
Aversiune 0 Satisfaetie 0 
IV. Va rog sa eititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa Ineereuiti eifra care eorespunde opiniei 









1. M-ar deranja daea 0 familie de 
germani s-ar muta pe strada mea. 
2. Nu m-ar deranja dadi un german / 0 
germana s-ar alatura familiei mele prin 
disatorie. 
3. Mi-ar plaeea sa am eolegi germani 
la servieiu. 
4. Nu mi-ar plaeea sa am prieteni 
germanl. 
5. Nu m-ar deranja daea medicul meu 
de familie ar fi german. 
6. N -a~ fi niciodata de aeord sa am 0 
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VI. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare eredeli ea refleeta eel mai bine earaeterul 
romanilor? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 7. 
Creativi D Inteligenti D Ipoeriti D Egoi~ti D Simpli D Murdari D Salbatici D Liberi D 
Laeomi D Cu prej udeeati D 
Eficienti D Logiei D 
Dependenti D Prieteno~i D Afeetuo~i D N einduratori D 
Loiali D Supu~i D 
Brutali D Instineti vi D 
VII. Care din emotiile urmatoare eredeti ea sunt eele mai earaeteristiee sentimentelor 
romanilor? Va rog sa alegeti eel pulin 5. 
Compasiune D Frica D 
Furie D Admiratie D 
Dispret D Regret D 
Plaeere D Mandrie D 
Vinovatie D Bueurie D 
Aversiune D Satisfaetie D 
La final, eateva informatii despre dv.: 
Sexul M F Varsta 
-----
N ationali tatea 
V -ati naseut in Romania? , DaD NuD 
Etnia Romana D Rroma D Maghiara D 




DaD NuD Oeupatia 
Anul de studiu 
Va multumese foarte mult pentru eooperare ~i pentru timpul aeordat. , 
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Chapter 8: Perceived low group status: An explanation for dehumanization 
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Department of Psychology, University of Surrey 
Your help is needed in conducting a study looking at perceptions of fairness. I would 
like you to read the following paragraph and to complete the following questionnaire. 
A recent report from the EU organization European Diversity in Education has 
highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) pupils in schools. It has found that 
exclusion is particularly bad in Britain. The European Roma Rights Office has used 
this report to persuade the European Commission to propose a new directive to 
combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU and the EU accession countries. If 
adopted by each EU member state and EU accession country, this will require the 
local education authorities to reserve special school places to Roma pupils, to offer 
Romani language schooling to Roma pupils, to offer free access for Roma pupils to 
compulsory and post-compulsory education, including higher education, and to 
introduce topics addressing Roma culture and history. However, if the directive is 
adopted, it will require additional funding from public money, and will also reduce 
the number of school places available to non-Roma children. Some British politicians 
have expressed concern that it will also put an additional burden on some under-
staffed state schools. 
I am interested in your reaction to the proposal of this new directive, as well as in 
your perceptions of this policy, of your national group, and of the Germans. I would 
like you to respond to the questions below. There are no right or wrong answers, and 
your responses will be anonymous. To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL 
the sections of the questionnaire. 
I. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
How likely do you think it is that this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
directive will be adopted by the British 
government? 
3 4 5 6 7 How likely do you think it is that the 1 2 
changes proposed by the directive will 
be implemented? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 How positive do you think the effects 1 
of this directive would be? 
II. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
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How legitimate do you think it is for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 the Roma to suggest this law? 
How acceptable do you think this law 1 
is? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
To what extent do you agree that the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
British government should implement 
this law? 
How entitled do you think the Roma 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
are to suggest these changes? 
How fair do you think this new law is? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Do you think the Roma have the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
authority to suggest this policy? 
To what extent do you agree that the 1 2 3 
Roma are good and fair people? 
4 5 6 7 
III. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do you 
think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7. 
Creative D Efficient D Intelligent D Logical D 
Hypocrite D Dependent D Selfish D Friendly D 
Simple D Affectionate D Dirty D Ruthless D 
Wild D Loyal D Free D Obedient D 
Greedy D Brutal D Prejudiced D Instinctual D 
IV. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do 










Fear D Pride D 
Admiration D Joy D 
Regret D Satisfaction D 
V. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your 
opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers. 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very much 
1. To what extent do you feel British? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. To what extent do you feel you have 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strong ties with the British? 
3. To what extent do you feel pleased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
to be British? 
4. How similar do you think you are to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
the average British person? 
.., 5 6 7 5. How important is it to you to be 1 2 -' 
British? 
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6. How much are your views about 
Britishness shared by other British 
people? 
7. When you hear a non-British person 
criticising British people, to what 








4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
VI. When thinking about the Gypsies, which of the following traits do you think best 
reflect their character? Please choose at least 7. 
Creative 0 Efficient 0 Intelligent 0 Logical 0 
Hypocrite 0 Dependent 0 Selfish 0 Friendly 0 
Simple 0 Affectionate 0 Dirty 0 Ruthless 0 
Wild 0 Loyal 0 Free 0 Obedient 0 
Greedy 0 Brutal 0 Prejudiced 0 Instinctual 0 
VII. When thinking about the Gypsies' feelings, which of the following emotions do 
















VIII. Below are a series of statements. Please use the scale below as a guide to your 
answers and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement. 
2 3 4 




1. Some groups of people are just more 
worthy than others. 
2. In getting what your group wants, it 
is sometimes necessary to use force 
against other groups. 
3. Superior groups should dominate 
inferior groups. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups of people stayed in 
their place, we would have fewer 
problems. 
6. It is probably a good thing that 
certain groups are at the top and other 
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7. Inferior groups should stay in their 
place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be 
kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if all groups could 
be equal. 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 
11. All groups should be given an 
equal chance in life. 
12. We should do what we can to 
equalize conditions for different 
groups. 
13 . We should fight for increased 
social equality. 
14. We would have fewer problems if 
we treated different groups more 
equally. 
15. We should strive to make incomes 
more equal. 








































































IX. Some groups in Europe are considered more advanced than others. Please rank the 
following groups from 1 to 9, where 1 is the highest and 9 the lowest: Russians, 
French, Romanians, British, Gypsies, Spanish, Hungarians, Germans and Moldovans 
in terms of: 
a) being technologically advanced: 
1. __________ 4. __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. _______ _ 
3. 6. 9. _______ _ 
b) making positive contributions to European culture: 
1. __________ 4., __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. ______ _ 
c) being economically developed: 
1. 4. __________ 7. _____ _ 
2.---------- 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. _____ _ 
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d) being a model to other groups: 
1.. _________ 4. 7 2 ---------------- .---------------
. 5. 8. 
3. 6. 9.-------
e) making contributions to scientific development: 
1. ______________ 4. ____________ 7. ______________ _ 
2. 5. 8. _______ _ 
3. 6. 9. 
--------------
f) having modem and liberal values: 
1. _____________ 4. ________________ 7. ______________ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______________ _ 
3. 6. 9. 
---------------
g) being able to influence other groups or countries: 
1. _________________ 4 .. _________________ 7. _____________ _ 
2. 5. 8. 
----------
3. 6. 9. 
----------
Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself: 
GENDER M F AGE 
NATIONALITY 
WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN? YES D NOD 
ETHNICITY ENGLISH D SCOTTISH D WELSH D 
OTHER D Please specify 
RELIGION 
STUDENT YES D NOD OCCUPATION 
DEPARTMENT YEAR OF STUDY 
Thank you for your help! 
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Chestionar psihologic 
Am nevoie de ajutorul dv. pentru realizarea unui studiu despre perceptia egaliHitii 
Intre grupuri. V -a~ fi recunoscatoare daca ati fi de acord sa participati. Va rog sa cititi 
paragraful de mai jos ~i sa completati urmatorul chestionar. 
Un raport recent al organizatiei de monitorizare Diversitate Europeana In Educatie a 
scos In evidenta exc1uderea sociala a elevilor rromi. Cu scopul de a promova modelul 
german de multiculturalitate, parlamentul german a folosit acest raport pentru a 
recomanda Comisiei Europene sa propuna 0 noua directiva de combatere a 
discriminarii rromilor. Daca va fi adoptata de fiecare stat UE ~i de fiecare tara 
candidata la UE, aceasta directiva nu va fi obligatorie, ci va lasa autoritatilor 
educationale locale optiunea sa rezerve locuri la ~coala pentru elevii rromi, sa Ie of ere 
educatie In limba rromanes, sa Ie of ere acces gratuit la educatia obligatorie ~i non-
obligatorie, inclusiv facultate, ~i sa introduca ore de pre dare a istoriei ~i culturii 
rromanes. Directiva a fost formulata In a~a fel Incat, daca va fi adoptata, nu va fi 
nevoie de fonduri suplimentare din banii contribuabililor, nici vor fi reduse locurile la 
~coala pentru alti copii. E putin probabil ca directiva sa fie 0 greutate In plus pentru 
~colile de stat. 
Ma intereseaza reactia dv. fata de propunerea noii directive, ~i felulln care Ii percepeti 
pe germani ~i pe romani. Va rog sa raspundeti la Intrebarile urmatoare. Nu exista 
raspunsuri corecte sau gre~ite, iar raspunsurile dv. sunt anonime. Pentru a va face 
raspunsurile valide, va rog sa completati toate sectiunile chestionarului. 
I. Va rog sa cititi Intrebarile de mai jos ~i sa Incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 
dv. pentru fiecare Intrebare. Va rog sa folositi scara de mai jos ca ghid pentru 
raspunsuri. 
Deloc 1 2 3 4 
l. Cat de probabila credeti ca este 
adoptarea aceastei directive de catre 
guvemul roman? 
2. Cat de probabila credeti ca este 
implementarea masurilor propuse de 
directiva? 
3. Cat de pozitive credeti ca ar fi 
efectele acestei directive? 
5 6 7 Foarte mult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II.Va rog sa cititi Intrebarile de mai jos ~i sa I~c~rcuiti cifra ca~e .corespun~e opiniei 
dv. pentru fiecare Intrebare. Va rog sa foloSlt l scara de mal JOS ca ghld pentru 
raspunsuri. 
Deloc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Foarte mult 
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1. Cat de legitim credeti ca este ca 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
germanii sa initieze aceasta directiva? 
2. Cat de acceptabila credeti ca este 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
aceasta directiva? 
" 3. In ce masura sunteti de acord cu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
adoptarea directivei de catre guvemul 
roman? 
4. Credeti ca germanii au dreptul sa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
sugereze aceste masuri? 
5. Cat de rezonabila credeti ca este , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
aceasta directi va? 
6. Credeti ca germanii au autoritatea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
necesara pentru a sugera aceasta 
directiva? 
" 7. In ce masura sunteti de acord ca 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
germanii sunt oameni buni ~i corecti? 
III. Cand va ganditi la germani, care din urmatoarele trasaturi credeti ca reflecta eel 
mai bine caracterul lor? Va rog sa alegeti eel putin 7. 
Creativi 0 Eficienti 0 Inteligenti 0 Logici D 
Ipocriti 0 Dependenti 0 Egoi~ti 0 Prieteno~i 0 
Simpli 0 Afectuo~i 0 Murdari 0 Neinduratori D 
Salbatici 0 Loiali 0 Liberi 0 Supu~i 0 
Lacomi 0 Brutali 0 Cu prejudecati 0 Instinctivi 0 
IV. Cand va ganditi la germani, care din emotiile urmatoare credeti ca sunt cele mai 






















V. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa incercuiti cifra care corespunde opiniei 
dv. pentru fiecare declaratie. Va rog sa folositi scara de mai jos ca ghid pentru 
raspunsuri. 
Deloc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Foarte mult 
I. In ce masura va simtiti roman? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , 
2. In ce masura simtiti ca aveti legaturi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
putemice cu romanii? 
3. In ce masura va simtiti bucuros / 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
bucuroasa ca sunteti roman / romanca? 
6 7 4. Cat de asemanator / asemanatoare 1 2 3 4 5 
credeti ca sunteti romanului obi~nuit? 
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5. Cat de important este pentru dv. sa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
fili roman? 
" 6. In ce masura sunt opiniile dv. despre 
ce lnseamna sa fii roman lmparta~ite 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
de alli romani? 
7. Cand auziti un strain criticandu-i pe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
romani, In ce masura va simtili criticat 
dv. ln~iva? 
VI. Care dintre trasaturile urmatoare credeti ca reflecta eel mal bine caracterul 
romanilor? Va rog sa alegeli eel putin 7. 
Creativi D Eficienli D Inteligenti D Logici D 
Ipocriti D Dependenli D Egoi~ti D Prieteno~i D 
Simpli D Afectuo~i D Murdari D Ne1nduratori D 
Salbatici D Loiali D Liberi D Supu~i D 
Lacomi D Brutali D Cu prej udecati D Instinctivi D 
VII. Care din emotiile urmatoare credeti ca sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor 






















VIII. Va rog sa cititi declaratiile de mai jos ~i sa lncercuiti cifra care corespunde 









l.Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur ~i 
simplu mai merituoase decat altele. 
2. Ca grupul tau sa obtina ceea ce vrea, 
e uneori necesar sa foloseasca forta 
lmpotriva alt~r grupuri. 
3.Grupurile superioare ar trebui sa Ie 
domine pe cele inferioare. 
4. Pentru a 0 lua lnainte In viala, e 
uneori necesar sa calci In picioare alte 
grupun. 
5. Daca anumite grupuri ar sta la locul 
lor, am avea mai putine probleme. 
6. E probabil un lucru bun ca unele 
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7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie sa stea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 la locullor. 
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie tinute la 1 2 3 
locullor. 
4 5 6 7 
9. Ar fi bine daca toate grupurile ar fi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
egale. 
10.Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui sa 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
fie idealul nostru. 
11. Toate grupurile trebuie sa aiba 1 
~anse egale in viata. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Ar trebui sa facem tot ce putem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
pentru a egaliza conditiile , pentru 
grupuri diferite. 
13. Ar trebui sa tindem catre egalitate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
sociala. 
14. Am avea mai putine probleme daca 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
am trata grupurile diferite in mod ega!. 
15. Ar trebui sa ne straduim sa facem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
veniturile cat mai egale. 
16. Societatea nu ar trebui sa fie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
dominata de un singur grup. 
IX. Unele grupuri din Europa sunt considerate mai avansate dedit altele. Va rog sa 
plasati grupurile urmatoare in ordine de la 1 la 9, unde 1 reprezinta cel mai sus ~i 9 cel 
mai jos: moldovenii, francezii, ungurii, romanii, englezii, rromii, germanii, spaniolii ~i 
ru~ii in functie de: 
a) cat de avansati sunt tehnologic: 
1. __________ 4., __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. _______ _ 
3. 6. 9. ______ _ 
b) cat de mult contribuie in mod pozitiv la cultura europeana: 
1. __________ 4., __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. _____________ _ 
c) cat sunt de dezvoltati economic: 
1. __________ 4. __________ 7. ______ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. _________ _ 
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d) cat de mult of era un model de urmat altor grupuri: 
1.. __________ 4. __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. ______ _ 
e) cat de mult contribuie la dezvoltarea ~tiintifica: 
1. __________ 4. __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. _______ _ 
3. 6. 9. ______ _ 
f) cat de modeme ~i liberale sunt valorile lor: 
1. __________ 4 .. __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. _______ _ 
3. 6. 9 .. _______ _ 
g) cat de mult pot influenta alte grupuri sau alte tari: 
1. __________ 4. __________ 7. _______ _ 
2. 5. 8. ______ _ 
3. 6. 9. _______ _ 
La final, cateva informatii despre dv.: 
Sexul M F Varsta ____ _ 
N ationalitatea 
V -ati nascut in Romania? 
Etnia Romana D 
Da D Nu D 
Rroma D Maghiara D 





DaD NuD Ocupatia 
Anul de studiu 
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